One of the essential distinctions in action theory is that between activity and passivity. I address this distinction in this article.

This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.

For the second edition of her landmark study of Simone de Beauvoir, Toril Moi provides a major new introduction discussing current developments in Beauvoir studies as well as the recent publication of papers and letters by Beauvoir, including her letters to her lovers Jacques-Laurent Bost and Nelson Agren, and her student diaries from 1926-7.

The idea that citizens have a right to receive information that is relevant for their suitable exercise of political rights and liberties is well established in democratic societies. However, this right has never been systematically analyzed, thus remaining a blurry concept. This article tackles this conceptual gap by conceptualizing citizens’ right to information. After reviewing previous approaches to this idea, I locate citizens’ right to information on the map of communication rights, and put forward a systematic framework for both justifying (...) and analyzing it. This framework focuses on this right’s grounds, its function, its holders, its content, and its correlative duties. Although the conceptualization offered here will be incomplete, it will be enough to distinguish the general concept of citizens’ right to information from both its specific conceptions and from the other two best-known rights of the public: freedom of information and the public’s right to know. (shrink)

Book synopsis: David-Hillel Ruben's new book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. He rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what he calls a 'prolific theory' of act individuation. He also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent (...) causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. He identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, Ruben denies that it is true. His own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. Ruben sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalisations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. He addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing. Inspiring and enlightening in its challenge to received wisdom, and in its convincing defence of some unfashionable positions, Action and its Explanation will be required reading for anyone working in this field. (shrink)

A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.

What is a woman? And what does it mean to be a feminist today? In her first full-scale engagement with feminist theory since her internationally renowned Sexual/Textual Politics (1985), Toril Moi challenges the dominant trends in contemporary feminist and cultural thought, arguing for a feminism of freedom inspired by Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex. Written in a clear and engaging style What is a Woman? brings together two brand new book-length theoretical interventions, Moi's work on Freud and Bourdieu, and (...) her studies of desire and knowledge in literature. In the controversial title-essay, Toril Moi radically rethinks current debates about sex, gender, and the body - challenging the commonly held belief that the sex/gender distinction is fundamental to all feminist theory. Moi rejects every attempt to define masculinity and femininity, including efforts to define femininity as that which 'cannot be defined. In the second new book-length essay, 'I am a Woman', Toril Moi reworks the relationship between the personal and the philosophical, pursuing ways to write theory that do not neglect the claims of the personal. Setting up an encounter between contemporary theory and Simone de Beauvoir, Moi radically rethinks the need, and difficulty, of finding one's own philosophical voice by placing it in new theoretical contexts. A sustained refusal to lay down theoretical or political requirements for femininity, and a powerful argument for a feminism of freedom, What is a Woman? is a deeply original contribution to feminist theory. (shrink)

A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of the social sciences, with regard both to particulars and properties. The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in the social sciences.

What I shall do in this paper is to propose an analysis of ‘Agent P tries to A’ in terms of a subjunctive conditional, that avoids some of the problems that beset most alternative accounts of trying, which I call ‘referential views’. They are so-named because on these alternative accounts, ‘P tries to A’ entails that there is a trying to A by P, and therefore the expression ‘P’s trying to A’ can occur in the subject of a sentence and (...) be used to refer to a particular, namely an act or event of trying. A conditional account such as mine avoids having to answer questions about those alleged particulars, for example their location and their causal relation to physical actions, or alternatively their identity to physical actions. In brief, the analysis I propose eschews any need to quantify over any sort of trying particulars. I both clarify the proposal and deal with five possible objections to it: metaphysically impossible actions: cases of finking and reverse-cycle finking; the empirical emptiness of preventers and blockers; proximate intentions and trying; and alleged explanatory loss. (shrink)

Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...) said to be identical with the physical action. -/- After carefully stating the second, world-side view, I produce two arguments against it. The first relies on the fact that if a=b and b=c, then a=c, sometimes put colloquially as: if something is identical to two things, then the two things must be identical to one another. In the case of trying, one might try to do something by performing a plurality of simultaneous actions, a sure sign that the relation between the trying and the plurality of actions by which one tries must be some relation other than identity. -/- The second argument discusses two cases, recorded in William James’ The Principles of Psychology, of a patient who tries but who performs no action whatever. This is sometimes called ‘naked trying’. A recent attempt at denying that there can be such cases of naked trying is examined and dismissed. (shrink)

What constitutes numerically one and the same tradition diachronically, at different times? This question is the focus of often violent dispute in societies. Is it capable of a rational resolution? Many accounts attempt that resolution with a diagnosis of ambiguity of the disputed concept-Islam, Marxism, or democracy for example. The diagnosis offered is in terms of vagueness, namely the vague criteria for sameness or similarity of central beliefs and practices.

