It is an attempt to exemplify the style of Wierciński’s scientific approach. The first part (A. Zamojski) presents his concept of the peculiarity of the specific human nature which is polarized into the animal side versus the human potential. The second part (R. Stefański) describes the anthropological concept of ideological development with the focus on the notion of ideological control subsystem. The latter can be employed as a tool of surveying the internal consistency of social organizations.

Ryszard Wójcicki's book „Ajdukiewicz. A Theory of Meaning” opens a series of publications Filozofia polska XX wieku [Polish Philosophy of XXth Century], created by Wójcicki. The main subject of the book is a theory of the meaning of linguistic expressions, which was formulated in the thirties and is known as a directival theory of meaning. The aim that the author has set for himself is not only to present and popularise that theory (these aims are implied by the character (...) of the series), but also the evaluation of its material adequacy and its significance for further investigations of language as a means of representation and transmission of knowledge. Adam Nowaczyk tries to show that Wójcicki's critique of Ajdukiewicz's conception is unjustified, for the fallacy allegedly committed in this conception is either only apparent or else easily remediable. Wójcicki disagrees with Nowaczyk's objection. (shrink)

[…] redaktorom udała się rzecz dość rzadka w tego typu publikacjach, mianowicie stworzyli imponujących rozmiarów księgę pamiątkową, która jednak, poza walorami okolicznościowymi, charakteryzuje się wysokim poziomem naukowym i zawiera sporo oryginalnych, wartościowych treści, z konieczności prezentowanych w krótkich formach, co jednak nie obniża ich rangi teoretycznej. Ponadto […] udało się w tej publikacji zgromadzić bardzo liczne, a jednocześnie reprezentatywne grono najwybitniejszych polskich filozofów, którzy ofiarowali profesorowi Tyburskiemu swoje cenne teksty, co czyni tę książkę tym bardziej wartościową i spowoduje, jak można (...) przypuszczać, że jeszcze po wielu latach będzie się do niej sięgało jako o źródła oryginalnych i bardzo ciekawych przemyśleń. Prof. dr hab. Jarosław Rolewski. (shrink)

Contents: PART 1. MODELS IN SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES. Joseph AGASSI: Why there is no theory of models. Ma??l??gorzata CZARNOCKA: Models and symbolic nature of knowledge. Adam GROBLER: The representational and the non-representational in models of scientific theories. Stephan HARTMANN: Models as a tool for the theory construction; some strategies of preliminary physics. William HERFEL: Nonlinear dynamical models as concrete construction. Elzbieta KA??L??USZY??N??SKA: Styles of thinking. Stathis PSILLOS: The cognitive interplay between theories and models: the case of 19th century optics. PART (...) 2. TOOLS OF SCIENCE. Nancy D. CARTWRIGHT, Towfic SHOMAR, Maricio SUAREZ: The tool-box of science. Javier ECHEVERRIA: The four contexts of scientific activity. Katline HAVAS: Continuity and change; kinds of negation in scientific progress. Matthias KAISER: The independence of scientific phenomena. W??l??adys??l??aw KRAJEWSKI: Scientific meta-philosophy. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: The emergence if scientific specialities: six models. Leszek NOWAK: Antirealism, realism and idealization. Rinat M. NUGAYEV: Classic, modern and postmodern scientific unification. Veikko RANTALA: Translation and scientific change. Gerhard SCHURZ: Theories and their applications - a case of nonmonotonic reasoning. Witold STRAWI??N??SKI: The unity of science today. Vardan TOROSIAN: Are the ethic and logic of science compatible. PART 3. UNSHARP APPROACHES IN SCIENCE. Ernest W. ADAMS: Problems and prospects in a theory of inexact first-order theories. Wolfgang BALZER and Gerhard ZOUBEK: On the comparison of approximative empirical claims. Gianpierro CATTANEO, Maria Luisa DALLA CHIARA, Roberto GIUNTINI: The unsharp approaches to quantum theory. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Falsification versus efficient truth approximation. Bernhard LAUTH: Limiting decidability and probability. Jaros??l??aw PYKACZ: Many-valued logics in foundations of quantum mechanics. Roman R. ZAPATRIN: Logico-algebraic approach to spacetime quantization. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest namysł nad sposobami reinterpretacji w powieściach Ryszarda Ćwirleja znamiennej dla kultury PRL formuły powieści milicyjnej która zdominowała rodzimą literaturę kryminalną lat 1955–1989, a która obecnie przeżywa „drugą młodość” jako zjawisko literackie i socjologiczne, pozbawione wymiaru ideologicznego. Rekonstruując dawne realia, pisarz ten tworzy obraz epoki zanurzony w „kulturze nostalgii”. Powieść neomilicyjna jest jednym z przejawów tęsknoty za PRL, w której sentymentalny wymiar powieści wyraża się w dążeniu do odzyskania dla współczesnego czytelnika etosu sprawczej władzy. Jednak jego przedstawiciele, którzy (...) są oficerami MO, stosują dalekie od legalności sposoby postępowania. Wyłaniający się – dzięki wykorzystaniu metody filologicznej i badań kulturowych, umożliwiających lekturę kontekstową – z twórczości Ćwirleja wizerunek stróżów prawa dość często naznaczony jest piętnem korupcji. Można zatem traktować go jako „uzupełnienie” zideologizowanego wzorca, do którego pisarz się odwołuje. (shrink)

