We demonstrate that social capital is associated with positive food security outcomes, using survey data from 378 households in rural Uganda. We measured food security with the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale. For social capital, we measured cognitive and structural indicators, with principal components analysis used to identify key factors of the concept for logistic regression analysis. Households with bridging and linking social capital, characterized by membership in groups, access to information from external institutions, and observance of norms in groups, (...) tended to be more food secure. Households with cognitive social capital, characterized by observance of generalized norms and mutual trust, were also more food secure than others. However, we established that social capital is, by itself, insufficient. It needs to be complemented with human capital enhancement. We recommend that development interventions which focus on strengthening community associations and networks to enhance food security should support activities which enhance cognitive social capital and human capital skills. Such activities include mutual goal setting, trust building and clear communication among actors. Education efforts for community members, both formal and non-formal, should also be supported such that they potentially strengthen social capital to improve food security in rural Uganda. (shrink)

The cautions of our commentators are all well taken, and we are grateful for them. When we say that physicians should respect the wishes of their patients for medical treatment, even if that would make them complicit in torture being inflicted on their patients, Henry Shue reminds us that that assumes that the patients undergoing torture retain minimally adequate decision-making capacity. Insofar as the torture aims at, and succeeds in, producing ‘regression to an infantile state’, patients who are victims of (...) such torture would likely fail standard tests of that. True though that observation may be, it leaves us with no solution to our initial problem. Were we to assume that the victim does not have decision-making capacity, and reject his request for treatment on that basis, we would victimise him further by abandoning him to his fate leaving him with no alternatives and no support whatsoever. Furthermore, in regimes of psychologically sophisticated torture of the sort Shue discusses, there may be an even stronger reason for a physician to comply with a victim-patient's request for her to treat him. For a physician to refuse a would-be patient's request for treatment, on grounds he lacks adequate decision-making capacity, might further reinforce the infantilising message of the torturers. If so, that would amount to complicity in his torture, insofar as it furthers the wrong done by perpetrators. In the absence of victim's consent, doctors typically use criteria like family's advice, patient's best interest or heuristics identifying what most patients would prefer in similar situations. None of these options is available to doctors caring for torture survivors during the course of their torture, however. The first is obviously not. The second is not because the physician cannot be altogether sure what is in her victim-patient's best interests, given that treating him will …. (shrink)

A propagator for a path space integral can be used to represent the and provides a natural way to model a control signal that is temporally segmented by placement of pairs of stimulating and recording electrodes. Although care must be exercised in interpreting the resulting measurement, the technique should prove useful to experimenters who study cerebellar functioning.

Revisioning macro-democratic processes in light of the processes and promise of micro-deliberation, Innovating Democracy provides an integrated perspective on democratic theory and practice after the deliberative turn.

Utilitarianism, the great reforming philosophy of the nineteenth century, has today acquired the reputation for being a crassly calculating, impersonal philosophy unfit to serve as a guide to moral conduct. Yet what may disqualify utilitarianism as a personal philosophy makes it an eminently suitable guide for public officials in the pursuit of their professional responsibilities. Robert E. Goodin, a philosopher with many books on political theory, public policy and applied ethics to his credit, defends utilitarianism against its critics and (...) shows how it can be applied most effectively over a wide range of public policies. In discussions of such issues as paternalism, social welfare policy, international ethics, nuclear armaments, and international responses to the environment crisis, he demonstrates what a flexible tool his brand of utilitarianism can be in confronting the dilemmas of public policy in the real world. (shrink)

In this strikingly original book, one of the leading scholars in the field focuses on the influential idea of deliberative democracy. Goodin examines the great challenge of how to implement the deliberative ideal among millions of people at once and comes up with a novel solution: 'democratic deliberation within'.

Discusses the justification for a minimal welfare state independent of political rhetoric from the right or the left.

May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote (...) from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling electoral procedure. To illustrate the conditional nature of this claim, we also identify a richer informational environment in which approval voting, not plurality rule, is supported by a May-style argument. (shrink)

William Whewell is considered one of the most important nineteenth-century British philosophers of science and a contributor to modern philosophical thought, particularly regarding the problem of induction and the logic of discovery. In this volume, Robert E. Butts offers selections from Whewell's most important writings, and analysis of counter-claims to his philosophy.

This book examines the Condorcet Jury Theorem and how its assumptions can be applicable to the real world. It will use the theorem to assess various familiar political practices and alternative institutional arrangements, revealing how best to take advantage of the truth-tracking potential of majoritarian democracy.

A thorough account of Langer's philosophical career.

Mechanical reductionism, which deals entirely with homogeneous variables, will constrain and enable the activities of richly heterogeneous living systems, but it cannot determine their outcomes. Such indeterminism owes to problems with dimensionality, dynamical logic, intractability, and insufficiency. The order in any living structure arises via an historical series of contingencies that were selected endogenously by stable autocatalytic processes in tandem with, and usually in opposition to, conventional external influences (natural selection). The development of living communities thereby resembles a Heraclitean dialectic (...) between processes that build up and those that tear down. Investigating this unconventional dynamic requires metaphysical assumptions that are complementary to those that have guided science over the past three centuries. The new dynamics can be represented in terms of weighted networks of interacting processes, which facilitate the statement of testable hypotheses. Network analysis thereby implements and tests ideas that heretofore could only be addressed as verbal propositions. (shrink)

Originally published in 1989 Liberal Neutrality approaches the recommendation of neutrality by confronting the abstract prescription (that we should be neutral) with the implications for particular people and institutions. This not only identifies what neutrality involves logically, but also exposes the practical difficulties that may be encountered in pursuing it. In some cases, such close examination shows that neutrality is not desirable, and in others that it is attainable only within certain limits. Although neutrality has become a fashionable term in (...) political theory, this is the only volume to subject the idea to systematic scrutiny. It will be useful not only to specialists in diverse disciplines - political scientists, philosophers, sociologists, lawyers and educationalists. (shrink)

This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on (...) which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Cultural relativism Ethical absolutism A cognitive alternative to EA: ethical relativism External and internal objections to ER Finding the middle ground: pluralistic relativism Ethics in business Conclusion.

