The article is devoted to the search for the meaning of the Russian-Ukrainian war from the perspective of intentionalism of the Ukrainian philosopher Stefan Baley. This article attempts to actualise Baley’s intentionalist approach to war in the context of the philosophy of war, especially the ethics of warfare. The article analyses from a philosophical point Baley’s views on the meaning of war, attempts to find the meaning of the Russian-Ukrainian war by method of analogy, and (...) formulates several inductive conclusions on the lessons from this war for the future. In conclusion, the article argues that the Russians’ justification of their armed invasion of Ukraine by a common history and the need for self-defense is hypocritical and self-deceptive. The article also suggests that such ‘morality’ of the Russians requires attention from the international community so that everyone in it does not mistake good for evil. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. This article explores the tasks and goal of university education in Ukraine during the war. The role of the University in the field of education and public life during the russian-Ukrainian war is outlined. The educational sector is going through significant challenges along with Ukraine in the context of the military operations. Therefore, the university community is actively involved in the struggle and not only on the educational front. (...) The article is particularly addressing the following questions: what are the challenges that universities face in times of war?; how can university education continue under the circumstances of war?; what are the main tasks of university education for this period?; what are the new tasks that the University is facing today compared to the original tasks at the moment of the emergence of universities?; The article also demonstrates the transformation of university education from the time of the coronavirus pandemic to the moment of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Met hod s. The research methodology includes general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis. Method of situational analysis is also adopted within the methodology. The article uses an analytical approach based on the study of historical and philosophical sources. R e s u l t s. It is evident that Ukrainian universities despite the circumstances of war still operate as centers of education, train highly qualified professionals, develop science, and raise a new generation of scholars. University as an institution keeps cultivating an average person into a cultured one. We mean that the University preserves and transmits to young generations the culture of the Ukrainian national spirit in times of war. C o n c l u s i o n s. The article proves that the University, in such a difficult time of war, is forming the contemporary culture of Ukraine. This contemporary culture is created by the inseparable unity of two guilds: those who teach and those who study. So we are witnessing the realization of a new, glorious history of Ukraine, and the University is actively contributing to it. After all, Ukrainians are united by belonging to a great culture, and nowadays this culture manifests itself in the greatness of the national spirit that the Ukrainian people demonstrate. (shrink)

The study examines Russian philosopher Andrei Smirnov’s conception of the logic of sense as a way of providing exposition of the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war. The logic of sense is simultaneously a theory of rules of sense-setting and the very rules of sense-setting created by a culture and the ruling culture. Smirnov thinks that the reasons lie in the clash between common-human European culture and its logic of sense and all-human Russian culture and its logic (...) of sense. Smirnov sees no difference between Russians and Ukrainians and considers the Ukrainian culture an essential and indispensable part of Russian culture. Therefore, the expansion of the common-human European culture to Ukraine challenges the all-human Russian culture. (shrink)

The article proposes to deepen and expand the classical methodological approaches formulated at the beginning of the 21st century within the framework of academic religious studies. Based on the methodological works of the founder of modern Ukrainian religious studies, Prof. Kolodnyi, who first clearly defined the principles of the scientific study of religion, in particular objectivity, historicism, worldview neutrality, pluralism, etc., the authors justify the need for contextualization as one of the main methodological approaches in the study of current (...) religious processes. They insist on rethinking not only the universality and effectiveness of some methodological principles in new circumstances — the Russian-Ukrainian war, but also on the actualization of new ones, critically rethinking their neglect in the pre-war period. It is proved that in the hierar- chy of religious principles, the principle of contextuality becomes a particularly sought-after re- ality of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even the concepts that researchers use describing a new religious situation must be contextualized. The authors remind about those contextual dangers for the life world of Ukraine that exist in its religious segment, highlighting external and internal factors that cannot be ignored when analyzing the contemporary religious situation in Ukraine and in the world. Analyzing the current reality, the authors conclude that contextuality as a methodological approach in religious studies should consider: 1) The event context — Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine — as a condition for the manifestation of religion, which determines its functional and substantive features; 2) Features, depth and intensity of research’s contextual inclusion/exclusion. Tragic changes in the context of the life of Ukrainians — linguistic, cultural, informational, religious, etc. necessarily correct expert neutrality, objectivity, non-involvement. According to the authors, the war situation liberates from an unbiased, out-of-contextual analysis. The admis- sibility of such contextualization is a matter of debate. (shrink)

The article is updated by several circumstances, which the authors reflect on. In their opinion, there are 1) obvious and external threats — violations of freedom of conscience in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, which arose as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and 2) internally hidden and potential dangers for freedom of religions of Ukrainian citizens. The well-known examples of discrimination of believers of certain faiths in the so-called DPR-LPR and Crimea given by (...) the authors are constantly updated. Relevant monitoring and analytical reports are prepared by both Ukrainian and international experts. They submitted these reports to international human rights organizations, including the rights for Freedom of Religion and Belief. Despite such convincing documented materials, separate accusations have recently appeared against Ukraine, which allegedly violates freedom of religion in the territory under its control. Some are trying to prove that Ukraine, taking advantage of the war situation and referring to the spiritual dangers for Ukraine from those religious organizations whose centers are in the aggressor country, threatens some churches, thereby violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience, which guarantee for all citizens, regardless of from their religious affiliation, freedom of religion. The authors refute these narratives lashed out by Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. Such negative conclusions, which express concern about the situation in Ukraine regarding freedom of conscience and religion, influence on the world public, experts on issues of freedom of conscience, religious organizations, spoil the image of Ukraine as a country with high level of freedom of conscience even among European countries. Religious freedom, as the authors conclude, needs protection today, but they call for separating real threats from imaginary ones and clearly defining who persecutes, whom he/she persecutes and where persecutes. Ukraine is consistent in its intentions to protect the rights of people and communities, to protect the freedoms of believers and their organizations. (shrink)

The phenomenon of information culture in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed. It has been proven that changes in the priorities of the development of information culture during the war are determined by the course of spiritual confrontation with the enemy, accelerated transformations of public consciousness, the peculiarities of state information policy, and the urgent need to protect the country’s information sovereignty. It is argued that under the influence of the war in Ukraine, including in the (...) spiritual and informational space, all components of information culture are being transformed, particularly its core - the information worldview. The features of the development of the information worldview as a fundamental component of information culture are identified. It is noted that living in an information society without possessing the necessary information culture poses a danger of getting lost in both virtual and real worlds simultaneously. Personal mastery of information culture in modern society is based on theoretical knowledge about the essence, content, features, and regularities of its functioning in societies with different levels of informatization. The negative impact of informational aggression on the formation of the information culture of modern youth is demonstrated. During the war, the information culture of youth is formed and changed at an accelerated pace due to the increase in information flows of both negative and positive nature and under the influence of new information technologies. One of the main problems in the process of forming the information culture of youth in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war is mastering methods of countering enemy propaganda, developing critical attitudes towards information, and having a value-based worldview barrier to countering fake and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The role of knowledge and the education system in the formation of the information culture of Ukrainian society is revealed. (shrink)

