Most research studying the corporate social performance –corporate financial performance link has utilized developed country samples. Also, this literature has generally focused on a wide variety of industries, ignoring the fact that certain sectors – such as controversial industries – have graver social and environmental issues. Hence, a gap exists in this tradition when it comes to emerging markets and controversial industries. This paper attempts to fill this void by providing preliminary evidence and insight on the matter. Based on an (...) exploration in six Latin American countries and five controversial industries, we find a negative bidirectional association between CSP and CFP. These results tend to contradict the mainstream conclusion of a positive bidirectional link, suggesting that institutional and market-level forces play a major role in shaping this relationship. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...) of our evolved moral intuitions, and that _ii) _that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to offer a critical analysis of the political projections that Antonio Damasio has put forward of his specific conception of homeostasis. By starting from a complex conception of homeostasis, one that focuses not only on the maintenance of life but also on flourishing, Damasio argues that certain cultures are contrary to the homeostatic imperative. I will suggest that, even if we adopt the complex interpretation of homeostasis (rather than the deflated one that is usual (...) in most evolutionary approaches), resorting to the concept of homeostasis would lead to a condemnation of modern capitalist societies, not from an ethical or political point of view, but from a strictly evolutionary one (i.e., a point of view that takes into consideration the preservation of the conditions under which our species can survive in the future). (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. (...) These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)

Descartes niega que una máquina pueda ser inteligente, pues los mecanismos son predecibles, inflexibles y limitados. Los seguidores de la Inteligencia Artificial clásica (o IA fuerte) argumentan lo contrario. Pese a esto, Descartes y la IA proponen que la mente podría no estar adscrita a propiedades físicas, posibilidad explorada por el primero a partir de una intuición modal que separa mente y cuerpo. La IA fuerte se acerca a esta tesis cuando reduce la mente a una Máquina de Turing cuya (...) realización física resulta irrelevante. Aunque ambos argumentos presuponen teorías e implicancias diferentes, en este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo resulta compatible con una forma de Dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica del Materialismo que originalmente la inspiró. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide a robust classification of valid sentences in set theory by means of existence and related notions and, in this way, to capture similarities and dissimilarities among the axioms of set theory. In order to achieve this, precise definitions for the notions of productive and nonproductive assertions, constructive and nonconstructive productive assertions, and conditional and unconditional productive assertions, among others, will be presented. These definitions constitute the result of a semantical analysis of (...) the notions involved. The conceptual clarification developed here results in a classification of valid sentences of set theory that goes against the standard view that extensionality is not an existence assertion. (shrink)

Interpersonal coordination in soccer has become a trending topic in sports sciences, and several studies have examined how interpersonal coordination unfolds at different levels (i.e., dyads, sub-groups, teams). Investigations have largely focused on interactional behaviors at micro and macro levels through tasks from dyadic (i.e., 1 vs. 1) to team (i.e., 11 vs. 11) levels. However, as the degree of representativeness of a task depends on the magnitude of the relationship between simulated and intended environments, it is necessary to address (...) a discussion on the correspondence between competitive and practice/experimental settings in soccer. The aims of this paper are to: (i) provide a brief description of the main concepts underlying the subject of interpersonal coordination in sports teams; (ii) demonstrate, through exemplar research findings, how interpersonal coordination in soccer unfolds at different scales; and (iii), discuss how coaches and researchers may ensure representativeness for practice and experimental tasks. We observed that papers addressing the analysis of interpersonal coordination tendencies in soccer often resort to dyadic (one vs. one) or sub-group (many vs. many) experimental tasks, instead of full-sized (11 vs. 11) games. Consequently, the extent to which such patterns reflect those observed in competition is somewhat uncertain. The design of practice and/or experimental tasks that rely on sub-phases of the game (e.g., 1 vs. 1, 4 vs. 4) should ensure the preservation of players’ behavior patterns in intended match conditions (11 vs. 11). This can be accomplished by measuring the level of action fidelity of the task, ensuring correspondence and successful transfer across contexts. (shrink)

