In Prophecy without Contempt, Cathleen Kaveny argues that prevailing scholarly approaches to religious and public discourse misunderstand the actual complexity of moral rhetoric in America. She endeavors to provide a better account through study of the role the Puritan jeremiad has played. Kaveny then offers a normative case for deliberative public moral discourse and the limited exercise of prophetic denunciation. I argue that Kaveny's distinction between deliberation and prophetic denunciation is overdrawn. They are ideal types that elide other rhetorical (...) forms. Moreover, both deliberative discourse and prophetic denunciation assume a social contract or shared tradition. Healthy moral discourse requires revolutionary rhetoric to interrogate and break traditions that are themselves morally compromised. (shrink)

Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy Without Contempt seeks to reorient the conversation among religious ethicists and political theorists about religion in public life. Rather than focus on religious speech in general, Kaveny distinguishes deliberation and indictment as forms of discourse, and she subjects indictment to ethical evaluation. She aims to constrain the public exercise of inordinate indictment, while encouraging prophetic indictment that meets the demands of justice. While the book is a much-needed corrective, Kaveny's focus on the powerful rhetoric of prophetic (...) indictment omits the harms that can come to the body politic from unjust silence. Such silence deserves more moral attention. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square by Cathleen KavenyKyle LambeletProphecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square Cathleen Kaveny CAMBRIDGE, MA: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. 464 PP. $49.95"The American public square is not a seminar room" (419). This being the case, Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy without Contempt challenges ethicists, among others, to reconsider the rhetoric of moral address. Rather than a narrow focus (...) on deliberation, Kaveny commends attention to the genre of indictment, and particularly the American jeremiad, as a significant mode of moral address that deserves normative analysis. Kaveny is no partisan of prophecy. But she offers moral and rhetorical criteria of prophetic speech that allow the genre to do its indispensable work.Kaveny's book proceeds in four parts. In the first part she sets the stage for her argument by surveying three prominent accounts of the status of public moral discourse, critiquing each yet drafting them all into a more global [End Page 195] critique of the failure to take into account the central significance of the rhetoric of prophetic indictment. Correcting this neglect in the second part, Kaveny executes a historical retrieval of the American jeremiad, beginning with early Puritan preachers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The point of her at times plodding historical reconstruction is that the jeremiad was not originally socially divisive but rather served to build up the community by calling listeners back to a commonly agreed-on covenant. This uniting function of the jeremiad fails in later generations. Some readers will worry that Kaveny's retrieval risks nostalgia insofar as it conforms to a MacIntyrian declension narrative in which golden origins were irreplaceably fractured.This risk, however, is mitigated by the third and fourth parts of the book, in which Kaveny turns to constructive ethics. She argues that the forensic rhetoric of prophetic indictment should be understood as a chemotherapy. It should not be confused with deliberation, the normal form of moral address. Yet, like chemotherapy, used in the right amount it can restore an ailing patient to health. As we have come to expect, Kaveny is especially adept at taking the moral frameworks developed in one sphere and applying them to another. Trading medical analogies for military, Kaveny argues that best practices of ius bellum verborum can be developed from just war criteria. She adds to these rhetorical constraints that prophetic critique be offered against one's own people with whom one identifies through lamentation and hope. Kaveny concludes with advocacy of prophetic humility and irony as necessary elements of prophetic speech in our pluralistic contemporary context.Although written in accessible prose, Kaveny's book deserves rigorous scholarly engagement. She constructs her argument with the gracious interdisciplinarity of a leading scholar of law and theology at the height of her powers. She is methodologically promiscuous but never shallow, drawing on scholarly fields of moral philosophy, biblical studies, American religious history, in-depth case analysis of contemporary arguments about abortion and torture, and historical paradigms of prophetic virtue (and vice). While scholars in each of these fields will find claims worth engaging in Kaveny's text, ethicists will be particularly interested in her argument for a constrained, continuing need for prophetic indictment.My one critique is that her account of prophetic rhetoric is too conservative. Based on her historical retrieval, Kaveny argues that indictment should serve only to call listeners back to an already agreed-on covenant. It is undoubtedly the case, however, that Kaveny's exemplars of indictment such as Jonah, Lincoln, and King innovated and developed the covenant, even as they invoked it. This complaint aside, Kaveny's book is a major contribution to contemporary conceptualizations of the public square, and stands poised to open new directions for moral analysis of religious actors in pluralistic publics. [End Page 196]Kyle LambeletNotre Dame UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