This article explores the connections between David Hume's theory of prejudice, present-day theories of structural ignorance, and Hume's own racist attitudes. Charles Mills has identified certain types of ignorance, including racial ignorance, that result from social structures. Here, I argue that Hume can do something similar. Hume uses the concept of prejudice to theorize the misjudgment of someone based on their perceived membership of a certain group. Despite its seemingly individualist presentation in the Treatise, Hume's theory can, as a result (...) of his deeply social view of the mind, be expanded to account for social-structural influences on the formation of prejudices. In fact, in several places he himself develops such structural explanations. On the resulting picture, both his racism and his theory of prejudice are seen to play important roles in his philosophy. (shrink)

What should be news in a democracy? This article offers a deliberative answer to this question by developing a deliberative account of newsworthiness. Drawing from the deliberative theory of democracy, I define the general criterion of deliberative newsworthiness as a mandate that commands journalists to seek, select, and report the contents that are most capable of stimulating high-quality deliberation. I then develop a two-step process through which journalists may apply this criterion. First, journalists should select the most newsworthy issues, which (...) are those that most profoundly affect (or are likely to affect) how just our society is. Second, journalists should select the most newsworthy facts and the most newsworthy arguments, both of which are to be chosen on the basis of their capacity to promote quality deliberation about the newsworthy issues. Ultimately, what should be news is a context-dependent issue that only journalists can decide, but deliberative newsworthiness is the normative criterion that journalists should follow when making these decisions – at least, if they want to produce the news that deliberative democracy needs. (shrink)

To what extend can genuinely mereological considerations apply to talk of wholes and parts in discussions of the relationship between individual persons and the social groups, etc. to which they belong?

The link between leadership and mental health at the workplace is well established by prior research. However, most of the studies have addressed this relationship from a single-source perspective. The aim of this study was to examine how supervisor and employee ratings of health-oriented leadership correspond to each other and which sources are predictive for employee mental health. We assessed data within 99 teams containing 713 employees in 11 different companies in Southern Germany. Supervisors and their staff completed questionnaires on (...) the supervisors’ health-oriented staff-care dimensions awareness, value of health and health behavior and current mental distress. Hierarchical linear models revealed that supervisors’ self-ratings were significantly related to their employees’ ratings only on the health behavior dimension, but not on the health awareness and value of health dimensions. Also, supervisors rated themselves significantly higher on HoL compared to their employees. Employee ratings of HoL significantly predicted their own level of mental distress, whereas supervisor ratings of HoL did not predict employees’ mental distress at the team level. Supervisors’ self-ratings of HoL did not influence the relationship between employee ratings of HoL and their mental distress on an individual level. These results highlight the complex relationship between multisource assessments of HoL and employee mental health, emphasizing the importance of subjective perception for mental health. Future studies should investigate under which conditions supervisor and employee ratings correspond to each other and are predictive for mental health at the workplace. (shrink)

In various of my writings, both in Philosophical Studies and elsewhere, I have argued that an account of trying sentences is available that does not require quantification over alleged attempts or tryings. In particular, adverbial modification in such sentences can be dealt with, without quantification over any such particulars. In ‘Attempts’, Jonathan D. Payton (Payton, 2021) has sought to dispute my claim. In this paper, I consider his claims and reply to them. I believe that my account withstands such scrutiny.

In virtue of what are later and an earlier group members of one and the numerically same tradition? Gallie was one of the few philosophers to have engaged with issues surrounding this question. My article is not a faithful exegesis of Gallie but develops a terminology in which to discuss issues surrounding the numerical identity of a tradition over time, based on some of his insights.