This paper examines two twenty-first-century developments in the enactive approach in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. The first is the surging interest in Hans Jonas, which begins with Weber and Varela's 'Life After Kant' (2002) and continues up to the present. The second is the 'social turn' that the enactive approach has taken, especially after De Jaegher and Di Paolo's (2007) work on participatory sense-making. We look at these two developments through the lens of the problem of other minds. We (...) argue that they are incompatible due to a residual solipsism in Jonasian phenomenology. Ultimately, this leaves enactive theory with a choice between embracing Jonas or embracing the social turn in enactive theory. We recommend replacing Jonasian influences with those from the late work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. We argue that enactivism can evade the problem of other minds using Merleau-Ponty's discussion of 'flesh' and 'expression'. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el Test de Turing, uno de los métodos más famosos y controvertidos para evaluar la existencia de vida mental en la Filosofía de la Mente, revelando dos mitos filosóficos comúnmente aceptados y criticando su dogma. En primer lugar, se muestra por qué Turing nunca propuso una definición de inteligencia. En segundo lugar, se refuta que el Test de Turing involucre condiciones necesarias o suficientes para la inteligencia. En tercer lugar, teniendo presente el objetivo y el tipo de (...) evidencia que recopila, se considera si el Test de Turing cuenta como un experimento científico a la luz de la concepción de Fodor. Finalmente, se argumenta que Turing simpatiza con una forma de Conductismo, confundiendo la simulación -un proceso epistémico que, gobernado por la verosimilitud, es eficaz cuando alguien es causado a creer que el computador es inteligente- con la duplicación de la inteligencia en cuanto propiedad, lo que ocurre a nivel ontológico. Tal confusión implica un dogma y explica por qué, a pesar de haber sido propuesto como una solución final a la problemática de si las máquinas programadas piensan, el Test de Turing ha tenido precisamente el efecto contrario en más de cinco décadas, estimulando el debate filosófico en torno a la naturaleza de lo mental. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta uma série de considerações sobre o tema do racismo no pensamento Iluminista com a intenção tanto de contribuir para a análise dos fundamentos do racismo moderno quanto para apresentar uma defesa da história da filosofia como disciplina capaz de auxiliar a tarefa de crítica filosófica de nosso presente. Em primeiro lugar, sugere uma série de reflexões gerais sobre maneiras de abordar e aprofundar a reflexão sobre o racismo no pensamento moderno, sobretudo no século XVIII. Em segundo (...) lugar, reflete sobre a categoria Iluminismo considerando seus aspectos históricos e filosóficos e a variedades de posições filosóficas que a noção abriga. Por fim, considera as manifestações racistas dentro da obra de Voltaire, levando em conta os comentários anteriores e a ambivalência das posições do autor para mostrar que seu racismo não se funda em uma filosofia da história como defesa da civilização europeia, mas em suas posições poligenistas gestadas em seu embate contra a ortodoxia cristã e sua explicação da origem dos seres humanos. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo é uma análise marxista da crise econômica mundial e do modo como ela coloca em questão o sistema capitalista. Nele defendemos a tese de que não estamos diante de uma "crise financeira", mas de uma crise clássica de superprodução, determinada pelo caráter cada vez mais especulativo do capital e pela hipertrofia do capital financeiro diante do capital que produz diretamente a mais-valia. São analisadas as dimensões estruturais da crise, o papel do Estado, a natureza do capital financeiro (...) e as determinações estruturais que produzem a tendência histórica à queda da taxa de lucro.Palavras-chave: Capital - Crise de Super-Produção - Capital Financeiro - Taxa de Lucro - Mais-valia.: This article is a marxist analysis of the global economic crisis and the way it defies capitalism as a whole. We argue here that this crisis is not a "financial" one, but a classical overproduction crisis, determined by the speculative character of capital and the hypertrophy of the financial capital in relation to the capital that produces directly plus-value. We discuss the structural dimensions of the crisis, the nature of financial capital and the structural determinations that produce the historical tendency to the fall of the profit tax. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizo por qué hay gente que desconfía en la IA, y cómo esta puede ser confiable. En específico, describo los orígenes de la desconfianza, hago un diagnóstico de la incertidumbre que pArovoca, y ofrezco una clave para una IA confiable. En la primera sección, trato con cómo las máquinas no han sido consideradas confiables, lo cual es la esencia de la desconfianza en la IA: tal como muestro, ha habido un cambio desde un debate académico acerca de (...) las mentes-IA, a raíz del escepticismo de las otras mentes, a miedos cotidianos, principalmente basados en la preocupación por el reemplazo humano. En la segunda, hago un diagnóstico acerca de la incertidumbre que la IA provoca. Finalmente, ofrezco una clave para una IA confiable basada en la explicabilidad. Argumento que esta vía expertos certificados institucionalmente son factores facilitadores de una IA confiable. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo busca reinterpretar la propuesta conceptual de Cómo hacer cosas con palabras de Austin, siguiendo los lineamientos con que Austin caracterizó su quehacer filosófico: pragmatismo, analítica y fenomenología del lenguaje. Austin no busca simplemente adherir a las corrientes contemporáneas que llevan estos nombres, sino reinterpretar las problemáticas modernas que las originan, con el fin de crear una propuesta conceptual que renueve la concepción tradicional del acto.