This is a reply to Ryszard Wójcicki's polemics against the view expressed in the author's paper „Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later” which have been published together in the previous issue of Filozofia Nauki. Contrary to Ryszard Wójcicki, the author is of the opinion that Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is pragmatic, and more exactly syntactico-pragmatic. The reason for this claim is the indisputable fact that while formulating the meaning-directives and the definition of synonymity and meaning, Ajdukiewicz has (...) used merely syntactical and pragmatical notions (the notion of meaning, which could have semantic implications, was the subject of explication). Since (for obvious reasons) Ajdukiewicz did not want to make use of the semantic notions as primitive notions, he had no other option. (shrink)

The entire Upper Silesian dialect is based on the Polish language system, and all elements from German are treated as borrowings. The main aim of the research was to focus on the issue of German loanwords in the field of clothing vocabulary that appear in the Upper Silesian dialect and which are listed in the “Dictionary of Silesian dialect” by Barbara and Adam Podgórski. The question of the assimilation of these borrowings was analysed on three levels: morphological, graphic and (...) semantic. (shrink)

The article is devoted to present Polish research on the literary work and philosophical thought of Hryhorii Skovoroda. The scientific reflection on Skovoroda’s legacy was initially carried out on the historical and literary level. It was initiated by Adam Honory Kirkor in 1874. In the context of the history of Ukrainian literature, Józef Tretiak, Ivan Franko and Bohdan Lepkyi presented the general characteristics of Skovoroda’s work, seeing in it only the original style and compilation character of thoughts. Ivan Mirtchuk (...) started his research on Skovoroda’s thoughts from the history of national philosophy, seeing in Skovoroda’s philosophy the features charac- teristic of Ukrainian philosophy, differing it fundamentally from Russian philosophy. As part of the research, it was possible to find an extensive article by Jarosław Ulwański, Philosophy of G.S. Skovoroda, published in 1930, in which the author presented arguments for a pantheistic interpretation of the Ukrainian philosopher’s thoughts. A breakthrough event was the publication of a monograph by Dmytro Tschižewskij, who formulated a view on the mystical philosophy of Skovoroda similar to the Western European mysticism of the 17th and 18th centuries. The interwar period ends with the work of Czesław Jastrzębiec-Kozłowski, in which the work of Skovoroda was analyzed against the background of Józef Hoene-Wronski’s messianic philosophy. After World War II and the 1990s, research on Skovoroda’s legacy was conducted primarily by philologists. Ryszard Łużny and Włodzimierz Mokry treated Skovoroda’s work as a Christian philosopher. In the 21st century, Polish research increasingly refers to philosophical interpretation. Denys Pilipowicz researched the ancient and patristic sources of Skovoroda’s mystical thought and compared it with the teachings of Paisij Velyczkovskyi. Iryna Betko analyzed his poetry from the perspective of Jung’s theory of archetypes. Michał Handzel conducted an in-depth historical and philosophical analysis of Skovoroda’s philosophy, seeing Skovoroda as a representative of the panentheistic trend, and Pavlo Snopkov examined the concept of Skovoroda’s self-knowledge from the perspective of Jung’s and Maslow’s psychological theories. (shrink)

