What does it mean today to talk about intersectionality or, better, about intersectional approaches within the vast and fragmented field of Feminist Studies? And how can intersectionality help understanding the development of transnational feminism, and viceversa? By offering a brief critical genealogy of the notion of intersectionality, from the systemic to the anti-categorial positions that have characterized the debate on this notion, the essay tries to present a reading of the main questions that stemmed from thinking the working of the (...) many power differentials and identity markers that constitute regional, national and transnational subjectivities. In adopting an anti-categorial stance, this work attempts at showing how feminism has changed thanks to different, yet complementary, perspectives on intersectional subject formations and positioning, along with the relational and transnational struggles that have been imagined in order to refine a feminist gaze at every level of social, cultural and political life, be it theoretical, methodological or epistemological. (shrink)

Riassunto: Lo strutturalismo piagetiano, segnatamente quello in matematica, fisica e biologia alla luce dell’epistemologia genetica, rappresenta una declinazione peculiare e feconda dell’eterogeneo movimento strutturalista. Dopo una fortunata stagione, le strutture matematiche, rintracciate e indagate sotto diverse prospettive, hanno finito per costituire un “paradigma” didattico e di ricerca utilizzato su più livelli; in modo non dissimile, perché collegata alla matematica, la fisica ha considerato i propri “oggetti” dotati di una struttura: ma se originariamente era una struttura intesa in senso materiale, (...) adesso si studiano strutture con un più alto grado di astrazione. La biologia, poi, è divenuta argomento à la page, ma pure terreno di scontro epistemologico tra meccanicismo ortodosso e istanze vitalistiche, tra sostanze eterne e trasformazioni continue, ovvero tra strutture fisse e strutturazione dinamica. Le conclusioni rivalutano l’attualità e le prospettive dello strutturalismo piagetiano proiettandolo al di là dello strutturalismo classico, fino a farne, forse, una insolita quanto feconda tendenza post-strutturalista. Parole chiave: Strutturalismo; Epistemologia genetica; Jean Piaget; Costruttivismo; Storia dell’epistemologia Scientific Structuralism. Mathematics, Physics, and Biology in Piagetian Perspective: Piagetian structuralism, notably a genetic epistemological perspective on mathematics, physics and biology, represents a unique and fruitful articulation of the heterogeneous structuralist movement. After their initial success, mathematical structures, traced and investigated from different points of view, end up constituting didactic and research “paradigms” that can be used on several levels; in a similar way, physics – closely related to mathematics – initially considered its own “objects” to be endowed with structure: yet, while such structure was initially understood in a material sense, nowadays it is studied with a higher degree of abstraction. Biology has become an à la page subject, but also presents an epistemological battle between orthodox mechanism and vitalism, between eternal substances and continuous transformations, that is, between fixed structures and dynamic structuring. These conclusions lead us to re-evaluate the up-to-dateness and perspectives of Piagetian structuralism, to project it beyond classical structuralism and, maybe, to turn it into an unusual and promising post-structuralist trend. Keywords: Structuralism; Genetic Epistemology; Jean Piaget; Constructivism; History of Epistemology. (shrink)

Quest’articolo prova ad offrire una ricostruzione storica e un’analisi teorica di due concetti che hanno pervaso il dibattito politico contemporaneo: post-verità e complottismo. Nel farlo, il principale obiettivo di chi scrive è quello di smentire la presunta filiazione tra post-strutturalismo e post-truismo. Questo tentativo si fonda sull’ipotesi che il passaggio da una società del segreto ad una società della trasparenza abbia prodotto di fatto una invisibilizzazione del reale attraverso la sua sovra-esposizione documediale.

Il tema del soggetto e dell’identità è uno dei più importanti della filosofia moderna e la destrutturazione di esso il tratto tipico di molta filosofia europea di fine ’800 e inizio ’900. Si pensi alla scuola del sospetto, come la definì Paul Ricœur, ovvero a Nietzsche, la psicanalisi ed al marxismo, ma anche, più recentemente, al post-strutturalismo. Successivamente l’argomento, dalla fine del postmoderno in poi, è stato trattato sempre meno in ambito continentale. È invece diventato sempre...

