The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has already caused large amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and will continue to do so for manyyears after hostilities have ceased mainly because of the emissions linked to the rebuilding of destroyed or damaged housing, public buildings, infrastructure, factories, and the like. My aim in this paper is to discuss how in a time of climate emergency such emissions of war should impact the political morality of states initiating, (...) continuing, and ending war (through a just and enduring peace) as understood by just war theory (JWT). My point of departure is a study by Lennard de Klerk and six co-authors detailing the emissions of the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war. (shrink)

Eastern Churches in Russia and Ukraine are facing the fratricidal war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These Churches maintain closeness in faith and liturgy. The similarities of these Churches’ teachings on war are juxtaposed with actual manifestations of their hierarchs’ hostility. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, which is in close unity with the Eastern Churches and understands the context of faith but is not a party to the (...) conflict, which makes it easier to remain objective in examining the phenomenon of fratricide. The first part of the article analyses the doctrinal and historical context. It helps to isolate the factors influencing the existence of enmity between doctrinally close Churches. The second part presents the biblical inspiration of Cain and Abel's story in a search for new ways to counteract this phenomenon. (shrink)

In this essay, we bridge the gap between two understandings of the power of the European Union (EU): as a normative actor, guided by ethical principles and empowered by the internal market, and as a geopolitical actor, building its own military capabilities and ready to defend its interests through deterrence and defense. In view of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we challenge the established “values vs. interests” dichotomy and argue that defending liberal democratic values is an essential foundation of (...) the EU's existing and potential geopolitical power. We show how, over the last decade, opting for short-term expediency and capitulating to a kind of realpolitik “regime indifference” in dealings with authoritarian regimes at home and abroad have severely weakened the EU and also diminished Ukraine's capacities to defend itself as it fights for these shared values on the battlefield. We argue that it is in the EU's strategic interest to strengthen its commitment to values-based foreign and defense policies, revive a meritocratic and credible enlargement process, and work with the United States to provide more effective military assistance to Ukraine in its fight for liberal democratic values and a rules-based European security order. (shrink)

This essay assesses the morality of Ukraine's use of drones to attack targets inside Russia. Following its invasion by Russian forces, Ukraine has had a just cause to wage a war of self-defense. However, its efforts to achieve that cause remain subject to moral limits. Even a state that has been unjustly attacked may not, for example, respond by deliberately targeting the attacking state's civilian population. To do so would violate the jus in bello principle of discrimination. (...) The essay first describes how drone technology has frequently enabled long-range strikes against Russian military assets as well as other targets inside cities. It then explains why it would be morally wrong for Ukraine to attack its enemy's population centers. First, Russian civilians are not liable to attack, and this nonliability is undiminished by the injustice of Russia's invasion or by any in bello wrongs committed by the Russian military. Second, attacking Russian cities with drones would arguably achieve little or no self-defensive benefit for Ukraine, and it could even be counterproductive. (shrink)

The fragility of the post-war international order is threatened not only by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but even more tellingly, by the decisions that Western nations, the European Union, and NATO make in response to Russian aggression. This paper frames Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine within what Reinhart Koselleck calls ‘the sediments of time’ or Zeitschichten that contain different temporalities, speeds, and directions. Koselleck’s approach of parsing the ‘sediments of time’ is (...) a heuristic device for understanding how Western responses to the war in Ukraine are framed by very different historical markers. Just as one might parse the grammatical components of a sentence in order to understand its meaning, so one might parse Western responses within different historical timescales that include Zeitenwende, déjà vu, interregnum, and Never Again. (shrink)

In this article, Mychailo Wynnyckyj details his experience of Russia’s attack on Kyiv in the spring of 2022 and then he argues that the notion of individual rights that lies at the foundation of Western legal and political institutions is incapable of dealing with the collective evil exhibited by the Russian army during their invasion of Ukraine.

The sequence and escalation of Russian–Ukrainian political and military conflicts since 2014, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have reopened interest in and debates on just war theory and practice in general and specifically in historic and modern Eastern Orthodox cultures and Orthodox-majority states. These debates have significant repercussions in areas like church–state and church–military relations in these cultures; ecclesial involvement in these conflicts has varied from war-justification rhetoric (in the case of the Russian Orthodox (...) Church) to reiterations of the inherited traditions of ecclesial pacifism/condemnation of all violence (the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, a number of Orthodox Churches, clerical and theological networks, etc.). The Russian ecclesial involvements in the justification of war/military necessity and formulation of just war narratives have triggered divisions and antagonisms in the Eastern Orthodoxy. The development and course of the ecclesial conflicts involving Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishes (and other Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies) will show whether Orthodox religious actors may begin to play a more significant role in the articulation and application of newly emerging trends in areas like the theology of just peace, just peace-making and Christian realism, Orthodox social ethics and the dynamic praxis of just peace-making. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojami interviu, atlikti su priverstinę migraciją dėl Rusijos pradėto karo Ukrainoje patyrusiomis migrantėmis iš Ukrainos, kurios atvyko į Lietuvą po 2022 m. vasario 24 d. Gilinamasi į pasakojimus apie karo bei priverstinės migracijos patirtis bei aiškinamasi, kokios situacijos įvardijamos kaip kritinės individualiame, šeimos bei bendruomenės lygmenyse, taip pat – kokios strategijos pasitelkiamos minėtoms krizėms įveikti.