This article describes present day reaction of Ukrainian Baptist community on the current geopolitical situation in Ukraine and its reflection in first modern independent theological steps of named Late Protestant denomination. It is stressed, that complete process of theology creation is a maker of healthy and protected, factually free religious life in certain boundaries of country or land. Also it’s shown that in Ukrainian case for present day’s start of the modern Baptist theology discourse the trigger factor was (...) Revolution of dignity 2013-2014 and de-facto Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war. Ideas and practices raising up in their environment mark how all this impacts the whole Ukrainians and members of Ukrainian Baptist Churches, do they feel themselves as responsible citizens of their country, would they react or not on realities of their country life or not, and do they think about question of their identity. This entire things signal about deeper processes of final institutionalization of named denomination, its entry into democratic era together with state. (shrink)

Posudok si pokladá Otázku: Je ruská armáda moderná? a v prostredí vojny odohrávajúcej sa na Ukrajine v roku 2022 analyzuje tri témy, ktoré poskytujú odpoveď. Prvou témou, ktorú analyzujeme, sú konvenčné sily: venujeme sa skúmaniu slabých aj silných stránok ruského letectva, námorníctva a pozemných síl. Aby sme dokázali vykresliť obraz ich schopností, určujeme si dva protipóly, s ktorými ich porovnávame: americkú a ukrajinskú armádu. Druhou hlavnou témou je informačný sektor, kde skúmame využitie informačných technológií a umelej inteligencie vo vojne. Tretím (...) aspektom je ekonomická stránka vojny, kde opisujeme zdroje financovania ruskej armády, obchody prebiehajúce vo vojenskom sektore, ale aj dopady opatrení spojené s konfliktom na Ukrajine: sankcie, zákaz využívania SWIFT systému a podobne. Tieto tri faktory boli zvolené na základe definície hybridnej vojny uvedenej v texte článku, ktorá sa na území Ukrajiny už od anexie Krymu v roku 2014 odohráva. Práca sa zameriava až na udalosti od 24. februára 2022. (shrink)

This essay argues that Russia's war on Ukraine and the post-Soviet experience, more generally, reveal ethical, empirical, and theoretical problems in the study of nationalism in the region; namely, the tendency to designate anti-colonial, non-Russian nationalism as a “bad” ethnic type and the related tendency to see opposition to it as a “good” civic, nationalist agenda while in reality, the latter agenda can be imperial. Conflation of imperialism with civic nationalism and underappreciation of the democratic potential of non-Russian (...) nationalism are problematic. The essay argues that these problems stem from theorizing about ethnic and civic nationalism that is rooted in abstract principles and does not take into account the empirical realities in which specific policies originate. I suggest that a more ethically and theoretically accurate characterization of types of nationalism as good or bad can be achieved by applying a methodology that takes into account not only formal markers of “ethnic” and “civic” policies but also the realities proponents and opponents of a given policy seek to establish and undo, the methods by which these realities come into being, and the constraints on employing illiberal methods that political actors face. (shrink)

The article analyzes arguments, made by John J. Mearsheimer and others, that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was largely caused by Western policy. It finds that these arguments rely on a partially false and incomplete reading of history. To do so, the article identifies a range of premises that are both foundational to Mearsheimer’s claims and based on implied or explicit historical interpretations. This includes the varying policies of Ukraine toward NATO and the EU as well as (...) the changing Russian perceptions thereof; the political upheavals in Ukraine in early 2014 that were immediately succeeded by the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass; and the supposed absence of Russian ‘imperialism’ toward Ukraine prior to 2014. Finding that these interpretations do not hold up in light of relevant and available data, the article qualifies and contextualizes the validity of Mearsheimer’s arguments, points to superior ones, and highlights the need for case-specific expertise when using explanatory theory to make sense of politically salient ongoing events. (shrink)

The essay deals with the enormous success of the Russian television series The Boy’s Word. Blood on the Asphalt (Slovo patsana. Krov’ na asfalte, 2023), directed by Zhora Kryzhovnikov, on both sides of the trenches during the Russo-Ukrainian war. It discusses the role of social media and the public reception in Ukraine and Russia. In particular, the way the series depicts the so-called ‘Kazan phenomenon’, when the Tatar capital was shocked by criminal youth gangs in the late Soviet (...) Union, makes it attractive and topical in the current situation. By analyzing this, the essay also attempts to gain a better understanding of how popular cultural products take up and process social problems and conflicts in a complex way. (shrink)

In the modern world, there is a growing interest in the problem of forming a person’s identity. The category of “identity,” despite the diversity of theoretical and empirical research, remains complex. The article is devoted to the study of transformations of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine. In the period from 2013 to 2019, there have been radical changes in many spheres of (...) public life in Ukraine. The Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea, and the war in the Donbas all led to significant political, legal, and socio-economic and socio-cultural changes that contributed to the processes of the transformation of the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens. The aim of this article is to study the dynamics of the changes in the collective identity of Ukrainian citizens after the Revolution of Dignity through the prism of the integrative approach. (shrink)

The article examines the provisions of the catechisms of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church regarding the war and its challenges, as well as the defense of the Motherland. A comparative analysis of relevant thematic instructions in the Catechism “Christ is our Easter” (published in 2011), the Catechism for youth “We walk with Christ” (published in 2021) and the “Catechism of the Christian Warrior” (published in 2022) was carried out. It was determined that the provisions of the UGCC's own fundamental (...) doctrinal documents, its Catechisms, regarding the problems of war and defense of the Motherland, were formed, clarified and supplemented according to the circumstances and needs of the time. The catechism of the UGCC “Christ is our Easter” contains general Christian considerations on the subject under consideration, which are principled, establishing, and refer to how civilized peoples should conduct themselves. The catechism for youth, created in the previous years of the undeclared Russian Federation's “hybrid” war against Ukraine, covers the issues related to the war and the defense of the Motherland in a substantive way and closer to current Ukrainian realities, although it still has some idealistic approach. The Catechism of the Christian Warrior, the preparation of which was completed and the publication was carried out during the full-scale military offensive of the aggressor, is a set of thorough and competent advises for Ukrainian soldiers, where things are called by their names, and there are no provisions that can cause doubts due to experience and be problematically achievable for implementation. Therefore, it is concluded that especially this Catechism, together with and in addition to the two previous ones, is a useful and timely contribution of the UGCC to the instruction of Ukrainians during the war, and therefore to Ukraine's victory over the enemy. (shrink)