The subject of this article is an ideological aspect of Pan Tadeusz, directed by Ryszard Ordyński as a film adaptation of Adam Mickiewicz’s poem. Picture was realised in 1928 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of regaining of national independence by Poland. Main goal of this article is to reflect in what ways filmmakers of Pan Tadeusz tried to implement a project of Polish national cinema. I also want to present how this film expressed social needs, programme specifications of (...) political power camp and how it explored national values in the cinema. (shrink)

The dispute in philosophical decision theory between causalists and evidentialists remains unsettled. Many are attracted to the causal view’s endorsement of a species of dominance reasoning, and to the intuitive verdicts it gets on a range of cases with the structure of the infamous Newcomb’s Problem. But it also faces a rising wave of purported counterexamples and theoretical challenges. In this paper I will describe a novel decision theory which saves what is appealing about the causal view while avoiding its (...) most worrying objections, and which promises to generalize to solve a set of related problems in other normative domains. (shrink)

In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to (...) recent skepticism about such views. (shrink)

There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism (...) framed as the upshot of different ways one might respond to a basic argument against the view from Roger White. I then introduce a new type of permissive view which the contemporary debate has completely ignored and which is made available when we reject a widespread and largely unexamined background commitment to static rational norms connecting beliefs and evidence in favor of dynamic norms governing processes of consideration. I show how the dynamic strategy of rejecting static norms on belief opens the door to a new kind of permissivism which is both independently attractive and especially well-placed to answer worries that have been raised against traditional permissivist views. (shrink)

Finite agents such as human beings have reasoning and updating processes that are extended in time; consequently, there is always some lag between the point at which we gain new reasons and the point at which our attitudes have fully responded to those reasons. This phenomenon, which I call rational delay, poses a threat to the most common ways of formulating rational requirements on our attitudes, which do not allow rational beings to exhibit such delay. In this paper, I show (...) first how this problem undermines synchronic formulations of rational norms. Then I show how it likewise undermines the most natural diachronic modifications of these norms. Ultimately, I argue that a successful account of rational delay will reject norms that directly govern attitudes or states of mind like belief and intention altogether, in favor of norms that fundamentally concern temporally extended rational processes like deliberation. (shrink)

Traditional rule consequentialism faces a problem sometimes called the ideal world objection—the worry that by looking only at the consequences in worlds where rules are universally adhered to, the theory fails to account for problems that arise because adherence to rules in the real world is inevitably imperfect. In response, recent theorists have defended sophisticated versions of rule consequentialism which are sensitive to the consequences in worlds with less utopian levels of adherence. In this paper, I argue that these attempts (...) underestimate the problem they are designed to avoid—the worry about ideal worlds is only one manifestation of a deeper and more general problem, the distant world objection, which threatens not only the sophisticated revisions of rule consequentialism, but any view which determines what we ought to do by evaluating worlds that differ from ours in more than what is up to us. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an approach to population ethics which explains what we are permitted to do in virtue of the possible complaints against our action. This task is made difficult by a serious problem that arises when we attempt to generalize the view from two-option to many-option cases. The solution makes two significant moves – first, accepting that complaints are essentially pairwise comparative, and second, reimagining decision-making as a tournament between options competing two at a time. The right (...) view about when one option defeats another with respect to complaints, paired with the right view about how to pick the winners of the tournament given the relations of defeat, leads to a uniquely attractive view in the person-affecting tradition. (shrink)

