In this chapter I consider three different positions on the a priori/a posteriori distinction that have been attributed to Hegel, specifically in the context of the epistemology of the metaphysical claims he defends in his Realphilosophie. I outline and briefly provide evidence for a reading of Hegel that understands him to retain the distinction in question, but to hold that the metaphysical claims he defends in the context of his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of spirit typically involve (...) elements of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge. I then defend this interpretation against two competitors. The first of these also takes Hegel to retain the distinction, but holds that the conclusions of his Realphilosophie, like those of his logic, are principally to be understood as known a priori. The second takes Hegel to abandon the a priori/a posteriori distinction altogether. I argue that these alternatives are less compelling. (shrink)

Although Hegel's absolute idealism is often presented as a solipsistically self-grounding, the Realphilosophie offers us an another image of Hegel which not only challenges standard interpretations, but more importantly gives us valuable resources to rethink living being. The zero-level determinacy of nature as “the idea in its otherness” has two consequences. Firstly, the starting point of any philosophy of nature must be a realism, insofar as nature's material constitution shows itself as unthought-like. Secondly, if idealism is to be viable, (...) it must prove itself to be a result of nature's immanent auto-development. Taking as my guide the category of “trembling” (Erzittern) and exploring its intimate connection with the emergent ideality of bodies producing sound, the chemical process and the voice of animals, I aim to show how the Realphilosophie is a reconstruction of the painful odyssey of the material genesis of the autopoietic self-referentiality of the concept as it is paradoxically begotten, by immaculate conception, in the pure extimacy of nature. The dialectics of nature is not a naturephilosophical theory of material being as implicit, self-unfolding productivity which necessarily leads to life via an intrinsic teleology, but rather an account of the contingent material emergence of unpredictable kinds of ontological determinacies from within the immanent field of mechanical nature. Only a naturalized idealism/idealized naturalism is capable of arguing for the ontological irreducibility of living being while simulta eously articulating its dependence upon different scientific domains which form its ontogenetic ground. It avoids both eliminative materialism and naïve vitalism. (shrink)

-- II. Allgemeine Gesellschaftstheorie, Theorie und Gesellschaftswissenschaften, in je zwei Fassungen -- III. Materialien zur Philosophie der konkreten Subjektivität, Erkenntnsstherorie.

Metaphysik, in ihrer älteren, sog. «klassischen» Phase schon mehrfach totgesagt, birgt einen Kern von Problemen, die in verschiedenartigster Umwandlung die denkende Menschheit nach wie vor in Atem hält. Der letzte grosse Versuch einer umfassenden Metaphysik z.Z. des Deutschen Idealismus scheiterte wirkungsgeschichtlich an der mangelnden Begegnungsfähigkeit mit den aufkommenden Naturwissenschaften. Eben dies wird hier nachzuholen versucht: Es geht darum - in konsequenter Fortführung früherer Arbeiten des Autors - Kerntheoreme der genannten philosophischen Bewegung, nicht primär historisch, sondern sachbezogen, mit dem mittlerweile selbstkritisch (...) gewordenen Problembewusstsein zeitgenössischer Naturtheorien systematisch in Beziehung zu setzen. (shrink)

The paper discusses four different topics: (1.) the role of personality in Hegel's system; his definitions of both (2.) logical and (3.) realphilosophical personality; (4.) the tension between the two.

Cette Philosophie de l'Esprit est le cours que Hegel donnait à ses étudiants de Iéna au moment même où il achevait la rédaction de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit. C'est dans ce texte que, pour la première fois, Hegel expose le schéma qui sera désormais classique : Esprit subjectif - Esprit objectif - Esprit absolu. Pour la première fois, surtout, qu'est proposée la célèbre triade : Art - Religion - Philosophie. La théorie du syllogisme que Hegel découvre en enseignant Aristote se (...) transforme ici dans le thème de " l'unité dialectique des opposés " dont la fortune sera considérable. Sous l'influence d'A. Smith et des économistes anglais, il prend conscience du bouleversement que le machinisme entraîne dans la vie économique : l'extrême richesse côtoie l'extrême pauvreté, et le corps social est ébranlé. L'ancien étudiant de Tübingen avait conservé la nostalgie de la Grèce antique. La Révolution française et les conquêtes napoléoniennes imposent une nouvelle vision du monde. Maintenant, dans ces manuscrits, perce le froid réalisme politique : d'où ce vibrant éloge de Machiavel avec la justification de la tyrannie, la caducité des traités et l'inutilité des projets de paix perpétuelle. Ecouter la leçon de Hegel lui-même et suivre ce penseur dans l'effort d'élaboration de son discours spéculatif reste la meilleure introduction à l'hégélianisme. (shrink)