NOTA DEL EDITOR: Bioética en práctica incluye también el texto “Criterios para la asignación de asistencia mecánica respiratoria en pacientes con Covid 19, un mirada bioética” del P. Rubén Revello, del Instituto de Bioética de la Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, quien amablemente autorizó su reproducción para esta sección de la revista. El Dr. Carlos A. Gómez Fajardo, docente de Bioética de la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana y miembro del Comité editorial de la revista Persona y Bioética (...) agradece y comenta brevemente el texto: “Agradezco y recibo con gran atención sus valiosos contenidos. Son pertinentes y acertados los principios mencionados sobre el bien global del paciente y el respeto a la vida de toda persona, sin discriminación, como parte esencial del ethos hipocrático. Es innegable la necesidad del uso de criterios objetivos en la asignación de asistencia mecánica respitatoria. Para ello, en la disciplina de los cuidados críticos se dispone de las herramientas soportadas en la evidencia, de gran valor práctico y como es obvio en el uso de elementos de diagnóstico y terapia, también con sus limitantes, como sucede con las limitaciones de valores predictivos de las mismas. Encuentro que el uso del concepto “preservar la mayoría de los años de vida”, por parte de Jakie Powder del Jhon Hopkins Center of Bioethic, se puede prestar a equívocos, pues podría entenderse como un intento de reducción de criterios utilitaristas para la asignación de recursos de ARM; el autor se hace cargo del tema e indica que “cabe aclarar que ‘preservar la mayoría de los años de vida’ no significa hacer un triage que excluya de la AMR a pacientes que sobrepasan una cierta edad, sino que no se incluya a pacientes cuya prolongación de la vida solo resulte precaria y penosa”. En el ámbito académico-filosófico de la disciplina de la bioética se encuentran en contradicción esencial dos visiones: la utilitarista materialista y la realista; es de difícil conciliación racional el intento de cuantificación objetiva de “calidad de vida”, pues ello conduciría a posibles decisiones injustas. Creo que es pertinente reconocer que el ejercicio práctico de la medicina se enmarca, generalmente -no solo en situación de pandemia- en un entorno de escasez de recursos. Estos, por supuesto, siempre han de asignarse dentro del marco de la racionalidad, la proporcionalidad terapéutica y la justicia, pero es pertinente reconocer que existen variables que determinan resultados fatales y que no pueden ser atribuibles a los procesos de decisión del clínico, quien no ha de ser obligado a lo imposible cuando el volumen y complejidad de las circunstancias de triage son apremiantes. Ello no deroga el imperativo racional hipocrático del respeto a la vida de todos como inspiración del quehacer”. Este escrito fue publicado por el Centro de Bioética: Persona & Familia, en su portal web, el 22 de abril de 2020. El autor autorizó a la revista Persona y Bioética publicarlo en su sección de Bioética en práctica. Se hicieron modificaciones ortotipográficas leves al texto y una adaptación de las referencias para hacerlo compatible con las pautas editoriales de la revista. (shrink)

Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Does 'Person P tried to A' entail that there is some particular, whether a mental act or a brain state or whatever, that is a trying? Most discussions of trying assume that this entailment holds. There is no good reason for holding that this is a valid inference. In particular, I examine one 'Davidsonian' argument that might be used to justify the validity of such an inference and argue that the argument is not sound. See: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/IxsuPqt7rvdzqMxpFiTv/full.

This paper argues that Spinoza held substances other than God to be inconceivable. It uses this claim to develop a novel response to the Problem of Other Substances, the problem of explaining why some of Spinoza’s proofs for God’s existence cannot be used to prove the existence of a non-divine substance instead.

An analysis of causal explanation, using counterfactuals and omitting laws or lawlike generalisations.

Most of the features of modern Russian business are transient, determined by the transitional character of the Russian economy and drastic changes in the social structure, ideology, and consciousness of Russian society in general. There are three main normative experiences in the traditions of Russian business: a) the experience of pre-Revolutionary business, specifically developed and practiced by the merchants of the old-believers extraction; b) the experience of socialist economy, which was more or less oriented to the public good and presupposed (...) selfless aspirations by the economic agents; c) the experience of legally and administratively constrained private business and illegal shadow business, which expected businessmen to be vigorous, industrious and enterprising. The process of privatization was developed under the aegis of state, specifically the state bureaucracy. The influence of changes in the social-economic system has been ambivalent for social morals. However, the reforms could stimulate their improvement. The recent development in the cultural environment of business testify to the emerging space of civilized business, which manifests that it is practically useful for businessmen to be ethical. (shrink)

Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their representational content. Instead, I (...) propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

El texto trata de abordar la noción de «significante» lacaniano desde una hermenéutica filosófica. Para ello se recorrerán algunos momentos clave de la elaboración de Lacan sin dar por supuesto ningún uso o definición que se promueve del término en cuestión, todo ello con la intención de subrayar aspectos como el del sentido y la vedad que desde un análisis hermenéutico-filosófico pueden ser captados en toda su profundidad.