Il volume analizza il tema della soggettività umana così come esso è stato affrontato nel pensiero francese del Novecento, a partire dal clima filosofico dello spiritualismo fino agli esiti teoretici della stagione post-strutturalista. Il presente lavoro vuole offrire l’occasione per approfondire e problematizzare le questioni del soggetto umano e dell’identità personale tramite lo specifico contributo che a queste tematiche hanno dato grandi autori del clima filosofico francese, un clima particolarmente ricco di prospettive speculative e soprattutto aperto al confronto critico (...) con le scienze umane, tra queste la psicoanalisi in particolare. La prima parte del volume (Lineamenti generali) delinea i principali tratti delle diverse filosofie che hanno caratterizzato il Novecento francese: in essa vengono presi in considerazione lo spiritualismo, il personalismo, l’esistenzialismo, lo strutturalismo, l’ermeneutica e la stagione di pensiero comunemente definita post-moderna. Si tratta di un excursusche descrive in maniera sintetica le metodologie tramite le quali i temi della soggettività e della persona sono stati affrontati nei diversi contesti filosofici. Nella seconda parte del libro (Percorsi di approfondimento) presentiamo undici saggi nei quali le tematiche della soggettività e dell’identità personale vengono trattate in riferimento ad uno specifico autore e contesto storiografico. Nei saggi sono presi in esame il concetto di riconoscimento intersoggettivo (Anerkennung) elaborato da Alexandre Kojève a partire dai suoi studi hegeliani, la figura emblematica dell’homme révolté in Albert Camus, la nozione di persona in Emmanuel Mounier e in Jacques Maritain, l’ontologia dell’homo capax in Paul Ricoeur, la decostruzione del sé in Jacques Derrida, il significato dell’alterità in Emmanuel Lévinas, l’ermeneutica del sé in Michel Foucault e l’analisi ontologica della soggettività compiuta da Alain Badiou. Gli ultimi due saggi del libro si caratterizzano per un approfondimento del tema della soggettività in ambito psicoanalitico: essi vertono sulle questioni sollevate da una “clinica del soggetto” e si rivolgono in particolare al pensiero di Jacques Lacan e di René Kaës. (shrink)

John F. Post argues that physicalistic materialism is compatible with a number of views often deemed incompatible with it, such as the objectivity of values, the irreducibility of subjective experience, the power of the metaphor, the normativity of meaning, and even theism.

In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post’s objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post’s objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational ancestry. (...) In reply, we construct in their own terms both a counterexample to the would-be transitivity of E, and a related objection to their never-in-its-own-ancestry argument. We also rebut their rejection of certain counterexamples to the would-be transitivity of some forms of inferential justification. By doing so, and by questioning their transitivity claim for E, we aim to further the project of undermining the circularity arguments advanced by a zoo of skeptics, relativists, antirealists and internalists against realism and externalism. (shrink)

This book draws from previously unpublished letters and interviews with physicists, theologians, and Sir John’s close associates and family to present Sir John’s ideas on pure unlimited love. Post, who was in dialogue with Sir John for fifteen years on this topic and who had founded the Institute for Research on Unlimited Love, addresses how John Templeton arrived at his philosophy as a youth growing up in Tennessee. Post also shares how classical Presbyterian ideas came to synergize in (...) his mind with the more eastern influences of American transcendentalism and the Unity School of Christianity and ponders if Sir John truly believed that science and spiritualty might fully converge on the same view of Ultimate Reality with their very different ways of knowing. _Is Ultimate Reality Unlimited Love?_ presents Sir John’s hope for spiritual progress with the eventual convergence of ultimate reality and unlimited love at its very center. (shrink)

New-wave psychoneural reduction, a la Bickle and Churchland, conflicts with the way certain adaptation properties are individuated according to evolutionary biology. Such properties cannot be reduced to physical properties of the token items that have the adaptation properties. The New Wave may entail a form of individualism inconsistent with evolutionary biology. All of this causes serious trouble as well for Jaegwon Kim's thesis of the Causal Individuation of Kinds, his Weak Supervenience thesis, Alexander's Dictum, his synchronicity thesis that all psychological (...) kinds supervene on the contemporaneous physical states of the organism, Correlation Thesis, and indeed his Restricted Correlation Thesis. All these theses are strongly individualist, in the sense of entailing that ALL a thing's properties are determined by its own physical properties and relations, contrary to many properties in biology and psychology. (shrink)