This essay outlines an explanatory virtue of presentism: its unique ability amongst temporal metaphysics to deliver a partial explanation of the conservational character of natural laws. That explanation relies on presentism, uniquely amongst temporal metaphysics, being able to support an endurantist account of persistence. In particular, after reconsidering a former argument for endurantism entailing presentism by Merricks (Noûs 33:421-438, 1999), a new argument for this entailment, is expounded. Before delivering the explanation of the conservational character of natural laws, a brief (...) account of that explanandum is given, followed by an elaboration of the wider significance of an explanation for the conservational character for natural laws, particularly for the dispositional essentialist project of nomic reductionism, and explaining the non-simultaneity of causation. (shrink)

The theme of this paper is that while there are four seemingly contradictory classes of statements in the Tao de Ching regarding moral values and the Taoist sage, these statements can be interpreted to be consistent with each other. There are statements which seemingly state or imply that nothing at all can be said about the Tao; there are statements which seemingly state or imply that all value judgements are relative; there are statements which appear to attribute moral behaviour to (...) the Taoist sage and there are statements which appear to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the Taoist sage. A consistent interpretation of these different statements can be found first by qualifying the assertion that the Tao is not capable of description to the less absolute assertion that nothing absolutely true can be said about the Tao; second, by arguing that the statements that appear to make all values relative refer to the correlativity of concepts, not the equality of values. Moreover, since the statements that appear to attribute moral behaviour to the sage are, by virtue of their predominance in the text, well justified and that by virtue of their paucity in the text, it is plausible to seek an alternate interpretation for the statements that seem to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the sage. Finally, the way in which the sage can be seen as good without attributing goodness to the Tao is by distinguishing between the way the sage appears to the observer who is outside of the Tao and the way in which the sage appears to himself. This latter distinction takes the form of the sage as appearing to display the quality of goodness in itself but not goodness for itself. (shrink)

Presentism states that everything is present. Crucial to our understanding of this thesis is how we interpret the ‘is’. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that on any interpretation presentism comes out as either trivially true or manifestly false. Yet, presentism is meant to be a substantive and interesting thesis. I outline in detail the nature of the problem and the standard interpretative options. After unfavourably assessing several popular responses in the literature, I offer an alternative interpretation that provides the desired (...) result. This interpretation is then used to clarify the distinction between ‘real change’ from mere variation and temporal relativisation. Reflecting on my solution, I try to diagnose the source of confusion over these issues. Then, building upon Fine’s distinction between ontic and factive presentism, I elucidate what the presentist thesis specifically concerns and how best to formalise it. In the process I distinguish a weak and strong version of the presentist thesis. Finally, I end by drawing out some limitations of the paper. (shrink)

This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s (1908, 1927) A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series (namely an ersatz-B-series) (...) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time. (shrink)

This paper firstly distinguishes between principles of “global justice” that apply the same anywhere and everywhere – Tännsjö’s utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism and such like – and principles of “local justice” that apply within the specific sphere of health-care. Sometimes the latter might just be a special case of the former – but not always. Secondly, it discusses reasons, many psychological in nature, why physicians might devote excessive resources to prolonging life pointlessly, showing once again that those reasons might themselves be (...) morally significant. (shrink)

Este artigo compara e contrapõe a abordagem naturalista pragmatista para a peculiaridade da linguagem, exemplificada, principalmente, mas, não exclusivamente, por John Dewey, com a extensa abordagem de Charles Taylor em seu O animal linguístico. Taylor, inspirado pelas obras de Hamann, Herder, e Humboldt, conta com recursos filosóficos e conceituais diferentes para o delineamento do que ele denomina de ‘a forma’ da capacidade linguística humana. Porém, Dewey e Taylor chegam a posições que se sobrepõem sem se identificar: a linguagem é a (...) característica definidora constitutiva dos seres humanos. Seres humanos são definidos pelo surgimento da ‘como’ consciência, uma ‘ruptura’ em nossa imersão imediata no mundo, e, como Peirce e Dewey mostraram de maneira tão lúcida, um reflexivo estar consciente do uso de signos e sistemas de signos de todos os tipos. Esses sistemas potencializam e transformam nosso acesso ao mundo e a nós mesmos. Eles não apenas rotulam um mudo já existente. Eles criam âmbitos de significados e valores que não surgiram sem eles. A distinção crucial de Taylor entre os modelos designativo e constitutivo da linguagem é apoiada plenamente pela consideração pragmatista da linguagem, a qual Taylor não declara. Essa distinção mostrará ser de importância especial para Dewey e Taylor na criação de paisagens existencialmente vitais de significado incorporados nas autodescrições e nas práticas delicadas das artes de auto-reflexão. Tanto Dewey quanto Taylor mostram que assim como as texturas abertas da experiência crescem por suas extremidades, assim a própria linguagem possui sua própria “extremidade” e nos aponta para os domínios “liminares” que sustentam o limiar do sentido para além do totalmente dizível. Esses domínios, que eles mostram de maneiras diferentes mas complementares, são acessados como realidades por formas não discursivas que abrangem as obras de arte, o que Taylor denomina de ‘representações,’ e rituais performativos e restaurativos, tanto pessoais, cívicos e religiosos que incorporam os significados. Dewey e Taylor, divergem, entretanto, sobre se e de que maneira estes domínios precisam transcender a natureza. (shrink)