While virtually all of the few scholars who have dealt with the subject of prophecy in Origen of Alexandria have limited their analysis to Origen’s Contra Celsum, the present essay will take into consideration the most remarkable insights from all of Origen’s extant literary output, including his definitions of prophecy, which can significantly enrich our understanding of the value, sources, and functions of prophecy according to Origen. Fruitful comparisons with Philo, Clement, Eusebius, and Plotinus will also be (...) drawn. What will emerge from the present investigation is that, for Origen, prophets are moral examples, and true prophecy is a gift shared by men and women alike, is a kind of “proof,” structurally related to allegory and philosophy, and contains the announcement of Christ and, closely connected to this, the promise of the eviction of evil and the universal restoration or apokatastasis, which is a core doctrine in Origen’s philosophico-theological system. (shrink)

Abū Bakr Muḥammad bin Zakariyya’ al-Rāzī (865–925) is generally known as a freethinker who argued against prophecy and revealed religion based on arguments from fairness of God and rationality. Recently some scholars argued that Razi was not as radical as the general interpretation takes him to be. Both the freethinker and conservative interpretations seem well supported based on difference bodies of evidence. However, the evidence is based on secondhand reports. In this paper I argue there is an interpretation of (...) prophecy which is supported by primary sources and can reconcile these putatively contradictory positions. Under my interpretation Razi allows for prophecy based on the rationality of moral deference in certain circumstances. In this picture one function of prophets is to act as moral experts for deference. This interpretation provides a synthesis of the freethinker and conservative views. Razi is conservative in having room for prophecy because of his dualist nature of humanity, and Razi is still a freethinker who values reason above all, because moral expertise requires excellent command of reason. (shrink)

A self-fulfilling prophecy is, roughly, a prediction that brings about its own truth. Although true predictions are hard to fault, self-fulfilling prophecies are often regarded with suspicion. In this article, we vindicate this suspicion by explaining what self-fulfilling prophecies are and what is problematic about them, paying special attention to how their problems are exacerbated through automated prediction. Our descriptive account of self-fulfilling prophecies articulates the four elements that define them. Based on this account, we begin our critique by (...) showing that typical self-fulfilling prophecies arise due to mistakes about the relationship between a prediction and its object. Such mistakes—along with other mistakes in predicting or in the larger practical endeavor—are easily overlooked when the predictions turn out true. Thus we note that self-fulfilling prophecies prompt no error signals; truth shrouds their mistakes from humans and machines alike. Consequently, self-fulfilling prophecies create several obstacles to accountability for the outcomes they produce. We conclude our critique by showing how failures of accountability, and the associated failures to make corrections, explain the connection between self-fulfilling prophecies and feedback loops. By analyzing the complex relationships between accuracy and other evaluatively significant features of predictions, this article sheds light both on the special case of self-fulfilling prophecies and on the ethics of prediction more generally. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 541 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy Howard Kreisel. Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. x + 669. Cloth, $200.00. This is a big book on a big subject. Kreisel offers us a full view of the most substantial discussions in (...) the Jewish Middle Ages of the phenomenon of prophecy (the cognitive awareness of the word of God) and of the bearer of the prophetic message. Even more, he does not stop with the end of the medieval period, but proceeds to Spinoza, whose ideas about prophecy and the prophet are shown, however, to depend upon medieval views, even while turning them on their head.Kreisel presents the views of seven thinkers: Saadiah Gaon, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, Gersonides, Crescas, Albo, and Spinoza. The chronological span of those covered is roughly seven hundred years, from the middle of the tenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century. Equally broad are the geographical span, from Baghdad to Andalusia to Amsterdam; and the linguistic diversity, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin.The challenge to be met in such a large project is to produce a coherent narrative in which the various participants talk to, not past, each other. After all, there is no prima facie reason why seven thinkers, writing at different times, in widely dispersed geographic locations, and in different languages, should all be conjuring up the same general ideas about prophecy. Even allowing for the religious tradition common to them and the biblical (Hebrew) background, there is still potentially much to divide them. The success of the book depends upon weaving together in a perspicuous fashion the disparate discussions.Kreisel is very aware of the challenge and rises to the occasion. He does much more than just present seriatim the views of his chosen thinkers. He presents their respective positions in dialectical fashion, with, for example, Maimonides responding to Halevi, Gersonides to Maimonides, and Spinoza to the entire prophetic tradition. The dialogue between thinkers throughout the medieval centuries on the subject of prophecy moves between poles of naturalism and supernaturalism, from understanding prophecy and the prophet without emphasizing divine intervention to understanding the same in less naturalistic ways. No one before Spinoza dismissed this project of accounting for how mortal (finite) minds could comprehend the divine, and within the medieval period itself Kreisel distinguishes strongly between those (especially Maimonides and Gersonides) who emphasized the human element in prophecy, the intellectual and moral conditions for prophetic insight, and those (especially Halevi and Crescas) who emphasized the role of the divine in prophecy. Given this latter dichotomy, Spinoza and Maimonides, so different in other ways, may be seen as sharing more in common with each other than either share with Halevi and the "supernaturalist" tradition that he represents.Kreisel works hard to present a philosophical dialogue between thinkers. This is important, lest the debate collapse into one between rationalists and religious fundamentalists. Halevi and Crescas emerge as important philosophers in their own right, even as they indicate the shortcomings of Greek wisdom and, in the case of Crescas, of the naturalism and reductionism of Maimonides and Gersonides. The end result of Kreisel's careful reconstruction is a deep discussion of the epistemology and politics of prophecy. The interested historian of ideas will learn much about medieval debates relating to (divine) knowledge of particulars, the nature of miracles, the nature and role of the imagination in prophecy, human happiness and perfection, and the prophetic mission.I would signal for special notice and attention the importance, stressed by Kreisel, of the universalist and cosmopolitan (Enlightenment) implications of the prophetic teachings of thinkers like Maimonides and Spinoza, who (again) diverge from each other in so many ways. Kreisel demarcates the latter thinkers from those like Halevi, whose supernaturalism undergirds a parochial, even racialist, belief in the superiority of the Jews. Finally, by stressing the (human) intellectual and/or moral qualities that are requisite for prophecy, Kreisel makes a... (shrink)