This brief introduction sets the stage for the central aim of this issue of Ethics in Progress devoted to Hegel: to underscore the enduring relevance of his thought, in particular his Philosophy of Nature and his Realphilosophie, in addressing contemporary challenges. While Hegel may appear to some as an abstract thinker, seemingly surpassed by the demands of our era, the core elements of his philosophy – particularly the dialectical method, his reflections on the complex relationship between Natur (nature) and (...) Geist (spirit), and key concepts such as Anerkennung (recognition) and Wille (will) – continue to provide a vital conceptual framework for addressing pressing issues of our time. These include the environmental crisis and the evolving dynamics between humanity, nature, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. Consequently, this issue strives to approach Hegel through the lens of our contemporary experience, not to distort or “denaturalize” his thought, nor to fall into the trap of anachronism, but to breathe new life into the concept. By doing so, it invites the reader to listen anew to what Hegel’s philosophy might still teach us today. (shrink)

Logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhde on keskeisimpiä Hegelin filosofian herättämiä kysymyksiä. Hegelin mukaan hänen systeeminsä ensimmäinen osa eli logiikka ja toisen ja kolmannen osan muodostava reaalifilosofia vastaavat toisiaan. Hegelin tuotannossa on kuitenkin aineksia monenlaisille tulkinnoille tästä vastaavuudesta. -/- Yleensä ajatellaan, ettei Hegel ei tarjonnut tyydyttävää selitystä logiikan ja reaalifilosofian suhteesta. Jos otamme tämän tulkinnan lähtökohdaksi, on kysyttävä, miltä osin Hegelin lupaama vastaavuus ei toteudu. Toiseksi on kysyttävä vastaavuusvaatimuksen merkitystä Hegelin filosofialle ylipäänsä. Johtaako luopuminen logiikan ja reaalifilosofian vastaavuudesta absoluuttisen idealismin hylkäämiseen?

Das voruegende Buch verfolgt ein systematisches und philologisches Anuegen gleichermassen, weshalb es auch in verschiedener Weise gelesen werden kann. Der systematisch interessierte Leser wird sich mehr durch den ersten Teil angesprochen fuhlen, in dem ein Interpretationsansatz zu Hegels Idee einer Realphilosophie vorgestellt wird. Das philologische Interesse wird dann eher im zweiten Hauptteil befriedigt, der eine ausfuhruche Detailanalyse der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes" durchfuhrt. Trotzdem uegen hier nicht zweierlei Bucher vor, die man gut auch getrennt hatte pubuzieren konnen, denn der (...) systematische Interpretationsansatz wird erst durch die anschuessende Detailanalyse belegt sowie auch die komparatorische Form der Kommentierung, die in der Einleitung" nahere Erlauterung finden wird, sich erst vor dem Hintergrund jenes Interpretationsansatzes als sinnvoll erweist. Auch wenn sich also beide Hauptteile mit einem fokussierten Interesse getrennt voneinander lesen lassen, so bedarf doch die Argumentation dieses Buches beider Teilstucke, um vollstandig zu sein.". (shrink)

This book provides a detailed account of the role of property in German Idealism. It puts the concept of property in the center of the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel and shows how property remains tied to their conceptions of freedom, right, and recognition. The book begins with a critical genealogy of the concept of property in modern legal philosophy, followed by a reconstruction of the theory of property in Kant's Doctrine of Right, Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right, (...) and Hegel's Jena Realphilosophie. By turning to the tradition of German Rechtsphilosophie, as opposed to the more standard libertarian and utilitarian frameworks of property, it explores the metaphysical, normative, political, and material questions that make property intelligible as a social relation. The book formulates a normative theory of property rooted in practical reason, mutual recognition, and social freedom. This relational theory of property, inspired by German Idealism, brings a fresh angle to contemporary property theory. Additionally, it provides crucial philosophical background to 19th century debates on private property, inequality, labor, socialism, capitalism, and the state. The Concept of Property in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in 19th Century German philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, political theory, and political economy. (shrink)

