The triumph of the socialist revolution in Russia, the fiftieth anniversary of which the Soviet people are marking this year, the building of socialism in the USSR, and the coming into being of a world socialist system eliminated the ideological monopoly theretofore enjoyed by exploitative society in the contemporary world. For the first time in human history, an ideology of the toiling masses has extensively taken root in a number of countries. This has meant a narrowing of the sphere in (...) which bourgeois ideology is dominant, and could not fail to have a bearing upon all the forms of social consciousness in the capitalist world, including philosophy. (shrink)

In the second half of the nineteenth century utilitarianism and naturalism dominated Russian ethical thought. The Russian intelligentsia, nurtured on the works of N. G. Chernyshevskii, P. L. Lavrov, and D. I. Pisarev, regarded utilitarianism as an alternative to all the ideologies that harness man to the service of "ends higher than himself." It was thought that only man, as a concrete, living individual, could be regarded as the end and purpose of activity. Such concepts as individual interests, utility, and (...) calculus became the cornerstones of practical morality, while scientific studies of human nature became the foundation of theoretical ethics. Any mention of "a priori duty" or "categorical imperative" were regarded as manifestations of religious authoritarianism and political conservatism. (shrink)

Издание содержит: Есть ли ошибка в формуле мира?; Бегство от смысла; Секрет формулы мира - закон притяжения?

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)