Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by interpreting or (...) consuming mechanisms, bypassing the more traditional focus, of those who would naturalize intentional content, on causal or informational inputs. Shea proposes to "add an input condition to teleosemantics," requiring that simple representations must carry "correlational information." I am grateful to Shea for his paper, as it presents me with an opportunity to clarify two fairly central features of my position on intentional content, one of which seems to have been overlooked in the literature (Millikan 1993a), the other of which I have stated previously only in a confusing way (Millikan 2004, Chapters 3-4). The first clarification concerns the general form that I take explanation by reference to intentional states to have. The second concerns my description of "locally recurrent natural information," why this kind of information is needed in place of Shea's "correlational information" to explain what feeds simple representational systems, and why no reference to natural information is needed to account for the success of behaviors by reference to the truth of representations that motivate them. (shrink)

In a memorable passage near the beginning of William James asks us to imagine a world in which all our dearest social utopias are realized, and then to imagine that this world is offered to us at the price of one lost soul at the farthest edge of the universe suffering eternal, intense, lonely pain. Then he asks.

Most of Christine Swanton’s quotations from and references to Nietzsche are drawn The Genealogy of Morals, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil. I suggest that Human, All too Human and Daybreak, two of Nietzsche’s most neglected works, provide rich resources for Swanton’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of self-love and its defining role in genuinely ethical action. Self-love assumes a central place in these writings, as do its cognate concepts of egoism and vanity. I outline some of the reasons (...) why these two middle period writings recommend themselves powerfully for Swanton’s philosophical purposes. I examine to what extent passages on self-love from these neglected works nourish, but also to what extent they challenge or upset, the central place accorded to self-love in Swanton’s recalibration of virtue ethics. (shrink)

In view of a resurgence of concern about the measurement problem, it is pointed out that the Relativistic Transactional Interpretation remedies issues previously considered as drawbacks or refutations of the original TI. Specifically, once one takes into account relativistic processes that are not representable at the non-relativistic level, absorption is quantitatively defined in unambiguous physical terms. RTI therefore provides a well-defined terminus to what appears to be a necessary infinite regress concerning ‘absorption’ when only the non-relativistic level is considered. In (...) addition, specifics of the relativistic transactional model demonstrate that the Maudlin ‘contingent absorber’ challenge to the original TI cannot even be mounted: basic features of established relativistic field theories dictate that the ‘slow-moving offer wave’ required for the challenge scenario cannot exist. It is concluded that issues previously considered obstacles for TI are no longer legitimately viewed as such, and that reconsideration of the transactional picture is warranted in connection with solving the measurement problem. (shrink)

“Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply that all descriptive representations are at the same time directive and that directives are at the same time (...) descriptive, hence that all representations are pushmi-pullyu representations. A pushmi-pullyu representation is at once indicative and imperative, telling both what the case is and what to do about it. The usefulness at all of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation is then questioned. I have recently found several new papers, dissertations, discussions, in which TP-PR is treated as definitive. However, the conclusions of TP-PR rest on misunderstandings of my position, so although the date is late, clarification seems still to be in order. I will indicate a few significant corrections that need to be made to TP-PR’s description of my position (originally called “biosemantics”) and explain central features of biosemantics that are omitted in TP-PR’s description of basic teleosemantics and which are incompatible with the main argument and conclusions of TP-PR. I will try to clarify and explain the value of the notion of a pushmi-pullyu representation. (shrink)

This is a comparison of graduate students attitudes in Spain and the United States on the issue of universal versus relativist ethics. The findings show agreement on fundamental universal values across cultures but differences in responses to behavioral ethics within the context of entrepreneurial dilemmas.

Subject & Object is a thematic collection of classic works by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, designed to foreground the authors' philosophical concerns, especially in the areas of epistemology, ontology, and method. The volume, which includes lucid introductions to all of the selections, illustrates Frankfurt School approaches to questions such as the nature of reason; the limits of empiricism, pragmatism and Kantian transcendental idealism; the case for materialism; the difficulty of thinking counterfactually; and the ideological character of mainstream (...) social science. Many of the pieces in the volume are otherwise out of print. Subject & Object will be a resource for social, political, and cultural theorists who may be less familiar with the philosophical aspects of the Frankfurt School, for analytic philosophers who may not have had previous exposure to their work at all, and for anyone wanting access to these seminal texts. (shrink)

Globalization -- Globalization and the environment -- Climate change and the crisis of philosophy -- Social conscience and global market -- Categories, environmental indicators, and the enlightenment market -- Environmentalism -- Pessimistic realism and optimistic total management -- Population statistics and modern governmentality -- Pragmatism -- Technological enframing -- Heidegger, the origin and the finitude of civilization -- Technology and the kultur of late modernity -- Embodied subjectivity and the critique of modernity.