Hegel's Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel calls the concept. My question is: can the concept in the Logic surprise itself? I argue that the answer to that question is yes—the concept can surprise itself when it rediscovers itself in a place it did not expect to be. I first clarify the kind of perspective that the Logic asks us as readers to occupy and its difference from the perspective inside the ‘opposition’ of consciousness. (...) I then provide an example of the concept's self-surprise, namely, the transition from subjective to realized purpose in the Subjective Logic. I conclude by drawing out some implications of self-surprise for Hegel's method in the Logic and in the subsequent Realphilosophie. (shrink)

It is well known that Hegel’s earliest explicit mention of Adam Smith is to be found in the first set of the Jenaer Systementwurfe, a text previously known under J. Hoffmeister’s title Jenenser Realphilosophie I. In this text, Hegel sums up the example by which Smith illustrates the division of labor: the manufacturing of pins. In a marginal note to this exposition, the name “Smith” appears with a page reference. It is quite significant that his first reference to Smith (...) is not to some marginal or merely historical point of Smith’s analysis, but to the crucial treatment of the division of labor, upon which, as a modern commentator put it, “the discipline of economics was nurtured.” Other indications of the importance which Hegel ascribed to Smith’s treatment are. (shrink)

The paper outlines a deflationary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysics, as presented in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. It focuses mainly on the Science of Logic as a theory of categories, which explores the movement of the Concept. The major idea is to read Hegel’s identification of logic and metaphysics as a thesis on deflating metaphysics into logic and semantics. Hegel’s metaphysics, which may better be called logico-metaphysics, does not describe the objective world directly. Rather, as a second-order theory, it (...) unfolds and makes transparent the fundamental concepts that are necessary for our understanding of the world and our orientation in it. -/- The paper begins with a brief discussion of Hegel’s idea of philosophy as system. The argument is made that Hegel should be interpreted holistically, in contrast to the popular approach of distinguishing between what is living and what is dead in his philosophy. In the second and third parts of the paper, an analysis is given of Hegel’s criticism of Kant, with an explanation of how Hegel’s Logic further develops Kant’s project of transforming traditional metaphysics. Here, the interesting fact that Hegel’s logical categories are not derived from an absolute first principle is pointed out. Instead, the task of Hegel’s Logic is to comprehend and systematize the concepts that have already been evolved in the history of philosophy. In the last part of the paper, the deflationary approach is extended to Hegel’s Realphilosophie. While Hegel’s Logic takes the place of ontology, his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit offers a comprehensive metaphysica specialis, laying conceptual foundations for understanding various dimensions of reality, from nature through the ethical-political world to different cultural domains. The paper takes Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit as an example to illustrate how the deflationary interpretation sheds light on Hegel’s “practical” philosophy as a second-order theory that does not aim to uncover first-order normative principles for guiding actions, but rather to develop the concepts necessary for normative judgments. (shrink)

This paper responds to the debate between John Burbidge, Edward Halper, and William Maker about the nature of Hegel’s idealism, and in particular of the relationship between Hegel’s logic and Realphilosophie. I argue that Maker’s position is the one most consistent with both what Hegel says about philosophy and Hegel’s own philosophical practice. I begin by highlighting the essential differences that separate the three interpretations and then turn to Hegel’s texts, to identify the passages that pose difficulties for the (...) readings of Burbidge and Halper. I conclude by considering, and ultimately rejecting, the objections that Burbidge and Halper raise to Maker’s interpretation. (shrink)

