This essay develops the relation, implicit in Essay 11, of intentional action to behaviour described in purely physical terms; Davidson repeats from Essay 3 that an action counts as intentional if the agent caused it, and asks to which degree a study of action thus conceived permits being scientific. Davidson stresses the central importance of a normative concept of rationality in attributing reasons to agents ; because this concept has no echo in physical theory, any explanatory schema governed by the (...) concept is irreducible to physical theory. Davidson adduces several facts that prevent us from giving strict laws connecting reasons and action: first, we cannot give conditions that are not only necessary but also sufficient for an action to be intentional, using only the concepts of belief, desire, and cause----for we cannot specify the ”right way’ in which beliefs and desires cause actions ; second, a certain holism of the mental pervades explanations of human behaviour: we cannot assign beliefs and desires independently of and prior to the actions they cause, a point Davidson takes Ramsey’s work on subjective probability to have shown. Davidson appends a set of replies to critics, which clarify his attitude to psychology as a science, his analysis of statements of law, the principle of causal interaction, and the relation between mutually irreducible explanatory schema. (shrink)

This paper defends a simple and surprisingly adequate definition of philosophy: as suggested by the “know thyself” imperative, philosophy is the “self-defining” discipline. The task of philosophizing is therefore best described as the task of self-defining. In responding to various objections, I defend four senses in which this definition holds. First, when other academic disciplines seek to define the nature of their discipline, they are generally recognized as exploring the philosophy of their discipline; only for philosophy (...) is such an inquiry self-referential, remaining fully within the discipline itself. Second, while some genuinely philosophical topics do not explicitly involve self-defining, philosophy as a way of life always has self-examination at its core. Third, even though psychology may have largely usurped philosophy’s classical role as the guardian of self-knowledge, the goal of helping persons to refine their own self-understanding is still crucial for philosophers today. Finally, in a deep but paradoxical sense, genuine philosophy is self-authenticating. While Socrates’ maxim, “the unexamined life is not worth living” should not be taken too literally, it does correctly convey the fact that only an authentic life is really worth living. (shrink)

In her introduction to this collection, Tymieniecka presents her phenomenology of life - the leitmotif of the three-volume anniversary publication of Analecta Husserliana - as something that stands out from preceding historical attempts to investigate life in an 'integral' or 'scientific' way. After an incubation lasting throughout the 2000 years of Occidental philosophy, this scientific phenomenology/philosophy of life at last uncovers the entire area of the 'inner workings of Nature', exposing the way in which the 'sufficient reason' and (...) the 'ground' of beingness as such crystallise out of the 'onto poietic' process. This onto-poietic process, continuing as it does in the human creative condition, also reveals the authentic genius of the works of the human spirit. This new and original philosophy, free of fallacious simplifications, speculations and reductionism, opens up a basic starting point for all philosophy. Life, 'the theme of our times', at last receives a profound philosophical treatment. (shrink)

Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, well-being, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included non-technical ‘translations’ of these views for eventual use (...) in other populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value. (shrink)

Focusing on philosophy’s roles in problem solving, this essay proposes a philosophy curriculum for a university “universalized” according to a Cuban model. This model arises from Fidel Castro Ruz’s “dream” that the Cuban nation itself should become a university for its people. The paper’s immediate stimulus was aVenezuelan paper on rural universalized universities at the Havana conference on university education, Universidad 2008. What should be the place of philosophy in a university curriculum for rural students? In the (...) idiom of Richard Rorty, philosophy is the collection of stories we tell ourselves for guidance through life. Philosophy’s critical function is to generate new stories when old ones fail to solve the problems that gave birth to them. The essay’s three parts address three levels of generality in philosophical reflection. The most general philosophical theories, such as Marxism or pragmatism, offer wholesale guidelines for life. More specific theories direct the practices of narrow subjects, such as physics, psychology, or economics. The most specific theories focus on the nexus of theoryand practice in solving life’s most concrete problems. The essay advocates a philosophy curriculum that contrasts students’ current philosophies with alternatives from the history of thought. Students absorb philosophies from the cultures in which they are raised. When students understand the accidental nature of their guiding thoughts, they are motivated to reflect critically on historical alternatives. When students study how to solve their problems using more specific disciplines like the arts and sciences, the history of the philosophies of those subjects will help them understand their freedom to choose among alternative solutions. When students reflect on the daily problems they must solve, attention to the connections of theory and practice can amplify their range of choices. (shrink)

