The use of nationalist discourse in the second Chechen War and the Russian violations of human rights have reconfigured Russian politics along a more nationalist direction. Certainly, this is a setback to Russia’s democratic transition process, which has been already complicated by pragmatic politicians seeking to maximize their power and wealth at the expense of masses.In the initial stage of the post-Soviet transition in Russia, the rhetoric of the international community held that Russia needed to be transformed into (...) a law-abiding state with a “civil society.” However, the Chechen campaign undermines both the rule of law and the autonomy of civil society. The style of justification of the Chechen campaign suggests that Russia’s problems in the post-Soviet transition are not diagnosed well by the Russian political elite. By seeking to raise the appeal of nationalism, the Chechen war has further inceased uncertainty over the political orientation of the post-Soviet Russia.However, it would be unfair to blame only on Moscow for all human fights abuses in Chechnya. In fact, radical and terrorist groups in Chechnya destabilized the region to the extent that Moscow found it both necessary and easier to resort to military force. In fact, at the root of the problems in Chechnya, one could identify the difficulty of the Chechens in developing a social, cultural and political foundation for stable political structures, a foundation which could bring together the Chechens around moderate political values, and marginalize radical groups. Unfortunately, it seems that innocent civilians, regardless of their ethnic origins, will suffer from human rights abuses until such political institutions develop. (shrink)

A literary debate occurred during 1969 and 1970 as Soviet society stepped into the holistic transition to conservatism. In the debate process, liberals in the journal Novyi Mir interpreted Soviet patriotism based on cultural pluralism and censured Russian nationalists of the journal Molodaia Gvardiia for deviating from Lenin’s ideas on the nationality question and obscuring the demarcation between patriotism and Russian chauvinism. Conversely, nationalists in Molodaia Gvardiia emphasized their validity in reviving the Russian tradition to defend the (...) national culture from Western cultural penetration and responded that Western cosmopolitanism was the innate character behind the words of Novyi Mir. The contention gradually stirred up so much public attention that Soviet authorities decided to quiet down the contestation. Eventually, the editorial boards of Novyi Mir and Molodaia Gvardiia were reshuffled, although the Soviet authorities sheltered Molodaia Gvardiia to some degree. The result of the debate was affected by a combination of synthesized factors: the background of rising Russian nationalism, the ideological rhetoric of the debate, and the influences of the opinions of international media and officials toward either side. Whatever individual preferences the authorities had, the principles of the Era of Stagnation (Zastoi) were the guidelines in dealing with the debate. (shrink)

The phenomenon of nationalism, which emerged as a result of modernization and industrialization in Western Europe, soon began to threaten the multi-lingual multinational feudal state structure of the Tsarist administration. Tsarist Russia, which wanted to preserve its borders and the existing state structure that expanded to the Caucasus and Turkestan, followed the assimilation and missionary policies towards the middle of the 19th century to Russify and Christianize non-Russian (Nerusky) and non-Christian (Inoverets) ethnic groups. At the beginning of this (...) cultural nationalist policy, which was carried out by Nikolai Ivanovich Ilminsky, who worked on theology and Turkish dialects in Kazan Spiritual Academy, in order to have Russian as a language of education and communication within the Tsarist borders. The education method of Ilminsky, supported by Tsar Alexander II, enabled the Russian language and Christianity to become widespread and more systematically applied as a reflection of the rising Russian nationalism. In line with this training method, it was aimed to carry out missionary activities, to teach Russian and Cyrillic alphabet alongside local languages, to divide these languages with accents and dialects and to make Russian a common language within Tsarist borders. Thus, the religious and ethnically different groups were wanted to be assimilated within the Russian and Orthodox Christian identities. This study examines the process of cultural assimilation policy carried out by the Russian nationalism through the education system of Ilminsky, the factors affecting this process, the structure and applications of this education system. Although the education system of Ilminsky did not reach its target within the boundaries of the empire, it was seen to be quite effective in Christianization of Tatar Turks, in spreading Russian among other ethnic groups and in terms of laying the ground for the subsequent Russification policies. The Ilminsky education system, which caused the start of a new phase in Russian nationalism, led to the emergence of nationalist ideas and intelligentsia among the ethnic groups exposed to this system The nationalist ideas spread among the ethnic groups exposed to the policy of Russification have enabled the establishment of new educational systems and the emergence of national liberation movements. (shrink)

Federal arrangements have been considered by some thinkers as a panacea for containing ethnic nationalism in the ethnically defined regions. This article challenges this view by arguing that federal institutions may enable ethnic nationalists in the ethnically defined regions to consolidate their power through the guarantees that they receive from the federal centre. Although the post-Soviet Russian leadership under Boris Yeltsin sought to use federalism as a tool for containing ethnic nationalism, Russia's this experiment with federalism demonstrates (...) that federalism may serve not to contain but to strengthen ethnic nationalism. Disillusioned with Yeltsin's failed use of federalism in containing ethnic nationalism, the overwhelming majority of the Russian people supported Vladimir Putin's anti-federalist reforms since 2000 which made federalism redundant in Russia. While undermining the basis for Western style democracy in Russia, Putin's centralism proved to be more effective than Yeltsin's federalism in containing ethnic nationalism. (shrink)

