The Buddha’s final illness, brought on by his last meal prior to his death, was traditionally seen as one of a set of ailments suffered by him at various points during his lifetime. This paper looks at different Buddhist explications of the causes of these ailments and applies them to the episode of the Buddha’s final illness. In both instances, three explanatory strategies are detected: the first stresses the causative importance of the Buddha’s own negative karmic deeds in past lives; (...) the second looks to the negative deeds and karma of others than the Buddha; the third offers non-karmic explanations. The first two engendered two rather different kinds of j?taka stories; the last did not involve any j?takas but highlighted various kinds of ‘natural’ explanations. (shrink)

Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir; Islamic philosophy; 20th century.

This chapter examines the sense of irony along with the parallels between the persona of “Stephen Colbert of The Colbert Report” and the character of the “ironist” discussed both by philosophical Romantics in the nineteenth century as well as the American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931–2007). For both Colbert and Rorty, irony can be funny and refreshing, and yet at the same time represents a challenge to our beliefs. The chapter looks at the differences between verbal irony and its more robust (...) counterpart, “existential irony,” and examines the extent to which Colbert fits this description. More importantly, the embracing irony has serious implications for how to deal with political responsibilities in the new and more precarious, “post‐ironic” world. (shrink)

Bradley and Whitehead certainly deserve a book-length comparison on such topics as experience, internal and external relations, particularly whole-part relations, time, and God. Leemon McHenry has explored these issues soberly and responsibly, and his conclusions are most informative. Yet I sometimes wonder whether the connection would be as firmly made had there not been one remark about Bradley in the preface to Process and Reality.

Two works on Dvaita (Vedanta) philosophy; critical edition.

John Martin Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will is devoted to two major projects. First, Fischer defends the thesis that determinism is incompatible with a person's control over alternatives to the actual future. Second, Fischer defends the striking thesis that such control is not necessary for moral responsibility. This review essay examines Fischer's arguments for each thesis. Fischer's defense of the incompatibilist thesis is the most innovative to date, and I argue that his formulation restructures the free will debate. To (...) defend his second thesis Fischer relies upon examples designed to show that an agent is responsible for an unavoidable action. I criticize Fischer's account of these examples, but I also maintain that my criticisms do not compromise his theory of responsibility. I raise several other difficulties for Fischer's theory of responsibility, and I close by offering some suggestions about how he might further defend it. (shrink)

It is my contention here that the chapter “Of Power,” in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, is not a metaphysical pronouncement upon the liberty-necessity debates but more along the lines of what those like James Harris portray it to be: a description of our experience of freedom of the will. It is also prescriptive since it is descriptive of the right use of the will. My claims are based upon two key pieces of evidence that are responses to (...) William Molyneux’s oft noted critique of the first edition of the chapter: 1) an admission by Locke in his correspondence: at least part of the reason he is attempting to avoid metaphysical pronouncements is that trying to reconcile divine and human agency is too difficult; and 2) the theological message of “Of Power”—the truly free agent is reasonable, and the truly reasonable agent will have her eyes fixed on the afterlife, thus aiming for herself to be a slave and determined, therefore, by her ever-cultivated desire for righteousness and not by her fleshly desires—and his development of it throughout the chapter eludes sectarian categorization by the avoidance of theological issues that are not unrelated to the metaphysical question of human free agency. To frame his chapter otherwise makes him out to be a theological novice or, perhaps, unconcerned with the religious background of his readership. (shrink)

In thinking of Derrida's notion of deconstruction as an attitude in understanding logocentrism, one might find it necessary to pre-empt this discourse by taking into serious consideration three words: center, consciousness, and difference. These words offer the key towards the problem of logocentrism within Derrida's deconstruction and, as far as these words seem to contextualize themselves within Derrida's texts, they also offer an explanation of how meaning becomes possible. Derrida's deconstruction is a form of writing in which the "I-ness" of (...) the self is given emphasis as both the limitation and possibility of appropriation in so far as context is concerned. Reading for him is already considered as an act of writing, the text, being polysemic in its inscription, already implies that the repetition of the syntax of words will always be rendered by the consciousness with a relative amount of impurity. Every instance of reading then is a form of writing, each time an Other tries to read the singularity of the construction of the text, it is already altered as another occurrence within another consciousness. (shrink)

Badawī, ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, 1917-2002; criticism and interpretation.

A brief presentation of the major conclusions contained in the recently published monograph entitled "The Ascent to Law: Searches and Solutions," written over a period of many years. Chapter headings are: The law - an objective reality. The dogma of the law. The drama of scholarship. Searching. "The entire" substance of the law. Juridical constructs. The logic of laws. The secret of the law. Law - the highest purpose. Law in the life and fate of mankind.

In this paper we define n+1-valued matrix logic Kn+1 whose class of tautologies is non-empty iff n is a prime number. This result amounts to a new definition of a prime number. We prove that if n is prime, then the functional properties of Kn+1 are the same as those of ukasiewicz's n +1-valued matrix logic n+1. In an indirect way, the proof we provide reflects the complexity of the distribution of prime numbers in the natural series. Further, we introduce (...) a generalization K n+1 * of Kn+1 such that the set of tautologies of Kn+1 is not empty iff n is of the form p , where p is prime and is natural. Also in this case we prove the equivalence of functional properties of the introduced logic and those of n+1. In the concluding part, we discuss briefly a partition of the natural series into equivalence classes such that each class contains exactly one prime number. We conjecture that for each prime number the corresponding equivalence class is finite. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de McGinn, Colin. Shakespeare ’s Philosophy : Discovering the meaning Behind the Plays [A filosofia de Shakespeare : descobrindo o significado atrás das peças]. New York: Harper, 2008. 230 páginas.