The five-volume set Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense contains the proceedings of the Eleventh International Kant Congress, which took place in Pisa in 2010. The proceedings consist of 25 plenary talks and 341 papers selected by a team of international referees from over 700 submissions. The contributions span 14 sections: Kant’s Concept of Philosophy; Theory of Cognition and Logic; Ontology and Metaphysics; Ethics; Law and Justice; Religion and Theology; Aesthetics; Anthropology and Psychology; Politics and History; (...) Science, Mathematics, and the Philosophy of Nature; Kant and the Leibnizian Tradition; Kant and the Philosophical Tradition; Kant and Schopenhauer; and Kant’s Heritage. Thanks to cooperation from the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft, the 2010 conference was the first in the history of the International Kant Congress to include a session on Kant and Schopenhauer. -/- . (shrink)

The philosophers of the Hellenistic schools in ancient Greece and Rome (Epicureans, Stoics, Sceptics, Academics, Cyrenaics) made important contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. This volume, which contains the proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, describes and analyses their contributions on issues such as: the nature of perception, imagination and belief; the nature of the passions and their role in action; the relationship between mind and body; freedom and determinism; the role of (...) pleasure as a goal; the effects of poetry on belief and passion. Written with a high level of historical and philosophical scholarship, the essays are intended both for classicists and for specialists interested in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Evald Ilyenkov (1924-1979) was an outstanding philosopher, whose ideas not only influenced profoundly the Soviet philosophy, but even left their mark on the discussions concerning the role of the dialectical method, the theoretical foundations of psychology and the philosophy of Marxism in general. This volume is based on the selected materials presented twenty years after the death of Ilyenkov at an international congress in Helsinki. The contributions focus on several areas of Ilyenkov's influence: on psychology, on (...) semiotics, on the logic of Marx's Capital. The volume also includes a previously unpublished foreword by Ilyenkov to the Russian edition of Hegel's Science of Logic. (shrink)

This paper traces the development of transcendental philosophy in the 20th century back to the strongly perceived need to preserve an exclusive area of a priori research for philosophy. It will argue that a genuine sort of aprioristic philosophical inquiry does not in fact require the step from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology taken by Husserl and well attested in his works from at least his 1911 essay "Philosophy as Strict Science", nor does it require the (...) "detranscendentalization" of Husserlian phenomenology carried out in the work of Heidegger. On the contrary, as I will show, recent work in philosophy connected to the development of the cognitive sciences suggests how it is possible to obtain significant a priori knowledge, by a sort of "wide reflexive equilibrium", consistently with the empirical impugnability of knowledge required by Quinean empiricism. (shrink)

конецформыначалоформыLeo Lopatin (1855-1920) elaborated the distinct and proved views on the subject, methods and tasks of philosophy. In this paper Lopatin's definition of the subject of philosophy is reviewed and his method of reasoning is shown. As Lopatin proves, philosophy has to be knowledge of theactual nature of things in their independent reality and in their internal attitude and interrelations; it is knowledge of the actual world. The exact and clear understanding of the subject, methods of philosophical (...) knowledge is necessary for any scientist-researcher working in the field of philosophy, ethics, and psychology. It might be useful for a researcher in the field of natural sciences as well. Philosophy should have an independent position among other sciences and it differs from theology that allocates belief in the isolated and unique source of knowledge. Lopatin's example, who shows how one can distinguish philosophy from theology, poetry, art reflections of a writer, inspires everyone who tries to answer "eternal questions" of knowledge. (shrink)

The chapter examines some common assumptions regarding the shape of the history of theories of mind. It questions the conception that the Scientific Revolution resulted in placing the mind “outside of nature.” During the seventeenth century, the followers of Descartes routinely placed study of the mind, or, at least, mind–body interaction, within “physics” considered as a science of nature in general (and so including physics in the narrow sense, biology, and psychology). By the end of the eighteenth century, many (...) authors treated the psychological and the physical as distinct areas of investigation (with points of contact, to be sure), both amenable to natural scientific study. Another assumption is that, prior to behaviorism, the notion of “the psychological” was equivalent to “the mental.” And yet, during the seventeenth century psychological phenomena were assigned to both sides of the mind–body divide: the Cartesians and their allies offered (nonmentalistic) mechanistic explanations for the sensory and behavioral capacities that human beings share with animals, while also holding that some aspects of mental life (including consciousness, free will, conceptual language, and general intelligence) require an immaterial mind. Finally, from the late eighteenth century onward, some have maintained that if mental states are reached only by introspection then they cannot be studied objectively. The chapter argues that the standard version of this objection misunderstands the nature of introspection, and it mounts a reply founded on Wundt’s methodological discussions and making reference to the perceptual investigations of the Gestalt psychologists. (shrink)