On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic—concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic—concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. However, a recent movement in epistemology has cast doubt on the (...) very existence of requirements of the latter type. My aim in this paper is to address what I take to be the most direct and general recent attack on diachronic epistemic rationality, the arguments for so-called ‘time-slice epistemology’ by Brian Hedden. I argue that Hedden's attempt to motivate the rejection of diachronic rational norms ultimately fails, and in particular that an independently attractive view about the nature of such norms, namely one on which such norms govern processes, escapes his assault unscathed. (shrink)

One popular defence of moral omnivorism appeals to facts about the indirectness of the diner’s causal relationship to the suffering of farmed animals. Another appeals to the claim that farmed animals would not exist but for our farming practices. The import of these claims, I argue, has been misunderstood, and the standard arguments grounded in them fail. In this paper, I develop a better argument in defence of eating meat which combines resources from both of these strategies, together with principles (...) of population ethics, and discuss its implications for which sorts of meat it is permissible to eat. According to the diner’s defence, there is an asymmetry between producers and consumers of meat. Producers can prevent the suffering of animals without preventing their existence, but consumers cannot. This asymmetry grounds a defence against harm-based objections to eating meat which is available to the consumer alone, and which avoids the controversial commitments about moral status or the interests of nonhuman animals endemic to existing attempts to justify omnivorism. (shrink)

According to a family of views under the label of epistemic conservatism, the fact that one already believes something can make it rational to continue to believe it. A number of philosophers have found conservatism attractive, but traditional views are vulnerable to several powerful criticisms. In this paper, I develop an alternative to standard views by identifying a widespread assumption shared by conservatives and their critics - that rational norms govern states of mind like belief, and showing how rejecting this (...) assumption in favor of a process-oriented approach opens the door to a new, dynamic form of conservatism which preserves its core motivations while avoiding its traditional objections. (shrink)

Zadaniem niniejszego wprowadzenia jest nakreślenie pewnych ram historycznych i teoretycznych współczesnej immunologii. Dyscyplina ta stosunkowo niedawno ukształtowana stara się wyjaśnić wszelkiego rodzaju zjawiska stojące na straży integralności organizmu. Organizmu rozumianego jako złożona struktura, wielosystemowa, ukształtowana w toku ewolucji. W wypadku tak szeroko rozumianego pojęcia odporności ewidentnie wymagana jest wnikliwa dyskusja, dlatego filozofowie biologii i naukowcy immunolodzy od pół wieku analizują podstawowe definicje i dochodzą do interesujących konkluzji.

We often care not only about what happens to us, but when it happens to us. We prefer that good experiences happen sooner, rather than later, and that our suffering lies in our past, rather than our future. Common sense suggests that some ways of caring about time are rational, and others are not, but it is surprisingly challenging to provide justifying explanations for these tendencies. This Element is an opinionated, nontechnical-guided tour through the main philosophical issues about the relevance (...) of the temporal location of our experiences to our desires and our choices, and the major arguments for and against different kinds of so-called time bias. (shrink)

Proponents of epistocracy worry that high levels of voter ignorance can harm democracies. To combat such ignorance, they recommend allocating comparatively more political power to more politically knowledgeable citizens. In response, some recent critics of epistocracy contend that epistocratic institutions risk causing even more harm, since much evidence from political psychology indicates that more politically knowledgeable citizens are typically more biased, less open-minded, and more prone to motivated reasoning about political matters than their less knowledgeable counterparts. If so, perhaps epistocratic (...) institutions will perform worse epistemically than corresponding democratic institutions. Call this 'the problem of epistocratic irrationality'. This paper argues that the problem of epistocratic irrationality can be overcome. First, I argue that critics of epistocracy have overlooked several complications regarding the psychological data they claim shows that more knowledgeable citizens are less politically rational. Second, I argue that appropriately designed epistocratic institutions could overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality even if such critics have interpreted the data correctly. I first explore whether refined selection mechanisms could allow epistocrats to avoid empowering less rational citizens, before assessing the prospects of implementing only those epistocratic institutions with a solid track record of reliable performance. (shrink)

