Panenetheism is the claim that God and the cosmos are intimately inter-related, with the cosmos being in God and God being in the cosmos. What does this exactly mean? The aim of this paper is to address this question by sheding light on four possible models of God-world-inter-relatedness. Being critical of those models, which understand maximal immanence in a literal, spatial sense, the paper argues in favor of a model, which cashes out immanence in terms of divine activity. God is, (...) where God acts. Since God acts upon all of creation everywhere and anytime, God is omnipresent to it at all times. Thus, the proposal is to read the ‘en’ in ‘panetheism’ in an ‘agential sense’: God is in the cosmos by creating and sustaining it and the cosmos is in God by constantly being within the sphere of divine activity. (shrink)

Mutations in DNA topoisomerase II are often correlated with drug‐resistance in tumor cell lines. Studies of topoisomerase II‐mediated drug‐resistance in various model systems, as well as the sequencing of such mutations from drug‐resistant tumors, have shed light on the functional domains of topoisomerase II, on how it interacts with inhibitors, and on the different mechanisms by which cells avoid the toxic effects of many clinically important anti‐tumor drugs.

Aristotle thinks all our knowledge comes from perception. Yet he doesn't say much about the sense in which our knowledge might be based on or derived from the things we perceive. So what exactly does perception contribute to the more advanced cognitive states that make up our intellectual lives, and how should we understand the nature of its contribution? I argue that perception contributes to these more advanced states by putting us in touch with particular things in a way that's (...) responsive to the universals governing their behavior: perceptible particulars possess certain features because they instantiate certain universals, and perception allows us to discriminate these features and experience them as action-guiding aspects of our environment. So for instance, a patient might exhibit feverish features because she instantiates malarial disease, and a doctor might perceive these feverish features and experience them as soliciting some course of action---as soliciting that the patient be leeched, say. I explain how perception, so understood, can serve as a basis for the development of a perceptually driven form of practical knowledge ; roughly, the form of knowledge possessed by a doctor who knows how to cure a range of patients but could not explain why or how her treatments work. I then explain how such practical knowledge can itself serve as a basis for the theoretically sophisticated grasp of universals Aristotle takes as his cognitive ideal. (shrink)

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it's not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. It's not clear, for instance, what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it. Nor is it clear how we should understand the nature of its contribution—what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are "derived from" or "based on" what we perceive. Aristotle (...) is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. I argue here that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception's role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. This book offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks that we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means—and that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animals—but also holds that our intellectual powers allow us to surpass these animals in certain ways and thereby develop distinctively human forms of understanding. (shrink)

Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...) good sense to be made of the claim that we come to grasp first principles inductively, and show that this reading is a natural one given Aristotle's broader views on scientific learning. (shrink)

The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.

Dürrenmatt a été profondément marqué par la philosophie qu’il a étudiée à l’Université de Berne. Le présent article montre quelques aspects de cette influence, qui comprend non seulement des aspects épistémologiques (Platon et Kant) auxquels Dürrenmatt s’est dit fidèle tout au long de sa vie, mais aussi une approche de l’écriture axée sur la communication indirecte, à la suite du Kierkegaard du Postscriptum aux Miettes philosophiques, puisant souvent dans les contes et les mythes antiques pour en dégager la pertinence et (...) l’actualité, contre toute visée systématisante et dogmatisante qui prétend se saisir de la vérité en soi. (shrink)

What happens to us when we die? According to Christian faith, we will rise again bodily from the dead. This claim raises a series of philosophical and theological conundrums: Is it rational to hope for life after death in bodily form? Will it truly be “we” who are raised again or will it be post-mortem duplicates of us? How can personal identity be secured? What is God's role in resurrection and everlasting life? In response to these conundrums, this volume presents (...) joint work of leading philosophers and theologians on life after death. So this volume is an impressive demonstration of interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and theology. Various models are offered which depict what resurrection into an incorruptible post-mortem body might look like. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, on which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and (...) their consequences must be assessed. I end by considering how we should understand the justificatory role played by perception, and sketching the nuanced, empirically-minded sort of foundationalism I take Aristotle to endorse. (shrink)

Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently (...) rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers influence perception in two ways. First, they allow for a form of perception that is contemplative—that is, a form of perception that aims to work out how and what things are, and not just how things are to be responded to. Second, they afford us practical and theoretical forms of understanding that inform what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals. (shrink)