In this essay, I assess Stalin’s ideas and concepts about nationalities, their ‘manipulability’ and their legacies. I do this by briefly reconstructing their theoretical and political roots in both Tsarist and socialist traditions. Special attention will be paid to the discovery of a positive correlation between economic development and the growth of nationalism among ‘backward’ peasant peoples, which went against the grain of previous socialist beliefs, and to the appearance of a theory according to which socialism would naturally produce (...) a superior national-popular society. After discussing the evolution of these ideas and concepts, their practical applications, and the reaction they generated up to 1953, I will focus on the Soviet post-Stalinist theories and practices, and their results, also by taking into consideration the development in Soviet times and after 1991, of new, hybrid variants of Russian nationalism, as well as of Eurasian trends. (shrink)

Investigates the question of Russian identity, spanning a territory, centuries, and a variety of political, social, and economic structures. This book places emphases on the struggle against the steppe peoples, Orthodox Christianity, autocratic monarchy, and Westernization.

Virginia Woolf famously wrote 'as a woman I have no country', suggesting that women had little stake in defending countries where they are considered second-class citizens, and should instead be forces for peace. Yet women have been perpetrators as well as victims of violence in nationalist conflicts. This unique book generates insights into the role of gender in nationalist violence by examining feature films from a range of conflict zones. In The Battle of Algiers, female bombers destroy civilians while men (...) dress in women's clothes to prevent the French army from capturing and torturing them. Prisoner of the Mountains shows a Chechen girl falling in love with her Russian captive as his mother tries to rescue him. Providing historical and political context to these and other films, Matthew Evangelista identifies the key role that economic decline plays in threatening masculine identity and provoking the misogynistic violence that often accompanies nationalist wars. (shrink)

Is Russia a neoimperial or postimperial state? In this paper, I compare two interpretations proposed by political commentators Marcel Van Herpen and Dmitri Trenin. Van Herpen holds that the Russian empire is literally being rebuilt, whereas Trenin believes that Russia is just ceasing to be an empire. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the current war against Ukraine cannot be interpreted as an attempt to restore the Russian empire. This is because being an empire requires a universalistic (...) ideology that can be accepted by other nations. Meanwhile, the ideological foundation of the current war is an obviously nationalistic conception of the “Russian world.” Polish historians Andrzej Nowak and Włodzimierz Marciniak brilliantly argued that it was Russian nationalism that had previously led to the collapse of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation the current war in Ukraine can be seen not as the rebirth but rather as the dramatic end of Russian imperialism. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the recent appearance in Russian letters of ultra-nationalist fantasies about the restoration of Russia’s imperial or totalitarian status. This new trend has its roots not only in the increasingly patriotic tone of Russian society and politics, but also in the dynamics of the literary field itself. ‘Imperialist writers’ such as Aleksandr Prokhanov and Pavel Krusanov have both revived and reacted against postmodern themes and motifs from earlier decades. Relying on the legacy of sots-art and stiob (...) , the ‘imperialists’ advance a new model in Russia’s postmodern tradition, one that is balanced on the very borderline between irony and ideological militancy. In playing the game of ambiguous fanaticism, these writers have been able to attract the attention of a broad and diverse public, and have moved from an intellectual periphery into the cultural mainstream. (shrink)

The article is one of the last reflections of the outstanding mathematician, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Nikolaevich Maslov, who passed away in August 2023. In it, in a free manner, the motives of personal biography are combined and easily turn into wise judgments about acute social conflicts of our time, it is shown that the real history of people and events found compromises and mutual understanding between seemingly irreconcilable ideas and positions. The Polish roots of (...) his biography in his worldview are surprisingly linked to the proximity of the mathematical ideas of the Banach space of the great Polish mathematician Stefan Banach with the indexes of his name, with the friendship and cooperation of Polish and Russian scientists. Social-democratic family traditions on the maternal and paternal lines are perfectly combined with patriotic service to the state and are imprinted with vivid examples. He contrasts one – sided ideas about Ukrainian nationalism with the experience of such a politician as Makhno, who was merciless even to the slightest manifestations of anti-Semitism, but most importantly, this is opposed by the unity of the origin of languages and the interweaving of cultural ties. The author expresses his belief in the international potential of socialist ideas, which is poorly used in solving modern social conflicts, in particular, in Ukraine, which he, as a person with Cossack roots, experiences with particular acuteness. (shrink)

This essay argues that Russia's war on Ukraine and the post-Soviet experience, more generally, reveal ethical, empirical, and theoretical problems in the study of nationalism in the region; namely, the tendency to designate anti-colonial, non-Russian nationalism as a “bad” ethnic type and the related tendency to see opposition to it as a “good” civic, nationalist agenda while in reality, the latter agenda can be imperial. Conflation of imperialism with civic nationalism and underappreciation of the democratic potential (...) of non-Russian nationalism are problematic. The essay argues that these problems stem from theorizing about ethnic and civic nationalism that is rooted in abstract principles and does not take into account the empirical realities in which specific policies originate. I suggest that a more ethically and theoretically accurate characterization of types of nationalism as good or bad can be achieved by applying a methodology that takes into account not only formal markers of “ethnic” and “civic” policies but also the realities proponents and opponents of a given policy seek to establish and undo, the methods by which these realities come into being, and the constraints on employing illiberal methods that political actors face. (shrink)