The article offers to look at modern political processes through the prism of the participation of the religious factor in them. Considering the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a kind of trigger that launched global changes in the system of international relations, burying its previous bipolar model, the authors analyze the changes that have taken place in Ukraine, in its religious segment. Ukraine is turning from a little-known part of the world religious space into an active reformer of this (...) space. At a certain moment, it becomes the center of a global confrontation between three main religious points - Constantinople, Rome and Moscow, reformatting the usual Christian landscape of the world. The given quantitative and qualitative indicators of the presence of Ukraine as a religious entity in the European and world space demonstrate both its enrichment and problematic conflict. The war revealed latent inter-denominational confrontations in Ukraine and in the world. Such a powerful tool of ideological influence as religion/church is used by conflicting parties to justify and sanctify aggression and protect against it. The authors focus their attention on Ukrainian Orthodoxy, on its role in reformatting the religious space. Ukrainians put an end to the unlimited dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, which affected other Christian communities. The absence of Ukraine in the geopolitical space, which lasted due to historical circumstances, has been overcome. Now it is subjectively present in the worldwide religious community and is there as an independent spiritual and organizational force that will only increase its potential. The former world security system has collapsed, and the old levers of restraining the aggressive and dangerous intentions of individual countries do not work. So, it is suggested to think about new forms of geopolitical coexistence. In the constructive solution of controversial issues, the human community must accumulate the efforts of all possible participators of the democratic alliance, including such a powerful religion, which over the millennia of its spiritual and practical activity has developed its own specific methods of peacemaking. (shrink)

An armed conflict between Ukraine and Russian Federation lasts for the past 10 years on and on February 24, 2022 it turned into full-scale war with all arsenal of conventional arm available used, nuclear excluded.The war turned into a new social and political reality that defined socio-political and socio-cultural vectors of development of Ukrainians and their state – focused on oppression to occupant’s conquer – for many years ahead.The war, as a socio-cultural phenomenon and the new stage of (...) class='Hi'>Ukrainian nation became a topic of research of the domestic academic environment. It defined in home philosophical research circles new polemic that aims at thinking through an ontological nature of the conflict, its social, cultural, and historical causes, to reveal its specific character in the past and in the present, to find out where the balance was lost in the structural order of the security, its lawful preventive mechanisms failure.Many analytical attempts to describe topological classification of that conflict (in the context of the growth of the contemporary philosophical discourse) were conducted. It were given some answers on the question on the roots of the conflict, on its continuity. It was pointed out its destructive impact on the condition of the Ukrainians, its social and cultural evolution from the point of view of different philosophical views and research programmes or contemporary historical narratives, modern principles of the native and Western-European philosophy.An evolution of the points of view on ontological and historical reasons of the war and philosophical reflections of the native scholars were considered in this article. Some problematic issues, determined by the different phases of the conflict were researched. (shrink)

Modern Ukrainian society is stratified not only economically, socially, professionally, informally, territorially, politically, historically, but ideologically and experiencedly. Is there something that unites Ukraine today? E. This - the present as a set of cultural and civilization factors and reality as a set of fateful events. The number and intensity of the fateful events for Ukraine in the last 3 years - from November 22, 2013, that is, the first protest against the non-signing of the association with the EU (...) - is abundant. It is not time to sum up, there is a permanent crisis, there is a war, we have a lot of losses, but we have already made our choice. (shrink)

The issue of inter-denominational understanding has been relevant to Ukrainians for many centuries. During the discussions the idea of ​​proclaiming the Ukrainian patriarchate was crystallized. According to the clergy, this would resolve the existing inter-denominational contradictions. However, the problem has become more political than religious. The emergence of such a powerful structure in Ukraine was opposed by the Polish authorities and the Polish-Latin clergy, as well as by the Russian government and its Orthodox Church. For Catholic Poland and (...) Orthodox Moscow, the establishment of an independent church in Ukraine was associated with state formation and signified a sharpening of the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, depending on the political situation, work in this direction was suspended or, conversely, revived. (shrink)

In this issue, the founder of the Donetsk regional branch of the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies, theologian, candidate of historical sciences, senior researcher of the Department of Religious Studies of the GS Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, President of the Center for Religious Studies member of the Expert Council on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations under the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, member of the Strategic Council under the Minister of (...) Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine. I. Kozlovsky worked for more than 25 years in the Donetsk Regional State Administration as a chief specialist and head of the department for religions, in the early 1990s he established the College of Religious Studies at Donetsk Open University, which was later transformed into the Faculty of Philosophy and Religious Studies of the State University of Information. intelligence, and has done much to promote interfaith and interreligious dialogue and cooperation in the Donetsk region, whose religious map is very diverse. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, I. Kozlovsky became one of the organizers of the interfaith prayer marathon "Prayer for Ukraine", which took place in Donetsk from early March to November 2014, which was attended by members of the Donetsk branch of the UAR. Until 2016, some members of the UAR, led by I. Kozlovsky, who still remained in the occupied territories, collected data on the state of religious freedom in Donetsk and the region. In 2016, I. Kozlovsky was imprisoned by a terrorist group of the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic" and was held captive for almost 2 years. (shrink)

The paper describes the historical and intellectual foundations on which the European political system was built after the Second World War; this system pursued the goal to prevent any war in Europe, but proved unable to prevent the russian-Ukrainian war. The paper shows that this system was built not only because of the trauma of the First and Second World Wars, but also in accord- ance with the liberal attitude to war, which M. Vatter called «war with “war”»; (...) at the same time, such a clear attitude does not refer to real wars, but to an imaginary «war of all against all». Based on the analysis of the principles and results of the research project “War and Society” under the direction of J. Baechler, the author outlines the principles of liberal Realpolitik as the implementation of the mentioned attitude in the realm of wars: it consists in their rationalization both at the level of goals and at the level of means of warfare; such a rationalization finally makes war irrational and unacceptable. From the point of view of such Realpolitik, war is only an extraordinary means of politics, and the russian-Ukrainian war is only an excess of violence, while in the opinion of the author, it is an inevitable consequence of the irrational and violent russian-Ukrainian extrapolitical conflict, whose stakes is the existence self of Ukraine. The author believes that one of the reasons for the inability of the European political system to prevent the russian-Ukrainian war is the belief that with the end of the Cold War, the “century of total war” in Europe also ended, and that the economic and cultural integration of post-communist countries into the European space makes such conflicts impossible. The author refers to the description of the own logic of wars of the 20th century, proposed in R. Aron’s book «The century of total war», and suggests considering the russian-Ukrainian war as a continuation of these wars. In the perspective pro- posed by R. Aron, the mentioned «century of total war» can be considered as a «long 20th century», which continues to this day. (shrink)