The issue of religious tolerance is increasingly raised in a globalized world with societies becoming more and more religiously diverse and inhomogeneous. Religious tolerance can be defined as the practice of accepting others as acting in accordance with their religious belief system. Philosophers have recently begun to study more thoroughly the relationship between religious pluralism and religious (in)tolerance with a main focus on the epistemic question of whether the recognition of and reflection on religious pluralism might lead to greater religious (...) tolerance. The major thrust of this idea is that any genuine reflection of a person about her epistemic peers adhering to other religions will weaken the person’s epistemic justificatory basis for believing that her own religious beliefs are better warranted than the religious beliefs of her peers. The rational consequence of the recognition of this justificatory fact, in turn, should lead to more religious tolerance and to a weakened dismissive attitude towards adherents of other religions. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of this account against the background of existing empirical, in particular psychological literature: Does increased contact with adherents of other religious traditions indeed lead to more tolerance? How are we able to show a deeper understanding for people with different religious beliefs and to take on—at least partially—their perspective? What are potential psychological obstacles to these achievements? Resources from research on intergroup toleration, social identity-theories, developmental psychology and personality traits will be used for tackling these questions. This shall help to broaden the so far rather narrow epistemic philosophical perspective on religious pluralism and (in)tolerance by embedding it into the larger context of constitutive traits of the human psyche. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that "although we perceive particulars, perception is of universals; for instance of human being, not of Callias-the-human-being" (APo II.19 100a16-b1). I offer an interpretation of this claim and examine its significance in Aristotle's epistemology.

Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...) requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle's views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness. (shrink)

A prominent version of mathematical structuralism holds that mathematical objects are at bottom nothing but "positions in structures," purely relational entities without any sort of nature independent of the structure to which they belong. Such an ontology is often presented as a response to Benacerraf's "multiple reductions" problem, or motivated on hermeneutic grounds, as a faithful representation of the discourse and practice of mathematics. In this paper I argue that there are serious difficulties with this kind of view: its proponents (...) rely on a distinction between "essential" and "nonessential" features of mathematical objects, and there's no good way to articulate this distinction which is compatible with basic structuralist commitments. But all is not lost. For I further argue that the insights motivating structuralism (or at least those worth preserving) can be preserved without formulating the view in ontologically committal terms. (shrink)

Many ethicists believe that moral statements can be true or false because there exist truthmakers for them. If these truth-makers are not conceived as natural but as moral facts „sui generis“ then we arrive at a position dubbed non-naturalistic moral realism (Non-NMR). This article tackles the question whether Non-NMR is persuasive. It is argued that metaphysics of supervenience and constitution between natural and moral facts will not suffice. Instead, Non-NMR should allow for moral standards or principles as abstract normative entities (...) in its ontology. These abstract normative entities are instantiated in our actions and thereby determine their moral quality. If we call an action „good“ or „bad“ we do not describe an action’s natural features but the moral standard realized in it. (shrink)

This paper explores recent developments in the philosophy of religion, emphasising alternative conceptions of God that move away from personal theism. Two alternative frameworks are presented: the euteleological concept of God developed by John Bishop and Ken Perszyk, which views God as an emergent phenomenon of an inherently purposive and good reality, and John L. Schellenberg’s ultimism, which conceptualises ultimate reality as metaphysical, axiological and soteriological ultimate, advocating for a cautious, open-ended understanding of the divine. These models argue for a (...) humble and exploratory stance toward religious understanding. They suggest a shift toward a pluralistic, non-personalist framework in conceptualising the divine and ultimate meaning. (shrink)

The aim of the current study was to investigate important pathways of the Environmental Stress Hypothesis concerning the role of peer relations. First, we examined (1) the mediating role of peer problems in the association between the motor performance in daily activities and internalizing problems as a main pathway of the Environmental Stress Hypothesis. Furthermore, we explored the role of (2) children’s popularity as a mediator and (3) best friendship quality as a moderator path of the effect of motor performance (...) on both peer problems and internalizing problems. The non-clinical sample of the present study consisted of 189 children (48.6% females) aged nine to eleven years (Mage = 9.69, SDage = 0.46). Parents reported on their child’s motor performance in daily activities by completing the Developmental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire. In addition, the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire was used to assess peer problems as well as internalizing problems. The Self Description Questionnaire provided a measure of children’s self-reported popularity. Finally, the Friendship Quality Questionnaire was used to investigate children’s best friendship quality. Results of a structural equation model suggest that peer problems fully mediated the association between the motor performance in daily activities and both popularity and internalizing problems. However, no evidence for the mediating effect of popularity in the association between peer problems and internalizing problems was found. Further, best friendship quality had small but non-significant positive moderating effect on the relation between peer problems and internalizing problems. The mediating role of peer problems highlights the importance of peer relations in the motor performance of daily activities. Possible reasons for the lack of some of the expected mediating and moderating effects as well as practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible (...) moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake. (shrink)