As of the time of writing of this paper (January 2023), Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused a European refugee crisis, death and displacement of countless Ukrainians, worldwide food shortage, fuel crisis and inflation. By comparing the Ukrainian example and the book of Ruth, this paper demonstrates that the effects of forced migration, food shortage and arrested economic productivity are tilted against women. This results in sudden stati of family headship and breadwinner, inability to provide meals for (...) or stabilise the family, and difficulty in attempting to re-establish a livelihood due to the double burden of care. The methodology of the paper is qualitative and gendered. In its interpretation of the biblical text, it is also allegorical and literary while for gathering the Ukrainian data, it is textual. One of the key findings of the study is that during displacement and crisis, women, unlike their male counterparts, tend to carry the family with them wherever they go, which means that women bear the greater burdens of these variables by far. The discussions in the sections of the paper merge the gendered situations, mindsets and events of the book of Ruth with those of the Ukrainian context.Contribution: Using the examples of the Russo Ukrainian war and the character of the biblical book of Ruth, this article examines the effects of displacement, food crisis and arrested economic production on women. This topic is aligned with the journal’s focus on religion, gender equality and environmental preservation, all of which fall within the journal’s scope. (shrink)

The article analyzes responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by philosophers on the left, like Balibar and Zizek, and feminist philosophers, such as Butler and Hark. A large-scale war in Europe proved to be a challenge for a number of feminist, pacifist, and leftist certainties, and this challenge was presented in philosophy and feminist theory as a series of antinomies that do not imply a simple solution. Some leading contemporary philosophers believe that Ukraine should stop (...) resisting aggression in the face of the threat of a world nuclear war or if the conflict turns into a war of extermination. An alternative solution was suggested by some left and feminist philosophers who argued that a true Ukrainian victory over an authoritarian aggressor would amount to preserving and empowering democracy in Ukraine, and that this was possible only on the basis of building broad transnational anti-Putin alliances, including alliances with the representatives of all forces opposing Putin in Russia and Belarus. (shrink)

The generational approach aims to reconstruct the existential context of the development of philosophy, to study the personal ties within the philosophical community. Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a split in the Russian philosophical network. The years of war practically destroyed professional solidarity in the Russian academic community, which is divided into three camps. In the first one, there are researchers opposed to Putin’s regime who have left Russia and found new work (...) in universities and research centres around the world. These colleagues have united in a number of new structures aimed at critically analysing the origins and consequences of the military catastrophe unfolding before our eyes. Some academics who have not found a use for their professional skills abroad have been forced to either change their occupation or return to Russia. In the second camp, there are colleagues working in Russia who see their mission in passive resistance and escapism. Most of them are intimidated and depressed. By the end of 2024, they began to remark that the Kremlin and the Duma were increasingly turning to academics for expert opinion and assistance in developing a new ideology. In the third camp, there are philosophers who share the values of the Russian far right and support the war and repression in Russia, and who are developing a Russian military philosophy. The article examines the transformation of values over two years of war in four generations of Russian philosophers active today (the so-called generations of “stagnation”, “glasnost”, “market reforms” and “relocalisation”). (shrink)

Drawing on contrasting theoretical perspectives of self-interest and utilitarian/ethical motivations, we examine the degree to which a company's pace of departure from Russia after the Ukraine invasion is driven by its exposure to the Russian market. Moreover, we investigate whether firm-level political and non-political risks influence the propensity to delay or expedite the exit/withdrawal process. Contrary to utilitarian expectations advocating for ethical exit decisions irrespective of exposure and risks, firms with higher Russian exposure were less likely to exit (...) sooner, indicating a prioritization of business interests over ethical imperatives. This self-interest effect was further amplified by heightened political risks but attenuated by non-political risks. These findings remained consistent across various model specifications, with limited discernible variations based on firm characteristics such as ranking, COVID-19 exposure and risk, past idiosyncratic volatility, or family ownership and control. In addition, an examination of post-exit effects on profitability, risk, cost of capital, and liquidity revealed no statistically significant relationships. Our study highlights the prevalence of self-interest motivations over utilitarian principles, as firms with substantial Russian exposure prioritized safeguarding their business interests in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, even at the potential cost of ethical and social responsibility imperatives. (shrink)