Hume’s "Of Miracles" concludes with the claim that prophecies, too, are miracles, and as such are susceptible to the same arguments which apply to miracles. However, both Hume and his commentators have overlooked the distinctive features of prophecy. Hume’s chief objection to miracles--that one is never justified in crediting second-hand testimony to miraculous events--does not necessarily apply to the argument from fulfilled prophecies as it was understood in the eighteenth century. Neither was prophecy necessarily thought to entail any (...) breach of the laws of nature. Consideration of Hume’s argument in its historical context shows that it fails to counter the argument from prophecies and was known to have failed. (shrink)

While prophethood is the backbone of the Islamic tradition and an uncompromised tenet of faith, the impact of modernity with its ambivalent status afforded to the prophet and institution of prophethood shook many Muslim scholars. Through analysis of these modern debates on prophethood in Islam, this book situates Muhammad Iqbal's (1877-1938) and Said Nursi's (1877-1960) discourses within it and assesses their implications on the modern period. This book introduces the 'what, who and how' of the prophets in the Islamic tradition. (...) It unveils the rich Islamic literature of both the classical and modern periods and analyses the construction of their philosophies and theologies. Concise in both historical and textual analysis, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of contemporary debates on prophecy and prophethood in Islam, and will be of great interest to postgraduate students and researchers of Islam, religious studies, medieval studies and contemporary studies of Islam and religion. (shrink)

Stemming from two conferences, held in 1994, and 1996, Prophecy and Diplomacy: The Moral Doctrine of John Paul II explores the general orientations and the specific applications of the moral teaching of Pope John Paul II. The first part of the book places the Pope's moral theory within a broader theological framework, attempting to identify the overarching philosophical and theological attitudes that shape the Pope's fundamental moral perspective. In part two, the work studies the Pope's teaching in the areas (...) of applied ethics. Both the major lecturers and the respondents focus upon those areas of applied ethics that have provoked the greatest tension between the magisterium and the academy and between the Church and the state in the West. The volume concludes by presenting a homily that places the ethics of John Paul II within a spiritual framework of repentance and redemption. The Pope's moral teaching is not an academic survey of ethical themes. Nor is it a Pelagian call to human self-regeneration. The ultimate truth concerning human conduct and moral judgement emerges only with the proclamation of God's grace. (shrink)