RESUMEN La historia de las ideas y de la cultura considera el romanticismo un movimiento estético y literario, sin embargo su origen responde a una cuestión esencial de la Filosofía, con una actitud altamente contestataria contra las formas políticas establecidas y la educación recibida de la generación anterior. Traer el romanticismo al academicismo del aula fue la forma de desactivar su fuerza. La búsqueda de una edad heroica, determinó una concepción del tiempo y su proceso civilizador opuesta a la pretensión (...) ilustrada de progreso. El primer precedente es Hamann, una teología crítica alimentada por el pietismo que interiorizó a la vez el empirismo de Hume. Con Herder la Naturaleza se convierte en medio y fin de la nueva educación, recuperando de alguna manera lo que fue el radicalismo de Rousseau. Para Kant, aquella moda era estridente, sin embargo comprendió de ellos las aporías de un finalismo organicista de la Naturaleza y la incapacidad de explicar este proceso desde el determinismo físico laplaciano, vigente en las ciencias experimentales. Frente a la casuística externalista, la libertad se convierte en la esencia de lo humano. Esto apasionó a los románticos. Para Schiller es el motor de la historia humana, que está por encima de la historia natural —el Espíritu, según Hegel—. Este fue el contexto de la Filosofía que Fichte enseñaba, el idealismo: el deber de acción es anterior al propio deber moral. Y esta es la Filosofía de los «años de formación» de Schelling, los Naturphilosophen y el mismo Hegel. La voluntad de acción de la Filosofía fichteana es en Novalis y Hölderlin una «fuerza insconsciente». Contemplan el sublime proceso de la Naturaleza, como una transposición de su propia juventud vivida, de la contradicción y devenir de su propia psique: la crianza que supera años e incorpora etapas. Por eso Hegel apunta en su semestre de 1805/06, la Realphilosophie: «¿La Tierra tiene una historia? ¿Qué es historia?». (shrink)

Conceptually, recognition claims a cardinal role in many prominent philosophical theories. Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, uses the German word Rekognition—a term that in many ways has no antecedent in prior tradition—to signify the identification, the grasping of, a unified meaning through thought. However, it is through Hegel that a substantial step in practical philosophy is taken, and recognition is put into dialogue with self-consciousness and freedom. Hegel uses the German word Anerkennung, in the period of Jena (...) class='Hi'>Realphilosophie, to mean the "real" actualization of freedom through a struggle which leads to two different levels of recognition: legal and moral—their forms constituted by love... (shrink)

Gegenstand der Arbeit ist der bedeutende Begriff der Anerkennung in drei Texten Hegels, dem System der Sittlichkeit (1802-3), der Jenaer Realphilosophie (1805-6) und der Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807). Vor diesem Hintergrund wird dann die kritische Auslegung und Ausarbeitung dieses Begriffes im philosophisch-politischen Denken Axel Honneths dargelegt.

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God (Oxford University Press, 2017) undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an (...) explicit level of theological significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

System der Sittlichkeit.--Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts.--Jenaer Realphilosophie.--Anhang zur Jenaer Realphilosophie.--Göhler, G. Dialektik und Politik in Hegels frühen politischen Systemen.--Rosenzweig, F. Die Entwicklung des Hegelschen Systems der Staatsphilosophie in Jena.--Marcuse, H. Die Jeaner Entwürfe der Hegelschen Sozialphilosophie.--Lukács, G. Hegels objektiver Idealismus und die Ökonomie.--Ilting, K.-H. Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der artistotelischen Politik.--Habermas, J. Arbeit und interaktion.--Riedel, M. Die Rezeption der Nationalökonomie.

Der erste Teil hat den Logos und sein Erscheinen in der Zeit zum Inhalt, d.n. den Übergang vom reinen Logos in die Realität und damit die gegenseitige Bezogenheit von Logik und Realphilosophie, wobei das Verhältnis von Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und seiner Philosophie der Religion im Fokus steht. Der zweite Teil weist die Religion als den Ort aus, in dem die Hegels Werk durchziehende Dialektik von unendlicher/absoluter und endlicher/ menschlicher Subjektivität kulminiert.