This paper serves to introduce the papers from the symposium by the same title, by describing the sort of work done in philosophy of psychology conceived as a branch of the philosophy of science, distinguishing it from other discussions of psychology in philosophy, and criticizing the claims to set limits on scientific psychology in the largely psychologically uninformed literatures concerning "folk psychology' and "wide" and "narrow" content. Philosophy of psychology as (...) class='Hi'>philosophy of science takes seriously and analyzes the explanatory structures, conceptual problems, and evidentiary practices of extant scientific psychology. (shrink)

Bessarion’s major philosophical treatise In Calumniatorem Platonis is a systematic approach to Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy written in response to George of Trebizond’s Comparatio Philosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis, which attacked Plato’s authority and proclaimed Aristotle’s superiority. A striking example of this is Bessarion’s attempt to defend Plato against George of Trebizond’s accusation that Plato did not offer sound arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. In this article, I focus on Plato’s proof of the immortality of the (...) soul in the Phaedrus, as presented by Bessarion in the eighth chapter of the second book of the In Calumniatorem Platonis. The Phaedrusʼ proof is based on soul’s definition as a self-mover: since the soul always moves itself, it is the source of motion and is, therefore, ungenerated, imperishable and immortal. Bessarion’s interpretation of the Platonic proof gives the impression that Bessarion cites the text where Plato argues that the soul is immortal, and he summarises the text where Plato argues that the soul is ungenerated and imperishable. I argue, however, that Bessarion does not offer an original reading of the Phaedrus’ proof, and I also propose that Bessarion’s interpretation reflects his attempt to harmonize the Platonic and the Aristotelian views. (shrink)

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento (...) inconcusso. Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character. (shrink)

One of the classic papers of Australian feminist philosophy is G. Lloyd's "The Man of Reason" (Lloyd, 1979). The main concern of this paper is the alleged maleness of the Man of Reason, i.e., the thesis that our philosophical tradition in some deep way associates the concepts rational and male. Lloyd claims that her main goal is to bring this "undoubted" thesis "into clearer focus" (p.18), and indeed she makes no strenuous effort to demonstrate that the to-be-clarified thesis is (...) actually true. There are however a few places where she advances material she seems to be taking as some kind of evidence that the Man of Reason is male. One is on the second page, where she quotes from Augustine: And finally we see man, made in your image and likeness, ruling over all the irrational animals for the very reason that he was made in your image and resembles you, that is because he has the power of reason and understanding. And just as in man's soul there are two forces; on which is dominant because it deliberates and one which obeys because it is subject to such guidance, in the same way in the physical sense, woman has been made for man. In her mind and her rational intelligence she has a nature the equal of man's, but in sex she is physically subject to him in the same way as our natural impulses need to be subjected to the reasoning power of the mind, in order that the actions to which they lead may be inspired by the principles of good conduct. Now an interesting feature of this passage is that it appears to directly contradict the thesis of the maleness of the Man of Reason. Far from saying that rationality is a male prerogative, Augustine claims that "in her mind and her rational intelligence she has a nature the equal of man's" (my emphasis). Certainly Augustine claims that in sex woman is subject to man, and he also claims that there is an analogy or parallel between the dominance of man over woman in sex and the dominance of the rational part of the mind over the natural impulses.. (shrink)

orbit and far beyond it. Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant critical re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and so called "method" in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflec tion in which all the above-mentioned work has either its (...) core or its source. In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least a satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl, through his already systematised and "authorized" work, and his courses, and later on in his spontaneous reflection (which did not find its way into a definitive corpus but was nevertheless sufficiently coherent with his previously established body of thought to be considered a continuation of it), uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts by philosophers (e. g., Merleau-Ponty, who drew upon this material and found there his own inspiration) who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the youngergenerationofphilosophers today. (shrink)