The main task for philosophers is introducing, clarifying, articulating, or simply redirecting concepts as—to echo Quine’s poetic formulation— “devices for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.” I sometimes use “coining concepts” as shorthand for this task. When the concepts are quantitative they are part of a possible science ; when the concepts are qualitative they can be part of a possible philosophy. Of course, in practice, concepts are oft en stillborn, while others have multiple functions in fi (...) elds of inquiry that may straddle philosophy and science. In this chapter I argue that historians of philosophy must, among other things, coin concepts that disclose the near or distant past and create a shared horizon for our philosophical future. In virtue of our expertise we can often do so by drawing on previously orphaned concepts. The more narrow aim of this paper is to introduce two concepts, “Newton’s challenge to philosophy” and, especially, “philosophic prophecy,” that are suitable to philosophers who engage with texts in a scholarly fashion. I do so by re-telling the story of early analytical philosophy and its connection to the reception of Spinoza. By “Newton’s challenge to philosophy,” I mean the following: from about 1700 onward, “natural science” is increasingly taken to be authoritative in settling debates within philosophy; it is a concept that focuses attention on the authority of science and its various manifestations within philosophy. By “philosophic prophecy,” I mean the structured ways in which concept formation by philosophers can shape possible futures, including that of philosophy. In what follows, I first develop and characterize philosophic prophecy more precisely. In order to illuminate the concept, I contrast it with several related, more familiar concepts. Second, I offer brief critical comments on two alternative approaches to the history of philosophy promoted by Quentin Skinner and Michael Kremer in order to make more precise the approach favored here. Third, I offer a fresh narrative about the prehistory and origin of analytical philosophy. My story focuses on Ernest Nagel, who, I claim, is the philosophic prophet of analytical philosophy. Along the way, I explore the shared origins of analytical philosophy and analytical history of philosophy in the anti-Spinozistic writings of George Boole and Bertrand Russell. I oppose Nagel’s and Russell’s narratives in light of Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle. I adopt Schlick’s bold and unappreciated vision of the task of philosophy in scientific age. I focus on his identification of philosophical legislation with qualitative concepts. (shrink)

In this essay, I take as a starting point Foucault’s rejection of two different ways of thinking about the future, prophecy and utopianism, and use this rejection as a basis for the elaboration of a more detailed rejection of them, invoking complexity-based epistemic limitations in relation to thinking about the future of political society. I follow Foucault in advocating immanent political struggle, which does not seek to build a determinate vision of the future but rather focuses on negating aspects (...) of the current conjuncture. I extend this argument into an ethical register, arguing that the same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to our personal lives. I conclude by engaging with Jacques Lacan’s account of subjectivity, and the interpretation of its political import furnished by Yannis Stavrakakis, drawing from these additional supports for my position, in particular the rejection of utopianism as an attempt to avoid limitation by the real. (shrink)

While it might seem prima facie plausible that divine foreknowledge is all that is needed for prophecy, this seems incorrect. To issue a prophecy, God hasto know not just how someone will act, but how someone would act were the prophecy issued. This makes some think that Middle Knowledge is required.I argue that Thomas Flint’s two Middle Knowledge based accounts of prophecy are unsatisfactory, but one of them can be repaired. However the resources needed for repair (...) also yield a sketch of a foreknowledge-only account of prophecy. (shrink)

It is widely assumed by scholars that Christ was in error on such matters as an expectation that the final judgement and its accompanying events would occur within the timeframe of a generation. While accepting that Christ did indeed prophesy his return within this timeframe, a recent co-authored work When the Son of Man Didn't Come aims to defend the veracity of his prophecy by drawing on the same historical-critical method that has given rise to doubts about it. The (...) authors propose a distinction between Mosaic and Jeremianic prophecy, arguing that Christ's was of the latter kind, which was present in the Ancient Near East, the Old and New Testaments, and other Jewish and Christian authors. Their argument, however, is at risk of reducing the truthfulness of a prophecy to its success. Hence this article explores a further distinction between two kinds of prophecy made in Thomas Aquinas's account of the truthfulness of prophecy, mapping it onto the Mosaic-Jeremianic distinction, and arguing that, in view of this linking of Aquinas's understanding of prophecy to the argument of the book, the book certainly adds to the set of proposed theological explanations of how Christ's prophecy of his return was true. (shrink)

There can, I think, be little dispute that the most exciting plays about Philoctetes are those which have been described by Bowra, Kitto, and now B. M. W. Knox. It is a matter for regret that we must choose between them, or even reject all of them, since only one play is in question, the Philoctetes of Sophocles. My purpose, however, is not to compare the merits of these rivals, but something more restricted and rather duller. I shall make use (...) of them in reexamining the difficulties raised by Sophocles' handling of the prophecy of Helenus, for it is to these that they largely owe their origin. (shrink)

Prophets, Prophecy, and Ancient Israelite Historiography. Edited by Mark J. Boda and Lissa M. Wray Beal. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2013. Pp. xii + 400. $54.50.