Amid Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, the human rights community has understandably focused its attention on human rights violations committed by the Russian state. This has, however, left the human rights implications of the martial law Ukraine has put in place for civilians largely unexamined. This essay highlights the ways Ukraine's travel restriction on “battle-aged” civilian men has harmed three overlapping groups—civilian men, the families of the men (including women and children), and trans and nonbinary individuals—and (...) shows that the restriction runs counter to important principles in international human rights and humanitarian law. It then considers the ethical dilemmas faced by the international human rights community in addressing such harms, and the political psychology of rights advocacy that may explain the tendency to underplay this particular set of human rights issues. Nonetheless, the essay ultimately argues that advocates should hold actors—including and perhaps especially those with which they may sympathize—accountable to the human rights standards to which they have pledged. (shrink)

In this essay, the author regards the individual as the chief courier of History, and Mr. Putin, the immediate cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – distinguishing his agency from broad precipitating socio-historical causes that deny inwardness, individuality, and free-will. A dark puppeteer, Mr. Putin is more sinister than Plato’s puppeteers (Allegory of the Cave). This invasion raises at least three questions: (1) Why has the west not responded as much to other recent non-western wars and (...) genocides? Why have Europe’s former colonies not protested Russia more vigorously? (2) Why do armed forces obey cultishly, the commands of autocratic heads of state? (3) How do we prevent autocrats from occupying positions of power? Western hedonism and Putin’s puritanism are opposites that cannot resolve one another. Moreover, Ukraine reminds us that non-violence, patriotism, defiance – even war – cannot be moral absolutes. Depending on the context, they are good, evil, or something in between. (shrink)

Russia's war against Ukraine has had devastating human consequences and destabilizing geopolitical effects. This roundtable takes up three critical debates in connection with the conflict: Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union; the role of Ukrainian nationalism in advancing democratization; and the degree of human rights accountability, not just for Russia, but also for Ukraine. In addition to challenging conventional wisdom on each of these issues, the contributors to this roundtable make a second, critically important intervention. Each (...) essay explores the problem of concealed political and normative commitments within much of the research on Russia's war against Ukraine by unearthing biases intrinsic to particular conceptualizations. The collection also questions the perceived separation between “interests” and “values” that permeates policy analysis. This roundtable further draws attention to the ethical problems that scholars and policymakers bring to policy debates through the occlusion of their preexisting political commitments. It argues for greater transparency around and awareness of the ways in which values, not just evidence, inform research findings and policy positions. (shrink)

The use of facial recognition technology (FRT) as a form of intelligence has recently made a prominent public appearance in the theater of war. During the early months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities relied on FRT as part of the country's defensive activities, harnessing the technology for a variety of purposes, such as unveiling covert Russian agents operating amid the Ukrainian population; revealing the identity of Russian soldiers who committed war crimes; and even identifying dead Russian (...) soldiers. This constellation of uses of FRT—in a war increasingly waged on the digital and information front—warrants ethical examination. The essay discusses some of the most serious concerns with FRT in the context of war, including the infringement of informational privacy; the indiscriminate and disproportionate harms it may inflict, particularly when the technology is coupled with social media intelligence; and the potential abuse of the technology once the fog of war dissipates. Some of these concerns parallel those to be found in nations that are not engulfed in war, but others are unique to war-torn settings. (shrink)

This article addresses the moral and legal difficulties sport governing bodies encounter as human rights promoters. The case presented here is the 2023 decision by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow athletes from Russia and Belarus to compete in international sport under neutral colours, after recommending complete exclusion a year before due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While IOC’s change of mind was influenced by UN experts on human rights, claiming that the ban discriminated against Russian (...) athletes, the same experts fail to take into account competing human rights elements that could favour the ban. To that end, this article discusses the complexities of prioritizing human rights in an Olympic context and, deriving from that, demonstrates the existence of moral and legal support for upholding the exclusion of Russia. Finally, the analysis of how to prioritize morally and legally between competing human rights offers deliberative material to other sport governing bodies which could be used to carve out preventive measures prior to their next encounter with a similar situation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether it is morally wrong to ban only male citizens from leaving a country in wartime, and if it is, why it is the case. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law and ordered general mobilization, at the same time prohibiting male citizens aged 18 to 60 from crossing the border. The justifiability of the ban is in dispute, and opponents have made a case in (...) both legal and moral dimensions. In the moral dimension, there are arguments based on consequentialism, individual freedom, and fairness or non-discrimination. In this paper, I focus on the third argument and argue that the ban unfairly and morally wrongfully discriminates against male Ukraine citizens on the basis of their gender. First, I define discrimination and apply it to our case. Second, moving from the descriptive definition of discrimination to its moral wrongness, I argue that the male-only ban is unfair and morally unjustified. Third, I argue that the ban can also be deemed morally wrong from one of the prominent views in the field of the ethics of discrimination, namely the deliberative freedom view. (shrink)