This essay examines Isaiah Berlin's ambivalent relationship with the ideas and practices of Jewish nationalism and the ways in which this ambivalence shaped some of the key premises of his political thought. Drawing upon extensive archival research in his unpublished letters from the mid-1930s to the late 1950s, this essay reconstructs Berlin's attempt to reconcile himself with the national idea. This attempt forced him to enrich his liberalism, and pushed him to develop and adopt the Jewish normalization discourse. In (...) the course of those intra-Jewish debates Berlin also began to conceptualize freedom as an opportunity concept, an idea that would later become central both in Berlin's famous negative concept of freedom and in his pluralism. Adopting a dual perspective, which considers Berlin as both a British liberal and a Russian-Jewish émigré intellectual, I therefore offer to see the Jewish Zionist writings as complementary rather than secondary to Berlin's enterprise. (shrink)

The author reveals Fyodor Dostoevsky's works main features, his importance for Russian and world philosophy. The researcher analyzes the concept of "Russian Idea" introduced by Dostoyevsky, which became a study subject in Russian philosophy's subsequent history. The polemics that arose regarding the characteristics of Dostoevsky's soilness ideology and his interpretation of the Russian Idea in his Pushkin Speech and subsequent comments in A Writer's Diary are unveiled. The author concludes that Dostoevsky overcomes the limitations of soilness (...) and comes to universalism. The universal for him does not have a rootless cosmopolitan character but is born from the national's heyday. Diversity adorns the truth, and national diversity enamels humankind. People's real unity is in that all-human value that is found in the highest examples of each national culture. The truth is not in rootless cosmopolitanism or nationalism - it is in the "golden mean," which, in our opinion, the writer-philosopher sought to express. Dostoevsky wanted to rise above the dispute, to recognize the points of view of the Slavophiles and Westernizers as one-sided, to get out of any particularity to universality. (shrink)

The subject of the research is the concept of "Russian idea" from the point of view of its transformation in the conditions of the modern postmodern paradigm. The characteristic markers forming the modern cultural-historical and philosophical paradigm are revealed – the specifics of their influence on the concept of "Russian idea" are analyzed. An example of the modern representation of the "neo-Eurasian" version of the concept as interpreted by A. G. Dugin demonstrates how in a postmodern situation, even (...) ideas that are in discursive opposition to postmodern principles inevitably turn out to be embedded in the modern paradigm. Russian postmodern situation determines the specific forms of existence of the concept of "Russian idea", which, in turn, are representative for the analysis of phenomena, processes and transformations of modern Russian culture and the study of its dynamics. The novelty of the research lies in the analysis of the "Russian idea" as a concept with an unchanging semantic core, fixed through the presence of cross–cutting terms, as well as in identifying the characteristic types of modern forms of existence of the concept - Messianic, conservative-protective, nationalist, neo-Eurasian, political-ideological, liberal and others. The article analyzes and identifies the patterns of the constitution of the concept "Russian idea" in the conditions of the postmodernist paradigm, examines the specific markers characterizing the concept in the postmodern situation. The "Russian idea", on the one hand, is opposed to postmodernism as an axiological antinomy, on the other hand, modern markers of the concept are revealed, making it part of the postmodern system. (shrink)

Taking its cue from Vladimir Putin’s use of Dostoevsky to support his critical view of Western culture, the article challenges the view that Dostoevsky can be straightforwardly corralled into the Russian President’s nationalistic and imperialistic agenda. Instead, it follows the approach taken by George Lukacs in response to National Socialism’s self-representation as the authentic inheritor of the German cultural tradition, namely, to show that any great cultural work is going to be resistant to the kind of one-dimensional interpretations typical (...) of authoritarian regimes. Particularly, the article focusses on much-debated passages of Dostoevsky’s The Possessed (aka Demons) to show that the writer has a more nuanced view and that his work contains resources to resist today’s ultra-nationalism. (shrink)

[1] From December 1994 to August 1996, Russia was engaged in the Chechen War, a Vietnam-style quagmire that exemplified, on the one hand, the end of Russia as a great military and imperial power, and, on the other hand, "one of the greatest epics of colonial resistance in the past century.'' No analysis can hope to understand the totality of forces that lend to the stability (or instability) of nations with large minority populations unless it first examines the conditions that (...) led to the Russian defeat in Chechnya. At the center of that problem lies an interesting issue. What aspects of the Russian state, Russian society, and the Russian psyche in the 1990s played a part in the Russian defeat, and what aspects of Chechen history, society, and culture played a part in the Chechen victory? Lieven uses the Chechen War as a keyhole into the wider debate concerning the nature and course of Russian nationalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite their differences in age, professional career and political background, Milošević and Putin share similar views on one of the main consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR: the involuntary dispersal of Serbs and Russians into different foreign states. This is a study of the segments of Milošević’s and Putin’s speeches referring to Kosovo and to Crimea respectively. The study analyses their rhetorical devices and thematic content, using the analytical framework and instruments for the analysis of nationalist discourses (...) developed by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis. The speeches, it is argued here, share a topos of sacralisation of the land based on the ancestors’ holy or glorious deeds which proclaims the land to be sacred to the chosen nation. This creates a ‘national entitlement’ to the land in a depoliticised and highly personalised setting. (shrink)