This volume contains the proceedings of a Symposium Prophecy in the Book of Jeremiah, arranged by the Edinburgh Prophecy Network in the School of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh, 11 12 May 2007. Prophetic studies are undergoing radical changes at the moment. Whereas it was formerly believed that the historical Jeremiah was hidden under countless additions and reinterpretations, and thus changed beyond recognition, it was still assumed that it would be possible to recover the real prophet with (...) the tools of historical critical methods. However, according to a majority of scholars today, the recovery of the historical Jeremiah is no longer possible. For this reason, the meeting in Edinburgh gathered specialists from Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the USA, in order to find new and different approaches to the study of prophecy. ". (shrink)

Prophecy in the Ancient Near East: A Philological and Sociological Comparison. By Jonathan Stökl. Culture and History of the Ancient Near East, vol. 56. Leiden: Brill, 2012. Pp. xvi + 297. $151.

Gregor Betz explores the following questions: Where are the limits of economics, in particular the limits of economic foreknowledge? Are macroeconomic forecasts credible predictions or mere prophecies and what would this imply for the way economic policy decisions are taken? Is rational economic decision making possible without forecasting at all?

This paper explores the claim made by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a. 3 that ‘sacred doctrine’ is ‘scientific.’ After reviewing some of the key historical commentators on the question, I propose an examination of Thomas' treatment of the gift of prophecy as providing an important clue into discerning more clearly his evolution from an Aristotelian understanding of knowledge or ‘science’ to a fuller sense of the term scientia as used by Thomas. Chief among these is (...) a clue into how Thomas resolves the difficulty between necessity and history. His treatment of prophecy in the Summa Theologiae gives one a glimpse into how Thomas is a historical thinker, despite weighty authorities such as Etienne Gilson arguing otherwise. Closer attention to prophecy permits one to rethink Thomas' account of sacred doctrine in Question One and appreciate how pivotal the fact of divine revelation having been made to prophets in history is for its ‘scientific’ character. (shrink)

Business research and teaching institutions play an important role in shaping the way businesses perceive their relations to the broader society and its moral expectations. Hence, as ethical scandals recently arose in the business world, questions related to the civic responsibilities of business scholars and to the role business schools play in society have gained wider interest. In this article, I argue that these ethical shortcomings are at least partly resulting from the mainstream business model with its taken-for granted basic (...) assumptions such as specialization or the value-neutrality of business research. Redefining the roles and civic responsibilities of business scholars for business practice implies therefore a thorough analysis of these assumptions if not their redefinition. The taken-for-grantedness of the mainstream business model is questioned by the transformation of the societal context in which business activities are embedded. Its value-neutrality in turn is challenged by self-fulfilling prophecy effects, which highlight the normative influence of business schools. In order to critically discuss some basic assumptions of mainstream business theory, I propose to draw parallels with the corporate citizenship concept and the stakeholder theory. Their integrated approach of the relation between business practice and the broader society provides interesting insights for the social reembedding of business research and teaching. (shrink)

Largely following on the heels of Thomas Flint’s book-length defense of Molinism a number of years ago, a debate has emerged about the ability of Molinism to explain God’s purported ability to successfully prophesy the occurrence of human free choices, as well as about the merits of other theories of divine providence and foreknowledge in this respect. After introducing the relevant issues, we criticize Alexander Pruss’s recent attempt to show that non-Molinist views which countenance only simple foreknowledge fare as well (...) as Molinism in explaining prophecy. We locate two serious problems with Pruss’s proposal, and in the process clarify the theoretical costs and benefits of an adequate Molinist account in this sphere. (shrink)