The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between (...) acts of aggression and wars of aggression. Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus early modern just war theorists’ views of just cause. Section 6 explores various theories of what exactly makes aggressive war so evil that it belongs in the pantheon of core crimes, side by side with genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes. The basic question is whether aggression is fundamentally a crime against states, a crime against human rights, or a crime against peace itself. I reject the first, statist, version, and endorse the human rights version. I examine three versions of the view that aggressive war is fundamentally about its human costs: that aggressive wars lead to atrocities (Trainin); that aggressive wars lead more generally to unjustified killings (Dannenbaum); and that aggressive wars lead to both unjustified killings by the aggressor, and to unnecessary killings that include the justified killings of aggressors’ troops by defenders (Mégret). As for crimes against peace, I argue that this theory of aggression’s evils comes in two “flavors,” one of which has justly been criticized by postcolonial writers, and one of which I think is legitimate. The former originates in Judge Pal’s famous dissenting opinion in the IMTFE, and argues that criminalizing aggression is a move by colonial powers to freeze the oppressive status quo. The more legitimate version is that in an age of catastrophically destructive weapons, the risks of escalation in armed conflict –the threat that conflicts will spiral into world wars–are simply too great in human terms. Thus, the legitimate version of “crimes against peace” is part and parcel of the human rights analysis. The final sections break new ground. Section 7 considers whether aggression is solely a leadership crime. Everyone agrees that it would be wrong to punish ordinary soldiers for the crime of aggression launched by their leaders. The questions is why, and it is not easy to answer. Examining it brings us to a contemporary dispute over which leaders can be prosecuted: only those who control or direct the aggressive policies (as per the ICC’s Rome Statute), or others as well, who “shape or influence” the policy without necessarily directing it (as the customary rule used to be formulated). I argue against any narrowing of the leadership clause. Section 8 explores the “paradox of immunity”: Under the legal principle of sovereign immunity, apex leaders are immune from prosecution in the courts of another state. But under the narrow leadership clause, only apex leaders can be prosecuted. Here I argue for a surprising conclusion: that in fact there never was a customary rule of immunity for the crime of aggression. If so, the paradox of immunity disappears. This resolution also helps cut the Gordian knot of a current debate about whether a relatively small subset of states (the EU, perhaps) can form an aggression tribunal and call it “international.”. (shrink)

The article raises three key questions: what explains Putin’s (mis)calculations in the field of security and Russia’s hard-power projection onto Ukraine, what prevented both Russian and international experts from taking seriously Putin’s resolve to launch the war prior to February 24, 2022, and what would be the long-term repercussions of the war for liberal international order? To answer these interconnected questions, we refer to the discipline of foreign-policy analysis and political theory.

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency (...) problem in realism: realists not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. (shrink)

The phrase ‘Never Again,’ ‘plus jamais, ‘nie wieder,’ ‘nunc más’ and ‘nunca mais’ promises to end the atrocities of the 20th century and warns of their return if individuals and governments remain indifferent to injustices in the world. Never Again is based on the moral claim that active remembrance is central to learning from the past and to preventing violence in the future. Indeed, as President Volodymyr Zelensky argued in his speech on May 8th commemorating the end of World War (...) II, ‘Never Again’ is ‘the anthem of the civilized world.’ While the promise of Never Again was undermined by genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the bombing of civilians in Syria and war in Afghanistan, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine tests the ethics of Never Again on a larger scale with its looming specter of nuclear war and growing list of war crimes. In an effort to understand how the very institutions that were created in the aftermath of World War II could not prevent war from returning to Europe, my argument proceeds in three parts: (1) Never Again is based on a paradox between the universal and the particular, as well as between the historical experience of individuals in the past and the universal promise to avert its reoccurrence. (2) Never Again refers to a break in historical time that links the living with memories of the dead and promises not to repeat the violence of the past in the future. At issue is the kind of intergenerational responsibility implied in the ethics of Never Again. (3) The imperative of Never Again is weakened when memory is reduced to a melancholic gaze of catastrophe that privileges a tragic understanding of history. (shrink)