Throughout the sources that have come down to us from the Roman period of the Stoic school, we find an important number of therapeutical practices that can be clearly linked to other schools and can be consequently seen to constitute the common ground that enables the idea that there is a general Hellenistic approach to the problem of philosophy as therapy. I will argue that a subset of those strategies, which I will refer to as repetition, ascetic and visualization practices, (...) can be better understood as part of an approach to the problem of comprehension, a new approach which, contrary to what may seem at first glance, is fully consistent with the intellectualist conception of human agency defended by both Early and Roman Stoics. I will further suggest that this new approach to the notion of comprehension may be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction with the Early Stoic excessively abstract approach to the problem of knowledge. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo consiste en poner en diálogo tres líneas de investigación dentro de la epistemología contemporánea: la Epistemología de la Virtud, el paradigma de la Racionalidad Limitada y la Teoría Argumentativa de la Razón. Frente al problema que interesa analizar aquí, a saber, la búsqueda de un marco teórico que permita diseñar estrategias pedagógicas (tanto al interior de la enseñanza de la filosofía como fuera de ella) sobre premisas realistas, la Epistemología de la Virtud será presentada como una (...) corriente marcadamente optimista desde el punto de vista epistémico. El paradigma de la Racionalidad Limitada representará la contrapartida de dicha corriente, en la medida en que parece conducir a un pesimismo marcado respecto de la posibilidad de diseñar estrategias que permitan perfeccionar las prácticas epistémicas de los sujetos. Frente a estos dos polos, se sugerirá que la Teoría Argumentativa de la Razón (desarrollada en la última década por Hugo Mercier y Dan Sperber) representa una alternativa prometedora por dos razones fundamentales: en primer lugar, porque ofrece una respuesta al problema (enfrentado por el paradigma de la Racionalidad Limitada) del carácter adaptativo de la razón humana desde un punto de vista evolutivo; en segundo lugar, porque permite superar el pesimismo epistémico esencial al paradigma de la Racionalidad Limitada al momento de planificar estrategias pedagógicas realistas y efectivas. (shrink)