In ihrem Beitrag: „Poisoning the well, or how economic theory damages moral imagination" (Nelson 2016) fragt Julie Nelson -/- "What if people might act out of social and other-regarding concerns, as well as reasonable self-interest in their economic lives, but are pushed by the economic theory of self-interested utility maximization to believe that it is permissible – and perhaps even appropriate – to be irresponsible, opportunistic, and selfish when participating in markets? What if business leaders might pay attention to the (...) implications of their decisions for workers, communities, the environment, and others who are affected by their firm's actions, but economic theory encourages them to believe that they should – and in fact must – focus on getting every last dollar of profit possible?" (Nelson 2016: 184) -/- Ich lese diese Fragen von Nelson als einen Appell, die Theorie der Ökonomie umfassend auf ihre Tauglichkeit für unsere Lebenswirklichkeit zu hinterfragen. Die Theorien der Ökonomie mögen Disziplinen-intern funktional sein, sie sind damit noch lange nicht lebenstauglich. Im Gegenteil, sie erweisen sich als Überlebens-avers, im schlimmsten Falle, Leben-zerstörend. Die Aufgabe, das Wozu der Wirtschaftsphilosophie lässt sich von hier aus schon trefflich bestimmen. Die Herausforderung jedoch bleibt, Umfang und Perspektive, von wo aus die Kritik und auch die In-Blicknahme des Ganzen geschehen kann, zu verorten, und genau dieses Anliegen ist im Beitrag von Ingo Pies und Marc Hübscher zentral: Aus welcher Perspektive kann diese Frage beantwortet werden, wenn diese Bestimmung als denkerische Selbstaufklärung realisiert werden soll? (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the possibility of accounting for the rationality of belief-formation by utilising decision-theoretic considerations. I consider the utilities to be used by such an approach, propose to employ verisimilitude as a measure of cognitive utility, and suggest a natural way of generalising any measure of verisimilitude defined on propositions to partial belief-systems, a generalisation which may enable us to incorporate Popper's insightful notion of verisimilitude within a Bayesian framework. I examine a dilemma generated by the decision-theoretic (...) procedure and consider an adequacy condition (immodesty) designed to ameliorate one of its horns. Finally, I argue in a sceptical vein that no adequate verisimilitude measure can be used decision-theoretically. (shrink)

Issues about communication in genomics have moved out of the clinic and into the public arena. Scientists other than clinicians are confronted by calls for public engagement. Genomics gives rise to these demands partly because it inevitably raises the three basic questions of philosophy as outlined by Kant: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? Genomics on its own cannot answer these questions. In relation to what can be known, its answer is at best (...) partial. Nor can the ought question be settled by science. In fact, science is criticized for reducing options while claiming to be neutral in the pursuit of knowledge. The answer to the ought question is crucially related to the hope question in so far as this deals with issues about the point of human life generally. The role of public engagement in relation to all these questions may have different objectives. It is argued that there is more of a place for it in relation to the hope question than is commonly recognized, and in particular with regard to the role of science, which could benefit from developing a service ideal in the sense found in discussions of professional ethics. (shrink)

From the stance of cognitive developmental theories, claims that general g is an entity of the mind are compatible with notions about domain-general development and age-invariant individual differences. Whether executive function is equated with general g or fluid g, research into the mechanisms by which development occurs is essential to elucidate the kinds of environmental inputs that engender effective intervention. (Published Online April 5 2006).

“There is no longer any world,” wrote the late philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy in 1993, and in this paper, the sense of this loss of world is analysed in terms of the modal notions of necessity, impossibility, and possibility. Modal differentiation can illuminate what constitutes the sense of actuality in a world, and hence, what it is that has been lost regarding this actuality of being in a world. Modal thinking does not rely on knowledge of the true state of affairs, (...) nor on having a constant grasp on necessity: modal thinking enables us to discern the actual by way of the relations between necessity, possibility, and impossibility. It is on the basis of these relations that a mode of rethinking actuality is suggested. In order to pursue this line of thought, I rely on Jacques Lacan’s understanding of modalities as writing operations, concentrating mostly on certain sections from his Seminar XXI, wherein he refers to Aristotelian modal logic and mentions the analytic philosopher Jaakko Hintikka. This ternary relation between Aristotle, Hintikka, and Lacan suggests a different outlook on the actual being-such of a world. The being-such of a world, its actuality, is understood as a contingency, a possibility emerging from the relation between what is declared necessary and what is impossible. The paper shows the implications of such a modal understanding of actuality, as demonstrated in Lacan’s view of human sexuality and sexual difference. (shrink)