This commentary offers a concise description of the structure revealed in the discourse about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but that also serves as a condition of the possibility for such events to happen. The points of view that this structure provides are relational, interdependent, and mutually constructed, and they are labeled as the Citizens, the Authorities, and the People. All these positions are structured in such a way that provides their subjects with a source of enjoyment. The (...) positions can be described as follows: fetishism of the Citizens, who almost invent their guilt without being held responsible; sadism of the Authorities, whose urge to make more and more atrocious decisions demand to repeatedly dismiss or shift the blame; masochism of the People, who accept their responsibility for anything without having a clear idea about the contents of decisions that were made in their name. In regards to communal guilt, it is crucial to take this level of enjoyment into account, in order to refuse sinking into emotions and avoiding using the language of guilt and shame. However, to simply switch to the language of understanding and responsibility instead is not enough. The language we need to seek is the one that would allow us to directly address the inadequacy of this distorted political arrangement—not some kind of metalanguage, but, on the contrary, a common language. (shrink)

Our world in 2022 is immersed in challenges and tragedies. The Covid-19 pandemic continues to be a constant theme in our lives and in the news. As I write this essay, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine e...

National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this paper, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, e.g., to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, etc. In response, I consider some other ways (...) humiliation may play a role in international conflict and argue that what is likely to be most relevant are not humiliating experiences, felt by individuals or groups, but rather humiliation narratives, which are often used as a discursive mechanism to justify conflict. This is important because it means a nation’s willingness to engage in international conflict depends not on something which seems intractable (i.e., the emotions felt by its citizens), but something more malleable: the narratives it accepts as frames for historical events. (shrink)

In recent times, the world has seen an explosion of episodes of forced migration. Whether another state has led the attack, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or by its own state such as Myanmar, ousting the Rohingyas, this international political reality of forced exit can neither be denied nor ignored. Consequent to the international political reality, some states have tightened their borders as they hold nationalist concerns against immigration of such kind. Their concern stems from the (...) philosophy of nationalism which claims the protection of borders and sovereignty in light of the influx of refugees and the burden on the state. This paper aims to elaborate on the interaction of political and legal philosophy related to Liberalism and Nationalism. I put forward the hypothesis that the current reality of international politics - the influx of victims of forced migration such as refugees should be rethought with the application of the philosophy of liberal nationalism. Liberalism and nationalism are two very different moral and political philosophies. Liberal claims protect individual freedom, advocate open borders, and promote equality of all before the law and consent of the governed. Nationalist philosophy promotes the interests of the state, and advocates devotion to the state, its ideology, culture and ethos. In the context of forced migration, the ideas of these disunited philosophies can be utilised to balance and accommodate the concerns of refugees, states and citizens. For this, I will examine the philosophies of liberalism, nationalism and liberal nationalism, which present an inclusive form of nationalism. (shrink)

The essay is concentrated on emotional affects caused by representation of violence in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine and beyond. Instant accessibility to first-hand visual information created fertile soil for planting and then multiplying manipulative strategies of one or another political interest. Meanwhile, the demand for shocking content continues to steadily rise because it guarantees popularity, spectacle and even a form of pleasure. This, in turn, supports a very propagandistic version of reality where violence plays a (...) central role in the overall design and transmission of contents, which is driven by shock as an affective medium. Blind Spot, Gradual Loss of Vision and Speck in the Eye represent a body of works by Mykola Ridnyi, address the question of what potential response(s) could be given by artistic interventions understood as a dialectical and critical framework able to face and make visible the problem of dehumanization through violence? (shrink)

One of the most pronounced features of the war in Ukraine has been the heavy reliance of the Russian forces on convict-soldiers, most notably by the private military and security company (PMSC) the Wagner Group. In this essay, I explore the ethical problems with using convict-soldiers and assess how using them compares to other military arrangements, such as conscription or an all-volunteer force. Overall, I argue that the central issue with using prisoners to fight wars is their perceived expendability. (...) To do this, I present three arguments. First, although many prisoners have been under major duress, using convict-soldiers may be somewhat preferable to using conscripts in this regard. Second, convict-soldiers are more likely to be subject to human rights abuses than other types of soldiers and this should be seen as the main problem with their use. Third, convict-soldiers’ liability to lethal force for fighting in an unjust war does not render it permissible to treat them as expendable. (shrink)

Now in its third year, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine remains at the very top of the international security agenda. This conflict has largely refocused the West's attention away from the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In February 2022, German chancellor Olaf Scholz went so far as to declare that the invasion signaled a zeitenwende, or “dawn of a new era.”1 Russia's aggression and the threat of having to (...) fight a peer or near-peer competitor raises difficult questions, many of which are ethical in nature. The essays gathered in this roundtable seek to provide answers to some of those questions. They are the result of a workshop I organized for the King's College London Centre for Military Ethics in October 2023. One of my ambitions for this workshop was to put leading academics working on the ethics of war into discussion with military practitioners, making sure to include Ukrainian voices. I was very fortunate to succeed in these objectives, and I am convinced that the published essays have benefited enormously from our conversations. (shrink)

In this article, Timothy Snyder recounts his meeting with President Zelensky shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Snyder explores the philosophical implications of Zelensky’s decision to stay in Kyiv as Russian troops marched on the Ukrainian capital. Specifically, Snyder explains what Zelensky’s bravery during the first few days of the full-scale invasion shows us about the relations between freedom and speech, freedom and risk, freedom and obligation, and freedom and security.