While greatly appreciative of Kaveny's important study of a neglected form of religious/moral discourse in the public square, this essay critically examines her metaphors for prophetic indictments and finds the metaphor of moral chemotherapy particularly problematic and the metaphor of warfare, connected with the just-war tradition, more promising. It stresses the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of avoiding contempt in prophetic indictments, as Kaveny conceives them, and finds her proposed solutions to this problem—standing with the people and expressing empathy and (...) compassion toward them—inadequate to the task. It further argues that attending to prophetic imagination, in addition to prophetic denunciation, can broaden the scope of practical deliberation and, at the same time, increase possible prophetic contributions to moral and political discourse. (shrink)

A good theory of rationality should accommodate debates over first principles, such as those of rationality. The modest challenge made in this article is that relativists try to explain the (intellectual) value of some debates about first principles (absolute presuppositions, basic assumptions, intellectual frameworks, intellectual commitments, and paradigms). Relativists claim to justify moving with relative ease from one framework to another, translating chunks of one into the other; this technique is essential for historians, anthropologists and others. Thus ideas concerning false (...) prophecy are transferable to contemporary discussions. Ancient false prophets offered illusions of overcoming difficult problems cheaply; relativists do that too. The problem that relativism purports to solve cheaply is that of legitimizing pluralism. As the absolutist theory of truth is intuitively problematic, relativism seems intuitively more acceptable, but this intuitive advantage vanishes when it manifests as false prophecy. (shrink)

This paper examined the integrity, impact and good governance value of election prophecies (EPs) in the last 20 years in selected African countries juxtaposed with President Donald Trump’s EPs in America. As a primary source, empirical research was conducted alongside a historical survey. The data collected from 519 respondents revealed that a majority believe in prophecies, but they queried the integrity, impact and value of EPs due to the inconsistency, inaccuracy, confusion and unhealthy public panics engendered. Despite the adverse effects, (...) many adherents still subscribe to the phenomenon due to the psychological and emotional influence. Subsequently, this article critiqued the research outcome through Biblical Theology. It held that EPs remain vital in the public life of nations, but the current approach in Africa needs some review. These include: (1) the need to revisit the tasks of prophets as Hope givers, Reformers and those who speak truth to power in pre- and post-election seasons; (2) the scrutiny of EPs by the plurality of Prophets, ecumenical leaders and the public, with the four suggested evaluation indices; and (3) the need to curb the negative effect of EPs on healthy electoral processes using enacted public account policies. Contribution: This article contributes to an interdisciplinary religious aspect of research covering Biblical theology, psephology and politics. (shrink)

One of the strongest arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free action appeals to the apparent fixity or necessity of the past. Two leading responses to the argument—Ockhamism, which denies a premiss of the argument, and the so-called “eternity solution”, which holds that strictly speaking God does not have foreknowledge—have both come under attack on similar grounds. Neither response, it is alleged, is adequate to the case of divine prophecy. In this paper I shall first state (...) the argument in question and the two responses to it. I shall then consider objections to these responses, focusing primarily on how they deal with prophecy. (shrink)