Researchers have studied the athletes' dual careers with the aim of helping them to combine the sport and the academic–vocational sphere. Most of this research has addressed the study–sport combination, but there is a lack of studies on the work–sport combination. The main objective of this research was to explore the subjective perceptions of Spanish elite athletes when attempting to combine their careers as professional athletes with a second profession or trade. Further, this study aims to identify the access to (...) facilitating resources and the perception of obstacles and barriers to the development of a dual career. A qualitative approach was chosen to address these research questions. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was carried out on a sample of 18 elite athletes, and the data were collected using semi-structured interviews based on a set of superordinate and subordinate categories. The results showed that the athletes interviewed possessed valuable resources such as the transference of sports values to the work sphere. However, important barriers were highlighted such as the perception of sport institutions as absent entities in the work–sport combination. Thus, the study of this type of dual career seems to be one of the challenges facing the interested scientific community for the coming years. (shrink)

Aunque el populismo es uno de los conceptos políticos más empleados en nuestra época, suele decirse que también es uno de los más escasamente comprendidos (Taggart 2002, 62), y hay incluso quien cree que está rodeado de un “completo caos conceptual” (Müller 2016, 11). También hay quien ha intentado clasificar diferentes aproximaciones al populismo (véase especialmente Taggart 2000, 10-22; también Panizza 2005, 2-3; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 186-96; Weyland 2017, 51-55). Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el principal consenso académico sobre (...) el populismo es, precisamente, que no hay ningún gran consenso sobre lo que pueda ser el populismo. Por eso hay quien dice que el populismo es un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que Gallie (1955) denominó “conceptos esencialmente controvertidos” (Weyland 2001; Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; 2017). -/- Semejantes dificultades para acordar una definición permiten explicar por qué prácticamente cualquier texto académico sobre el populismo empieza advirtiendo que en este debate hay que andar con pies de plomo. Así las cosas, esta entrada no aspira a ofrecer ninguna definición concluyente del populismo (para intentos de ese tipo, véase Mansbridge y Macedo 2019 o Urbinati 2019b). Cada sección tiene una aspiración más modesta. La primera identifica algunas dificultades que complican la comprensión y definición del populismo. La segunda sección presenta dos rasgos en los que, a pesar de las discrepancias, la mayoría de las definiciones del populismo coinciden. La tercera ofrece una reconstrucción sintética de la teoría populista desarrollada por Laclau y Mouffe –dos de los teóricos más influyentes tanto política como académicamente. (shrink)

To what extend do the standard tests for realism, say in the philosophy of mind, apply to the social sciences?

Ruben Berrios Queen’s University Belfast Anti-realism and Aesthetic Cognition Abstract At the core of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is the question of the relation between scientific theory and the world. The realist possesses a mimetic conception of the relation between theory and reality. For the realist, scientific theories represent reality. The anti-realist, in contrast, seeks to understand the relations between theory and world in non-mimetic terms. We will examine Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation in order to (...) illuminate the anti-realist position. Science consists of phenomenological and theoretical laws. The former are concerned with appearances, or those phenomena that can be directly observed; the latter involve the unobservable reality that is alleged to underlie appearances, and are capable only of indirect confirmation. Phenomenological laws are said to be descriptive, whilst theoretical laws are understood as explanatory. Cartwright is concerned with the theoretical. She claims that the standard realist account of the explanatory efficacy of theoretical laws is faulty. The explanatory power of theoretical laws consists in their ability to provide an explanation of physical phenomena. According to Cartwright, the realist claims that laws explain phenomena by providing an abstract description of them, in terms of their micro-structural features, that is alleged to be true. On this view, explanatory power is entirely dependent on descriptive adequacy. As phenomenological laws describe appearances, so theoretical laws describe the fundamental reality that governs appearances. Cartwright rejects the preceding view and in its place proposes a simulacrum account of explanation. According to Cartwright, the explanatory power of theoretical laws is related not to descriptive adequacy, but rather to the construction of adequate models. To explain a phenomenon is to construct a model which best or most adequately accommodates the phenomenon to a theory. The model will consist of various posited objects that serve to explain the phenomena in terms that are consistent with a set of theoretical laws. Cartwright claims that theoretical laws are true of, or describe, the objects of the model. The objects of the model, however, are not descriptive of reality. They are simulacra. They have, that is, the form or appearance of things, without possessing their substance or proper qualities. In light of the foregoing account we can summarise the distinction between scientific realism and anti-realism as follows. The realist claims that theoretical laws literally represent real objects. The anti-realist claims that laws represent objects of a model that are simulacra of reality. Anti-realism has an aesthetic dimension. The movement from realism to anti-realism is also the movement from the mimetic conception of the scientist as holding a mirror to nature to the constructionist view of the scientist as engaging with nature through invention. There is a lot of the artist in the anti-realist’s view of the scientist. This is true for Cartwright as well as, for example, Van Fraassen in his doctrine of constructive empiricism. It would appear, then, that the philosophy of science has absorbed some concepts that are ordinarily housed in aesthetics. And it has done so profitably. The aim of this paper is to reverse the direction of disciplinary influence. Can art, in relation to its status as a cognitive enterprise, be illuminated by scientific anti-realism? I will argue that it can. In an unexpected reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, Cartwright draws a suggestive parallel between theoretical laws and general moral principles, on the one hand, and physical phenomena and everyday moral conduct, on the other hand. If we add to this the claim that a central component of art’s value is cognitive, then we have the basic materials with which to flesh out a broadly anti-realist view of art. In the production of art, artists can construct models that mediate between everyday ethical phenomena and general ethical tendencies. These models reveal the ways in which there are implicit consistencies or inconsistencies, conflicts or congruences and so forth, between the phenomena and the tendencies. On this basis art can contribute to the reflective understanding of ethical life. This constitutes to a large degree art’s status as a cognitive enterprise. To apprehend art cognitively as artist or critic is to engage in aesthetic cognition. (shrink)