_A few public actions prepared the way for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the purpose of which was to define a special military operation as forced, necessary and inevitable. The use of armed force against Ukraine was discussed during those public events. The Russian authorities applied many arguments, and a great deal of attention was paid to the moral justification of war. In this article, I consistently analyze three problems: why did Russian officials use moral language to (...) justify the war, what arguments did they use, and would these arguments retain their effect in the long term. I will examine several addresses made by the President of Russia and the Russian Federation Security Council meeting materials to address these questions. I conclude that Putin's lack of legitimacy forced him to justify the war in moral terms, and the peculiarities of Russian moral discourse allowed him to do that. However, even if this strategy was effective to a certain extent at the beginning of the war, it can hardly be stable and sustainable._ _Keywords_: invasion of Ukraine, Russia, Ukraine, just war, morality. (shrink)

This paper contains my attempt to pastiche the Lacanian philosopher and social theorist Renata Salecl. The pastiche focuses on the effects of coronavirus on liberal societies, the invasion of Ukraine, and offers a definition which I think is of interest to analytic philosophy.

The article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer’s claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as (...) well as the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian ‘imperialism’ toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer’s arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events. (shrink)

Preview: /Aaron J. Wendland interviewed by Przemysław Bursztyka/ “What Good Is Philosophy?” took place on 17-19 March 2023, and it aimed to raise the funds required to establish a Centre for Civic Engagement at Kyiv Mohyla Academy. This Centre will provide support for academic and civic institutions in Ukraine to counteract the destabilizing impact that Russia’s invasion has had on Ukrainian higher education and civilian life. Keynotes at the conference were delivered by world-renowned author, Margaret Atwood, one (...) of the most celebrated scholars of Ukrainian history, Timothy Snyder, and two of Ukraine’s preeminent public intellectuals, Mychailo Wynnyckyj and Volodymyr Yermolenko. Lectures were also given by some of the most influential philosophers writing today, including Peter Adamson, Elizabeth Anderson, Seyla Benhabib, Agnes Callard, Quassim Cassam, Tim Crane, Simon Critchley, David Enoch, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Sally Haslanger, Angie Hobbs, Barry Lam, Melissa Lane, Dominic Lopes, Kate Manne, Jeff McMahan, Jennifer Nagel, Philip Pettit, Kieran Setiya, Jason Stanley, Timothy Williamson, and Jonathan Wolff. The closing remarks were delivered by Ukraine’s Ambassador to Canada, Yulia Kovaliv. This benefit event was designed to provide members of the public, individual academics, colleges and universities, professional associations, charitable foundations, and private companies with a way to support students, scholars, and civic institutions in Ukraine. The entire conference is now available to be viewed online via on the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy’s YouTube channel. Here is the relevant link. I encourage everyone who watches the conference to make a donation to support students, scholars, and publicly engaged academics in Ukraine. All donations can be made here. And as the conference organizer, I am extremely grateful for any and every contribution to this cause. (shrink)

The article analyzes the political motives of Ukrainian resistance to Russian invasion and aggression. First of all, it emphasizes the falsification of history by Russian propaganda, its use of history as a political instrument, the destruction of the traumatic memory of the recent imperial past and the glorification of the “glorious centuries-old” imperial history in modern Russia. This determines the difference in the structure of the historical memory of Russians and other former peoples of the empire, and the recent (...) memory of the tragic imperial past is the leading factor in the choice of the Ukrainian and Moldovan peoples for their political destiny. The article also shows that this choice, as well as the desire for truth, freedom and rights, determines these peoples’ slow but sure progress toward democracy. These choices and aspirations are at the same time a determining factor in the ability of the Ukrainian people to resist Russian armed aggression. Instead, the so-called “civilizational” links between the former peoples of the empire, with which Russia tries to justify its aggression, are actually a cover for its desire for political dominance. The article also outlines the importance of Ukrainian resistance for European democracies, calling for their unconditional support. The war in Ukraine is a challenge for them, because no matter what problems democracies around the world are facing today, they will remain actors of their own history only if they provide support to all those who resist the destruction of the minimum of rights and freedoms that define democracy. Using Kant’s work «Perpetual Peace» as an example, the article also shows that the cessation of war for the sake of cessation of war, which is often called for today, will not contribute to the establishment of peace. It will leave grounds for the renewal of war, which the aggressor, if he will not change its political essence, will always be able to use it again. (shrink)