This article examines the development of the concept of a “special path” in societies that have experienced problems with their self-identity. Western European intellectuals who needed an “other” in the construction and definition of their own cultural and geographical space in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries played an important role in shaping the understanding of a Russian “special path.” The “Russian chaos” they postulated was contrasted to “Western” rationalism and order and Eastern “slavery” was seen (...) as a counter position to the “Western” demands regarding human dignity. With the coming of an era of nationalism in Russia, many of these ideas were adopted by Russian intellectuals and laid a foundation for their own work toward the formation of a national identity. Orthodoxy, autocracy, Narodnost’ and communal traditionalism were seen as the only alternatives to the modern West. The Russian “Westernizers” were captivated by the idea of a “special path” as much as the “Slavophiles” and saw this path through the prism of uniquely refracted concepts of “Orthodoxy, autocracy and Narodnost’”. The author considers the concept of the ‘special path’ not only as a means of forming group identity, but also as a type of social search within the boundaries of the dominant paradigm. Russian intellectuals claiming Russian ‘uniqueness’ today, as two centuries ago, are doing so, to a very considerable degree, as a result of western intellectualism. (shrink)

Russians and Westerners access, process and communicate information in different ways. Whilst Westerners favour detailed analysis of subject matter, Russians tend to focus on certain components that are, in their view, significant. This disparity makes it difficult to achieve constructive dialogues between Western and Russian stakeholders contributing to cross-cultural communication problems. The author claims that the difference in the ways Russians and Westerners negotiate information is a significant cultural difference between Russia and West rather than an irritating (and in (...) principle amenable) lack of analytical skills on the Russian partners’ part. Understanding the reasons behind the Russian-specific approaches to dealing with information would be a positive step towards a more effective cross-cultural communication, important in business situations and essential in diplomacy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mikhail Bakhtin, Vyacheslav Ivanov, and the Rhetorical Culture of the Russian Third RenaissanceFilipp SapienzaAlthough Mikhail Bakhtin figures centrally in multiculturalism, community, pedagogy, and rhetoric (Bruffee 1986; Welch 1993; Zebroski 1994; Zappen, Gurak, and Doheney-Farina 1997; Mutnick 1996; Halasek 2001, 182; see also Bialostosky 1986) many of his major ideas remain enigmatic and controversial. The elusive aspects of Bakhtin's theories exist in part because rhetoricians know little about Bakhtin's (...) own rhetorical culture. Theorists recognize this problem and call for a reworking of Bakhtin more on his own terms. This call has been made to resolve concerns about Bakhtin's ambivalence toward rhetoric. Since Bakhtin disliked rhetoric, any use of Bakhtin in rhetorical theory is largely a hybrid synthesis of his distinct ideas on poetics, prose, satire, the epic, the novel, and so forth. John Murphy proposes a reconception of Bakhtin closely built around his ambivalence and guided by the question, "what do we [rhetoricians] mean by the concept of a rhetorical tradition?" (2001, 259). The suggestion encourages rhetoricians to take Bakhtin more on his own terms than has been done in the past. Unfortunately, as the word "we" indicates, Murphy reworks Bakhtin primarily in terms of Western ideas about rhetoric. Slavists and "Bakhtinologists" in Russia argue that when talking about Bakhtin, "we" has often meant Western, obscuring the Russian cultural roots of his theories (Kozhinov 1993; Miller and Platter 1993, 118). The privileging of Western perspectives has also been criticized by scholars of other discourse cultures. Discussing American Indian rhetoric, Malea Powell argues that "we" means a Rhetorical Tradition that begins "with the Greeks, goes Roman, briefly sojourns in Italy, then shows up in England and Scotland, hops the ocean to America and settles in" (2002, 397). Differences in interpreting Bakhtin also proceed from translation difficulties between Russian and English. The Russian reader views Bakhtin in more essentialist ways as opposed to the "post-modern give-and-take" theorist of many Western [End Page 123] interpretations (Emerson 1990, 113). Read in the Russian language and from that cultural context, Bakhtin's vocabulary contains "conspicuous" elements of Orthodox Christianity and Slavic nationalist ideas (Kozhinov 1993; Mihailovic 1997) that reveal a Russian theological subtext to his ideas about community and dialogue.In this essay, I provide a reading of Bakhtin against the background of his own rhetorical culture. More specifically, I offer an analysis of an intertextual dialogue about language and community between Bakhtin and the symbolist writer Vyacheslav Ivanov. Scholars identify Ivanov as a poet, philosopher, and teacher who profoundly impacted Bakhtin (Mal'chukova 1992, 55). The Russian symbolists upheld strong nationalist ideals and a linguistic theory rooted in metaphysics (Mirsky 1972, 188). Many Slavists and Russian readers of Bakhtin suspect that Ivanov strongly influenced Bakhtin's rhetoric even though, for reasons unknown but that are suspected to be political, Bakhtin understates his debt to him (Ivanov 2001, 3). Bakhtin was not unlike his contemporaries in sharing an interest and vocabulary that addressed the major threads of symbolism. Read side by side with Ivanov's essays in Russian, Bakhtin's rhetoric displays a mixture of the European, Slavic, and Christian ideals that were in parlance among many Russian theorists in early twentieth-century Russia. Bakhtin and Ivanov give us a glimpse of this rhetorical culture. More specifically, they help us to better understand our appropriations of Bakhtin based on an elucidation of the meaning of specific terms as they existed among Bakhtin's contemporaries.The method that I use requires translation of specific Russian passages into English. Terms and phrases are interpreted against the usage background of others in early twentieth-century Russia. Bakhtin's Slavic-theological connections become evident through the elucidation of these intertextual references. Through this method, a common and accepted practice in Slavic literary studies, the use of key words and phrases are traced in and among texts to identify a discourse among authors and explicate its meaning.1 As Steven Mailloux points out, a "rhetorical hermeneutics" focuses on "the historical sets of topics, arguments, tropes, ideologies, and so forth" that give meaning to rhetoric (1988, 15-16). The approach is necessary due to the unique political and artistic circumstances during the early... (shrink)