In this paper I argue that one of the most important impulses that structure Hegel's account of religion is the need to show gratitude for the gift of creation. Beginning with the “Love“ fragment and 1805-6 Realphilosophie , I first explore what it means to see God's relationship to spirit as one of externalization or divestment ( Entäusserung ). Then, relying on the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I argue that Hegel takes Christianity to be the Consummate (...) Religion because it not only offers its own divestment to match God's, but actually takes itself to participate in God's own divestment. This leads to a discussion of revealed religion in the Phenomenology , which, in contrast to simpler forms of religion such as the worship of luminous being ( Lichtwesen ), is able to conceive of a divine generativity in which spirit actively participates. I conclude by identifying two political implications of the centrality of divestment in Hegel's account. First, it means that, since Hegel takes Christianity to be unique in its representation of divine divestment, he cannot be a simple pluralist on religious truth. Second, Hegel's emphasis on divestment in his various accounts of religion helps set up his critique of sovereignty from the standpoint of philosophy or absolute knowing. While religion still clings to a vision of humanity as sovereign over nature, its origin in gratitude for creation proves to be incompatible with this vision. (shrink)

There is a place in the Hegelian system where the notion of Objectivity is explicitly articulated. One entire section in the Science of Logic is entitled ‘Objectivity’, almost suggesting that that would be the appropriate place to unveil the question of the notion of objective thought. However, precisely that section, its content and its presence have always represented a problematic knot in the Hegelian logical system. The problem is two-fold: on the one hand, the categories of this section (Mechanism, Chemism (...) and Teleology) seem to refer to the realm of the Realphilosophie, and they seem not to respect the purity of logical thought. This makes the connection between such section and the remaining Hegelian system uncertain and questionable. On the other hand, the Objectivity section does not seem to present any character which determines its logical advancement over Subjectivity. This contribution focuses on the interpretation of the origin of this section and on the logical meaning that “objectivity” has in the Logic. This paper explores the roots of the problem attempting to undo a few of its theoretical knots via a particular interpretation of the Syllogism. The underlying thesis in this analysis is in fact that the section on Objectivity originates precisely in the internal dynamics of the Syllogism. The forms of self-reflection in the Syllogism justify the presence of the section Objectivity. In this context, Objectivity does not present itself with the characters of immediacy and externality that are normally attributed to it, but it expresses the result of the syllogistic process. The second fundamental aspect of this short analysis is that Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology as categories are not directly exported from the Realphilosophie. They are rather organizational forms in the relationships among concepts. Thus, they don’t figure as abstractions from the proper structures of nature and spirit. Rather, they express the relational structures reached by thought once the syllogism has been able to manifest a yet occult rational capacity of thought. (shrink)

If Hegel has been taken seriously at all in this century it has been qua social and political philosopher. As author of the Science of Logic, that work on which he considered the Realphilosophie dependent, he has been largely dismissed. Recently, however, interest in Hegel’s peculiar logico-ontological project as developed in his Logic has been revived and the traditional negative reading of this work challenged. Here debate has tended to center on the question of his relation to Kant. In (...) contrast to the traditional rejection of Hegel’s logical project as exemplifying the kind of dogmatic metaphysics effectively killed off by Kant’s critical philosophy, the revisionist reading construes Hegel as a definite post-Kantian thinker, intent on freeing Kant’s philosophy from the remnants of the traditional metaphysics still ensnaring it. (shrink)

