Lire Heidegger, c'est relire autrement tout ce que nous lisons. Ce Cahier invite à mieux comprendre la pensée heideggérienne autours des thèmes principaux qu'il aborde.Des essais, témoignages et lettres retracent l'impacte de sa pensée dans la culture moderne.Textes de : Walter Biemel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Jünger, Roger Munier, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Luc Marion, John Sallis, David Farrel Krell, Jean-François Courtine, Jean Beauffret, Dominique Janicaud, Otto Pöggeler, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-Pierre Charcosset, F. Wybrands, Jacques Taminiaux, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Marc (...) Froment-Meurice, Jean-Michel Palmier, Reiner Schürmann, Jean-Marie Vaysse, Henri Birault, Jacques Derrida, Gérard Granel, Daniel Charles, Gabriel Liiceanu, Jean Greisch, René Gonner.Contient un choix de textes de Heidegger. (shrink)

Volumes I and II provided a completely new translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. Volume III contains 207 of Descartes' letters, over half of which have previously not been translated into English. It incorporates, in its entirety, Anthony Kenny's celebrated translation of selected philosophical letters, first published in 1970. In conjunction with Volumes I and II it is designed to meet the widespread demand for a comprehensive, authoritative and accurate edition (...) of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

German description: Descartes' Meditationen von 1641 haben bis heute die philosophische Reflexion immer wieder herausgefordert. In diesem Werk geht er von einer Haltung radikalen Zweifels aus, macht dann aber geltend, dass selbst ein ausserster Skeptizismus nicht die fundamentale Wahrheit, dass ich existiere, in Frage stellen kann: ego sum, ego existo. Ausgehend von dieser Gewissheit versucht Descartes, die Grundlagen einer neuen Wissenschaft zu legen. Ursprunglich auf Lateinisch verfasst, wurden die Meditationes 1647 ins Franzosische ubersetzt. Diese Ubersetzung wurde von Descartes selbst durchgesehen (...) und bearbeitet und unterscheidet sich in vielen Nuancen vom lateinischen Original. Diese Ausgabe ist die einzige, die neben der neuen Ubersetzung ins Deutsche den lateinischen Text wie auch die franzosische Version bietet. Erganzt wird sie durch einen umfangreichen Kommentar. Sie eignet sich damit besonders als Arbeitsbuch fur Studenten. (shrink)

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes VOLUME 3. Volumes 1 and 2 provide a completely new translation of many of the major works in metaphysics, epistemology, and natural philosophy.

Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. (...) Even though Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness has been very influential, a number of philosophers have put forward powerful arguments against it. In this paper, I defend the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense. My argument has two parts. In the first part, I provide a phenomenal contrast argument in favor of twofoldness. In the second part, I respond to what I take to be the most important objections against twofoldness. I believe that both parts together provide strong support for the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense. (shrink)

These two volumes provide a completely new translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. They are intended to replace the only reasonably comprehensive selection of his works in English, by Haldane and Ross, first published in 1911. All the works included in that edition are translated here, together with a number of additional texts crucial for an understanding of Cartesian philosophy, including important material from Descartes? scientific writings. The result should meet (...) the widespread demand for an accurate and authoritative edition of Descartes? philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

A translation by Thomas Steele Hall, an historian of physiology, of the 1664 edition of Descartes' L'Homme (ed. Claude Clerselier). Includes an introduction, review of Descartes' physiology, a synopsis of the first French edition, bibliographical materials (editions and sources of L'Homme), and extensive interpretive notes. Also incorporates the French text of 1664 of L'Homme. Forward by I. B. Cohen.

These two 1985 volumes provide a translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. They are intended to replace the only reasonably comprehensive selection of his works in English, by Haldane and Ross, first published in 1911. All the works included in that edition are translated here, together with a number of additional texts crucial for an understanding of Cartesian philosophy, including important material from Descartes' scientific writings. The result should meet the (...) widespread demand for an accurate and authoritative edition of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

Principles of Philosophy. Author’s Letter to the Translator (Preface).

Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer (...) plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences. (shrink)

This edition features reliable, accessible translations; useful editorial materials; and a straightforward presentation of the Objections and Replies, including the objections from Caterus, Arnauld, and Hobbes, accompanied by Descartes' replies, in their entirety. The letter serving as a reply to Gassendi--in which several of Descartes' associates present Gassendi's best arguments and Descartes' replies--conveys the highlights and important issues of their notoriously extended exchange. Roger Ariew's illuminating Introduction discusses the Meditations and the intellectual environment surrounding its reception.