The author conducts a comparative analysis of the Russian Revolution developed by two prominent social-political thinkers of Germany and Russia in the early twentieth century—Max Weber and Peter Struve. The article focuses on their respective interpretations of the causes, course, and consequences of the Revolution as determined by their political ideals, i.e. a specific combination of nationalism and liberalism. The author pays special attention to Weber’s and Struve’s perception of the Russian Revolution, which, albeit for different reasons, (...) was rejected by both thinkers. (shrink)

U drugom delu teksta o Filotejevoj doktrini o Moskvi kao?Trecem Rimu? autor se bavi njenom recepcijom u kasnijim periodima ruske intelektualne i politicke istorije. Iako u svom izvornom obliku to ucenje nije sadrzavalo imperijalnu, spoljno-politicku konotaciju, u radu su analizirane interpretacije ideje Treceg Rima koje su imale i znacajne politicke konsekvence. Na unutrasnjem planu ona je posluzila knezu Kurbskom za kritiku vlasti Ivana Groznog, kao i za odbacivanje crkvenih reformi patrijarha Nikona u literaturi Staroveraca. Ipak, obnova interesovanja za ideju Treceg (...) Rima karakterise ruski XIX vek u kome su vodjene diskusije o odnosu Rusije i Zapada. Slovenofilski kriticari reformi Petra Velikog u proslosti Moskovskog carstva nasli su potvrdu kulturne originalnosti i superiornosti Rusije. Autor naglasava razlike izmedju slovenofilske i panslovenske interpretacije ruskog mesijanizma. U zavrsnom delu rada mesijanska ideja dovodi se u vezu sa radjanjem nacionalizma u imperijalnom kontekstu. Na taj nacin, autor dovodi u pitanje rasirene interpretacije o njenim distinktivno ruskim karakteristikama. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179014. (shrink)

In 1991, new political discourses emerged in the Soviet republics that had to reinvent themselves as independent states, redefining their national identity on several dimensions. This process matured ambiguous attitudes toward the former imperial center and different visions over the scopes, perspectives, and claims of a ‘Russian World’ in the former Soviet space, where Moscow still asserted an exclusive political and cultural sphere of influence. In this article, we will review the cases of Armenia and Uzbekistan with peculiar national (...) projects and relationships with Moscow, reviewing their inclusion within the USSR, their path to independence, their post-Soviet relations with Moscow, and the changes during the turning points of 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. (shrink)

The essay examines the various manifestations of Russian influence on present-day Bulgarian nationalism. Although this phenomenon dates back to the early days of Bulgarian nationalist thought in the 19 th century, it gained particular prominence in recent years, especially in the context of Russian hybrid warfare. After outlining the political landscape of Bulgarian nationalism in the post-communist period, the article offers an in-depth analysis of the dominant pro-Russian narratives that are vociferously reproduced by the country’s (...) major nationalist actors. While some of these messages have been firmly adapted in the collective memory of generations of Bulgarians due to various historical reasons (e.g., the narrative of the “Russian liberators”), others are a direct product of today’s Kremlin propaganda (the notions of the alleged “decadence” of the West). Furthermore, the growing divisions within Bulgarian society that took shape against the background of this prolonged Russian influence have also been thoroughly addressed. The paper argues that Kremlin-backed actors are trying to monopolize and privatize the patriotic discourse in Bulgaria, thereby disrupting the country’s pro-Western orientation. (shrink)

To some extent, the current Russian-Ukrainian may be described as a conflict between two visions of nation, respectively, ethnic and civic models. Putin believes that a language defines a nation. In his understanding, since many Ukrainians are Russian speakers, they are Russians. His perception of Ukraine is anachronistic. He has failed to notice Ukraine's radical transformation since it gained independence. The current Ukrainian identity has a strong civic component. Its core is represented by a new urban middle class (...) with a new set of values. Sustainability of this identity largely depends on longevity and results of the war. (shrink)

Benevolenski and Kortunov discuss the array of moral, ethnic, and nationalistic questions emerging after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. They suggest that the cause for the collapse was not poor economic performance, but a moral bankruptcy the people could no longer endure.