Any society can have its own worthy place in the history of human civilization, if human problem in it becomes a core, a base of politics and world outlook, economy and culture, morality and science and all main goals of social practice are re-comprehended on this base. In public theory human problem has an important place. For a long time function of philosophy was in elucidation of nature and essence of a man and his attitude to the world. In (...) theory of a man methodological problem about specific features of a man as an object and subject of cognition is starting. Peculiarity of a man as an object of cognition is in complex interweaving of various sides: biological, psychological, and social. Peculiarity of a man as a subject of cognition is expressed in regular increase of his potential intellectual resources. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers writing on the issue of personal identity agree that, whatever is disputable about fission cases, there is little doubt that, if there could be fission, there would be psychological continuity between the original person and her offshoot (if the branching is one-one), or between the original personand her offshoots (if the branching is one-many). The belief is one with a long history dating back to John Locke; it has, over time, acquired the status of self-evident truth. This paper (...) is not an attempt to refute this deeply rooted belief, though I think the near universal acceptance of it is rather unfortunate. My main goal in what follows is to make an initial case for three forms of psychological discontinuity that I believe would exist between the fission ancestor and the offshoots. If I am right about the existence of the three forms of psychological discontinuity, contemporary Lockeans on the issue of personal identity will need to rethink their position, or so I will argue in the last section of the paper. (shrink)

The article discusses the highlights of the 9th Polish Congress of Philosophy held in Gliwice-Katowice-Wisła, Poland from September 17–21, 2012. The conference was organized by the Institute of Philosophy of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Silesia and the Department of Applied Social Sciences of the Faculty Organisation and Management, Silesian University of Technology in Gliwice. Aleksandra Kuzior of the Silesian University of Technology opened the conference.

The International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP) is the oldest international association of psychologists, founded in 1920. Since that year the IAAP has sponsored a long series of influential International Congresses . The proceedings of these Congresses provide an invaluable resource of information about the history of psychology in general and applied psychology in particular. Until now these Proceedings have been exceptionally difficult to locate; this collection reproduces the rarest and most inaccessible volumes (the first (...) 13 Congresses, 1920-1958), which document international activity in applied psychology between the wars and during the post-War reestablishment of international scientific collaboration. Individual prefaces highlight the content and importance of key Congresses. The collection has a new 76 page Index in English, which will appear only in Volume1. This is an invaluable guide to the Proceedings, which are in a variety of languages, including German, Italian, Spanish, French, English and Russian. The set is also available as individual volumes at £85.00 per volume (except Volume 1 which is £55.00). (shrink)

The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia (...) of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire, which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'. (shrink)

We know the history of philosophy as Arabian, English, American, Greece, Indian, Chinese, Korean, German, Russian, French, Japanese… But it is surprisingly that we do not use more common concept as "national philosophy", which may be included in notions "regional" and "world" philosophy. The other words common to all mankind. As the President of Independent Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov emphasized, "It is important to understand the life giving, deep sources of national culture, East philosophy which (...) serve at vigorous stimulus of rapid progress and renovation". We suppose that the main part of philosophy is human life, man's coming to be and evolution as a subject of interaction with the world. Any philosophy is the philosophy of a man, His life. A man belongs tosome nationality, nation and mankind. The nature is definite geographic midst for a man. Each nationality, nation has its own history and specific outlines – style of life, way of life, traditions, nation interests, psychology, ideas, values, culture. It is common and typical for all nations and it imposes an imprint at all sides of realityas well as philosophy. (shrink)

José Luis Bermúdez introduces the philosophy of psychology as an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature and mechanisms of cognition. _Philosophy of Psychology_ charts out four influential 'pictures of the mind' and uses them to explore central topics in the philosophical foundations of psychology, including the relation between different levels of studying the mind/brain; the nature and scope of psychological explanation; the architecture of cognition; and the relation between thought and language. Chapters cover all the core concepts, including: (...) models of psychological explanation the nature of commonsense psychology arguments for the autonomy of psychology functionalist approaches to cognition computational models of the mind neural network modeling rationality and mental causation perception, action and cognition the language of thought and the architecture of cognition. _Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction_ is a very clear and well-structured textbook from one of the leaders in the field. (shrink)

A description of the psychological profile of the philosophical personality. ●●●●● -/- 2022 UPDATE: The approach of this paper has been updated and developed further in Chapters 1 and 2 of the author’s 2021 book _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning_. The book is available both in a printed edition (under ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6 from Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and other booksellers) and an Open Access eBook edition (available through Philpapers under the book’s title and other philosophy (...) online archives). (shrink)