Over 1000 companies have either curtailed or else completely ceased operations in Russia as a response to its invasion of Ukraine, a mass corporate exodus of a speed and scale which we’ve never seen. While corporate withdrawal appears to have considerable public support, it’s not obvious that it has done anything to hamper the Russian war effort, nor is it clear what the long-run effects of corporate withdrawal as a regularised response to war might be. Given this, it’s (...) important the evaluate the ethical merits of such a response. In this paper I critique what I take to be the two most common arguments given in favour of voluntary corporate withdrawal, which I label ‘the instrumental argument’ and ‘the clean hands argument’ respectively. After illustrating their shortcomings, I reframe corporations’ predicament as a ‘spattered hands’ case—one where they may do good by remaining in a war-waging state, but where they contribute indirectly to grave wrongdoing by doing so. Drawing on ideas from the ‘Business for Peace’ and ‘Business and Human Rights’ literature, I highlight the potentially positive role of corporate presence within war-waging countries, before highlighting four considerations which corporations ought to bear in mind when determining whether to withdraw, or whether it is the lesser evil to stay and to let their hands be spattered. (shrink)

The article offers a philosophical rereading of George Orwell’s novel 1984 in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. In recent decades, the dystopia of the English writer has become not only a model of literary criticism of totalitarianism but also the subject of constant falsifications and censorship for Russian propagandists. This study aims to clarify the primary philosophical content of Orwell’s novel and its heuristic potency to (...) expose the sociopolitical situation in contemporary Russia. The author of the article turns to biographical descriptions and philosophical interpretations of the novel in the works of leading Western scholars to finally draw reasonable analogies between the dystopian world of 1984 and the contemporary Russian Federation. (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

This essay considers calls to boycott working with the Russian academy after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Against the view that such a boycott would prevent Western academics from working with their Russian colleagues to counter Kremlin propaganda and to co-produced Western-Russian research that may benefit everyone, I argue that the Russian censorship and policing of the academy combined with Russian ideology means that there are currently no conversation partners for Western academics within the Russian academy.

The category of a national interest is one of the most popular notions used in international relations. It has a polysemic character and is differently interpreted by various scientific perspectives. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief analysis of selected approaches of the theory of international relations to defining interests and correlating the interpretations of national interests of the Russian Federation performed on their bases. The choice of case study concerning the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (...) is not accidental because in countries aspiring to gain world power the concept of national interest is raised while explaining the motives of decisions taken by their leaders exceptionally often. In this article, Russia’s interests will be discussed in reference to the annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s actions towards Ukraine. Those events vividly show the specificity of defining the national interests, based on one hand on the pursue to being a powerhouse and understanding the interests in the category of power and, on the other hand, resulting from the political identity of Russian elites. As a result, an assessment of the scientific utility of selected theoretical paradigms and their use in the analyses of Russia’s foreign policy will be outlined. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the philosophical legacy of Evald Ilyenkov in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine. The authors use the example of Ilyenkov and his legacy to show how drastically different the philosophical situation was in Soviet Ukraine in order to present a holistic viewpoint on Soviet philosophy. The authors highlight the differences between the political and philosophical circumstances in Russia and Ukraine from the 1950s to the 2010s. The Ukrainian philosophical tradition is characterized by its focus (...) on pedagogics, aesthetics, and nonacademic forms of philosophical communication. The main organizational role in Ukrainian philosophy was played by Pavel Kopnin and Valeriy Bosenko, who introduced dialectics as logic to Kyiv universities and made an effort to create philosophical circles for students. Anatoliy Kanarskiy, the prominent Soviet philosopher who specialized in aesthetics adopted the same idea of organizing students into circles. All these personalities were connected with Ilyenkov and each other, thus proving the existence of a common tendency and tradition of thinking within the discourse of Soviet philosophy. The authors highlight that this specific tradition may be called a “Socratic tradition” with its focus on free thinking, on discussions and dialectics. This tradition goes beyond academic philosophy and roots itself in cybernetical studies by Viktor Hlushkov and exists in modern Ukraine in the form of various philosophical circles and literature clubs. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. This article explores the tasks and goal of university education in Ukraine during the war. The role of the University in the field of education and public life during the russian-Ukrainian war is outlined. The educational sector is going through significant challenges along with Ukraine in the context of the military operations. Therefore, the university community is actively involved in the struggle and not only on the educational front. (...) The article is particularly addressing the following questions: what are the challenges that universities face in times of war?; how can university education continue under the circumstances of war?; what are the main tasks of university education for this period?; what are the new tasks that the University is facing today compared to the original tasks at the moment of the emergence of universities?; The article also demonstrates the transformation of university education from the time of the coronavirus pandemic to the moment of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Met hod s. The research methodology includes general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis. Method of situational analysis is also adopted within the methodology. The article uses an analytical approach based on the study of historical and philosophical sources. R e s u l t s. It is evident that Ukrainian universities despite the circumstances of war still operate as centers of education, train highly qualified professionals, develop science, and raise a new generation of scholars. University as an institution keeps cultivating an average person into a cultured one. We mean that the University preserves and transmits to young generations the culture of the Ukrainian national spirit in times of war. C o n c l u s i o n s. The article proves that the University, in such a difficult time of war, is forming the contemporary culture of Ukraine. This contemporary culture is created by the inseparable unity of two guilds: those who teach and those who study. So we are witnessing the realization of a new, glorious history of Ukraine, and the University is actively contributing to it. After all, Ukrainians are united by belonging to a great culture, and nowadays this culture manifests itself in the greatness of the national spirit that the Ukrainian people demonstrate. (shrink)