This work was originally published anonymously.

Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...) argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense. (shrink)

Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we (...) can visually experience natural kind properties. In this paper, I argue that certain kinds of low-level properties, namely shape-gestalt properties, can explain these phenomenal contrasts just as well as high-level properties. If successful, this is a modest, but nevertheless significant result. Even though it does not prove the falsity of Siegel’s proposal, it nevertheless secures the existence of a plausible alternative. (shrink)

While National Human Rights Institutions are widely regarded as particularly promising tools in the emerging transnational regime for the regulation of business and human rights, we still know little about their potential and actual contribution to this field. This article bridges the gap between business and human rights research and NHRI scholarship, proceeding in three steps: Firstly, I analyze the structural conditions for NHRIs to tackle business-related human rights abuses effectively, focusing on the key conditions of legitimacy and competences. Secondly, (...) I examine the envisaged role and functions of NHRIs in business and human rights regulation according to the Paris Principles and the UN Guiding Principles. Thirdly, I reconstruct and critically assess NHRIs’ mandates and powers to address corporate human rights abuse, based on the analysis of surveys and reports. I argue that there is a significant mismatch between the essential structural conditions for effective NHRI engagement with business and human rights, the expected contribution of NHRIs to the prevention and remedy of corporate human rights abuses, and the limitations of their mandates and powers in practice. To overcome that misalignment and unlock NHRIs’ full potential, this article proposes a reform of the Paris Principles which would provide these institutions with a robust source of international legitimacy and increase the pressure on state governments to extend their powers. (shrink)

Increasingly, nurses use the philosophy of hermeneutics, especially Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutics, to inform interpretive research. However, application of the work of these philosophers to interpretive nursing research has proved problematic as it fails to recognise, or act upon, obligations inherent in their work. Through a review of hermeneutically informed nursing research, methodological implications regarding the use of hermeneutic philosophy are examined in relation to: (i) the need to address forestructures and pre‐understandings; (ii) checking interpretations with research participants; (iii) seeking (...) objectivity, consensus and accuracy in textual interpretation; (iv) evaluating interpretations; and (v) gaining entry into the hermeneutic circle. This review suggests that despite obligations inherent in Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophy, nurses fail to actualise these obligations in their research. In following Heidegger, nurses need to make the scientific theme secure by working out their forestructures in terms of the phenomenon under investigation. Those following Gadamer need to accept that interpretation seeks to manifest textual meanings rather than individual ones. And, whether following Heidegger or Gadamer, the way to make manifest textual meanings is to engage with the text within the hermeneutic circle by continuing to address forestructures and pre‐understandings and by considering their influences upon the research. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the (...) color solid: hue, saturation, and lightness. I argue that a viable version of representationalism needs to renounce this restriction to three dimensions and consider illumination to be a genuine phenomenal dimension of color. My argument for this thesis falls into two parts. I first consider the phenomenon of color constancy in order to show that neither Russellian nor Fregean representationalism can do justice to the phenomenal significance of local illumination. I subsequently formulate a version of representationalism that accounts for illumination by taking it as a phenomenal dimension of color. (shrink)

Attempts to interpret the manifold aspects of the ternary heaven, earth and man, drawing mainly on Far-Eastern sources. This study aims to demonstrate the metaphysical, cosmological and spiritual perspectives underlying the Triad symbol.

Degree-sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x (...) has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief. (shrink)

In this article, we distinguish between a ‘game code of conduct’, an ‘ethical and/or legal code of the military profession’, ‘codes of social intercourse’, and a ‘code of respect’, and we assess to what extent these codes are reflected in the chivalrous behaviour we see today. Chivalry has developed from archaic medieval game codes of conduct into a codification regarding the laws of war and humanitarian law, but also in behavioural standards that are formalized in books of etiquette. However, these (...) forms of moral codes of conduct do not overcome the problem of benevolent sexism, due to the fact that ‘chivalry’ is in essence a masculine ideology that excludes women from the military profession. Eventually, chivalric codes of social intercourse might develop into a code of respect, which may solve this issue. (shrink)

1 contient:Les préambules ; Les observations ; Les olympiques ; Les règles pour la direction de l'esprit ; Le traité de l'homme ; Le discours de la méthode ; Le traité de la mécanique... 2 contient: Les méditations ; Les objections et les réponses ; Réponse aux instances de Gassendi ; Lettre au P. Dinet ; La recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle ; Des extraits de la correspondance.3 contient:Les principes de la philosophie ; Les notae in programma (...) ; Les passions de l'âme... (shrink)