The article explores the representation of psychological traumas afflicted by war in contemporary literary writing by Burundian (African) and Ukrainian (European) authors who were witnesses of the events described in their works. Based on the existing linguistic and psychological theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of a mental wound, a comparative perspective is provided on the nature, literary, and linguistic manifestations of psychological trauma in Burundian novels by Antoine Kaburahe and Marie-Therese Toyi, presenting the tragic, but stoic experience during the (...) civil war in the East African country, and the shocked, but resilient experience of Ukrainian civilians during the full-scale aggression of the russian federation in the Ukrainian diary (Serhiy Zhadan) and essay writing (Ilya Kaminsky, Ludmila Khersonsky, Zarina Zabrisky, Elena Andreychykova, Andrei Krasniashikh) available in English translation. The implemented analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the effects of wartime psychological trauma on the lives of an individual. Due to a more distant time perspective, the protagonists of Burundian texts reveal both the tragedy of the interethnic civil war conflict and the importance of addressing the causes of the conflict to prevent its replication in the future. In the Ukrainian texts, the initial stage of psychological trauma obtaining can be observed, which accounts for a range of the related emotional states among the characters who do not fully realize yet the traumatization process they have been going through during the first days and weeks of the russian military invasion. The narrative structure of the Burundian and Ukrainian texts was also highlighted, which helped identify traces of oral story-telling tradition (African texts) and broad allusions to the historical and cultural phenomena (Ukrainian texts). (shrink)

The Vatican probably hoped that the visit of the apostolic nuncio Claudio Gugerotti on December 16-18, 2016 to the occupied territories of the Donbas Ukrainian society "swallowing" was just as easy as it easily "swallowed" the same and his Easter visit, as the "swallowed up" meeting on June 10, 2015 by Pope Roman Francis with the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, in which many saw the obvious anti-Ukrainian context, not to mention here the anti-Ukrainian (...) gesture that the Pope had made by signing on February 12, 2016 The shameful "Havana Declaration", p Vatican which essentially gives Ukraine at the mercy of Moscow, since it recognizes domain of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, one should pay tribute to those who, seeing the pro-Moscow line of conduct of the Vatican, in particular its current head, Pope Francis, aspire to persuade Ukrainian society, first and foremost, of Ukrainian Roman and Greek Catholics, which, they say, only in this way the Holy See and can prove that he "loves Ukraine", but simply needs to have the ability to "read," "listen," to "look at the world through the eyes of God the Creator," as the Pope teaches. (shrink)

The article offers a philosophical rereading of George Orwell’s novel 1984 in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. In recent decades, the dystopia of the English writer has become not only a model of literary criticism of totalitarianism but also the subject of constant falsifications and censorship for Russian propagandists. This study aims to clarify the primary philosophical content of Orwell’s novel and its heuristic potency (...) to expose the sociopolitical situation in contemporary Russia. The author of the article turns to biographical descriptions and philosophical interpretations of the novel in the works of leading Western scholars to finally draw reasonable analogies between the dystopian world of 1984 and the contemporary Russian Federation. (shrink)

The sequence and escalation of Russian–Ukrainian political and military conflicts since 2014, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have reopened interest in and debates on just war theory and practice in general and specifically in historic and modern Eastern Orthodox cultures and Orthodox-majority states. These debates have significant repercussions in areas like church–state and church–military relations in these cultures; ecclesial involvement in these conflicts has varied from war-justification rhetoric (in the case of the Russian (...) Orthodox Church) to reiterations of the inherited traditions of ecclesial pacifism/condemnation of all violence (the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, a number of Orthodox Churches, clerical and theological networks, etc.). The Russian ecclesial involvements in the justification of war/military necessity and formulation of just war narratives have triggered divisions and antagonisms in the Eastern Orthodoxy. The development and course of the ecclesial conflicts involving Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches and parishes (and other Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies) will show whether Orthodox religious actors may begin to play a more significant role in the articulation and application of newly emerging trends in areas like the theology of just peace, just peace-making and Christian realism, Orthodox social ethics and the dynamic praxis of just peace-making. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to a complex analysis of the “war texts”. Discursive features of the triad “war – author – text” are proposed to be researched through the prism of the holistic linguistic act of communication. Discourse analysis of “war texts” is carried out on the material of works of Oksana Zabuzhko, namely, the collection of essays “And Again I Crawl into the Tank” and “The Longest Journey”. The way the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war is understood (...) and interpreted in the public intellectual discourse is investigated. Such research gives a possibility to acquire data on how the author presents her/his own activity-in-the[1]world and transfers her/his attitude to the events described. It is reiterated that the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war can be researched within the boundaries of development of the discourse portrait of language personality, as the author’s texts are the information tracks of public discourse. Models of “war texts” of Oksana Zabuzhko are characterized with the help of three types of meaning: experiential (thematic sphere of communication), interpersonal (meaning of social roles), and textual (characterizes the channel of communication). The sense structure of the corresponding respective texts was scrutinized. That helped to acquire new data about their semiotic models. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the theoretical background and practical meaning of the so called war writings which emerged within the phenomenological movement during the First World War. The author exemplifies it by researching the works of two German representatives of this movement, Max Scheler and Kurt Stavenhagen. He focuses on their application of the phenomenological method to the analysis of Russian national identity, and historical as well as cultural foundations of Russian state. The paper’s (...) main thesis is that the politicization and militarization of phenomenology consisted in both “personalization” and “sociologization” of the phenomenological approach to the problem of the state. While interpreting Scheler’s personalism as an exemplification of the approach to the state as a problem of social ontology, the author reconstructs the theoretical conditions of analyzing the Russian imperial state in terms of the “world.” The focus of the paper is particularly on the phenomenology of, as Scheler put it, Russian collective personality and Russian national consciousness or “soul” as well as on the question of legitimacy of Ukrainian resistance against Russian imperialism. (shrink)