This work shows how systematically studying people’s use of emotion concepts (what people think emotions are), can inform debates regarding the nature of emotion (what emotions are). As such, it makes a contribution both in terms of method and content. In regards to the methodological approach, this work constitutes the first experimental philosophy Intuitions Project approach (see Article 4) to general questions regarding the nature of emotion. It does not only bring together the philosophical and scientific literature on emotion (as (...) much research has already done) but directly combines philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to study emotion. Articles 1 – 3 use quantitative (inferential statistics) and qualitative (text analysis) methods on data from surveys whose design was guided by philosophical analysis. And Article 4 considers the use of neuroimaging methods in philosophy. Finally, Article 2 builds bridges between analytic philosophy and the scientific study of concepts. In particular, by considering concepts’ internal structure (typicality, weight, and dependency relations). In regards to the content, the main contribution of this work consists in testing the premises used in arguments for (and against) emotion theories. This helps us discriminate between sound and unsound arguments, and select the appropriate conclusions regarding the nature of emotion. Figure 1 graphically represents the state of the debate after this contribution (see Figure 5 in the Introduction for a comparison point). In the following, I will detail the contribution of each of the articles in this work, and how they converge and complement each other to provide a coherent picture of emotion (concepts). Figure 1. Arguments from conditional and problem cases as applicable for both Cognitive / Perceptual theories and Somatic / Attitudinal theories. Solid black arrows indicate support, dashed red arrows indicate opposition. Claims challenged in this work are flagged using dashed lines. Claims not tested are flagged using transparency. -/- The studies presented in Article 1 tested the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic theories of emotion. The results of these studies showed that people apply emotion concepts (fear, anger, sadness) in cases of absence of bodily feelings. This questions the claim that bodily perceptions (attitudes) are necessary for emotion (see Introduction §4.1.) and supports the existence of “calm” cases of emotion (see Introduction §4.3.2.). As we saw in the introduction, these two claims are incompatible. The first one supports the Subtraction Argument in favor of Somatic (Attitudinal) theories, while the second one supports arguments against them. With these results in hand, we can conclude that the Subtraction Argument is unsound (its main premise is likely false), and the argument from calm emotions is sound (see Figure 1). This poses a problem for Somatic and Attitudinal theories of emotion, but also Hybrid theories of emotion, as they are also committed to the claim that felt bodily changes constitute emotions. The studies presented in Article 2 went beyond those in Article 1 by testing people’s use of emotion concepts in cases where the presence (absence) of bodily feelings, cognitive evaluations, and action tendencies is independently manipulated. The results show that people consider that bodily feelings are non-necessary for emotion, in line with the results in Article 1. Action tendencies were also regarded as non-necessary, which poses a problem for Motivational theories of emotion (see Introduction §5.2.1.). Finally, cognitive evaluations were considered non-necessary in two out of three studies. However, across all studies, cognitive evaluations were the most important factor in determining people’s use of emotion concepts. Thus, it seems like we should not give up the claim that “When someone does not [value perception/belief], she is not emotion]” (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the results show that bodily changes and action tendencies depend on cognitive evaluations. These last two results square well with the core tenets of Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories of emotion. Thus, the results presented in Article 2 support these theories. Article 3 complements Article 1 and 2 by testing the weight of yet another factor in people’s use of emotion concepts. Namely, the value of the situation in which the emotion is experienced. The results of Article 3 show that this factor significantly influences people’s use of emotion concepts. This poses a challenge for theories of emotion as non-intentional states (Morag, 2017; Whiting, 2011). According to these accounts, emotions are only causally related to the situation in which they are experienced, but they are not about that situation. Thus, they seem unable to explain why differences in the value of the situation influence the use of emotion concepts even when the reaction of the agent is the same. By stressing the importance of the intentionality of emotion and the (normative) connection between emotion and value, these results (as those in Articles 1 and 2) favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. As we saw in the Introduction, these theories are especially well-suited to explain the intentionality of emotions and their relation to value. Finally, the main goal of Article 4 is to analyze the prospects of using fMRI to inform philosophically relevant questions concerning emotion. First, we saw that there are no brain areas specifically associated with emotion. The brain correlates of emotions are also involved in other psychological processes, so we cannot infer emotion from localized brain activity. Second, and against the predictions of Basic Emotion theories (see Introduction §5.2.), we saw that patterns of brain activity are not significantly different across emotion types. This provides evidence against this particular Componential account. However, other Componential theories (e.g. Appraisal theories) are compatible with the results. Note that the same approach used to test the claims of Basic Emotion theories (Ontology testing) could potentially be used to inform questions regarding the role of evaluative cognitions / bodily feelings in emotion. In particular, we could test the degree of overlap between the neural correlates of emotion and evaluative cognitions vs. the degree of neural overlap between emotion and bodily feelings. Future research should consider this approach to further investigate what constitutes emotions. To sum up, Articles 1 to 4 challenge Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, Motivational, and Basic Emotion theories, and instead favor Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories. But before declaring winners, some limitations should be taken into account. First, it is important to note that Cognitive, Perceptual, and Appraisal theories still face challenges. Cognitive theories have to account for the emotions of non-human animals as well as the phenomenology of emotion. Appraisal theories have to account for the problem of integration. And all Cognitive, perceptual, and appraisal theories have to account for cases of recalcitrant emotion. The work presented here provides an independent motivation to develop and defend such accounts. Second, as it has been noted in the discussion of Article 1, one could account for mismatches between theoretical and ordinary uses of emotion concepts by appealing to factors that are orthogonal to emotion. For example, it might be that people’s use of emotion concepts is heavily influenced by pragmatic factors. Thus, although the results presented in this work demand proponents of Somatic, Attitudinal, Hybrid, and Motivational theories to develop and empirically support such hypotheses, it doesn’t preclude the possibility to protect these theories from the evidence. Third, note that important issues around the nature of emotion, such as those concerning emotions’ representational (see, e.g. Grzankowski, 2016) or reason-responsive nature (see, e.g. Maguire, 2017), were not treated in this work. Arguably, these questions are better addressed using philosophical analysis alone. However, future work should consider the prospects of using empirical research methods to illuminate these issues. In general, future work should continue to explore the possibilities of combining philosophical analysis and empirical research methods to inform questions regarding the nature of emotion, so we can further advance long-standing debates in emotion theory. Hopefully, this work sets a precedent for this. (shrink)