This paper aims to show Hegel’s system to be a self-generating and conceptually closed system and, therefore, an idealism. Many readers have agreed that Hegel intends his logic to be a self-generating, closed system, but they assume that the two branches of Realphilosophie, Nature and Spirit, must involve the application of logical categories to some non-conceptual reality external to them. This paper argues that Nature emerges from logic by the reapplication of the opening logical categories to the final category (...) of logic, Absolute Idea, and that the resulting categories are irreducible bipartite compounds that develop into new categories by characteristic forms of self-relation following, roughly, the sequence in logic from Being through Essence. With the determination of Absolute Idea by Concept, Spirit emerges, and it develops through its own characteristic forms of self-relation until Absolute Idea is self-determined. Hence, Realphilosophie is a rigorous conceptual development that goes beyond logic without introducing anything that is not conceptual. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Hegel pense qu’il n’y a rien de plus important à comprendre que la liberté pour nous autres humains, et rien que nous ne comprenions plus mal. Tout son système philosophique, de fait, avec son ampleur et sa précision incroyables, peut être compris comme une unique démonstration très élaborée de l’importance et de la signification de la liberté. Qui plus est, la philosophie de Hegel n’est pas seulement à propos de la liberté, mais elle prétend aussi la produire. Car la (...) recherche philosophique sur ce que cela signifie que d’être libre aboutit chez lui à l’idée que la liberté dépend de la pratique de la philosophie. Comprendre cette position — ce qui est l’objectif principal du présent article — requiert d’examiner ce que Hegel a à dire au sujet de la liberté, de la philosophie et de leur interconnexion. La section 1 prépare cet examen en situant la liberté dans le système de Hegel. La section 2 présente l’explication du concept de liberté qu’il nous fournit dans sa Logique. La section 3 exploite cette explication logique pour interpréter la thèse de Hegel, dans sa Realphilosophie, que tous les êtres spirituels, et eux seuls, sont libres. La section 4 réfléchit sur le rôle attribué à la philosophie dans la libération de tels êtres spirituels. Et la section 5, enfin, conclut l’article en discutant quelques questions qui peuvent être soulevées au sujet de mon interprétation du traitement hégélien de la liberté. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an explicit level of theological (...) significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Hegel's notion of 'idea'. I provide first of all some general clarifications on this notion, and then I analyze the meaning of the logical Doctrine of the idea in relation to the internal organization of the system. My aim is to interpret this section of the Science of Logic as a Grammar of Hegel's Realphilosophie.

Agreeing that Hegel is a realist, I take issue concerning how Hegel establishes realism. Westphal’s Hegel develops a Kantian formal-transcendentalphilosophy founded in an epistemology which establishes how consciousness apprehends a given world. My account contends that Hegel has moved beyondfoundational epistemology, beginning philosophical science in a logic which develops conceptual self-determination independently of and prior to any assumptions about consciousness and world. This methodological idealism leads to metaphysical realism in that the completion of logic’s selfdeterminationnecessitates the subsequent consideration of the (...) nonlogical in the Realphilosophie. This reconciles Hegel’s insistence that philosophy be thoroughly self-grounding with his recognition of a world beyond thought which philosophy conceptualizes realistically as a distinct domain that is neither thought itself nor thought-like. (shrink)

Einleitung. 1. Pantragismus - Panlogismus - 2. Der Begriff der Negativitat - 3. Zum methodischen Vorgehen der Arbeit Erster Teil: Der Systemansatz der ersten Jenaer Jahre. I. Der Tod Gottes, die griechische Tragodie und das absolute Nichts. 1. Bedrohungen der Freiheit - 2. Die Tragodie im Sittlichen - 3. Das Absolute als Nacht, Nichts und Abgrund - II. Grundlagen der Kritik an der Verstandesreflexion. 1. Die kritische Funktion von Logik und Skeptizismus - 2. Ansatze zu einer Geschichtsphilosophie - III. Kritik (...) an der neuzeitlichen Subjektivitats- und Reflexionsphilosophie. 1. F.H. Jacobis Philosophie der Subjektivitat - 2. Fichtes Ausgang vom reinen Selbstbewusssein - 3. Kants Antinomienlehre - IV. Der Begriff der Negativitat als Grundlegung spekulativen Denkens. 1. Die Durchfuhrbarkeit des spekulativen Ansatzes - 2. Die Ambivalenz der Aussagen der praktischen Philosophie - 3. Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Tradition Zweiter Teil: Die Ausarbeitung und Umwandlung des Systemansatzes in den Jahren 1803-1806. I. Die Negativitat der modernen, neuzeitlichen Gesellschaft. 1. Kritik an den neuzeitlichen Naturrechtstheorien auf der Grundlage einer Theorie des Kampfes um Anerkennung - 2. Das Gefuge der Stande - 3. Der Staat - II. Negativitat und Selbstbewusstsein in den Jenaer Systementwurfen. 1. Die Rekon- struktion der absoluten Sittlichkeit im System der Sittlichkeit - 2. Die Bewusstseinslehre des Systementwurfs von 1803/04 - 3. Das Erkennen und die Metaphysik der Subjektivitat in der Logik und Metaphysik von 1804/05 - 4. Die Negativitat des Selbstbewusstseins in der Realphilosophie von 1805/06 - III. Das Verhaltnis der verschiedenen Formen von Negativitat zueinander. 1. Negativitat des Seins und Selbstbewusstseins - 2. Die Negativitat der Entzweiung in der modernen Gesellschaft - 3. Vorblick auf die Phanomenologie Dritter Teil: Der Begriff der Negativitat in der Phanomenologie des Geistes. I. Die Idee einer Geschichte des Selbstbewusstseins. 1. Pragmatische Ges". (shrink)