The paper attempts to situate the work of Fyodor Dostoevsky in the tradition of Russian existentialism, and to indicate his influence on the subsequent development of existentialism in its ontological or ethical guise. In fact, Dostoevsky may be seen as the originator of a tradition which will later on influence and be taken up, via Nietzsche and Shestov, by the figures like Emanuel Levinas, Albert Camus or Maurice Blanchot, all explicitly concerned with existentialist questions of debt, guilt or suicide. (...) Dostoevsky's writings are also interpreted in relation to Russian nationalism, and the sense of Russian Messianic election, which at the end of Crime and Punishment coalesce in another destination for Raskolnikov, launching him towards a Messianic future prior to the Abrahamic time and monotheistic sacrificiality. The end of Crime and Punishment imagines another existence for Raskolnikov, before the religious history, or the history tout court, has taken place or time. That time space is akin to something that Jacques Derrida formulated as an advent of an event to-come, a-venir. Dostoevsky is thus, in our interpretation, both a progenitor of the important strains of existentialism, but also a writer returning his hero's existence to an advent of a completely other, time before time, yet to come. (shrink)

_The purpose _is to study that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, in which his ideas of russian messianism are most clearly outlined ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"). To delineate the forms of determining the influence of messianism on his negative assessments of the anthropology of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Realization of the specified purpose presupposes, first, the analysis of his way of interpreting humanism in the European classical philosophy, and, secondly, to clarify the nature (...) of his connection with the way of substantiating the idea of the Russian messianism. _Theoretical basis._ Our view of Gogol’s heritage is based on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics. _Originality._ It is revealed, that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, which most clearly outlines his ideas of russian messianism ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"), his position on human nature and its calling is fundamentally different from the position of philosophy of Early New Age and the Enlightenment. If in the first case, it is a question of service to the russian empire, in the last one, it is a question of self-development of the person. Gogol’s dehumanization of those perceptions about the man that have occurred in European classical philosophy is a precondition in justification of russian messianism for him. One of its key factors is a narrow understanding of insight the ideas concerning the spiritual foundation of the world, namely – its reduction to the russian empire. _Conclusions._ Gogol’s philosophical doctrine of man is only partially described as belonging to the "philosophy of the heart". The disadvantage of this qualification is the impossibility of explaining the question of the origins in Gogol’s attempt to substantiate russian messianism. The article demonstrates that the deformation of the basic idea about the connectivity of man with the spiritual arche of the world is its substantive precondition for the philosophy of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Gogol narrows it down to the Russian Empire, which makes it impossible to positively delineate the orientations of the russian people. Therefore, his oeuvre during the work on "Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession" for future generations is a warning about the futility of a single russian path of development, isolated from European civilization. As the further development of russian thought and history proves, Gogol’s warning as a Ukrainian thinker really has not been heard. A vivid manifestation of this is the cave nationalism that we see today during the russian-Ukrainian war. (shrink)

Each Olympic Games will provide new material for research in the field of sports philosophy and social philosophy. This article raises the problem of understanding sports as a participant in social development on the example of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. The author analyzes the phenomenon of combining the philosophy of social sports, represented by the modern Olympic movement, and traditional Chinese philosophy. The main conclusion is that sport, as a social force, is reborn in the modern era due (...) to the combination of Eastern and Western cultures and civilizations. This gives rise to new social cognition. The leadership of the countries hosting the Olympic Games gain experience and the opportunity to demonstrate their own political and economic strength and deep mental foundations. The Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, taking place in a completely new societal environment (COVID-19 pandemic, world power realignment) is used as a case study for analysis. Using this example, the article shows the social significance of the Olympic Games and emphasizes that the social value of sports and the Olympic movement is reflected in the "spirit of fair competition" and the "spirit of peace", "human intelligence". This is a relatively new direction in the development of research in the field of physical education and social philosophy, and the special contribution of this study is to study one of the promising trends in the development of sports, that is, the modern Olympic movement, integrated with the national culture of different countries. (shrink)