El presente artículo es una genealogía tras el sentido amplio del arte y la técnica al interior del palimpsesto lingüístico ‘técnica del arte’ considerando para ello los sentidos estético y técnico del arte y el sentido antiguo de la téchnē griega. Se propone que a través de la indagación genealógica sobre el palimpsesto en cuestión es posible dar cuenta de la propuesta heideggeriana sobre la téchnē griega. La téchnē, el arte y la técnica en sentido amplio son un saber que (...) trae delante las cosas a su presencia en virtud de un ‘haber visto’ que permite el ir tras de algo y descubrir lo que oculto ya se presenta. Esta indagación emprende su camino desde una consideración heideggeriana del lenguaje según la cual lo más esencial de las palabras está en una continua retirada original de ocultamiento, dando así lugar a una incursión genealógica tras el sentido originario del término ‘arte’ y de su cognado ‘técnica’. Tentando a cada paso una respuesta a la pregunta por aquello que es el arte y la técnica, se hace una revisión del sentido y relación de estos términos en las lenguas antiguas latina y griega y las modernas romances, como también una breve revisión de la historia de la estética y del mito griego del dios de la téchnē, Hefesto, a la luz de la noción de belleza en los antiguos griegos. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception comprises two main levels of analysis: the description of the general foundation upon which all human perception occurs and that of the lived, situated aspects of perception, as experienced by individuals. These ‘structural’ and ‘situated’ accounts of perception assume, respectively, the existence of a pre-personal body, which all human beings possess in principle, and of a historical body, which is the product of an individual’s ‘synchronization’ with the world. A comprehensive and faithful description of human perceptual (...) experience must contain, simultaneously, the general, structural, individual, and situational elements involved in perception. It has also to show the ways in which these elements impact each other, leading to distinct outcomes. I propose, here, a situated account of perception that fulfills these requisites while confirming Merleau-Ponty’s insights and descriptions empirically, through cases of perceptual skill and learning in a large industrial plant near the Amazon rainforest in Brazil. (shrink)