This ambitious and exciting study appears in a series concerning philosophers in the Kantian and post-Kantian European tradition. Ferrarin opens with a clear statement of his goal: “This work does not merely intend to show the extent to which Hegel is indebted to Aristotle or the degree to which his interpretation of Aristotle is at times arbitrary or misguided. To be sure, it will also spell out such points, but it is not intended simply to be an exposition of Hegel’s (...) interpretation of Aristotle. It can be characterized as a detailed analysis of the relation between Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle’s thought and his usage and elaboration on it. Its main task is to show the tensions that result from this contrast”. Ferrarin works out his account in four parts, “The History of Philosophy and Its Place Within the System”, “Logic And Metaphysics”, “Aristotle and The Realphilosophie”, and “Conclusions”. The volume is completed by an extensive Bibliography and two Indices. (shrink)

I began my review of volume 6 of the new critical edition by saying that from the three volumes published we could see how the editors planned to deal with almost all the problems that they faced. I shall not be tempted into any rash statement of this kind again; for it is clear that every volume brings its own special problems with it. The present volume contains the manuscript that Hegel wrote for a course on “Realphilosophie” which he (...) probably gave for the first time at Jena in the Winter Semester of 1805/6, and again in Summer 1806. This manuscript was first utilized by K. Michelet, who inserted copious quotations from the “Naturphilosophie” into the Zusätze for his edition of the Encyclopedia “Philosophy of Nature”. Michelet already knew fairly accurately what the provenance and date of the manuscript were. Modern studies have only made the dating a little more precise and altogether more secure. The whole manuscript was finally published by J. Hoffmeister in 1931. It has been known to us for the last forty-five years as Jenenser Realphilosophie II. (shrink)

Hegel transformed political philosophy in distinguishing between civil society and the state. That is Riedel’s thesis. Riedel reads Hegel in the context of the preceding and contemporary writers to whom Hegel responded, e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, Haller, Wolff, Thomasius, and Kant. In the tradition composed of such writers, civil society was the state and vice versa. In light of the English industrial revolution and the French political revolution, Hegel concluded that this identity was untenable. Riedel traces the intellectual arguments (...) of Hegel’s early works, like the Jenenser Realphilosophie, Naturrecht, and System der Sittlichkeit, to the Philosophie des Rechts. (shrink)

This work exposes the development of Hegel’s political theory from its origins in Hegel’s reading of Sir James Stewart and the composition of the early theological writings, through the Philosophy of Right. Its principle value lies in showing how careful use may be made of Hegel’s earlier writings in interpreting his mature political philosophy. Avineri describes Hegel’s early dissatisfaction with the understanding of the state as an instrument for the protection of private property, and his attempts to develop a concept (...) of ethical community. Developments of the latter notion are seen in the anti-nationalism of The German Constitution, as well as in the theories of property, class, and representation contained therein. Avineri shows the inappropriateness of ascribing to Hegel a political romanticism, regarding either Prussia or Classical Greece. And in his comments on the System der Sittlicheit [[sic]] and the Realphilosophie, he offers detailed and valuable commentary on Hegel’s early concept of labor. He demonstrates here Hegel’s sensitivity to the complex economic reality of modern society, and shows the early Hegel’s ability to describe labor, class divisions, commodity production, money, and alienation in ways remarkably akin to Marx. Here too Hegel’s notion of the state as that which overcomes the private character of production in civil society and constitutes society as an ethical community is seen. (shrink)