This article presents a critical qualitative study of two opinion articles, written by two eminent scholars (Jürgen Habermas and Timothy Snyder), on the German government’s hesitant arms supply for Ukraine during the first phase of the Russian war of aggression in 2022. The main aim of the article is the uncovering of the discursive practices of critique performed by two major public intellectuals. This case study thus allows insights into the simplistic representation of the Russo-Ukrainian war in German (...) elite media discourse. The analysis focuses on actor representations and topic limitations and manipulations in the two op-eds. It is shown that both Habermas and Snyder use characteristic ways of social actor representations in their texts which exhibit their allegiances. Furthermore, both of them limit and change topics at the meso- and macro-levels of their texts in order to make their arguments sound. In closing, the critical potential of linguistic discourse analysis is shortly addressed by arguing that the context sensitive application of the categories for analyzing discourse can uncover the internal norms to which authors orient which makes them open for a critical analysis. (shrink)

The protection of the Russian language and Russian “compatriots” has been a major issue of Russian political discourse for years. According to Russian official announcements, it was even a major reason for Russian war activities in Ukraine. In 2014, the Russian Federation introduced its language policy in Crimea and began to control the language policy of Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics.” Both Russian and Ukrainian, as well as other languages, have been affected (...) by these measures. Since 24 February 2022, Russian language policy has entered new temporarily occupied territories. Although Ukrainian has occasionally been declared a “state language” in Crimea, in DNR and LNR and then either been deprived of this status (LNR, DNR) or not (Crimea) it has never actually played this role. On the contrary, it has gradually been removed from the public sphere. Announcements regarding the language policy in recently occupied territories have been contradictory for months. Generally, Russian political discourse regarding the Ukrainian language is still based on traditional double-bind strategies. Official “appreciation for the Ukrainian language” is notoriously accompanied with narratives about the “artificiality” of the Ukrainian language, its “uselessness,” and even its virtually inherent “Nazi ideology.” At present, new textbooks of “the classical Ukrainian language” are allegedly being prepared in the Russian Federation. Historians of the Ukrainian language are curious how this unheard-of language might be designed. (shrink)

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at various stages of (...) Ukrainian state formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

This essay assesses the morality of Ukraine's use of drones to attack targets inside Russia. Following its invasion by Russian forces, Ukraine has had a just cause to wage a war of self-defense. However, its efforts to achieve that cause remain subject to moral limits. Even a state that has been unjustly attacked may not, for example, respond by deliberately targeting the attacking state's civilian population. To do so would violate the jus in bello principle of discrimination. The essay (...) first describes how drone technology has frequently enabled long-range strikes against Russian military assets as well as other targets inside cities. It then explains why it would be morally wrong for Ukraine to attack its enemy's population centers. First, Russian civilians are not liable to attack, and this nonliability is undiminished by the injustice of Russia's invasion or by any in bello wrongs committed by the Russian military. Second, attacking Russian cities with drones would arguably achieve little or no self-defensive benefit for Ukraine, and it could even be counterproductive. (shrink)

This article examines the issues of social (re)integration in Ukraine, which were actualized during the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014-2022. The first part of the article is devoted to the consideration of theoretical issues related to the conceptualization of social integration in the social sciences and the role of the state in reproducing social relations. The author assumes that during the last decades, ideas about the role of the state in these processes have changed significantly, which was caused by (...) the departure of the governments of developed democratic countries from the policy of the welfare state. This caused a reorientation of the state towards policies of inclusion, that is, targeted support and assistance to the most vulnerable social strata. The second part of the article is devoted to the consideration of the processes of social integration of migrants and refugees during the war in Ukraine. The author concludes that during the first full-scale invasion, processes of rethinking one's own national identity intensified in Ukrainian society. The armed confrontation and the catastrophic consequences caused by it contributed to the nationwide consolidation of Ukrainians and neutralized socio-cultural differences, which for a long time became the cause of political opposition and electoral divisions. Instead, the long stay of part of the territory and citizens of Ukraine under occupation under conditions of repressive and propaganda pressure, violent mobilization to the armed forces of the self-proclaimed republics and participation in the armed confrontation on the side of the occupiers revealed new divisions between Ukrainians who were on different sides of the front line. These divisions will obviously become an obstacle to the successful reintegration of Ukrainians after de-occupation, which will require a balanced and careful integration policy from the state authorities during the post-war reconstruction. (shrink)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has already caused large amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and will continue to do so for manyyears after hostilities have ceased mainly because of the emissions linked to the rebuilding of destroyed or damaged housing, public buildings, infrastructure, factories, and the like. My aim in this paper is to discuss how in a time of climate emergency such emissions of war should impact the political morality of states initiating, continuing, (...) and ending war (through a just and enduring peace) as understood by just war theory (JWT). My point of departure is a study by Lennard de Klerk and six co-authors detailing the emissions of the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war. (shrink)

_The purpose _is to study that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, in which his ideas of russian messianism are most clearly outlined ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"). To delineate the forms of determining the influence of messianism on his negative assessments of the anthropology of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Realization of the specified purpose presupposes, first, the analysis of his way of interpreting humanism in the European classical philosophy, and, secondly, to clarify the nature (...) of his connection with the way of substantiating the idea of the Russian messianism. _Theoretical basis._ Our view of Gogol’s heritage is based on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics. _Originality._ It is revealed, that period of evolution of Gogol’s position, which most clearly outlines his ideas of russian messianism ("Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession"), his position on human nature and its calling is fundamentally different from the position of philosophy of Early New Age and the Enlightenment. If in the first case, it is a question of service to the russian empire, in the last one, it is a question of self-development of the person. Gogol’s dehumanization of those perceptions about the man that have occurred in European classical philosophy is a precondition in justification of russian messianism for him. One of its key factors is a narrow understanding of insight the ideas concerning the spiritual foundation of the world, namely – its reduction to the russian empire. _Conclusions._ Gogol’s philosophical doctrine of man is only partially described as belonging to the "philosophy of the heart". The disadvantage of this qualification is the impossibility of explaining the question of the origins in Gogol’s attempt to substantiate russian messianism. The article demonstrates that the deformation of the basic idea about the connectivity of man with the spiritual arche of the world is its substantive precondition for the philosophy of the Early New Age and the Enlightenment. Gogol narrows it down to the Russian Empire, which makes it impossible to positively delineate the orientations of the russian people. Therefore, his oeuvre during the work on "Selected Passages" and "The Author’s Confession" for future generations is a warning about the futility of a single russian path of development, isolated from European civilization. As the further development of russian thought and history proves, Gogol’s warning as a Ukrainian thinker really has not been heard. A vivid manifestation of this is the cave nationalism that we see today during the russian-Ukrainian war. (shrink)