This groundbreaking work by one of the world's foremost theoreticians of culture and scholars of Russian philosophy gives for the first time a systematic examination of the development of Russian philosophy during the late Soviet period. Countering the traditional view of an intellectual wilderness under the Soviet regime, Mikhail Epstein provides a comprehensive account of Russian thought of the second half of the 20th century that is highly sophisticated without losing clarity. It provides new insights into previously (...) mostly ignored areas such as late Soviet Russian nationalism and Eurasianism, religious thought, cosmism and esoterism, and postmodernism and conceptualism. Epstein shows how Russian philosophy has long been trapped in an intellectual prison of its own making as it sought to create its own utopia. However, he demonstrates that it is time to reappraise Russian thought, now freed from the bonds of Soviet totalitarianism and ideocracy but nevertheless dangerously engaged into new nationalist aspirations and metaphysical radicalism. We are left with not only a new and exciting interpretation of recent Russian intellectual history, but also the opportunity to rethink our philosophical heritage. (shrink)

This paper is exploring the theme of "conservative turn” in the public debates of the second half of perestroika (1989-1991), while this very period was often described as revolutionary. Based on the analysis of the leading "thick” journals and official review Kommunist, we are showing that a set of very similar historiosophical and political arguments, which could be reasonably described as conservative, was forming in the ideologically competing groups, including liberal supports of the market economy, humanist socialists and Russian (...) nationalists. We identify several stable and interchangeable idioms, widely used by different authors to articulate conservative and anti-revolutionary arguments, drawn from late Soviet Marxism and from the reception of the classical conservative tradition through the work of Alexander Soljenitsin. We discuss the specificity of the "conservative turn” in the late USSR, which have combined the critique of the revolutionary ideology going against the human nature with a utopian assumption in the wholesomeness of history - purified from ideology, violence and political projects. During this period, hundreds of voices articulating conservative arguments do not refer to the actual social experience and practices worth to be preserved and defended, but to a utopian "natural-historical” flow. In this respect, perestroika's conservative turn differs significantly from the heritage of Edmund Burke who appealed to the tangible British tradition and common-Law. (shrink)

The article considers the features contemporary transformations narratives official Russian Orthodoxy in the years 2015-2016. At the end of 2015 and in 2016 narrative "Russian world" Patriarch and his entourage tried to upgrade using the ideal of "solidarity." The ideas of "solidarity" in the XX century evolved differently in Catholic social teaching and fascism. Spokesman of the Russian Orthodox Church sees the embodiment of the ideals of solidarity in the best manifestations of Soviet mentality. "Solidarism" in the (...) rhetoric of the Patriarch and his entourage are a means of legitimizing Russian nationalism and revanchism. According to the Patriarch of core values and "Russian world" is "faith, state, justice, solidarity and dignity." These values must be an alternative to liberal values - freedom, rights, human rights. According to Patriarch values should determine the policy, and especially value the unity of the Russian people and state. This means that the patriarch claim to symbolic power over the politicians of Russia and neighboring countries. Іn rhetoric of patriarch the West, with its core value of freedom, embodies evil. Russia tempted by Western values, and this is the cause of many crises. The role of savior in this narrative belongs to the church and its leadership. Present rated as the culmination of the struggle between good and evil. The future victory of good patriarch linked not only to preserve the unity and uniqueness of Russia, but the triumph of traditionalism in Europe, the adoption of the values of solidarity society. (shrink)

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.

This volume brings together the religious and philosophical writings of the founders of Russian religious philosophy, Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky. Both began their intellectual careers in the literary world of the 1820s. The texts collected here make the philosophical concepts of Sobornost (community, universality, wholeness, ecumenicity) and integral knowledge, available to western readers. Based on the primacy of the heart, the spiritual wholeness of the human being and the cognitive will, integral knowing moves beyond rationality to union with (...) the object of knowledge in knowing. This book provides an introduction to Russian religious philosophy, and a profound, meditative text for anyone concerned with human and spiritual unity. Also included are two responses to Slavophile ideas by the prominent Russian philosophers Pavel Florensky and Nikolai Berdiaev. (shrink)

The sources of religious tolerance but also of religious nationalism in post-soviet Russia can be found basically in the group identification of nationality and religion. In crisis situations, the historical religion of the Russian society - Orthodoxy - becomes the criterion for identifying the national identity. However, despite the fact that the majority of Russians in our times consider themselves Orthodox, many of them are not believers. The observable effect of the “external belief” results in the fact that (...) the religion tends to become a matter of personal choice and an individual value. It assumes a nationalistic function and to become an ideology. As a result, the political elite considers religion as a means of achieving different non- religious purposes. The Russian Orthodox Church, the official church, is compelled to take this fact into consider- ation and even support it. This is why religious intolerance and religious nationalism in modern Russia are often directed towards religion. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to explain the intellectual formation, cultural and political implementation of the Azerbaijan National Movement in Azerbaijan under the rule of Tsarist Russia from the mid-19th century to 1918 and resulted in the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in the context of Miroslav Hroch's approach to the three-phase development of national movements. It is very important to understand Miroslav Hroch's approach in order to understand the originality, fundamental dynamics and the way of development (...) of the Azerbaijani National Movement, which was revealed by the Turkish nationalists in Azerbaijan with many discourses and practices. In this study, the history of Azerbaijan National Movement is divided into three phases through Hroch's approach. Phase A, which began in the mid-19th century, had a purely cultural, literary and folkloric content, while a modern nation from the ethnic group was formed by the nationalist agitation through the transition to Phase B in the early 20th century. After the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Azerbaijani National Movement gained mass support and moved on to Phase C. -/- . (shrink)

In response to Anderson and Arzyutov’s paper, I argue that ambiguities in the Russian social-scientific concept of “etnos” reveal its place in what I call a “field style” for thinking and doing science. Tolerance for ambiguity is, I suggest, a methodological strength of the field sciences. I support these reflections by also addressing the etnos concept’s origins in the complex history of Ukrainian nationalism.