The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. This volume presents a selection of the most important (...) recent writings on the nature of explanation. It covers a broad range of topics from the philosophy of science to the central philosophical terrain of the theory of knowledge. The distinguished contributors include Peter Achinstein, Wesley C. Salmon, Carl G. Hempel, Philip Kitcher, Bas C. van Fraassen, Jaegwon Kim, B. Brody, Timothy McCarthy, Peter Railton, David Lewis, Peter Lipton, James Woodward, and Robert J. Matthews. (shrink)

RESUMEN: En este trabajo defiendo que el ideal de una ciudadanía competente es viable incluso en los contextos adversos que ofrecen las sociedades digitales. Para ello, identifico cinco problemas que obstaculizan a la ciudadanía la adquisición de competencia política: el pluralismo, el problema del moderador, la dificultad para acceder a información relevante, la apatía política y los sesgos políticos. Aunque estos problemas se agudizan en las democracias digitales, muestro que existen mecanismos institucionales que permiten corregir y mitigar sus efectos perjudiciales (...) sobre la competencia política. Por ello, concluyo, el ideal de ciudadanía competente es prima facie factible y podría lograrse mediante la implementación de medidas institucionales que fomenten la adquisición de competencia política por parte de la ciudadanía. -/- ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that the ideal of a competent citizenry is feasible even in the adverse context digital societies offer. To do so, I identify five problems that hinder citizens’ acquisition of political competence: pluralism, the chairman problem, difficulties in finding relevant information, political apathy, and political biases. Even though these problems worsen in digital democracies, I show that there are institutional mechanisms that allow for the correction and mitigation of the detrimental effects they might have on political competence. I thus conclude that the ideal of a competent citizenry is prima facie feasible and could be achieved through the implementation of institutional measures that foster political competence among citizens. (shrink)

A comparison of disjunctive theories of action and perception. The development of a theory of action that warrants the name, a disjunctive theory. On this theory, there is an exclusive disjunction: either an action or an event (in one sense). It follows that in that sense basic actions do not have events intrinsic to them.

David-Hillel Ruben; II*—Social Properties and their Basis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 23–46, https://doi.or.

Book synopsis: This volume presents a selection of the most important recent writings on the nature of explanation. It covers a broad range of topics from the philosophy of science to the central philosophical terrain of the theory of knowledge.

The idea of sociability - a person’s disposition and ability to communicate and live in the community - goes through the whole history of philosophy. Due to the peculiarity of translations, this term and the whole tradition related to it have been lost to the Russian reader. The article discusses some tendencies in comprehending the idea of sociability in early modern moral philosophy. The key to this consideration is F. Hutcheson’s essay On the Natural Sociability of Mankind, the title of (...) which contains the very term “sociability” and which presents the main essential points in a discussion of the issue in the first third of the 18 th century. One can distinguish two main approaches to the problem. According to one of them, sociability determined by various human natural needs is the basis of social relations, and a person becomes a moral agent as a social being (H. Grotius, T. Hobbes, S. Pufen-dorf, B. Mandeville). According to another approach, sociability is a manifestation of a person’s natural tendency to care for the good of others, and its consistent implementation leads to the formation of community and supports its stability (Cambridge Platonists, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, J. Butler, D. Hume, A. Smith). Representatives of both approaches recognized contradiction in manifestations of sociability or in its nature. I. Kant theoretically overcame the confrontation between these approaches and conceptualized the contradiction and associated it with the human nature. According to Kant, the “unsociable sociability” is given in the fact that a person has a tendency to sociability but also a tendency to self-assertion at the expense of others. However, despite the presence of asocial features (evil principle), Kant considered the person’s inherent sociability (good principle) as a prerequisite for culture and as one of the most important conditions of possibility of morality. (shrink)