In this paper we explicate the notion of a miracle and highlight a suitable ontological framework for it. Our proposal draws on insights from Aquinas’s discussion of miracles and from the modern ontology of powers. We argue that each substance possesses a characteristic set of natural powers and dispositions which are operative or become manifest in the right circumstances. In a miracle divine intervention activates the fundamental disposition inherent in each creature to be responsive to God’s call. Thus, a miracle (...) brings something about which a substance’s set of natural powers and dispositions could not bring about by itself. (shrink)

Eleonore Stump’s intensive work on theodicy culminates in her opus magnum Wandering in Darkness. Her explicit thesis with regard to the evidential problem of evil is: From the background of a Christian worldview even terrible sufferings can be conceived as a necessary and indispensable part of a healing process through which God guides human beings from their postlapsarian sinful state towards their ultimate end, communion with God and fellow human beings. Stump pursues this aim by the use of biblical narratives (...) as a way of sharing interpersonal experiences between God and men. In this article I present the main steps of Stump’s argument. Then I discuss whether she is successful in her attempt to treat human suffering and the loss of one’s deepest desires as appropriately as she claims. Finally I outline the explanatory limits of this, and most probably, every theodicy by means of the concept of a worldview. (shrink)

SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this (...) hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. (shrink)

The present study aimed to examine the promotive and protective role of general self-efficacy and positive self-concept in the context of the effects of early familial risk factors on children’s development of emotional problems from early to middle childhood. A total of 293, 239, and 189 children from 25 childcare centers took part in the present study. Fourteen familial risk factors were assessed at T1 using an interview and a questionnaire that were administered to children’s primary caregivers. These 14 familial (...) risk factors were used to compute a familial risk factors score. Primary caregivers also reported on their children’s emotional problems at T2 and T3 and on their children’s general self-efficacy at T2. Children reported on their positive self-concept at T2. Results showed that early familial risk factors were positively associated with emotional problems in the short and long term, although the long-term effect was small and non-significant. Further, the pattern of effect sizes of both promotive and protective effects of general self-efficacy as well as positive self-concept was found to be consistent in the short term. However, in the long term, no consistent support for either the promotive or the protective role of general self-efficacy or positive self-concept was found. These results suggest that general self-efficacy and positive self-concept might contribute to promote mental health and to protect from undesired effects of familial risk factors in the short term. Possible reasons for a lack of long-term effects are discussed along with practical implications. (shrink)

The present study aimed to examine the longitudinal promotive and protective role of process quality in regular early childhood education and care (ECEC) centers in the context of early cumulative family risks on children’s social–emotional development from early to middle childhood. The sample consisted of 293 (T1;Mage = 2.81), 239 (T2;Mage = 3.76), and 189 (T3;Mage = 9.69) children from 25 childcare centers in Switzerland. Fourteen familial risk factors were subsumed to a family risk score at T1. Parents and teachers (...) reported on children’s conduct problems (CP), emotional problems (EP), and prosocial behavior (PB) at T2 and T3. Childcare process quality was assessed at T2 using external observations of teaching and interaction, provisions for learning, and key professional tasks. Results showed that early family risks were positively associated with CP and EP and negatively associated with PB in the long term. High-quality teaching and interaction as well as caregivers’ professional behavior in terms of systematic observation, documentation, and planning of children’s individual learning processes and needs protected children from the undesirable long-term effects of early family risks on conduct problems, emotional problems, and prosocial behavior from early to middle childhood. The results indicate that a high process quality in ECEC might serve as an essential contextual protective factor in the development of resilience in children at risk. (shrink)

Toot. Pass gas. Break wind. Cut the cheese. Float an air biscuit. Burp from behind. Blow the brown horn. The backfire, bant, bucksnort, booty bomb, colon cologne, drifter, fanny bubble, gasser, gurgler, moon beam, nether belch, pants puffer, pooh tune, rip-snort, sphincter whistle, thunder dumpling, tush tickler, and trouser cough. These are synonyms for a bodily function that is as natural as breathing, eating, or sleeping. Yet unlike other physiological functions, the ‘flatus’ is a source of endless humor – (...) perhaps more so than any other subject in human experience. But why are farts funny? That is a question that is both serious and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