The paper looks into the phenomenon of criticism of the Russian World concept in contemporary Ukrainian religious, political and social discourses. It is shown that the propagandistic ideological narrative model, developed according to numerous historical analogs, is becoming a subject of critical analysis by specialists in many scientific areas. Experts' views coincide in many respects but there are also different stances on some disputable issues. The historical aspiration of Russia for domination and substantiation of its unique nature is considered (...) the root of the concept. This explains the use of such narrative constructs as "Moscow is the third Rome", "specific civilization" etc. Based on evidence of competent authorities, the author proves that the concept was most likely developed by a group of leading Russian ideologists in the late 20th century. It acquired the modern conservative and nationalist form only after it had become an object of interest of Russian clerical circles and started spreading through church resources. The symbolic figure in this respect is the current Moscow Patriarch Kyrylo who has been an active promoter of the Russian World concept from the early 21st century. After he had been voted into the Patriarch office, Kyrylo turned the Russian World into the leading church and political narrative. The wide use of the concept for political purposes was consistently criticized for undisguised militarism, aggressive and nationalistic ideas underpinning the Russian World. According to numerous experts, these ideas have no common root with Christianity, sometimes being in open contradiction with the latter. Critical studies also indicate that the basis of the Russian World is the belief that the Russian culture and language are culturally superior to historical achievements of numerous other peoples, including the Ukrainians. As historical experience shows, the use of such ideological concepts as the Russian World results in consolidation of society around one national idea and expansion of aggressive state policy to neighboring countries. (shrink)

_The purpose_ of the article is to clarify the most relevant philosophical dimensions of modern patriotism against the background of defending the processes of national identity. _The theoretical basis_ of the study consisted of institutional analysis, synergetic and philosophical-anthropological approaches, as well as existential philosophy and philosophy of applied ethics. Patriotism is seen as a path to self-expression, the world of life, mental self-limitation and self-aggrandizement of modern man. The peculiarities of modern considerations about the philosophical content of patriotism within (...) the framework of its comparison with other value structures, such as cosmopolitanism, liberalism, nationalism, etc., are established. _Originality._ The scientific novelty is that the article for the first time reveals the correlations of patriotism with other ideological and ideological doctrines and systems of political and social worldview, which fix the identity of individuals and groups in the context of ethnic, social or political community. _Conclusions._ The existential dimension of patriotism is based on worldviews of involvement in the local community. Trends in globalization are forcing modern people to "seek refuge" in small communities, or even in a family or other small group. "Local" or "neighborhood" patriotism acquires the character of an expression of involvement in a friend and relative. It almost completely "crosses out" the constitutional and ideological patriotism inherent in the states of the twentieth century. The reorientation of significant philosophical justifications of patriotism in modern conditions provokes a discussion about the spirituality and societal nature of patriotic meanings. In the struggle for the independence of modern Ukraine, we are all witnessing the process of overcoming "state" patriotism "local". This process is very important in the face of opposition to the totalitarian ideology of the Russian aggressor. (shrink)

_The goal of this study is to investigate the ethnic conflict in southern Kaduna in connection to eastern Ukraine, which has now spread internationally as a result of major countries' action on Ukraine's behalf. The Hausa-Fulani are Muslims, whereas indigenous Christian communities make up the bulk of the population in southern Kaduna. Although the root causes of the situation in southern Kaduna are multifaceted given their theological and sociopolitical undertones, they are primarily cultural and patriotic in the case of Ukraine. (...) The special status of the Russian language is a subject of heated debate among those on the side of Ukraine's government and opposition nationalists who are pro-Russia. The study's purpose dictated that premordialism theory be used as a working model. Ethnic activists and nationalists commonly employ primordialist ideas to explain and defend ethnic wars, like the ones under study (in southern Kaduna and eastern Ukraine). In addition to hoping that the United Nations is permitted to fulfil the purpose for which it was established so that peace can return to Ukraine, we also hope that the same can be achieved in southern Kaduna if the recommendations of the state and federal governments assigned to investigate the crisis are dusted off and implemented._ _In conclusion, it is hard to discuss peace in an environment rife with injustice and nepotism. More peace advocacy is needed from the main international political powers, but they can only do that if they allow the United Nations (UN) to function freely. Primordialist theories are frequently used by ethnic activists and nationalists to explain and justify ethnic conflicts, such as those in southern Kaduna and eastern-southern Ukraine, which is why this research supports the use of the primordial theory of ethnic conflict despite its flaws._. (shrink)