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse (...) behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. (shrink)

Universities are increasingly pushed to apply for external funding for their research and incentivised for making an impact in the society surrounding them. The consequences of these third-mission activities for the degree of freedom of the research, the potential to make a substantial research contribution and the ethical challenges of this increased dependency on external funding are often neglected. The implications of external sponsorship of research depend on the level of influence of the sponsor in the various elements of the (...) research. This paper provides a typology of sponsored innovation management research projects in order to create a common language between researchers and practitioners. Through in-depth analysis of nine innovation management research projects, carried out and funded in Northern Europe, and a rich set of qualitative data, the paper outlines the key dimensions of the projects where researchers and practitioners should agree on the degrees of freedom of the research project. It identifies three different methodological dimensions that can impact the likelihood of generating publishable results from the innovation management research. The three dimensions are purpose, throughput and output. The paper discusses the positive and negative impact of these types of projects and generates implications for the central stakeholders. (shrink)

Current perspectives on attractiveness-related prosocial biases emphasize the contribution of evolutionarily shaped mating drives. Here, we extend these concepts by highlighting the pivotal role of the hypothalamic peptide oxytocin in augmenting the salience and rewarding value of social stimuli, including the partner's face, thereby fostering social bonding in general and the stability of monogamous pair bonds and offspring care in particular.

In his paper “Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia,” Işık Sarıhan addresses the debate between strong representationalists and qualia theorists. He argues that qualia theorists like Ned Block and Amy Kind who cite double-vision, afterimages, etc., as evidence for the existence of qualia are mistaken about the actual nature of these states. According to Sarıhan, these authors confuse the fact that these states are non-endorsed representational states with the fact that they are at least partly (...) non-representational. I argue that Sarıhan’s argument contains gaps that suggest that he misidentifi es the mistake that leads these qualia theorists to their conclusion. In my view, these qualia theorists do not confuse the fact that the states in question are non-endorsed states with the fact that they are non-representational, but rather mistake certain representational contents, or certain aspects of these contents, for qualia. (shrink)

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which reflects the power of the individual positions in the network. Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution, which turns out to be (...) proportional to the well-known degree measure. We compare the β-measure and degree measure by providing characterizations, which differ only in the normalization that is used. (shrink)

Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason and seeking truth in the field of science -- The meditations concerning first philosophy -- Rules for the direction of the mind.

El presente artículo se enfrenta al problema clásico sobre cómo interpretar lo que Aristóteles, en de An. III, 5, denomina “el intelecto que produce todas las cosas”, llamado comúnmente intelecto agente. Históricamente, se han presentado dos lecturas: una, que se remonta a Alejandro de Afrodisia, que lo asocia con el motor inmóvil y con la divinidad y otra, asociada a Teofrasto pero que tiene en Filópono y St. Tomás de Aquino a sus principales representantes, que lo considera una facultad puramente (...) humana. Esta última interpretación ha sido históricamente la más sostenida; sin embargo, en tiempos recientes ha habido un resurgimiento de interpretaciones del intelecto agente como “divino”. Lo que queremos mostrar en este texto es que este resurgimiento se debe, más que a una reinterpretación del intelecto agente, a una comprensión diferente de la divinidad en la filosofía aristotélica, con características inmanentes y más próximas al intelecto humano. (shrink)

Can agents overcome unconscious psychological influences without being aware of them? Some philosophers and psychologists assume that agents need to be aware of psychological influences to successfully control behavior. The aim of this text is to argue that when agents engage in a proactive control strategy, they can successfully shield their behavior from some unconscious influences. If agents actively check for conflicts between their actions and mental states, they engage in reactive control. For engaging in reactive control, agents need awareness (...) of those mental states which are in conflict with an action. In contrast, if agents are actively maintaining a goal in consciousness, they engage in proactive control. Proactive control does not consist of conflict detection or conflict resolution. I argue that proactive control explains how agents overcome unconscious psychological influences. In doing so, I claim that consciousness is important for engaging in reactive and proactive control. (shrink)

