This article presents an empirical examination of the consequences of the virtual entailment principle proposed by Jean Buridan to resolve the Liar paradox. This principle states that every sentence in natural language implicitly asserts its own truth. Adopting this principle means that the Liar sentence is not paradoxical but false, because its content is contradictory to what is virtually implied. As a result, humans should perceive the Liar sentence the same way as any other false sentence. This solution to the (...) Liar paradox received criticism for making ad hoc claims about the natural language. However, thanks to modern advancements in psychophysiology, it became possible to empirically investigate if the human brain really perceives the Liar sentence like a false sentence. We designed and conducted an experiment to examine brain activity in response to true sentences, false sentences and self-referential sentences. Our results provide support for the Buridan’s hypothesis and show that the Liar sentence is processed by the human brain identically to false sentences, while the Truthteller sentence is perceived identically to true sentences. This agrees with predictions derived from the virtual entailment principle and supports the idea that humans think with the logic of truth—a logic for which the truth is a designated value of its adequate semantics. (shrink)

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which (...) to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on pro- cedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal (...) calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones. (shrink)

The paper presents the possibility of using the lifestyle concept for better recognition of the employee motivation attitude towards work leadership and managerial behaviours. That could result in better human capital management in different types of organizations. Different approaches to the lifestyle concept are presented in the paper. Also the linkage between the motivation theory, here the Douglas McGregor theory, and the lifestyle based theory VALS is examined.

Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxiology (theory of efcient action), and the so called “planning theory of intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two proposals helps to remove aws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also shows the way, in which we can enrich the (...) idea of plans in the frame-work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can improve our understanding of planning when confronted with infuentialcontemporary accounts. (shrink)

The structure of this paper is as follows. My starting point is psychological flexibility (henceforth, PF) as it has been presented in psychology. Here I offer a synthetic view which embraces the most crucial aspects of flexibility, and describes its functional roles and underlying mechanisms. Secondly, I move my attention onto the field of current action theory and discuss two elementary concepts we commonly use when describing our actions: intention and desire. Of course, there are many “theories of desire” and (...) there is no point in trying (nor even the option) to discuss all of them under one heading. To show where the question of PF sneaks into the scene of action theory, I explore the idea of the resistance of desire, as proposed by Timo Airaksinen. The second concept to investigate at this stage is intention. As in the previous case, it is plain that there are plenty of accounts of intentions and there are many roles they play in the phenomenology of action. For the purposes of this paper, we need only something that can be interpreted as an approach to PF. Such an approach can be found in the idea of stability of intention or a plan, discussed famously by Michael Bratman. According to my interpretation, these two ideas, resistance of desire and stability of intention, allow to initially understand some important aspects of PF in action theory. To get a slightly more comprehensive view – and to supplement the outcomes gained on the grounds of the analyses of these two accounts – I introduce, in the third step, the concept of plasticity which comes from the so-called praxiology proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (Lvov-Warsaw School). I try to show how this concept is still feasible and how it may enrich current philosophical accounts of agential flexibility. The strategy behind this stage of the paper is to enrich the Bratmanian approach to psychological stability. The last part of the paper contains some remarks on the philosophical outcome of the interdisciplinary approach to PF. (shrink)

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $$\alpha $$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be $${{\,\mathrm{I\Delta _{0}+\exp }\,}}$$ ) such that for some formula $$\Theta $$ and any arithmetical sentence $$\varphi $$, $$\Theta (\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner )\equiv \varphi $$ is provable in $$\alpha $$. We say that a sentence $$\beta $$ is definable (...) in a sentence $$\alpha $$, if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of $$\beta $$ to the language of $$\alpha $$ which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of $$\beta $$ is provable in $$\alpha $$. Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not $$\Sigma _2$$ -definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no $$\Sigma _2$$ -sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic. (shrink)

This article argues that if contemporary philosophical counseling wishes to perpetuate the spirit of ancient philosophy, it must also incorporate metaphysics. This kind of incorporation means, among other things, regarding as essential the implementation of the meditation practices of certain historical schools of philosophy. Meditation was an inherent feature not only of Eastern schools of thought, but also within Western philosophy. These practices lead to a psychophysical state, known as ataraxia, which causes the perception of reality to undergo a radical (...) change, including occasional “altered states of consciousness,” as they are known by psychology. The author calls such practices “live metaphysics.” He also maintains that, without the inclusion of such metaphysical practices, philosophical counselling and coaching lose their eudemonic character and become a means of hedonistic gratification in the service of the liberated ego of the contemporary man. (shrink)