How we experience space by listening: the concepts of aural architecture, with examples ranging from Gothic cathedrals to surround sound home theater. We experience spaces not only by seeing but also by listening. We can navigate a room in the dark, and "hear" the emptiness of a house without furniture. Our experience of music in a concert hall depends on whether we sit in the front row or under the balcony. The unique acoustics of religious spaces acquire symbolic meaning. Social (...) relationships are strongly influenced by the way that space changes sound. In Spaces Speak, Are You Listening?, Barry Blesser and Linda-Ruth Salter examine auditory spatial awareness: experiencing space by attentive listening. Every environment has an aural architecture.The audible attributes of physical space have always contributed to the fabric of human culture, as demonstrated by prehistoric multimedia cave paintings, classical Greek open-air theaters, Gothic cathedrals, acoustic geography of French villages, modern music reproduction, and virtual spaces in home theaters. Auditory spatial awareness is a prism that reveals a culture's attitudes toward hearing and space. Some listeners can learn to "see" objects with their ears, but even without training, we can all hear spatial geometry such as an open door or low ceiling. Integrating contributions from a wide range of disciplines—including architecture, music, acoustics, evolution, anthropology, cognitive psychology, audio engineering, and many others—Spaces Speak, Are You Listening? establishes the concepts and language of aural architecture. These concepts provide an interdisciplinary guide for anyone interested in gaining a better understanding of how space enhances our well-being. Aural architecture is not the exclusive domain of specialists. Accidentally or intentionally, we all function as aural architects. (shrink)

Charles Taylor is one of the most prolific and wide-ranging philosophers in the English-speaking world today. He writes with authority in the fields of moral theory, political philosophy, theories of language, the history of western thought, epistemology and hermeneutics.1 Currently an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, he has enjoyed a distinguished academic career which includes being Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford University. He has also been active and influential in the politics of his native (...) Quebec, arguing passionately for recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, but against the province’s secession from Canada. For many years he has been a member of the New Democratic Party. The American philosopher Richard Rorty described him as ‘among the dozen most important philosophers writing today’ and one of North America’s ‘most thoughtful politicians’. He is interviewed here by Ruth Abbey. Ruth Abbey: There can be no doubt that the theories and practices of management would benefit from the contributions of philosophers: as the editors of this journal contend, many of the terms and ideas used by managers are philosophical ones, yet there is little awareness of this and their uses and meanings in management practices remain undertheorised. Management therefore rests on a host of unarticulated but constitutive beliefs and ideas. One of the ideas that has recurred in your writings over the years has been just how significant the unsaid is, and how valuable it can be to articulate this. Could you say something about this? (shrink)

“Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a naturalistic way. (...) The naturalist challenge here is to show, first, that natural purposiveness can explain the intentionality of explicitly represented purposes, hence that it is associated with “aboutness” (as in Brentano’s usage). Second, it needs to show how the same kind of analysis can also be used to naturalize intentionality in cases where facts are represented rather than purposes or ends. (shrink)

This article proposes a third way of reading Nietzsche's remarks on women, one that goes beyond misogyny and metaphor. Taking the depiction of women in the works of the middle period at face value shows that these works neither entirely demean women nor exclude them from the higher life. Nietzsche's middle period comprises HAH (1879-80, which includes "Assorted Opinions and Maxims" and "The Wanderer and His Shadow"), D (1881) and GS (1882). The works of this period do not disqualify women (...) from free spirithood, for some of their passages can be read as befitting some women of the future for this honour. (shrink)

Four questions are raised about the semantics of Quantified Modal Logic. Does QML admit possible objects, i.e. possibilia? Is it plausible to admit them? Can sense be made of such objects? Is QML committed to the existence of possibilia?The conclusions are that QML, generalized as in Kripke, would seem to accommodate possibilia, but they are rejected on philosophical and semantical grounds. Things must be encounterable, directly nameable and a part of the actual order before they may plausibly enter into the (...) identity relation. QML is not committed to possibiha in that the range of variables may be restricted to actual objects.Support of the conclusions requires some discussion of substitution puzzles; also, the semantical distinction between proper names which are directly referring, and descriptions even where the latter are "rigid designators".Views of W.V. Quine, B. Russell, K. Donnellan, D. Kaplan as well as S. Kripke are invoked or evaluated in conjunction with these issues. (shrink)

The works of the middle period are sometimes labeled positivist, and one of their distinguishing features is the praise they contain for science. In these works, Friedrich Nietzsche repeatedly expresses his admiration for science’s methods and procedures, and for the values and characteristics of its practitioners. As part of his vision of an enlightened future, Nietzsche looks forward to the generation of a new aristocracy. This chapter explores the tension in these writings between his ideas of an aristocracy of spirit (...) and an aristocracy of birth. The significance of embodiment in each of these models of aristocracy is discussed, and a Nietzschean ethic of care of the self is adduced. (shrink)