In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to explain his other intentional states. This account develops the (...) multistage Lewisian approach presented at the end of my earlier "Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?" (2013). (shrink)

Conceptual engineers endeavor to improve our concepts. But their endeavors face serious practical difficulties. One such difficulty – rational conceptual conflict - concerns the degree to which agents are incentivized to impede the efforts of conceptual engineers, especially in many of the contexts within which conceptual engineering is viewed as a worthwhile pursuit. Under such conditions, the already difficult task of conceptual engineering becomes even more difficult. Consequently, if they want to increase their chances of success, conceptual engineers should pay (...) closer attention to – and devise strategies to mitigate – rational conceptual conflict. After outlining the phenomenon at greater length and mapping its connections to other similar practical problems (Section 1), I explore the dynamics of such conflict by way of several detailed case studies (Section 2). In particular, I focus on cases driven by material, social, and moral incentives. I then consider some important methodological implications of rational conceptual conflict (Section 3). Among other things, I argue that conceptual engineers should focus more heavily on cultivating settings that modify the payoffs and penalties associated with conceptual conflict. By such indirect means, they can incentivize conceptual cooperation rather than conflict, thus making it easier to achieve success in conceptual engineering. Section 4 concludes. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss several problems with current Big data practices which, we claim, seriously erode the role of informed consent as it pertains to the use of personal information. To illustrate these problems, we consider how the notion of informed consent has been understood and operationalised in the ethical regulation of biomedical research (and medical practices, more broadly) and compare this with current Big data practices. We do so by first discussing three types of problems that can impede (...) informed consent with respect to Big data use. First, we discuss the transparency (or explanation) problem. Second, we discuss the re-repurposed data problem. Third, we discuss the meaningful alternatives problem. In the final section of the paper, we suggest some solutions to these problems. In particular, we propose that the use of personal data for commercial and administrative objectives could be subject to a ‘soft governance’ ethical regulation, akin to the way that all projects involving human participants (e.g., social science projects, human medical data and tissue use) are regulated in Australia through the Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs). We also consider alternatives to the standard consent forms, and privacy policies, that could make use of some of the latest research focussed on the usability of pictorial legal contracts. (shrink)

H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.

Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.

Develops an empirical argument against naive realism-disjunctivism: if naive realists accept "internal dependence", then they cannot explain the evolution of perceptual success. Also presents a puzzle about our knowledge of universals.

Many contemporary democratic theorists are democratic egalitarians. They think that the distinctive value of democracy lies in equality. Yet this position faces a serious problem. All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Such democracies are highly unequal: representatives have much more power than do ordinary citizens. So, it seems that democratic egalitarians must condemn representative democracies. In this paper, I present a solution to this problem. My solution invokes popular control. If representatives are under popular control, then their extra power is (...) not objectionable. Unfortunately, so I argue, in the United States representatives are under loose popular control. (shrink)

In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.

Despite their many virtues, democracies suffer from well-known problems with high levels of voter ignorance. Such ignorance, one might think, leads democracies to occasionally produce bad outcomes. Proponents of epistocracy claim that allocating comparatively greater amounts of political power to citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge may help us to mitigate the bad effects of voter ignorance. An important challenge to epistocracy rejects the claim that we can reliably identify a subset of citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge (...) than others. Roughly put, such knowledge should involve knowledge of various politically relevant social-scientific facts. But since the social sciences are mired in controversy, it’s not clear what the politically relevant facts are. Accordingly, we cannot definitively say of some citizens that they possess more politically relevant knowledge than others. Call this the Argument from Political Disagreement. In this paper I respond to the Argument from Political Disagreement. First, I argue that it conflates social-scientific knowledge with politically relevant knowledge. Even if there were no uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge, there is much uncontroversial politically relevant knowledge. Second, I establish the importance of such non-social-scientific knowledge for political decision-making. I conclude that this knowledge constitutes the minimal body of knowledge which epistocrats need to make their case. (shrink)