“Grandes epidemias”, de Émile Littré, é um ensaio que se debruça sobre a história das epidemias e tenta lançar as bases para uma história patológica da humanidade, a partir dessas grandes calamidades. O texto também avança no que Littré chama de “afecções menos grosseiras”, que ele identifica com “doenças nervosas”, considerando‑ as em seu caráter epidêmico. Essa transição entre duas categorias de infortúnios de ampla repercussão abre uma série de questões concernentes à definição mesma de epidemia, e nos dá a (...) oportunidade de pensar a peste como metáfora. Apresentamos aqui uma versão portuguesa deste texto, publicado originalmente em 1836, mas que se mantém muito atual em várias das suas afirmações. (shrink)

A arte da ilustração e o livro ilustrado são, sem sombra de dúvida, presentes aos olhos, delicadezas e mistérios que encantam a qualquer leitor, de qualquer idade. O Traço e a prosa: entrevistas com ilustradores de livros infantojuvenis (2012) é uma coletânea sobre artistas ilustradores organizada por Odilon Moraes, Rona Hanning e Maurício Paraguassu, da editora Cosac Naify e que trata desse assunto, especificamente.O livro é composto de doze entrevistas com autores/ilustradores brasileiros experientes na área, e inova em acervos e (...) fontes para pesquisadores e estudantes da área de literatura infantojuvenil, trazendo boa amostra do que vem sendo produzido no Brasil em termos de ilustração e de narrativa. (shrink)

El presente texto problematiza el llamado “fe-minismo musulmán” contemporáneo a la luz de la crítica averroísta a la teología política desarrollada por el filósofo cordobés en el Fasl Al Maqal (“Tratado Decisivo”) argumentando que el ejercicio crítico de las teóricas feministas musulmanas actuales reedita la iytihad o “es-fuerzo personal de interpretación” de los textos (con independencia de su tradición), operación presente en la tradición jurídica que, en su momento, Averroes extrapolará a la práctica filosófica. Para ello se analizará el razonamien-to (...) de algunas críticas feministas musulmanas para mostrar su semejanza con la crítica ave-rroísta desarrollada en el siglo XII. (shrink)

Taking into account a survey made by Madrid Press Association among journa-lists and users of mass media, this article discusses the positions expressed by Carlos Ruíz (2008) and Hugo Aznar (2009) about the role that Ethics and Law play as a means to supervise the behaviour of mass media nowadays. Firstly, we will try to argue about the necessity of complementing the concept of journalism of classical liberalism with the contributions made by the so called social responsibility theory. Secondly, we (...) will show some of the limits of Law as a means of control of journalism practice and will defend the values and contributions of ethical reflection. Finally, we will point out the conditions that journalistic self- regulation must satisfy to act as a credible tool for regulation. (shrink)

In the last decades, proportionality has become increasingly influential in human rights adjudication. Even in the United States, a country with its own tradition of constitutional review, proporti...

Cognitivismo é uma tendência recente da Ciência Cognitiva que defende que o computador fornece uma imagem correta da natureza do mental, e não deve ser visto como metáfora apenas. No entanto, esta visão não se compromete em afirmar que computadores têm, literalmente, estados mentais, mas somente que o cérebro efetua processamento de informação: pensar, por exemplo, seria processar informação. Ora, se processar informação é, justamente, manipular símbolos, e os computadores digitais efetuam processamento de informação, então a melhor maneira de se (...) estudar a mente seria através de modelos computacionais (vide programas de computador) que simulassem o funcionamento da mente. Bem, o objetivo deste trabalho se restringirá e se situará nesse ambiente de discussão entre Searle e o Cognitivismo. Vamos nos comprometer aqui em apresentar e discutir algumas dificuldades que Searle, em suas investigações e pesquisas, considera estarem presentes nessa visão, dificuldades essas que têm sérias conseqüências para os estudos da mente em geral e para a Ciência Cognitiva em particular. Visto que o autor pondera que os resultados de seu experimento mental do argumento da sala chinesa não atingiram esta visão, que dificuldades Searle levanta à tese de que o cérebro é um computador digital que efetua processamento de informação? Continuariam elas a serem obstáculos aos modelos computacionais da mente, isto é, ao modo cognitivista de estudar a mente? Estas são as perguntas básicas que este trabalho visa responder, e este é seu objetivo principal. (shrink)