The article discusses the peculiarities of the functioning of Ukrainian fantasy fandom as well as its transformations related to two main aspects: 1) from “the old” fandom to the new one and 2) from the ordinary forms of existence during the peaceful times to existence during the wartime after Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022.The article indicates the general transformation of the scholarly research of the fandom in the Western academic context. It is possible to present (...) it as the flow from an “ethnographic” or external interpretation of the fandom as a part of the mass culture that depends on the specifics of the popular culture production, to the “internal” or integrated descriptions of the fandom functioning as a separated sphere of social activity.The article argues that there are two stages of the existence of Ukrainian fantasy-related fandom. “The old” fandom emerged in the pre-computer era and was based on the Soviet fandom, which influenced its peculiarities. For instance, there are such aspects as statelessness, the absence of national representation (and the dominance of Russo-centrism as the common cultural platform), the importance of direct interpersonal contacts, distancing from contact with authorities, and the tendency to reduce the presence of the fandom in the shared urban space.Unlike “the old” fandom, “the new” one is developing under the influence of new communicational technologies, which erases the barriers to entering the fandom for new members, enlarges the zones of potential contacts, eliminates geographic and territorial barriers, etc. Moreover, “the new” fandom is more integrated into the urban space and is more available for communications. For the Ukrainian fandom, the transition from “the old” fandom to the “new one” means focusing on domestic cultural issues as the fandom becomes Ukraine-centric.Russian military aggression against Ukraine, from annexing Crimea in 2014 to the full-scale invasion in 2022, became the inner catalyst for the development and transformation of the Ukrainian fandom. The external existential threat led to the transformation of the practices, implemented by the fandom and to the rise of the Ukrainian popular culture, which is closely related to the fandom. During the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian fandom, preserving its core responsibilities (communication and social activity around popular culture functioning), spreads its new topical responsibilities: apart from the domestic volunteer work, which unites the majority of Ukrainian communities, it includes the educational activity, gaining subjectivity during international communication with the foreign fandom of Europe and the USA, charitable activity, etc. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the antecedents of solidarity behavior towards Ukrainian refugees, specifically examining the role of subjective uncertainty generated in public opinion by the aggression of Ukraine on feelings of compassion and perceptions of refugees as a threat. Based on pooled data from six representative samples collected in different waves during the first six months of the Russian army’s invasion of Ukraine among a representative sample of adult Italian citizens (N = 6,063), the study provided support (...) for the intensification hypothesis, suggesting that uncertainty can act as an affective amplifier. Indeed, the results showed that uncertainty increased perceptions of refugees as a threat (acting on its emotional component, i.e., anxiety), but also feelings of compassion, which is a main driver of solidarity. Moreover, compassion seemed to reduce the (perceived) threat posed by refugees on an economic, cultural, security, or political level. The pattern of relationships tested in the model proved to be stable across different areas of the country and for the first 6 months of the Russian invasion, suggesting that the empathic concern generated by the suffering of the Ukrainian population under attack did not significantly diminish its effects over the period considered. (shrink)

The Patriotic War of 1812 was a tremendous historical testing of our people against the world's most powerful enemy — the army of Napoleon. The treacherous invasion of Russia by the Napoleonic hordes called forth in our country a feeling of hatred for the foreign conquerors, self-sacrifice and heroism. The people as a whole rose to struggle against the invaders. Alongside the Russian Army there were numerous folk levies and guerrilla bands, all with the single motive of freeing their (...) homeland from the foreign conquerors. Whereas Napoleon's was a war of conquest against Russia, the War of 1812 was, from the very outset, a just war of national liberation for their country on the part of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and other peoples. (shrink)

The paper examines the representations of Ukrainian refugees in Polish press at the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion. Using corpus linguistics methods (namely, collocation analysis) it shows that the displaced Ukrainians were mostly referred to as (war) refugees and discussed with respect to their movement and reception in Poland. The study contrasts the construal of Ukrainian refugees in media outlets with different ideological and business aims. The findings are also discussed with respect to how European media (...) tend to cover immigration from other regions, notably the Middle East and North Africa, and how these two types of migration become linked in the analysed news reports. Altogether, while pointing to a potential of the media to shape positive attitudes towards refugees, as attested by their coverage of Ukrainians, the study also highlights the extent to which racism is likely to determine the construal of different groups of migrants. (shrink)