Biomedical sciences cannot answer the question who should be saved from death if not everyone can be. This is an ethical issue. However, we face exactly this question when deliberating on the criteria for organ allocation. The main aim of this article is to formulate a pluralistic theory of just distribution of organs, which incorporates the tenets of utilitarianism, egalitarianism and sufficientarianism. Each constituent theory adopts a different value as a criterion for organ allocation. For utilitarianism it is a health (...) benefit for the patient, for egalitarianism it is the ratio of deserts and health-related well being, for sufficientarianism what is important is that the candidate for a transplant be situated below the sufficientarian threshold. The article presents a proposal to reconcile these three competing theories. (shrink)

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since (...) it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything. (shrink)

This article introduces a model of levels of analysis applied to statements found in philosophical, scientific, and religious discourses in order to facilitate a more accurate description of the relation between science and religion. The empirical levels prove to be the most crucial for the relation between science and religion, because they include statements that are important parts of both scientific and religious discourse, whereas statements from metaphysical levels are only important in terms of religion and are neutral in relation (...) to particular scientific theories. In particular, the rejection of certain ontological assumptions behind special divine action logically entails the rejection of the literal meaning of empirical statements describing special open expression of supernatural factors in nature. Such a rejection also entails an essential revision of many religious systems of beliefs, including traditional Christian theism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:According to the mainstream bioethical stance, death constitutes the termination of an organism. This essay argues that such an understanding of death is inappropriate in the usual context of determining death, since it also has a social bearing. There are two reasons to justify this argument. First, the mainstream bioethical definition generates an organismal superposition challenge, according to which a given patient in a single physiological state might be both alive and dead, like Schrödinger's cat. Therefore, there is no clear (...) answer as to whether organ retrieval from a brain-dead patient is an act of killing or not. Second, when combined with the dead donor rule, the mainstream position in the definition of death might lead to ethically unacceptable verdicts, since there is a discrepancy between terminating an organism and depriving someone of moral status. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Edith Stein’s approach to lived experience emerges only in light of intentionality as reasonableness. The “personal touch” or authentic affectivity means in this context one’s own “living body” in regard to a threefold dimension of the human experiencing: the personal, the humanistic, and the spiritual, and seems to echo those of Immanuel Kant’s, i.e., the soul, the world and God. Consequently, not whatever kind of own’s commitment is at stake. Moreover, no less important is the role of (...) community and its various types. For sure, Stein’s genuine account is found in dialogue with the phenomenologists of her time. It paves the way toward a community of life and life itself. Therefore, it seems to be possible to some extend to accord Stein’s account with contemporary discussions of the meaning of life and “a fundamental transformation of human existence.”. (shrink)

This volume explores two traditions in practical philosophy: action theory, which concerns the nature of motivation for human action, and praxiology, the study of human action. By bringing different perspectives together, the volume strives to contribute to the international debate on theories of reasons for action as a philosophy of action. The volume consists of three main parts. The first part, “Reasons for Action," bridges the gap between reasons for action theories and praxiology. The second part of the volume, titled (...) “Theories of Action," explores philosophical approaches to action. Finally, in the third part, “Applications," the contributors show several ways of applying praxiological ways of thinking and acting to the problems of reflection assessment, solving action incompleteness, and knowledge management. The ultimate goal of this volume is to broaden the scientific view of action: to establish a perspective on action that is permeated by moral theories on the one hand, and accounts focused on efficiency and economy of action on the other hand. (shrink)

This paper analyzes selected issues related to the philosophy of the Krakow physicist Andrzej Fuliński. Since the 1970s, Fuliński has been strongly associated with the interdisciplinary milieu gathered around Heller and Życiński. His activity can therefore be considered within the context of the broader phenomenon known as the Krakow School of Philosophy in Science, which was founded by Heller and Życiński. This paper proposes the thesis that Fuliński’s style of philosophy is connected with the concept of philosophy in science and (...) tries to justify the thesis that Fuliński, due to his cooperation with the interdisciplinary milieu in Krakow and the specificity of his philosophical works, deserves to be regarded as a representative of the Krakow School of Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