Ecologists traditionally regard time as part of the background against which ecological interactions play out. In this book, Eric Post argues that time should be treated as a resource used by organisms for growth, maintenance, and offspring production. Post uses insights from phenology -- the study of the timing of life-cycle events -- to present a theoretical framework of time in ecology that casts long-standing observations in the field in an entirely new light. Combining conceptual models with field (...) data, he demonstrates how phenological advances, delays, and stasis, documented in an array of taxa, can all be viewed as adaptive components of an organism's strategic use of time. Post shows how the allocation of time by individual organisms to critical life history stages is not only a response to environmental cues but also an important driver of interactions at the population, species, and community levels. To demonstrate the applications of this exciting new conceptual framework, Time in Ecology uses meta-analyses of previous studies as well as Post's original data on the phenological dynamics of plants, caribou, and muskoxen in Greenland.--Back cover. (shrink)

Anti-racist debate today remains polarised between ‘class reductionist’ (any attempt to address racial disparities reinforces capitalist class relations) and ‘liberal identity’ (disparities in racial representation can be resolved without questioning class inequality) politics. Both positions share a common perspective – racial oppression and class exploitation are the products of distinctive social dynamics whose relationship is historically contingent. This essay is an initial step toward characterising a structurally necessary relationship between capitalism and racial oppression. The essay draws upon Anwar Shaikh and (...) Howard Botwinick’s elaboration of Marx’s political economy, and Ellen Wood’s analysis of the specificity of capitalist imperialism. (shrink)

Argues for an objective protomoral normativity in terms of what an adaptation is for, without falling victim to Hume's Law, open-question arguments, queerness arguments, and internalism/externalism debates. Also provides a general strategy for naturalizing objective moral normativity which is likewise proof against the usual-suspect objections.

The author examines various strains in the wider historical tradition of Christian ethical thought that have obscured the moral excellence of mutual love. This examination presupposes that the communion between God, self, and other(s) is the highest ideal of Christian love. Moreover, several conclusions are offered that relate this examination to the writings of Gene Outka and other contemporary ethicists concerned with the meaning of love.

American public law scholarship views law as a purposive instrument for the achievement of democratic purposes. It has analyzed how this instrument can best be employed within the historical context of the legal institutions and traditions of particular nation-states. Emerging forms of international law, articulated by international tribunals, challenge these fundamental premises of American public law scholarship. Much international law does not reflect the will of an indentifiable demos, and it is articulated through innovative legal institutions that combine the procedures (...) and organizational forms of many distinct states and legal cultures. Attempting to omprehend the sources and limitations of the legitimacy of this kind of international law will force American public law scholarship to re-examine deep and implicit presuppositions, inherited from legal realism, about the inherent normativity of the rule of law. The author speculates about possible effects of this re-examination on the substantive and methodological agenda of American public law scholarship. (shrink)

Collingwood's theory of presuppositions has never been taken very seriously. But critics have completely overlooked its significance as a theory or model of inquiry intimately tied to certain aspects of discourse in a context of investigation. Viewed this way, Collingwood's theory is on very strong ground, especially when it is reconstructed with the aid of a formal language. The reconstruction shows what is essential to the theory and what is not, allowing us to disregard those of Collingwood's extravagant claims which (...) have frustrated an understanding of his theory's real strength. The reconstruction also provides a general framework within which recent discussion of presuppositions can be unified. (shrink)

. In whatever form, terminal philosophy holds that some matters are so fundamental that they are presupposed in any practice of reason-giving; accordingly, if reason-giving were applied to such matters in order to justify them, or even to criticize, then the very attempt to do so would necessarily assume what is at issue, a fatal circularity . No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality ; rational reason-giving must terminate.

The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect that when it comes (...) to correspondence and universals or samenesses found not made, realists have no noncircular argumentative recourse, hence must gaze on reality bare, looking to see that the categories of our language or thought conform to something in reality. Furthermore, realists can justify their view via nontransitive forms of inferential justífication, without recourse either to look-see or to morally problematic notions of sameness and difference made rather than lovingly found. (shrink)

To ask the question "Why does anything at all exist?" is equivalent to asking "What is the explanation of why anything at all exists." Thus the question presupposes that there is an explanation, known or unknown or unknowable, of why anything at all exists.