The distinction often made between “ethics of virtue” and “ethics of duty” may have led to the suggestion that the Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions of morality were fundamentally different from each other. This distinction could justify refusing to consider the motives of virtuous action as “moral” motivations in the strict sense. Yet, is it not the same thing to act in a virtuous manner as to act “by seeing”? Rosalind Hursthouse can thus note, as early as the end of the (...) last century, that there is “growing enthusiasm” for the idea that “the ideal Kantian agent” and “the ideal neo-Aristotelian agent” are “not so different from what they were supposed to be”. We would like to examine this thesis by going back to its sources in some temporal interpretations of the Kantian conception of action accomplished “by duty”. (shrink)

This book compares the range of different contemporary neo-Aristotelian moral theories. It shows that the most successful are those that remain faithful to the program proposed by Elizabeth Anscombe.