We are currently developing a short, online ethics course that attempts to teach students why well-intentioned people act unethically and what students can do to decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in the middle of an ethical crisis in the future. Most of the well-known case studies in professional ethics textbooks concern ethical failures that do not involve difficult ethical choices. When our students read these case studies, it is not difficult for them to determine what went wrong (...) or what the players in the cases ought to have done. And students don’t need to read Kant or Mill to make these determinations. Importantly, the agents who acted wrongly usually seem to be ethical people. Rarely do cases involve moral monsters. In a similar vein, most cases of research misconduct are cut-and-dry, and most of our students who plagiarize did not enroll in the course intending to plagiarize. Rather, something went wrong. Professional ethics classes neglect to address an important practical question: Why do well-intentioned people find themselves in the middle of ethical crises and how can our students decrease the likelihood that they will find themselves in an ethical crisis in the future? We are developing a course that answers this question. Our course is built around the findings of John Dorris and other situationists. After teaching our students about situationism, we teach them a two-level theory of cognition that may help them avoid acting unethically. (shrink)

An obvious feature of the development of the philosophy of science during the past decades is an increasing specialization and fragmentation that have led to reduced impact of philosophy of science outside the sphere of its own discipline. It seems that philosophy of science and scientific research are moving away from each other. The major question of this article is how can reconnect these two?To answer this question I will try to highlight some events especially in the (...) fields of social sciences that researchers are involved in discussions, generally related to philosophy of science, not in an abstract and isolated way, but in a way that is completely intertwined in their research practices. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has not been properly considered by philosophers of science and has remained more as a subject in the field of social sciences, specifically research methodology. It seems that if philosophy of science enters into dialogue with social sciences, we can expect the revival of the philosophy of general science. In this article, I try to show the signs of this phenomenon in cognitive psychology. I will first turn to one of the most influential theories in the cognitive sciences, expertise theory. After reviewing the important theories of expertise and their differences, in the next step I will discuss the seemingly opposing theories in this field and their efforts to find common ground. Then I will review the current movement in cognitive psychology, which I call the “integration model” stream. After a critical review and categorization of these models, I will show that in a broader view in social science, we can realize the meta-theoretical issues that are a good room for a dialogue between philosophy of science and scientific research. In the end, I will point out the horizons that this view opens to the revival of philosophy of general science. (shrink)

What is the relationship between common-sense, or 'folk', psychology and contemporary scientific psychology? Are they in conflict with one another? Or do they perform quite different, though perhaps complementary, roles? George Botterill and Peter Carruthers discuss these questions, defending a robust form of realism about the commitments of folk psychology and about the prospects for integrating those commitments into natural science. Their focus throughout the book is on the ways in which cognitive science presents a challenge to (...) our common-sense self-image - arguing that our native conception of the mind will be enriched, but not overturned, by science. The Philosophy of Psychology is designed as a textbook for upper-level undergraduate and beginning graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science, but as a text that not only surveys but advances the debates on the topics discussed, it will also be of interest to researchers working in these areas. (shrink)

Abstract Psychology's goal has been to become a science, taking the modern natural sciences as the model. It has not been understood that each science undergoes a transition from early disunification to later unification, that a fundmental dimension is involved that differentiates sciences. Psychology is a modern disunified science, distinguished by its chaotic knowledge and ways of operating. A philosophy of science based on modem unified science, as philosophies generally are, is inappropriate as a means of understanding (...) psychology or of guiding its development. We need a philosophy to describe the special problems of theory construction of modern disunified sciences, and to advance paths by which to work on those problems. Theory tasks to be undertaken in large quantities range from articles to reduce artificial diversity to the construction of grand unified theory. Psychology must begin those tasks, and it must understand its characteristics as a modern disunified science, if it is to make good decisions concerning its development and organization. Otherwise it will continue on its path towards fragmentation, an impenetrable obstacle to full development as a science and a profession. (shrink)

The study of human behaviour, and the minds that produce that behaviour, has been an occupation of scholars, artists, and philosophers for millennia. But it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that psychology came into its own as a distinct field of study—and, more importantly, as a scientifically legitimate field of study. When we view psychology as a science, certain questions naturally emerge: what sorts of phenomena does psychology seek to explain? What is distinctive (...) about the kinds of explanations adduced in this science? How do these explanations integrate with theories and explanations in other fields of study? Does psychology aim to explain all mental phenomena, or are there some areas, such as consciousness, that will be forever beyond its explanatory powers? Due to its very nature, psychology is a field that both philosophers and scientists have critically examined over the years. This critical examination has, in turn, generated a literature that is voluminous, heavily contested, and increasingly technical. To help users to make sense of this large and complex scholarly corpus, this new four-volume collection from Routledge is both comprehensive and sensitive to the ongoing nature of debates in the field. Two expert editors have carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create an indispensable ‘mini library’ of the best and most influential scholarship in the philosophy of psychology. With a comprehensive index and newly written introductions by the editors, The Philosophy of Psychology will be welcomed by a broad range of scholars, researchers, and advanced students, especially those working in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. (shrink)