1. IntroductionCan the discourse of tianxia (“All-under-Heaven”) provide a peaceful resolution to the “Taiwan problem”? This article seeks to address this question. The urgency of such a resolution seems to be evident at this moment: since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, starting on February 24, 2022, observers of international politics have focused on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with regard to its position on Russia’s aggression, on the one hand, and to its decision on Taiwan, on (...) the other. Consequently, the question of “Will Taiwan be the next Ukraine?” was raised so frequently that the PRC’s former minister of foreign affairs had to urge other states to stop drawing a comparison between Taiwan and Ukraine.1 However, such a call has not eased the concern over the PRC’s potential invasion of Taiwan, as key actors in international politics, such as the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, continue to reiterate their position regarding a peaceful resolution between China and Taiwan,2 suggesting the lack of it to this day. (shrink)

Personification, one of major types of metaphors often employed to express an attitude, is also an argumentative tool, especially in media texts on politically contested events. The present investigation aims at disclosing the attitudinal stance in personifying Ukraine, Russia, the Western countries and Lithuania in a corpus of texts collected from Lithuanian media in 2015–2018. The study relies on the three-step Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA, Charteris-Black 2004), involving three levels: linguistic, cognitive and rhetorical. More specifically, they include (1) identifying (...) personification cases, (2) interpreting personification through cognitive metaphorical scenarios (Musolff 2016), and (3) explaining ideological implications encoded in the scenarios. The findings indicate that in the scenario of COMMUNICATION, Ukraine is mostly presented positively: active defender and in need of support, with occasional scepticism whether it is capable to change. The West, Lithuania including, is presented as a supporter, whereas Russia is viewed as a negatively evaluated antagonist. (shrink)

In focusing on the decade-long prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll have provided an excellent and accessible account of the situation in Ukraine on...

ExcerptThe high-water mark of globalization has passed. New competitions continue to emerge in a decidedly multipolar international system. As the United States views China and Russia as strategic competitors or worse, an array of mid-level powers—Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, the BRICS, and so forth—try to navigate this complex system and pursue their national interests. Meanwhile, no matter how much the United States and the European Union both believe themselves part of a single “West,” divergent interests tend to (...) drive them apart, even as tensions within the EU itself have grown sharper. In order to describe part of this increasingly competitive environment, an analytic distinction between so-called “civilizational states” and “liberal empires” seems to provide a framework to analyze international political processes in starkly contrasting terms.1 To some extent, the two terms repackage the terminology of the Cold War era that contrasted closed and open societies, and if we are indeed entering a new Cold War, the return of these categories is arguably appropriate. Yet more is surely at stake than a repetition of the historical competition between Communism and democracy, and the focus on the contrast between allegedly civilizational states and liberal empires may be missing a key part of the picture. Let’s take a closer look at the two concepts and then ask whether this binary provides an adequate toolkit to understand, for example, the conflict in Ukraine. To anticipate the conclusion: those who celebrate Russia as a “civilizational state” doing battle with the evil “liberal empire” of the West miss the key point in the conflict, the will of the Ukrainian people to assert their autonomy as a nation and to resist foreign occupation. (shrink)

My critique of Mearsheimer and Rosato questions the use of theory by policymakers, contending that they are more likely to turn to so-called historical lessons for guidance. It then engages their concept of credible theory, which they apply an arbitrary manner. To buttress their claim for most uses of force being rational, they offer five short case studies of “grand strategic decision-making” and another five of ciris management. Their interpretations depart significantly from the convention wisdom, ignore contrary evidence and recent (...) and respected historical scholarship. Least defensible of all are their characterizations of Hitler’s invasion of Russia and Putin’s of Ukraine as rational and motivated by defensive concerns. The most important takeaway from this book is the extent to which international relations theories can be used for purposes of analysis or justification because most theories arewoefully underspecified. They do not include scope conditions or markers to carefully define and narrow their application. (shrink)