Zasadnicza teza tekstu brzmi, że możliwość totalnego chaosu empirycznego, która jest rozpatrywana w ramach eksperymentu unicestwienia świata, nie jest możliwością realną, lecz możliwością logiczną. Według Husserla hipoteza totalnego chaosu empirycznego pozostaje w związku z zasadniczą nieadekwatnością doświadczenia świata, która nie wyklucza możliwości nieistnienia świata. Unicestwienie świata jako efekt całkowitego załamania się doświadczenia świata mogę jednak przyjąć tylko hipotetycznie i taka fikcyjna możliwość nie ma charakteru możliwości realnej, ponieważ absolutny fakt mojego doświadczenia poprzedza wszelkie możliwości, nadając im dopiero znaczenie możliwości realnych. (...) Doświadczenie w swej pierwotnej strukturze obejmuje zarówno doświadczenie świata, jak i doświadczenie ego cogito i jest jednym, absolutnym doświadczeniem, tak że możliwość globalnego chaosu empirycznego okazuje się jedynie pustym eksperymentem myślowym i jako taka możliwość ta pozostaje w zasadniczej analogii do możliwości niepoznawalnych rzeczy samych w sobie. Słowa kluczowe: fenomenologia transcendentalna, eksperyment unicestwienia świata, doświadczenie świata, doświadczenie ego cogito, realna możliwość, logiczna możliwość. (shrink)

This paper develops a proof theory for logical forms of proofs in the case of monadic languages. Among the consequences are different kinds of generalization of proofs in various schematic proof systems. The results use suitable relations between logical properties of partial proof data and algebraic properties of corresponding sets of linear diophantine equations.

In the article I refer to the philosophy of William Hasker and his proposal to reconcile respect for the basic dogmas of Christianity with the contemporary standards of knowledge and the needs of people today. In the first part I analyse Hasker’s view on the idea of Christian philosophy. Since he assumes the truthfulness of the main doctrines of Christianity, he is not opposed to being referred to as a Christian philosopher, but neither is he enthusiastic about this name. This (...) attitude is the result of his conviction that the state of absolute neutrality is not possible in philosophy and that regardless of the views accepted as true by a given thinker the requirement for good philosophy is fairness and evaluating all perspectives and beliefs for their internal coherence and their correspondence with the evidence. Therefore, Hasker first tries very carefully to reconstruct positions different from his own and to track down various difficulties in them, especially contradictions. In my opinion, however, the objection of self-contradiction is ineffective when applied to philosophical positions which, as a rule, use vague concepts. The same applies to the claim that these positions are contradictory to evidence, because one of such vague notions is also the notion of evidence. That is why philosophical claims have the extraordinary ability to persist in life or unexpectedly revive after being considered definitively dead. It does not follow from this that one cannot convincingly justify one’s position using less formal criteria. In the second part I focus on the rhetorical device used by Hasker to make his concept of God more attractive. He suggests that we should shape our concept of God based on our idea of a great man, i.e. one who educates children to live independently and is able to effectively and fairly manage large groups of people. Leaving aside the accusation of anthropomorphism, the question arises about the epistemic value of this image, which is not universal, changes over time and depends on the conditions in which people live. The content of this image proposed by Hasker isn’t also consistent with the idea of the God of Christian orthodoxy, which is dominated by traditional rather than open theism. This is where the problem of linking creative thinking and respect for Christian identity arises. Regardless of the opinion that open theism has among traditional theists, Hasker supports the concept of a strong Christian identity determined by a universally recognized creed. I propose to treat this identity a little more flexibly. (shrink)

Artykuł prezentuje filozofie Kanta i Husserla w odniesieniu do Hartmannowskiego rozumienia irracjonalności. W metafizyce poznania Hartmanna irracjonalność, która odpowiada częściowej niepoznawalności bytu, okazuje się argumentem przeciwko idealizmowi, który zakłada całkowitą racjonalność naszego poznania ijego przedmiotu. W artykule autor pokazuje, że można wskazać podobieństwa między Kanta ideą niepoznawalności przedmiotu transcendentalnego, Husserla koncepcją transcendentalnej konstytucji świata i Hartmanna pojęciem gnoseologicznej irracjonalności. W transcendentalizmie Kanta irracjonalność implikuje asymetria między warunkami możliwości doświadczenia i warunkami możliwości przedmiotów doświadczenia, jako że niepoznawalność przedmiotu transcendentalnego i rzeczy (...) samej w sobie wskazuje, że nie wszystkie warunki przedmiotów są jednocześnie warunkami możliwości doświadczenia. Według Husserla świadomość transcendentalna nie jest racją wystarczającą świata w aspekcie jego Da- sein i Sosein, ponieważ fakt konstytucji świata jest faktem irracjonalnym i nie może być wyprowadzony z istoty świadomości. Autor próbuje wykazać, że analogia między Husserlem i Hartmannem w kwestii irracjonalności otwiera nowe możliwości interpretacyjne relacji między fenomenologią transcendentalną i Hartmannowską filozofią. (shrink)