This book is about some topical philosophical and methodological prob lems that arise in the study of behavior and mind, as well as in the treatment of behavioral and mental disorders. It deals with such questions as 'What is behavior a manifestation of?', 'What is mind, and how is it related to matter?', 'Which are the positive legacies, if any, of the major psychological schools?', 'How can behavior and mind best be studied?', and 'Which are the most effective ways of (...) modifying behavioral and mental processes?' These questions and their kin cannot be avoided in the long run because they fuel the daily search for better hypotheses, experimental designs, techniques, and treatments. They also occur in the critical examination of data and theories, as well as methods for the treatment of behavioral and mental disorders. All students of human or animal, normal or abnormal behavior and mind, whether their main concern is basic or applied, theoretical or em pirical, admit more or less tacitly to a large number of general philosophi cal and methodological principles. (shrink)

Besides Giving An Account Of The Origin And Development Of Buddhism As Well As The Works Of Vasubandhu And Reviewing The Abhidarwa Literature Of Buddhism, Written In Sanskrit And Pali This Book Thoroughly Analyses The Doctrine Of Sarvastivada And The Buddhist Conceptions Of Feeling, Perception, Consciousness And Impression.

A brief history of environmental consciousness in the western world places our views in perspective and provides a context for understanding the maze of related and unrelated thoughts, philosophies, and practices that we call “environmentalism”. Environmental ethics is a collection of independent ethicalgeneralizations, not a tight, rationally ordered set of rules. Environmental ethics is a collection of interrelated independent tendencies - a process field that is brought together for a long time. Ethics really results from people’s perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. (...) Society is facing many important decisions about the useof science and technology. These decisions affect the environment, human health, society and international policy. To resolve these issues, and develop principles to help us make decisions we need to involve anthropology, sociology, biology, medicine, religion, psychology, philosophy, and economics; we must combine the scientific rigour of biological data, with the values of religion and philosophy to develop a world-view. The goal of environmental ethics is not to convince us that we should be concerned about the environment. Instead of it, environmental ethics focuses on the moral foundation of environmental responsibility, and how far this responsibility extends. The challenge of duty-based eco-centrism is to explain how conflicts are to be resolved between human‐centered duties and environment-centered ones. An adequate duty-based approach to environmental obligation requires prioritizing environmental duties according to a ranked importance of the various ecosystems in question. Conflicts between prioritized environmental and human duties, then, can only be resolved on a case by case basis. Although eco-centrism fails as a normative theory, eco-centrism may have merit as a way of expressing emotionaloutrage at environmental damage and demanding change. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings _is a comprehensive anthology that includes classic and contemporary readings from leading philosophers. Addressing in depth the major topics within philosophy of psychology, the editor has carefully selected articles under the following headings: pictures of the mind commonsense psychology representation and cognitive architecture. Articles by the following philosophers are included: Blackburn, Churchland, Clark, Cummins, Dennett, Davidson, Fodor, Kitcher, Lewis, Lycan, McDowell, McLeod, Rey, Segal, Stich. Each section includes a helpful introduction by (...) the editor which aims to guide the student gently into the topic. The book is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject, including discussion of the leading philosophers in the field. Ideal for any student of philosophy of psychology or philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This simple and informal approach to the study of philosophy offers a straightforward explanation and interpretation of the seven departments of philosophy: Metaphysics, the Nature of Being and of God; Logic, the Rule of Reason: Ethics, the Code of Conduct: Psychology, the Science of the Soul; Epistemology, the Nature of Knowledge: Esthetics, the Urge to Beauty; and Theurgy, the Living of Wisdom.

First published in 1989, this book tackles a relatively little-explored area of Wittgenstein’s work, his philosophy of psychology, which played an important part in his late philosophy. Writing with clarity and insight, Budd traces the complexities of Wittgenstein’s thought, and provides a detailed picture of his views on psychological concepts. A useful guide to the writings of Wittgenstein, the book will be of value to anyone concerned with his work as a whole, as well as those with (...) a more general interest in the philosophy of psychology. (shrink)