The article’s reasoning is based on the definition of the nature of the war in Ukraine, which, following the Russian aggression on February 24, 2022, escalated into a full-scale conflict: this war has gradually acquired features of the total wars of the 20th century and transformed into a war of attrition, which could last for a considerable period of time. If such a war does not end with the capitulation of one of the parties, the most likely outcome would (...) be a peace agreement involving third parties, which would take the form of a compromise and involve a renunciation by the participating parties of complete victory in the war. Given the just nature of Ukraine's war against Russian aggression, the author raises the question of whether a peace can be considered just without a complete victory over the aggressor and without the full restoration of justice disrupted by the aggression. Drawing on the classical work of M. Walzer, the author concludes that renouncing complete victory and halting hostilities at a point when the conflict can be resolved through political means fully aligns with the concept of a just war as a limited war. To establish the moral principles and possible limits of compromises in wartime, the author turns to A. Margalit’s concept, which, in his view, continues Walzer’s reasoning by outlining the possibility of compromises for the sake of peace. Drawing on contemporary research on political compromises, the author analyzes possible configurations of compromises in wartimes, their differences from political compromises in peacetime, and other potential outcomes of a war of attrition, including scenarios such as the capitulation of one of the parties or a modus vivendi. The article develops on the ideas of M. Walzer and A. Margalit, emphasizing that limiting the war and reaching a compromise for peace make necessary to clarify the requirements of justice. This, in turn, necessitates that the party engaged in a just war be guided by the ethics of responsibility when determining war aims, while also adhering to the fundamental distinction between good and evil in order to avoid "rotten" compromises. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The field of war ethics changes its focus, and grows, in reaction to salient conflicts of the day – and this is how things should be. World War II made the deficiencies of contemporary law and policy crystal clear, remaining the obvious reference point up to this day. It was in reaction to the atrocities of the Vietnam War that Michael Walzer and others made just war theory relevant again, featured in military academies and politician’s speeches. The Iraq War inspired (...) the so-called revisionists in just war theory and fixated military ethicists’ glance on the complex conundrums of counterinsurgency, while G.W. Bush’s War on Terror ignited debates on torture, use of private military contractors and targeted killing. Had these wars been different, contemporary ethics of war would have dealt with different problems, or at the very least it would apportion attention and expertise differently. Consequently it is no surprise that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched clandestinely in April 2014 and escalated in February 2022, has generated its own ethical problems. A rare large scale, conventional, inter-state conflict, fought both with legacy Soviet systems and cutting edge contemporary technologies, the Russo-Ukrainian War is different from the asymmetrical, low-end (though not low harm) conflicts of the last thirty years. It is also marked by the almost complete disregard shown by the aggressor side to the issues of justice, both ad bellum and in bello ones. Indeed, as I write these words, use of nuclear weapons in offensive warfare is being openly threatened, and one is to assume, considered, by the Kremlin. Both frost and hunger are being weaponized against civilians, with the inhabitants of Ukraine being far from the only target, or casualty, of such policies. In a globalized world, the suffering is also global. While the issue of ad bellum justice is uncharacteristically straightforward, many other questions are anything but answered. Nuclear blackmail, and nuclear-backed imperialism, stand out as theoretically underappreciated yet vastly important problems. So does the role of the global community in limiting the spillover effects of the war from hurting the most vulnerable. Devising an appropriate international response to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed by a nuclear power, yet by conventional means, offers another set of stark problems. These heavyweight questions are just the very first ones that spring to mind when one contemplates the events of the current war. Russian attacks on power plants and heating stations, conducted at the verge of winter, unfortunately may be said to have some precedent in the actions of Western powers in Serbia and Iraq. Whether such attacks are legal under international laws of armed conflict, and, if they are legal, whether the laws should change is another subject ripe for debate. So is the issue of POW’s notorious vulnerability to wanton and needless cruelty, once again exposed by this war. The internment of Mariupol garrison commanders in Turkey seems to offer a glimpse of a solution far more civilized than the current system. As far as the ethics of novel military technologies are concerned, the widespread use of armed drones, permeating to ever lower levels of military organization has major, though unclear implications both for the future of drones and that of autonomous weapons. Does the wildfire proliferation of armed drones prove the attempts to frame them as illegitimate, morally suspect weapons were naïve and futile? Or does it prove ethicists should double down their efforts to shackle such technologies in their infancy? The general problem is far from the only one. What about the use of drones or autonomous weapons that cannot be tied to a particular actor against critical infrastructure, such as the Nord Stream pipelines? How are such attacks to be responded to or deterred? Regarding technology, this is also the first conflict of this size followed almost in real time by a truly global audience of sympathizers, spectators and trolls capable of impacting political and military outcomes through influence campaigns, donations, volunteer online work etc. It is clear that trying to sway one’s government to increase or cease support for a side of this conflict is not morally neutral, nor is transferring money for the war effort. How should we think of these new forms of extended participation in conflict? And given their importance, how should those who report the truth about the ugly realities of war proceed? What about pundits and commentators with large audiences – what are their responsibilities, and what standards can we expect of them? The questions that may be asked about the behavior of essentially private citizens may of course also be asked about the behavior of governments – and corporations. What degree of assistance to the victim state may be required? What degree of involvement with the aggressor state is permissible? What these and many other conundrums placed in the spotlight by the Russian invasion have in common is that they need answers – most quite urgently. Consequently we invite a variety of learned and considerate voices to opine on these in our journal’s special issue. Among questions and doubts, one thing is certain – when confronted with the evils of war, we cannot stay silent, and we cannot cease to reflect. (shrink)

For decades the papal tradition has renounced the term ‘war’ as something around which to build an ethical approach. One can sympathize with this: resort to war seems the consequence of ethical failure and brings in its train a host of brutalities including rape, torture, and murder that harm both victims and perpetrators. But that view of ‘war’ is an incomplete representation of the possibilities of the uses of force to secure legitimate political goods. Thus the popes have struggled to (...) maintain a clear voice in the face of abject tragedies like the Russian invasion of Ukraine: on the one hand, Pope Francis condemns war in an almost absolute manner; on the other, he recognizes the legitimacy of Ukrainian defensive uses of force. In so doing, of course, he merely abides the so-called ‘just war theory’ he seems to have discarded. My contribution will focus on the current state of the just war in Catholic teaching. I will maintain the state remains where it has been since at least the middle of the twentieth century: skeptical about the capacity of states to judge in terms of international law, but cognizant of their right to defend themselves against ongoing aggression. (shrink)

The sheer number and scale of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian military in Ukraine since the beginning of their all-out invasion, has prompted many experts and politicians to define this brutality as a genocide and seek for the prosecution of perpetrators under international law. The lawyers are cautious in this regard, however, maintaining that crucial element of the criminal case – the clear-cut proof of a genocidal intent on the side of the (...) class='Hi'>Russian leadership – might be missing or largely unprovable in the court. This article provides an overview of the ongoing debate on the alleged Russian genocide in Ukraine and argues that the Kremlin’s genocidal intent can be proved if the anti-Ukrainian rhetoric of Russian officials, pundits, and propagandists is systemically scrutinized, deconstructed, and contextualized. (shrink)

The article is aimed at a philosophical study of the foundations/causes of war. Its background is a definition of the Russian-Ukrainian full-scale warfare as an irreconcilable existential conflict of the "Russian world" between the "Russian world" and the national world of Ukraine. Methodological specific of the article is reliance on the everydayness of a boundary situation of war to define the cultural world, as well as cultural identity as concepts that get existential meaning. Philosophy potential is (...) used to clarify the key question for today's war discourse about why the parties to the conflict are determined to take military actions, but not to resolve the conflict through peace negotiations. The answer is sought by comparing two ontologies of the world that there are in Habermas' communicative theory of action and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Each of them provides an alternative concept of understanding and, accordingly, different foundations for its truth theory. This also provides a perspective, firstly, to distinguish two alternative positions of participants in the discourse of war – "internal" one as "being in a culture at war" and another of an "external" observer. Secondly, this distinction helps to explain why war as a conflict of cultural worlds could be considered from different philosophical points of view, namely from the position of the philosophy of communicative action, as well as in the context of existential analysis of being. Examination of the explanatory potential of both approaches is carried out on the basis of a comparison of different concepts of the world, fundamental to each of philosophers. It is done by clarifications of basics of two ontologies of understanding and, accordingly, of their theories of truth. The article indicates that the theory of truth in communicative philosophy is based on the regulative idea of the unity of the objective world. Instead, with reference to examples from Charles Taylor and Jean-Luc Nancy, the author claims that the fundamental ontology can be reinterpreted in terms of the plurality of being-in-common of people in sovereign cultural worlds. Accordingly, the interaction of representatives of different cultural identities under certain political conditions, i.e., official propaganda can turn into a radical disagreement of different existential understandings of the meaning of being, into a war of cultural worlds that cannot be overcome by just negotiations at the level of competent communication. The article ends with an open question about searching for ways to unify the mentioned ontological approaches. (shrink)

