La philosophie de la Nature et du Temps chez Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) n’a peut-être pas assez retenu l’attention des scientifiques, en particulier en France. On sait que ce mathématicien-philosophe collaborant avec Bertrand Russell pour l’écriture des Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) a insisté sur le caractère abstrait des points d’espace dans la fondation de la géométrie. A partir de 1911, il étend cette observation aux instants de temps, et développe progressivement, à partir de là, une vision de l’ontologie du monde comme (...) une succession de « concrescences d’entités actuelles » dont chacune apporte avec elle une brique de temps finie. Ces concrescences ne sont pas sans rappeler les réductions du paquet d’ondes dans les opérations de mesure en mécanique quantique ; en fait, Whitehead a suivi de près le développement de cette théorie, comme il a suivi de près le développement de la relativité. Par ailleurs, sa philosophie de la Nature, ou comme il le dit sa philosophie de l’organisme, prévoit une solidarité globale des entités actuelles qui par certains côtés rappelle l’intrication quantique. On examine plus en profondeur cette similarité et ses limites, et aborde les relations esprit-matière chez cet auteur. Malgré ses défauts, la métaphysique de Whitehead, en en particulier la négation de l’instant a mis en lumière, à mon sens, la complexité du temps de la nature (chez Whitehead le process), bien au-delà de la variable continue t des physiciens. Une large part de cet article est basée sur mon livre Whitehead, Philosophe du Temps (auteur, 2020, à paraître). (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), a mathematician and logician by training, is the author of highly original works at the crossroads of science and philosophy, exploring the nature of the world around us and its temporal flow. Convinced that everyday terms distort reality, Whitehead invented or borrowed terms more appropriate to his project. The word "Process", which gives its title to his most famous work Process and Reality (1929), is central to his thinking. Process introduces his vision of nature as a (...) succession of crystallizations, each of which proves the finite granularity of time: the instant does not exist. It also implies a confrontation with the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Whitehead's perspective allows for the occurrence of creative novelties, but for which the world necessarily cooperates with a deity, the role of which is examined in this book's last chapter. In Alfred North Whitehead, Philosopher of Time, author Rémy Lestienne mixes biographical elements and intellectual advances, from logicism to philosophies of nature. A compelling introduction to Whitehead's demanding work, this book deciphers a metaphysical landscape often considered too abstract to be approachable, but points out the philosopher's imperfections with respect to the scientific advances of our time. (shrink)

In 1922, three young men founded the avant-garde magazine 7 Arts to promote the arts and in particular the synthesis of all the arts as only architecture and cinema can achieve. Pierre Bourgeois, a poet, his brother Victor, an architect, and the painter Pierre-Louis Flouquet were soon joined by the composer Georges Monier and Karel Maes, painter, engraver and furniture designer. "The five" succeeded in harnessing the vital forces of the Belgian avant-garde and in placing their magazine at the very (...) heart of the European avant-garde. Throughout the six years of publication the pages of the magazine provided a platform for the principal protagonists of the Belgian and international artistic scene: De Stijl, the Bauhaus, the Purists, the Constructivists, the Futurists and many other champions of the geometric abstraction to which they gave the name Plastique pure or Pure Plastic. Their ambition was to have the arts penetrate every dimension of modern urban life and to transform it in the process. In 2020, CIVA is devoting a retrospective exhibition to 7 Arts, the impressive adventure that this work presents. (shrink)

Considering the urgency of addressing grand challenges that affect human health and achieving the ambitious health targets set by the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, the role of business in improving health has become critical. Yet, our systematic review of the business–health literature reveals that business research focuses primarily on occupational health and safety, health care organizations, and health regulations. To embrace the health externalities generated by business activities, we propose that future research should investigate the conditions under which business (...) articulates and participates in health challenges, engages in multilevel actions toward tackling health challenges, and improves health outcomes and its impact on the health of external stakeholders, including customers and local communities. We also urge business scholars to engage with the public health research community to increase impact. (shrink)

L’ecclésiologie catholique contemporaine s’est progressivement focalisée sur quelques expressions techniques très précises de l’ensemble des documents du concile Vatican II, dont l’enjeu oecuménique était certainement important. Toutefois, les débats qu’elles ont suscités se sont relativement essoufflés. L’examen des traités ecclésiologiques catholiques récents laisse entrevoir des perspectives de chantiers nouveaux qui doivent affronter la difficile question de l’unité de cette réalité complexe qu’est l’Église, ainsi que le dit Lumen gentium, no 8.