Od metafizycznej neutralności do metafizyki problemów. Status metafizyki w filozofii Husserla Streszczenie Artykuł prezentuje przejście filozofii Husserla od psychologii fenomenologicznej do fenomenologii transcendentalnej jako zwrot metafizyczny. Husserlowska fenomenologia przedtranscendentalna jako deskryptywna analiza fenomenów mentalnych wyklucza wszelkie metafizyczne pytania dotyczące istnienia świata zewnętrznego, podczas gdy fenomenologia transcendentalna nie jest metafizycznie neutralna, ponieważ ma za zadanie odsłonięcie ostatecznego sensu świata w jego faktycznym istnieniu. Z jednej strony, zgodnie z pierwszeństwem ejdetycznych możliwości przed rzeczywistością, fenomenologia transcendentalna jako nauka ejdetyczna poprzedza metafizykę jako naukę (...) o rzeczywistości i umożliwia ją. Z tego punktu widzenia fenomenologia transcendentalna może być rozumiana w znaczeniu ostatecznego ugruntowania metafizyki jako uniwersalnej i absolutnej nauki o faktach, która jest zwieńczeniem naturalnych nauk o bycie. Z drugiej strony, zasada pierwszeństwa istoty przed faktem nie znajduje zastosowania do transcendentalnego faktu konstytucji świata i ten irracjonalny fakt prowadzi do metafizyki jako filozofii dotyczącej „najwyższych i ostatecznych zagadnień”, takich jak teleologiczne, teologiczne i etyczne zagadnienia. Zagadnienia te okazują się irracjonalną resztą (metafizycznym residuum) fenomenologii transcendentalnej i jej zwieńczeniem. Słowa kluczowe: ejdetyczne możliwości, fakt absolutny, fenomenologia transcendentalna, metafizyka krytyczna, metafizyka problemów, nauka o faktach. (shrink)

W artykule poddano badaniu pojęcie przesądu w teoriach Kanta i Husserla. Według Kanta, przesądy należy odróżnić od sądów tymczasowych, które można nazwać antycypacjami lub maksymami wszelkiego badania. Wydajemy sąd tymczasowy o jakiejś rzeczy, zanim poznamy ją za pomocą sądu określającego. Z kolei przesądy są sądami tymczasowymi błędnie uznanymi za sądy określające, to znaczy sądami, które przyjmujemy jako zasady bez badania warunków ich prawdziwości. Kanta pojęcie przesądu ma zatem konotacje negatywne a celem filozofii krytycznej jest przezwyciężeniewszelkich przesądów. W przeciwieństwie do Kanta, (...) Husserl rozróżnia przesądy pozytywne i negatywne: pozytywny przesąd jest rozumiany jako przed-sąd w formie presumpcyjnej przedwiedzy i odpowiada Kantowskiemu pojęciu antycypacji, która jest właściwa sądowi tymczasowemu, podczas gdy obiektywistyczna naiwność okazuje się przesądem negatywnym.Celem fenomenologii jest zawieszenie wszystkich przesądów i to zawieszenie umożliwia badanie ich źródeł. W artykule autor wykazuje, że Husserlowska koncepcja przesądu jako przed-sądu jest analogiczna do Gadamerowskiej rehabilitacji przesądów jako przed-rozumienia. Dlatego też można wskazać podobieństwa między Kanta pojęciem sądu tymczasowego, Husserla ideą przedwiedzy i G adamera koncepcją przed-rozumienia. (shrink)

This monograph represents a rare, classical-philosophical approach to culture. It is grounded in philosophical realism and emphasizes personalism as a true achievement of philosophical anthropology. Employing the apparatus of the history of philosophy, science and religion, the author demonstrates the immense scope of the drama unfolding within human culture. In a classical approach, evaluation is inevitable-with regard to various theories of culture, human culture as such, and all its main actors. Jaroszyński's work shows that realistic study of what it means (...) to be a human person leads to the most comprehensive understanding of culture as it is and should be. (shrink)

The affective knowledge of God is this kind of knowledge that follows human affection. This knowledge comes about on two levels: on the natural human inclination to God and on the religious level of man’s orientation towards God. What is the nature of the affective knowledge of God? What does the passage of ex affectu circa divina in intellectum consist in? It seems that there are three matters: – firstly, since there is a natural inclination towards God in man (desiderium (...) naturale vivendi Deum), man will be “restless” as long as he does not recognise or find God, – secondly, who loves God gains a new and more profound knowledge of Divine matters through con-naturalness and inclination, – thirdly, as a result of meeting with God and unification with Him, man experiences certain subjective states that cannot be expressed in words. (shrink)