Expressions of emotion pose a serious challenge to the view that we perceive other people’s emotions directly. If we must perceive expressions in order to perceive emotions, then it is only ever the expressions that we are directly aware of, not emotions themselves. This paper develops a new response to this challenge by drawing an analogy between expressions of emotion and perceptual media. It is through illumination and sound, the paradigmatic examples of perceptual media, that we can see and hear (...) objects around us. Instead of screening these objects from view, however, they enable our perception while being transparent to us. With reference to perceptual constancy and transparency, I show how expressions show up in our experience of emotions in a surprisingly similar way. Given this, we can understand expressions as the media _through_ which we perceive emotions and overcome the above challenge to an otherwise attractive view. (shrink)

I argue that the direct perception of emotion (DP) is best conceived in terms of event perception, rather than fact perception or object perception. On neither of these two traditional models can the perception of emotion be as direct as its counterpart in ordinary perception; the proponent of DP must either drop the ‘direct’ claim or embrace a part-whole model of emotion perception and its problems. But our best account of how we perceive events directly can be applied to emotion (...) perception without any loss in directness. Not only this but there are good reasons to think that such a conception better respects both empirical evidence and the phenomenology of emotion perception. (shrink)

People engaged in international research projects – whether sponsors, researchers or participants – have different cultural and religious backgrounds. This can lead to quandaries over whose values should dictate the ethical basis for research. This paper addresses this issue by claiming that four core values are integral to the nature and justification of valid research and that to have integrity researchers must be committed to these values. Since the values are not specific to any particular culture or religion they constitute (...) a neutral ethical framework for the conduct of international research. It then claims that if researchers understand these values they can take responsibility for applying them to their own situation. This can help overcome problems which currently arise when researchers are not certain what to do because the specific ethical requirements of sponsors would be impractical or damaging if implemented in the circumstances in which the researchers operate. Finally, it is suggested that the four values outlined in the paper may be a basis for further work – such as developing awareness training and evolving guidance for specialist areas of research. (shrink)

I propose that accounts of emotional expression can be divided into primary and secondary quality accounts. Primary quality accounts of expression take behaviour to express emotion only if certain perceiver-independent facts about the behaviour or behaving subject obtain. I argue that views of this kind get the extension of expression wrong. I argue instead that behaviour expresses emotion just in case it is disposed to appear to express emotion to standard observers under standard conditions.

The snub-nosed, reclining, and serene image of the fetus is commonplace in cultural representations and analyses of obstetric ultrasound. Yet following the provocation of various feminist scholars, taking the fetal sonogram as the automatic object of concern vis-à-vis ultrasound cedes ground to anti-abortionists, who deploy fetal images to argue that life begins at conception and that the unborn are rights bearing subjects who must be protected. How might feminists escape this analytical trap, where discussions of ultrasonics must always be engaged (...) in the act of debunking? This article orients away from the problem of fetal representation by employing a method which may appear to be wildly unsuitable: media archaeology. Media archaeologists typically reject the body and the human sensory apparatus as the default subject of media and argue that the interpretive methods of the humanities are incapable of accounting for the ontology of machines. I propose, however, that media archaeological methods provide a necessary vocabulary to attend to obstetric ultrasound outside of iconography. I develop and deploy a media archaeological method that integrates feminist concerns—including advocation of subjugated persons and the making visible of maligned subjects—to examine the ultrasonic experiments performed by gynecologist Ian Donald on working-class Glaswegian women during the 1950s and 1960s, ultimately arguing that, in the case of ultrasound, there can be no separation between technical process and the historically situated body. (shrink)

Part I: Seeking ethical values for the professions -- Sources of guidance and the basis of ethics -- Seeking a foundation for ethics in the professions -- Values integral to the role of professions -- Part II: Exploring values as principles -- Seeking the best results -- Treating people justly and fairly -- Treating people justly and fairly -- Respecting autonomy -- Acting with integrity -- Part III: Applying principles to practice -- Ethical thinking in professional situations -- Dealing with (...) dilemmas -- Blame -- A guide to thinking about rights. (shrink)