Both John Henry Newman and Vincent Gasser offered influential interpretations of the First Vatican Council’s teaching on infallibility. In contrast to many of theircontemporaries, Gasser and Newman placed papal infallibility alongside episcopal infallibility and the infallibility of the Catholic faithful. After exploring the views of Gasser and Newman, this essay compares their views to the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on infallibility in Lumen Gentium and concludes that even though Lumen Gentium cited Gasser, its theology is closer (...) to Newman’s. (shrink)

Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...) one website. Paste the whole URL. http://archive.org/stream/RobertiAudi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy/Robert.Audi_The.Cambrid ge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy -/- The 2015 third edition will be available soon. Before you think of buying it read some reviews on Amazon and read reviews of its competition: For example, my review of the 2008 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic,29:3,291-292. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701300429 -/- Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. The discussion provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light. -/- Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition. Besides the help received from people in Buffalo, help from elsewhere was received by email. We gratefully acknowledge the following: José Miguel Sagüillo, John Zeis, Stewart Shapiro, Davis Plache, Joseph Ernst, Richard Hull, Concha Martinez, Laura Arcila, James Gasser, Barry Smith, Randall Dipert, Stanley Ziewacz, Gerald Rising, Leonard Jacuzzo, George Boger, William Demopolous, David Hitchcock, John Dawson, Daniel Halpern, William Lawvere, John Kearns, Ky Herreid, Nicolas Goodman, William Parry, Charles Lambros, Harvey Friedman, George Weaver, Hughes Leblanc, James Munz, Herbert Bohnert, Robert Tragesser, David Levin, Sriram Nambiar, and others. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines three proposals on the difference between the complex and the simple view about personal identity: Parfit’s original introduction of the distinction, Gasser and Stefan’s definition, and Noonan’s recent proposal. I argue that the first two classify the paradigm cases of simplicity as complex, while Noonan’s proposal makes simplicity and complexity turn on features whose relevance for the distinction is questionable. Given these difficulties, I examine why we should be interested in whether a position is complex or (...) simple. I describe two purposes of having a distinction, and show that extant accounts of the complex versus simple distinction fail to serve these. I argue that unless we find a satisfying account of the difference between complex and simple positions, we should not frame discourses on personal identity in these terms. (shrink)

A truth-preservation fallacy is using the concept of truth-preservation where some other concept is needed. For example, in certain contexts saying that consequences can be deduced from premises using truth-preserving deduction rules is a fallacy if it suggests that all truth-preserving rules are consequence-preserving. The arithmetic additive-associativity rule that yields 6 = (3 + (2 + 1)) from 6 = ((3 + 2) + 1) is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. As noted in James Gasser’s dissertation, Leibniz has been criticized (...) for using that rule in attempting to show that arithmetic equations are consequences of definitions. -/- A system of deductions is truth-preserving if each of its deductions having true premises has a true conclusion—and consequence-preserving if, for any given set of sentences, each deduction having premises that are consequences of that set has a conclusion that is a consequence of that set. Consequence-preserving amounts to: in each of its deductions the conclusion is a consequence of the premises. The same definitions apply to deduction rules considered as systems of deductions. Every consequence-preserving system is truth-preserving. It is not as well-known that the converse fails: not every truth-preserving system is consequence-preserving. Likewise for rules: not every truth-preserving rule is consequence-preserving. There are many famous examples. In ordinary first-order Peano-Arithmetic, the induction rule yields the conclusion ‘every number x is such that: x is zero or x is a successor’—which is not a consequence of the null set—from two tautological premises, which are consequences of the null set, of course. The arithmetic induction rule is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. Truth-preserving rules that are not consequence-preserving are non-logical or extra-logical rules. Such rules are unacceptable to persons espousing traditional truth-and-consequence conceptions of demonstration: a demonstration shows its conclusion is true by showing that its conclusion is a consequence of premises already known to be true. The 1965 Preface in Benson Mates (1972, vii) contains the first occurrence of truth-preservation fallacies in the book. (shrink)