Cassirer and Panofsky: A Philosophical Misunderstanding This paper argues that German art historian and iconologist Erwin Panofsky unintentionally misused the concept of "symbolic form" coined by his friend and colleague, philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Although both shared the same neo-Kantian background, I contend that Panofsky clung to Kant’s dualistic theory of knowledge, while Cassirer explicitly adopted a non-dualistic way of thinking largely inspired by Goethean morphology. That is why Panofsky could distinguish between the "natural" space of perception and the cultural space (...) of artistic representation, when Cassirer refused such a possibility. In so doing, Panofsky proved that he totally missed Cassirer’s point: according to the philosopher of symbolic forms, there is no such thing as a "nature," unless this "nature" is grasped as inherently cultural and historical. (shrink)

We present and contrast two accounts of cooperative communication, both based on Active Inference, a framework that unifies biological and cognitive processes. The mental alignment account, defended in Vasil et al., takes the function of cooperative communication to be the alignment of the interlocutor's mental states, and cooperative communicative behavior to be driven by an evolutionarily selected adaptive prior belief favoring the selection of action policies that promote such an alignment. We argue that the mental alignment account should be rejected (...) because it neglects the action-oriented nature of cooperative communication, which skews its view of the dynamics of communicative interaction. We introduce our own conception of cooperative communication, inspired by a more radical ecological interpretation of the active inference framework. Cooperative communication, on our ecological conception, serves to guide and constrain the dynamics of the cooperative interaction via the construction and restructuring of shared fields of affordances, in order to reach the local goals of the joint actions in which episodes of cooperative communication are embedded. We argue that our ecological conception provides a better theoretical standpoint to account for the action-oriented nature of cooperative communication in the active inference framework. (shrink)

Rémi Tison Dans cet article, je traite de la nature des processus cognitifs sous-tendant nos attributions d’états mentaux aux animaux non humains. Selon la conception traditionnelle, nous n’avons qu’un accès indirect aux états mentaux d’autrui, qui doivent être inférés sur la base du comportement. Cette conception traditionnelle influence autant les débats conceptuels concernant l’esprit des animaux que les recherches empiriques sur la cognition animale. Or de récents travaux sur la cognition sociale humaine avancent plutôt une conception « interactionniste », selon (...) laquelle les états mentaux peuvent parfois être directement perçus dans le comportement. J’applique dans cet article la conception interactionniste à l’attribution d’états mentaux aux animaux. Je conclus que celle-ci rend mieux compte des attitudes du sens commun à l’égard des états mentaux des animaux et est plus féconde pour la recherche empirique sur la cognition animale que la conception traditionnelle. (shrink)

Consumer-based datasets are the products of data brokerage firms that agglomerate millions of personal records on the adult US population. This big data commodity is purchased by both companies and individual clients for purposes such as marketing, risk prevention, and identity searches. The sheer magnitude and population coverage of available consumer-based datasets and the opacity of the business practices that create these datasets pose emergent ethical challenges within the computational social sciences that have begun to incorporate consumer-based datasets into empirical (...) research. To directly engage with the core ethical debates around the use of consumer-based datasets within social science research, I first consider two case study applications of consumer-based dataset-based scholarship. I then focus on three primary ethical dilemmas within consumer-based datasets regarding human subject research, participant privacy, and informed consent in conversation with the principles of the seminal Belmont Report. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce an ecological account of communication according to which acts of communication are active inferences achieved by affecting the behavior of a target organism via the modification of its field of affordances. Constraining a target organism’s behavior constitutes a mechanism of socially extended active inference, allowing organisms to proactively regulate their inner states through the behavior of other organisms. In this general conception of communication, the type of cooperative communication characteristic of human communicative interaction is a (...) way of constraining interaction dynamics toward the goals of a given joint action by constructing and altering shared fields of affordances. This account embraces a pragmatist view according to which communication is a form of action aiming to influence the behavior of a target, and stands against the traditional transmission view according to which communication fundamentally serves to convey information. Understanding acts of communication as active inference under an ecological interpretation allows us to link communicative and ultimately linguistic behavior to the biological imperative of minimizing free energy and to emphasize the action-oriented nature of communicative interaction. (shrink)