Originally published in 1958. This volume brings into focus an area of Islamic religio-philosophical thought to which relatively little attention has been paid by modern scholars of Muslim thought. The importance of the subject lies in the fact that it constitutes a central point at the confrontation of the traditional Islamic and Hellenic thought currents.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Prophecy and Authority in the TrachiniaiLaurel Bowman(Tr. 1278)When deianeira goes silently offstage to her death at line 812 of Trachiniai, she removes herself from her husband's story. Her mistake was in thinking it was hers. Despite her emotionally riveting presence at center stage for well over half the play, her focus (and thus that of her audience) is always on Herakles, absent or present. Her only concern, throughout (...) the play, is Herakles' whereabouts, his welfare, and his relationship to her. But the prediction1 which Deianeira thinks she understands, and on which she acts so fatally, concerns his fate and not her own. Even though the prophecies concerning Herakles depend on Deianeira's actions for their resolution, none mention her; their focus is the end of Herakles' labors, and once she has performed her function in their fulfillment her further actions are irrelevant. Her death, like Klytemnestra's in Sophocles' Elektra, is not significant enough to warrant a prophecy of its own. The prophecies of Trachiniai concern only the fates of males.2 [End Page 335]My focus in this essay is the use of predictive speech in Trachiniai. I will show that the speech of Nessos to Deianeira functions as a parallel to the prophecies in the play. A prediction is authorized as a "prophecy" by the same social mechanism which defines a child as "legitimate." Relying on an unauthorized prediction is thus, in Trachiniai, represented as analogous to stepping outside authorized marital bonds. Deianeira's attempt at independent action, in that it relies on the speech of Nessos, is equivalent to infidelity and is therefore destructive, a definition which is strengthened by the description of her behavior as destructive in specifically feminine ways. The final prophecy of the play negates Deianeira's role in previous events. Prophecy in Trachiniai is thus used both to define independent action in women as destructive, and ultimately, to exclude them from it.There are two sources of predictive speech in the play, but only one, Zeus, is said to produce "prophecy" (, 77, 1165). The predictive speech of the other, Nessos, is simply called instructions, or laws (, 568–69;, 682). are a particular kind of predictive speech–act; the term is used in Sophocles and elsewhere to refer specifically to those predictions which come from a source with the appropriate authority for making. In Homer the term is used once (Od. 12.272), of a prophecy made by Tiresias, who is elsewhere (e.g., OT 410) described as inspired by Apollo. In Herodotus and Thucydides only responses from oracular shrines (usually Delphi) are termed (e.g., Hdt. 1.46–1.53, 1.91; Thuc. 1.25, 1.28, and elsewhere). In the tragedians are likewise either responses from oracular shrines (e.g., Aesch. Eum. 716, Eur. Hipp. 236, IT 1255), or, more rarely, speeches of seers inspired by Apollo (Aesch. Ag. 1215, of Kassandra). Sophocles outside the Trachiniai follows the same usage: are most frequently responses from an oracular shrine, usually Delphi (e.g., OT 21, 149, 407, 481, 857; OC 453), or, more rarely, are predictive speeches of an Apollo–inspired seer (OT 394, of Tiresias). To be [End Page 336] termed, in short, it is not enough that predictive speeches come true; they must also have a divine or explicitly divinely inspired source. Just as a child is defined as "legitimate" by reason of his relationship to a father who is authorized3 to produce legitimate children, and who acknowledges the children as his, so predictive speeches become through their relationship to an authorized and acknowledging source. are predictive speeches to which a constructed legitimacy has been attached.Zeus is constructed in the Trachiniai as an authorized source of legitimate predictions,. He occupies the position at the pinnacle of the hierarchical structure in the play, both as ruler of the gods and as Herakles' father. As ruler of the gods in general, and more specifically as the god most nearly concerned with the events represented in Trachiniai, he is called upon more often than any other divinity in the play.4 Zeus is called "father of all" (, 275). He is the god most often invoked in prayer... (shrink)

It is time for a reconsideration of the dating and interpretation of the Middle English narrative work in rhyming couplets known as The Prophecy of the Six Kings to Follow John . It has hitherto been confidently given a rough date of composition and a particular political role. Its only editor, Joseph Hall, says that “it was most probably written with a view to discredit Henry the Fourth.” He continues: “the poem says he is the Mole cursed from God's (...) mouth, in whose days terrible evils must come on England. It is a good example of the political use made of the popular belief in the ‘prophecies of Merlin.’” The notes to his text identify figures in the prophecy as representing, for example, Thomas of Woodstock, Henry Percy , Owen Glendower, and “perhaps Macmurrugh.” The only historian of the whole genre of political prophecy in medieval England, Rupert Taylor, says that the work “is very important because of its historical connections, for it is the prophecy that was used against Henry the Fourth by the Percy-Glendower faction, the ‘skimble-skamble stuff’ of Shakspere.”. (shrink)

Stereotypes are often described as being generally inaccurate and irrational. However, for years, a minority of social psychologists has been proclaiming that stereotype accuracy is among the most robust findings in the field. This same minority also opposes the majority by questioning the power of self-fulfilling prophecies and thereby the construction of social reality. The present paper examines this long-standing debate from the perspective of predictive processing, an increasingly influential cognitive science theory. In this theory, stereotype accuracy and self-fulfilling prophecies (...) are two sides of the same coin, namely prediction error minimisation, pointing to a new middle course between the two existing views. On the one hand, predictive processing indicates that depicting stereotypes as generally inaccurate runs counter to their actual purpose of making the social world predictable, which supports the minority view. On the other hand, predictive processing supposes that expectations, including stereotypes, permanently affect perception and behaviour and thereby co-construct social reality, which supports the majority view. Therefore, from a predictive processing perspective, stereotypes are largely rational and not per se inaccurate, and self-fulfilling prophecies are omnipresent and greatly affect social reality. This new middle course appears to fit the empirical data better than the two existing views. (shrink)