The multifaceted work of the late Susan Leigh Star is explored through a selection of her writings and essays by friends and colleagues. Susan Leigh Star (1954–2010) was one of the most influential science studies scholars of the last several decades. In her work, Star highlighted the messy practices of discovering science, asking hard questions about the marginalizing as well as the liberating powers of science and technology. In the landmark work Sorting Things Out, Star and Geoffrey Bowker revealed the (...) social and ethical histories that are deeply embedded in classification systems. Star's most celebrated concept was the notion of boundary objects: representational forms—things or theories—that can be shared between different communities, with each holding its own understanding of the representation. Unfortunately, Leigh was unable to complete a work on the poetics of infrastructure that further developed the full range of her work. This volume collects articles by Star that set out some of her thinking on boundary objects, marginality, and infrastructure, together with essays by friends and colleagues from a range of disciplines—from philosophy of science to organization science—that testify to the wide-ranging influence of Star's work. Contributors Ellen Balka, Eevi E. Beck, Dick Boland, Geoffrey C. Bowker, Janet Ceja Alcalá, Adele E. Clarke, Les Gasser, James R. Griesemer, Gail Hornstein, John Leslie King, Cheris Kramarae, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Karen Ruhleder, Kjeld Schmidt, Brian Cantwell Smith, Susan Leigh Star, Anselm L. Strauss, Jane Summerton, Stefan Timmermans, Helen Verran, Nina Wakeford, Jutta Weber. (shrink)

This paper gives an ethical argument for temporarily waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines. It examines two proposals under discussion at the World Trade Organization : the India/South Africa proposal and the WTO Director General proposal. Section I explains the background leading up to the WTO debate. Section II rebuts ethical arguments for retaining current IP protections, which appeal to benefiting society by spurring innovation and protecting rightful ownership. It sets forth positive ethical arguments for a temporary waiver that (...) appeal to standing in solidarity and holding companies accountable. After examining built-in exceptions to existing agreements and finding them inadequate, the paper replies to objections to a temporary waiver and concludes, in section III, that the ethical argument for temporarily waiving IP protection for COVID-19 vaccines is strong. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper, I clarify what is at stake in the debate between accounts of the iterative conception based on the notion of metaphysical dependence and the minimalist account I have defended in previous work (Incurvati 2012; 2020). I argue that the debate concerns how to understand and motivate the central tenet of the iterative conception that every set occurs at some level of the cumulative hierarchy. This debate, I contend, should be distinguished from the debate (...) between actualist and potentialist accounts of the cumulative hierarchy. In the second part of the paper, I use the distinction drawn in the first part of the paper to assess an objection leveled by Mark Gasser (2015) against ante rem structuralism. In particular, this distinction makes it clear that there are two different objections in Gasser’s article. The first objection is that the iterative conception conflicts with dependence claims made by structuralists. As I have suggested in previous work, ante rem structuralists can address this objection by endorsing a minimalist account of the iterative conception. The second objection is that the indefinite extensibility of the set concept conflicts with the idea that the cumulative hierarchy is exhausted by the ZFC axioms. I chart various possible ways of addressing the second objection and show that by disentangling ante rem structuralism from the idea that mathematical structures ought to be given by implicit definitions opens up a novel way of addressing the second objection. I conclude by contending that although my arguments show that ante rem structuralism is compatible with the iterative conception, there are still reasons to favour a more deflationary understanding of structuralism, advocated by John Burgess, Joel Hamkins and Gasser himself. (shrink)