The study of the subjectivity and the subject appears today as a disputed field by different perspectives. In this article, we expose a framework to understand the subjectivity in a cultural historical approach and we propose theoretical, methodological and axiological issues for the study of subjectivity. We discuss the place of discourse in the study of social subjectivity through structuralism’s positions and proposals of social constructionism. Finally, we defend that the Critical Discourse Analysis proposed by Norman Fairclough as a solid (...) theoretical-methodological perspective for the study of the complex links between subjectivity, discourse and social reality. We propose that this approach, based on categories such as discursive practice, social practice hegemony, discursive order, intertextuality and discursive shift, can address the theoretical, methodological and axiological challenges regarding the study of subjectivity. El estudio de la subjetividad y del sujeto aparece en la actualidad como un campo en disputa por distintas corrientes y posiciones. Las propuestas para el estudio del campo de la subjetividad variarán de acuerdo a las concepciones teóricas y supuestos que sobre ella se tengan. En el presente artículo se plantean una serie de desafíos teóricos, metodológicos y axiológicos necesarios de afrontar para el estudio de la subjetividad. Asimismo, se discute el lugar del discurso en el estudio de la subjetividad social, debatiendo con las posiciones estructuralistas y con las propuestas del construccionismo social. Por otra parte, se expone una forma de comprender la subjetividad desde el enfoque histórico cultural y, en consistencia con lo anterior, se plantea una perspectiva teórica-metodológica pertinente para abordar las complejas relaciones entre subjetividad, discurso y realidad social: el Análisis Crítico del Discurso propuesto por Norman Fairclough. Proponemos que este enfoque, a partir de categorías como práctica discursiva, práctica social, hegemonía, orden discursivo, intertextualidad y cambio discursivo, permite abordar los desafíos teóricos, metodológicos y axiológicos antes planteados respecto del estudio de la subjetividad. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo propone contribuir al estudio sociológico de la "abstracción" como una clave para comprender las complejas relaciones entre lo conceptual y lo empírico. Nuestro argumento es que la "abstracción" constituye un tercer término que desafía el divorcio entre ambos dominios en la sociología e interroga su compleja mediación en la vida social. Para ello, exploramos las posibilidades de una sociología de la abstracción como un ejercicio de observación tendiente a: comprender la inmersión de las prácticas de abstracción de (...) la teoría social de un modo inmanente a las dinámicas de abstracción de la sociedad; descifrar el movimiento concreto de los conceptos que dan forma a la sociedad y permiten la durabilidad a las relaciones sociales. En otras palabras, sostenemos, el trabajo sociológico de la abstracción consiste en un inevitable repliegue reflexivo que moviliza los conceptos para alcanzar lo que está más allá de los conceptos.: This paper aims to contribute to the sociological study of "abstractions" as a key to comprehend the relations between the conceptual and the empirical. Our argument is that "abstraction" is a third term that challenges the customary divorce between these domains in sociology inasmuch as interrogates their complex mediation in social life. To do so, we explore the possibilities of a sociology of abstraction as an exercise of thinking and observation aimed at: comprehending the immersion of social theory's practices of abstraction as immanent to the dynamics of abstraction of society; and deciphering the concrete movement of concepts that give form to society and durability to social relations. Thus, we intend to show that the project of a sociology of abstractions consists in an unavoidable reflexive retreat that displays concepts in order to reach what is beyond concepts. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo abordar o tratamento dado por Foucault ao tema da produção dos sujeitos e objetos do conhecimento. A partir de conceitos fundamentais de Foucault como saber, poder, prática e discurso, procuro ressaltar a influência que os textos de Nietzsche dedicados ao conhecimento tiveram sobre a abordagem genealógica foucaultiana. Passando por alguns textos de teor metodológico de Foucault, pretendo mostrar como a sua genealogia é marcada por uma crítica do conhecimento em que se questiona, a partir de (...) uma perspectiva nietzschiana, o estatuto da relação entre sujeito e objeto e os modos de constituição da verdade são questionados. (shrink)