Many prominent scholars of Hume's philosophy have suggested that Hume eventually abandoned his associationist account of sympathy, which he made so much of in the Treatise, by the time he came to write the second Enquiry. In this paper I reconsider the seeming disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy, but with the ultimate aim of defending a no-change hypothesis. That is, I’ll argue that careful analysis reveals that Hume not only retained the associationist theory of sympathy in his later (...) work, he made no substantive changes to this theory, including in particular, in EPM. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an account of linguistic content based on the active inference framework. While ecological and enactive theorists have rightly rejected the notion of content as a basis for cognitive processes, they must recognize the important role that it plays in the social regulation of linguistic interaction. According to an influential theory in philosophy of language, normative inferentialism, an utterance has the content that it has in virtue of its normative status, that is, in virtue of the (...) set of commitments and entitlements that the speaker undertakes by producing this utterance. This normative status is determined by the normative attitudes shared by members of the utterer’s linguistic community. I propose here an account of such normative attitudes based on the ecological interpretation of the active inference framework. I explain how social normativity can be understood in that framework as the way in which members of a group shape their social niche to make it more predictable. Finally, I apply this account of social normativity to basic communicative practices, thereby explaining how social normative expectations can emerge to regulate these communicative practices, eventually leading to the institution of the sort of normative statuses constitutive of linguistic content. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of why consumers engage in ethical consumption. The authors draw on self-affirmation theory to propose that the choice of an ethical product serves a self-restorative function. Four experiments provide support for this assertion: a self-threat increases consumers’ choice of an ethical option, even when the alternative choice is objectively superior in quantity (Study 1) and product quality (Study 2). Further, restoring self-esteem through positive feedback eliminates this increase in ethical choice (Studies 2 and 3). As (...) an additional test of the robustness of our results, a final study examined the effect of self-threat on choice in a field setting (Study 4). The findings indicate that ethical purchases are not just altruistic. They hold purposeful individual value and can help in the self-restorative process. Implications for managers making decisions regarding investment in ethical product features are discussed. (shrink)

The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading, and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this (...) paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy. (shrink)

We show that MRP + MA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . This generalizes a result by Weiß who showed that PFA implies that ITP(λ, ω 2 ) holds for all cardinal λ ≥ ω 2 . Consequently any of the known methods to prove MRP + MA consistent relative to some large cardinal hypothesis requires the existence of a strongly compact cardinal. Moreover if one wants to force MRP + MA (...) with a proper forcing, it requires at least a supercompact cardinal. We also study the relationship between MRP and some weak versions of square. We show that MRP implies the failure of □(λ, ω) for all λ ≥ ω 2 and we give a direct proof that MRP + MA implies the failure of □(λ, ω 1 ) for all λ ≥ ω 2. (shrink)

The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that (...) this new account, despite tacit acceptance by all major theories of emotion, in fact rules out some of the most fundamental and controversial claims of one side of the nature-of-emotion debate, emotional cognitivism. (shrink)

This essay centralizes and explores Ernst Cassirer’s concept of style. Although it does not emerge as much as the concept of form or symbol in Cassirer’s corpus, style plays a major—if intrinsic—role throughout the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. I shall examine how Cassirer’s conception of style is derived from Goethe’s theory of art and why it is fundamental to Cassirer’s theory of knowledge. Style is considered the defining feature of the cultural sciences, as well as the sign of the anthropological (...) character of the natural sciences, and, more generally, as the creative principle underlying all objectivity. I argue that it is therefore justified to read style as the fundamental yet variable expression of our symbolic relation to reality. Indeed, style refers neither to an abstract principle nor to a predetermined truth: it is a formative force actualizing itself in the incessant diversification of its forms. In so doing, Cassirer’s underexamined concept of style proves highly relevant in our times of epistemic and cultural pluralism. (shrink)

The authors report that the reorganization of body configuration during weightlessness is based on an intrapersonal frame of reference such as the configuration of the support surface and the position of the body's center of gravity. These results stress the importance of “knowledge” of the state of internal geometric structures, which cannot be directly signalled by specific receptors responsible for direct dialogue with the physical external world.

Sur le plan des expériences, une première éthique féminine, centrée sur l’idéal de la mère au foyer, est souvent efficacement intériorisée et influencent les sentiments. Ces normes sexuées informent des idéaux auprès desquelles les femmes mesurent leurs réalisations, si bien qu’ils participent de la couleur des romans personnels. Après 1970 apparaît une nouvelle éthique féminine concurrente qui a multiplié les chemins du bonheur pour les femmes dans un monde social devenu plus ouvert.

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} O presente escrito aborda a relaçáo entre subjetividade e objetividade, mais precisamente trata da constituiçáo e configuraçáo da subjetividade na concepçáo do racionalismo crítico de Karl Popper. Considerando que para os fins deste texto os termos “eu” e “sujeito” sáo usados como sinônimos, o título do presente artigo poderia (...) ser: “O que o sujeito pensa que está fazendo no cosmos?”; “O ‘eu’ pensa que por ser autocriado é Deus?”; “Pode objetivamente uma máquina ser insubstituível?” Ou ainda: “O fantasma emerge no mundo”; Todas essas possibilidades têm em comum a indicaçáo direta ou metafórica da interdependência entre o “eu” (o sujeito, o fantasma, a personalidade), o cérebro (máquina, corpo) e o pensamento objetivo (resultado da interaçáo entre o “eu” e o cérebro). Qualquer das possibilidades acima evita as variáveis à pergunta que tradicionalmente foi feita: o que é o “eu”? Este tipo de questáo normalmente conduz a respostas essencialistas, infrutíferas e que redundam em verbalismos e equívocos. (shrink)