This paper is a technical study of the systematic observations and computations made by Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Maghribī (d. 1283) at the Maragha observatory (north-western Iran, c. 1259–1320) in order to newly determine the parameters of the Ptolemaic lunar model, as explained in his Talkhīṣ al-majisṭī, “Compendium of the Almagest.” He used three lunar eclipses on March 7, 1262, April 7, 1270, and January 24, 1274, in order to measure the lunar epicycle radius and mean motions; an observation on April 20, (...) 1264, to determine the lunar eccentricity; an observation on August 29, 1264, to test the model; and another on March 15, 1262, for measuring the lunar parallax. In the second period of activity at the Maragha observatory, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Wābkanawī (c. 1254–1320) adopted all of al-Maghribī’s parameter values in his Zīj, but decreased his value for the mean longitude of the moon at epoch by 0;13,11∘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$^{\circ }$$\end{document}. By comparing the times of the new moons and lunar eclipses in the period of 1270–1320 as computed from the astronomical tables of the Maragha tradition with the true modern ones, it is argued that this correction was very probably the result of actual observations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius IV:On Theological Method and the Nexus MysteriorumConor McDonough, O.P.From the point of view of Church history, chapter 4 of Dei Filius might seem like dull terrain. Dei Filius as a whole has been regarded as the "forgotten decree" of the First Vatican Council,1 and the principal controversies during its passage through the Council were, for the most part, proxy battles over papal infallibility.2 Of the whole document, (...) the fourth chapter, on the relationship between faith and reason, provoked the fewest interventions from the Council fathers.3 On April 24, 1870, the day the constitution was passed unanimously by the Council fathers, an American bishop, John McQuaid of Rochester, described Dei Filius in a letter: [End Page 891] "There are some obstruse [sic] metaphysical points which few can fathom and certainly will never trouble the brains of any but a German philosopher for whose especial benefit they seem to have been made. The rest is quite simple theology."4Whether McQuaid regarded chapter 4 as "obstruse" or "simple theology" is anybody's guess, but it is clear that it was indeed composed with German thinkers in mind, especially the rationalists Georg Hermes (1775–1831) and Anton Günther (1783–1863),5 and its composition and passage through the conciliar process was also largely the work of Germanophone theologians: Johann Baptist Franzelin, S.J. (1816–1886), Joseph Kleutgen, S.J. (1811–1893), and Bishop Vincent Gasser (1809–1879).6 It may not have provoked much debate on the floor of the Council, but its careful pronouncements on faith and reason were a vital antidote both to rationalism and fideism. More than that, Dei Filius outlines key points of theological method, making explicit what had long been implicit in the work of theologians. As we shall see, these insights are of enduring relevance to the wise practice of theology.Reason's Work and the Mysteries of FaithWhat is the role of reason in relation to the mysteries of the faith? Or, to put it another way, how does theology proceed? Rationalism and fideism both answer these questions badly. Speaking very broadly, we can say that rationalism, in its more extreme variety, claims that reason can actually construct the whole edifice of faith. God has revealed mysteries of the faith, like his triunity, for example, but reason can—so claim the rationalists—arrive independently at the same mysteries of faith (rendering them, one might add, somewhat less mysterious).Fideism, in its extreme forms, gives hardly any role to reason at all: we receive revelation, and we repeat and transmit it, with little room for reflection and growth in understanding. The light of faith, according to [End Page 892] this view, makes redundant the natural light of reason, at least in the realm of the revealed truths.Dei Filius rules out these two extremes: reason does not independently reconstruct the mysteries of faith, nor does it merely repeat these mysteries. But the constitution does not limit itself to ruling out extremes. In chapter 2 it affirms the capacity of human reason to know God's existence independently of revelation, and in chapter 4 it develops a positive account of the role of reason within faith, enunciating basic principles of sound theological method. Having affirmed in this final chapter a "twofold order of knowledge," accessible by natural reason and faith, respectively, and having affirmed the existence of truths "which, unless they are divinely revealed, are incapable of being known," the constitution outlines the kind of work human reason can carry out on these mysteries:Reason, enlightened by faith, when it seeks persistently, piously, and soberly, does achieve by God's gift some understanding—a most profitable understanding—of the mysteries, both by analogy from what it knows naturally, and by the connection of these mysteries with one another and with the final end of humanity; but reason is never rendered capable of penetrating these mysteries in the way in which it penetrates those truths which form its proper object.7Avoiding any hint of rationalism, Dei Filius indicates here two methods or paths8 by which reason can gain "some understanding" of the mysteries revealed by God... (shrink)

Работа предназначена для ученых и специалистов, преподавателей, аспирантов, слушателей, студентов, а также всех интересующихся рассматриваемой темой.

John. R. Searle’s account of perception is often called the intentionality theory of perception (ITP). ITP maintains direct realism. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly perceived. Searle denies Locke's representational theory of perception since the latter is an antithesis of direct realism. Searle's contention is that, first, according to the representational theory of perception, subjective ideas (mind-dependent entities) are the only object of perception, we do not perceive physical objects at all. Second, Searle says that on the face (...) of the resemblance thesis, the representational theory of perception is not secured because the former is insufficient to explain the latter. This paper is an attempt to reflect on these two charges raised by Searle. First, I will try to show how we can conceive physical objects are objects (indirect) of perception within Locke’s representational theory of perception. Then, it will be argued that Locke’s representationalist theory of perception can be upheld without the support of the resemblance thesis. (shrink)

In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; (...) Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis. (shrink)