The hexagonal structure for ‘the geometry of logical opposition’, as coming from Aristoteles–Apuleius square and Sesmat–Blanché hexagon, is presented here in connection with, on the one hand, geometrical ideas on duality on triangles (construction of ‘companion’), and on the other hand, constructions of tripartitions, emphasizing that these are exactly cases of borromean objects. Then a new case of a logical interest introduced here is the double magic tripartition determining the semi-ring ${\mathcal{B}_3}$ and this is a borromean object again, in the (...) heart of the semi-ring ${{\rm Mat}_{3}(\mathbb{B}_{\rm Alg})}$ . With this example we understand better in which sense the borromean object is a deepening of the hexagon, in a logical vein. Then, and this is our main objective here, the Post-Mal’cev full iterative algebra ${\mathbb{P}_4 = \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{F}_4)}$ of functions of all arities on ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ , is proved to be a borromean object, generated by three copies of ${\mathbb{P}_2}$ in it. This fact is induced by a hexagonal structure of the field ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . This hexagonal structure is seen as precisely a geometrical addition to standard boolean logic, exhibiting ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ as a ‘boolean manifold’. This structure allows to analyze also ${\mathbb{P}_4}$ as generated by adding to a boolean set of logical functions a very special modality, namely the Frobenius squaring map in ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . It is related to the splitting of paradoxes, to modified logic, to specular logic. It is a setting for a theory of paradoxical sentences, seen as computations of movements on the bi-hexagonal link among the 12 classical logics on a set of 4 values. (shrink)

According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...) colours are represented by a single type of mental state. The main goal of this paper is to show that a more complex account of colour representation is needed for the monitoring theory of consciousness to do justice to the phenomenology of colour experiences. In particular, I will argue that the fine-grained character of colour experience—that is, the fact that perceivers can become conscious of small differences between colours—requires that colour representation be construed in terms of two different types of mental states, namely sensory states that represent appearance properties and colour representations that represent physical colours. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Reid on MemoryRené van Woudenbergthis paper is a discussion of Thomas Reid’s views on memory as an “avenue of knowledge.” Part 1 deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning memory, knowledge, and belief which he holds to be “obvious and certain.” Part contains a more detailed discussion of Reid’s thesis that “memory is unaccountable.” Part 3 inquires how Reid’s critique of the Way of Ideas fits with his (...) own views on memory.Reid’s dealings with memory are part of his broader inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the human mind. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses not only memory, but other avenues of knowledge as well, such as perception and reasoning. In these essays Reid is doing straight epistemology. This is not to deny that Reid addresses other topics as well. In the essay on memory, for instance, Reid criticizes John Locke’s account of personal identity. But even then his discussion focusses on epistemological matters; one of his conclusions, for example, is that Locke confounded personal identity with the evidence we have of our personal identity, a thesis, Reid points out, that is bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid’s views on memory are related with his views on personal identity, I will abstain from a discussion of the latter. His epistemology of memory, I think, warrants attention in its own right.11. memory, knowledge, and beliefI.IIn Essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1784],2 entitled “Of Memory,” Reid writes: [End Page 117]It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment.(EIP 339)Memory, says Reid, gives us knowledge of things past, whereas sense perception gives us knowledge of things present. Reid takes it to be “obvious and certain” (as the title of the first chapter of Essay III indicates) that “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception... must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of perception” (EIP 340).These remarks may, however, occasion some doubts. One way of explaining Reid’s remark that the object of memory is something that is past, is that whenever someone, S, remembers something, viz., that p, p will be a proposition about something that is past.3 This explanation gives the right result for such propositions as there was snowfall in late August, and she once visited Finland4 But, as Norman Malcolm has observed, it does not always give the right results.5 For, he says, there are cases of S remembering that p, where p is not a proposition about the past. Let p be his telephone number is 2 79-289-59 75, or his car is in the garage. What is remembered, in these cases, is a proposition about something that is not past, but present (or: about what is presently the case). It is, so it seems at least, possible for S to remember the present.It even seems possible for S “to remember the future” (something Aristotle deemed impossible).6 S can remember, for instance, that the game starts at 8:00 P.M., or that there will be elections next year.No doubt some will find these suggestions preposterous. Still, we say such things as “I remember my telephone number” and “I remember the game starts at 8:00 P.M.” Someone who balks at the suggestion that we can remember present and even future things, therefore, has to find a way of dealing with these quite common modes of saying. One way would be to argue that these manners of saying are incorrect, another that they are elliptical. Since the first thesis is unconvincing (it is, after all, correct, i.e., correct English to use the expressions under consideration), we are left with the second, viz., that these modes of saying are elliptical. Can this be made acceptable? Let us see.Might... (shrink)