After the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, the flow of forced migration from Ukraine has significantly increased as people tried to protect their lives and find a safe place to live. Given that Ukraine shares the external border with the European Union, most people sought protection precisely in the Member States of the European Union. The study aims to analyze the features of the legal regulation of the provision of temporary protection in the European Union and (...) determine the reasons and conditions that led to its activation after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The leading method of the research was the method of systematic analysis, which helped define temporary protection as a multifaceted phenomenon and determine the reasons and conditions that led to its activation in the European Union after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In order to regulate the mass influx of Ukrainian displaced persons, the European Union has activated the mechanisms of temporary protection, which is an emergency mechanism introduced by a decision of the Council of the European Union. The status of a person with temporary protection provides certain rights analyzed in the article. Thus, the activation by the European Union of the Temporary Protection Directive is a justified and appropriate measure to protect the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine. (shrink)

Ukraine's war of self-defense against Russia is one of the clearest examples of a nation fighting a just war in recent history. Ukraine is clearly entitled to defend itself, and Russia is clearly obligated to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and make repair. In light of this, some of the most salient moral questions related to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine involve the international community; namely, what moral duties it has toward Ukraine, especially in light of Russia's extreme and pervasive (...) human rights abuses. The first section of the essay argues that there is a pro tanto moral duty to intervene militarily in Ukraine to stop Russian human rights abuses and ensure that Ukraine achieves a military victory. This duty is grounded in duties of rescue, promissory obligations, and reliance obligations, as well as duties to nations’ own citizens and to the international community. The second section of the essay argues that the most relevant consideration in determining whether there is an all-things-considered duty for the international community to intervene militarily in Ukraine is Russia's nuclear coercion and the associated risk of nuclear war. This section highlights the nuclear risks involved in compliance with Russian nuclear coercion, which I argue have been neglected in prominent discussions. The moral stakes involved in this determination are very high, and succumbing to Russian nuclear coercion in the face of massive human rights violations would set a dangerous precedent. Any course of action should be guided by a thorough analysis of all the risks involved, both nuclear and moral. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the decolonization of Ukrainian culture as an important factor of nation-building in the European perspective. At the same time, decolonization is a current trend in Western academic thought, which is embodied in social activism, in particular, in the wok movement and the culture of abolition. Postcolonial studies has become an intellectual battleground. These studies draw a new front line in the culture wars. Rethinking Western culture in light of its imperial expansionist past defines the (...) goal of decolonization. However, the tendency towards the politicization of vouk and the culture of cancellation. carries the risks of undermining the basic values of Western culture - freedom of thought and the rule of law, while the decolonization of Ukrainian culture has a different purpose. Unlike cultural decolonization in Western countries, cultural decolonization in Ukraine is aimed at legitimizing modern European values (Lisbon Agreement, 2007) by overcoming the «Russian-oriented» (Eurasian) tradition of thinking.Identifying the authentic contents of Ukrainian culture and refuting its imperial-Soviet interpretations is one of the main tasks of the decolonization of Ukrainian culture. The article offers a comparative analysis of Ukrainian and Western versions of cultural decolonization in order to avoid uncritical borrowings and ignoring the peculiarities of the Ukrainian context. The successful decolonization of Ukrainian culture requires the development of its 1) concept, 2) methods of theoretical substantiation, and 3) methods of practical implementation. The article states that the decolonization of Ukrainian culture becomes possible if its research strategies are deprived of colonial influences, which reveal indications of the imperial and Soviet scientific paradigm of social and humanitarian knowledge. The key concepts of the research are referring to the works of Nigel Giggar (2023), Douglas Murray (2022), Linda Martín Alcoff (2023), Jonh Darwin (2009), Kwasi Kwarteng (2013), Yaroslav Hrytsak (2022), Serhii Plokhii (2021, 2023), Timothy D. Snyder (2017, 2918) and others. (shrink)

Стаття присвячена етичним проблемам відновлення миру в контексті викликів сучасної війни. Аналізується ситуація кризи просвітницьких ідеалів мирного облаштування світу на основі універсальних цінностей та апріорних засад людського порозуміння. Проаналізовано розвиток ідей справедливого миру та етичні аргументи стосовно виправданості війни від Середньовіччя (А. Августин, Тома Аквінський) до Нового часу й сьогодення. Окрему увагу приділено етиці миру І. Канта як такій, що визначає раціональні умови співіснування держав. Як і інші мислителі Ренесансу, Реформації та Просвітництва, Кант розумів природність війн та їх політичні цілі, (...) однак мав на меті суспільні зміни задля їх зникнення у майбутньому. Такі цілі виявилися у міжнародному праві та ідеї світової федерації республік. Утім, нині просвітницький проєкт підважений політикою авторитарних країн. Розкрито проблему порозуміння між сторонами сучасних воєнних конфліктів (особливо у російсько-українській війні), як таку, що полягає у несумірності етичних дискурсів, орієнтованих на архаїчне минуле та утвердження бажань окремих етносів з модерним дискурсом світових демократій. Як релевантну етиці порозуміння стратегію відновлення миру підтримано ідею «нового Просвітництва», яка розвивається у сучасній західній та українській філософії і суспільній думці у широкому контексті осмислення глобальних безпекових проблем, включаючи й екологічні (війна людини з природою). (shrink)

This article deploys what has come to be known as revisionist just war theory to analyze the morality of action by both sides in the current Russia-Ukraine war. Among the conclusions of this analysis are: (i) that virtually all uses of force by the Russian military in Ukraine are impermissible; (ii) that Ukrainian forces are bound by moral constraints, such as the requirement of proportionality, which requires the most careful attention to risks of escalation to the use of (...) nuclear weapons and which may make it impermissible for Ukraine to achieve all of its just goals, and (iii) that some Russian civilians are liable to some harms, so that the imposition of economic sanctions is permissible, though only if they have a sufficiently high probability of being effective. (shrink)

In this book, Marc Raphael Dietrich sheds light on a critical yet politically practicable notion of cosmopolitanism which centers on the individual and is framed by a set of universal principles, thus providing valuable alternative insights on the Crimea and Donbas conflict.

The 1917 February Revolution led to the reshaping of the war-era image of the German enemy. Focusing on the former imperial borderland province of the Southwestern Krai, this article unveils the national, political, and cultural considerations of the local Ukrainian and Russian-language media that affected their attitude towards the Germans. It argues that the developments of the 1917–1918 Ukrainian Revolution presented a unique case of constructing the image of the Germans due to the ongoing rivalry between the (...) respective Ukrainian and Russian national projects. The study is based on the materials of prominent Kyivan daily newspapers, thus rendering the spectrum of the region’s political thought. Built upon the concept of imagology, the article apprehends the images of “otherness” in conjunction with the actor’s own identity. (shrink)