Semantic theories based on a hierarchy of types have prominently been used to defend the possibility of unrestricted quantification. However, they also pose a prima facie problem for it: each quantifier ranges over at most one level of the hierarchy and is therefore not unrestricted. It is difficult to evaluate this problem without a principled account of what it is for a quantifier to be unrestricted. Drawing on an insight of Russell’s about the relationship between quantification and the structure of (...) predication, we offer such an account. We use this account to examine the problem in three different type-theoretic settings, which are increasingly permissive with respect to predication. We conclude that unrestricted quantification is available in all but the most permissive kind of type theory. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss Aristotle's phenomenology of giving. I try to point out the relations between virtues such as liberality, magnificence and magnanimity. These virtues deal with different domains, i.e. with the right flow of money, with expenditure and finally with political and spiritual greatness. I argue, however, that they share a common structure, the friendship with oneself. Aristotle's concept of friendship with oneself means a personal integration, an achieved harmony of individual faculties, which represents the core of (...) the different virtues. It can be recognized in its most accomplished form in the case of magnanimity, a secondlevel virtue that is not primarily about economic goods and deals rather with self-knowledge and self-realization. Friendship with oneself is actually the result of a long process of maturation, made possible by practice, imitation of good models, teachings and personal reflection. During this process the natural individuality, with its attachments and cravings, is regenerated and adjusted to higher goals: the ethical and political life. Accordingly, I try to make clear that both the liberal and the magnificent man have gone through this long and challenging path. Both the liberal and the magnificent citizen can give to others in the right way as they do not rob themselves of the good they deserve. The consequence of Aristotle's theory of virtuous giving is intriguing: one can give to other people in a virtuous way only if one is friend of himself and recognizes himself the right to the goods he is truly worth of. (shrink)

The present paper studies the relationship between criminal law and exception. In the first part are presented the categories of legality and legitimacy, in relation to the crisis of the liberal state. The second part presents the theory of Agamben on the state of exception, seeing a connection with the legal theory of Jakobs.

Questo saggio, risultato del lavoro seminariale svolto presso la Fondazione Centro Studi Campostrini, avanza una proposta teoricasulla base di un’ipotesi. L’ipotesi è che quando usiamo il vocabolariodella credenza diciamo qualcosa di specifico e irriducibile adaltre nozioni. Alla ricerca del nucleo di irriducibilità e specificitàdella credenza Giuseppe Di Salvatore scarta tutte quelle forme dicredenza che dipendono in maniera più o meno diretta da unaconsiderazione in termini di conoscenza o da un’implicazione dellaverità. Se alcuni tipi di giustificazione della credenza possono essereutili (...) a individuarne l’irriducibilità, solo le credenze primitive, unacomplessa nozione di “credenza soggettiva” e un originale modellofiduciario della credenza fungono da buoni candidati per difenderela specificità della credenza. Dopo la discussione di alcune tesi diLudwig Wittgenstein e il ricorso a fonti eterogenee, da William Jamesa Henry Habberley Price fino a Niklas Luhmann, l’autore proponela nozione originale di “credenza progressiva” come il migliorcandidato che confermi l’ipotesi di partenza. In essa una precisaidea di rischio e la fiducia, al cui dibattito è dedicata un’ampiaattenzione, contribuiscono a delineare la credenza progressivainsieme ad alcuni suoi aspetti soggettivi, così profilandola comeuna postura sperimentale. Il saggio si completa con una riflessionesulla peculiarità della questione filosofica della credenza religiosa,la quale viene approcciata nella sua preliminare generalità, quindiconfrontata con la credenza progressiva. (shrink)

This paper reports the framework, method and main findings of an analysis of cultural milieus in 4 European countries. The analysis is based on a questionnaire applied to a sample built through a two-step procedure of post-hoc random selection from a broader dataset based on an online survey. Responses to the questionnaire were subjected to multidimensional analysis-a combination of Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Cluster Analysis. We identified 5 symbolic universes, that correspond to basic, embodied, affect-laden, generalized worldviews. People in this (...) study see the world as either a) an ordered universe;b) a matter of interpersonal bond;c) a caring society;d) consisting of a niche of belongingness;e) a hostile place. These symbolic universes were also interpreted as semiotic capital: they reflect the capacity of a place to foster social and civic development. Moreover, the distribution of the symbolic universes, and therefore social and civic engagement, is demonstrated to be variable across the 4 countries in the analysis. Finally, we develop a retrospective reconstruction of the distribution of symbolic universes as well as the interplay between their current state and past, present and future socio-institutional scenarios. (shrink)

Plural expressions found in natural languages allow us to talk about many objects simultaneously. Plural logic — a logical system that takes plurals at face value — has seen a surge of interest in recent years. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between (...) this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic's applications than has been given thus far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the final chapters, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a "critical" alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known. This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn (1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this article, we (...) present a new proof to the effect that not all truths are knowable, which rests on different assumptions from those of the original argument published by Fitch. We highlight the general form of the knowability paradoxes, and argue that anti-realists who favour either an hierarchical or an intuitionistic approach to the Paradox of Knowability are confronted with a dilemma: they must either give up anti-realism or opt for a highly controversial interpretation of the principle that every truth is knowable. (shrink)

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first-order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non-standard interpretations that confronts higher-order logics on their more traditional, set-based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic (...) that does not resort to sets or set-like objects to interpret plural variables, but adopts the view that a plural variable has many objects as its values. Using this semantics, we also articulate a generalized notion of ontological commitment which enables us to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic. (shrink)

Issues relating to the migration of entire populations and to religious and political integralism have thrown the paradigm of ‘inclusion’ into crisis by challenging the already fragile equilibrium. This necessitates a push for deeper answers, not merely those imposed by a passing need. Balbo’s current reflections allow us to re-think the dilemma of our relationship with the ‘other’ through the paradigm of the ‘dialectic integration’, which by referring to the ‘sublation’ or experiential ‘going through’ seems to promote integral human development (...) in a more efficient way. Thanks to this, ‘differences are unified without destroying each other’, and thus, are mutually enriched in being: each one can improve creatively, not against, but with, for, through, and thanks to the ‘other’. (shrink)

World-systems analysis is a well-established but poorly-defined critical research tradition in the social sciences. Its undisputed progenitor, Immanuel Wallerstein, steadfastly maintains that world-systems analysis is not a theory, yet it is widely referred to as such by commentators, critics, and practitioners alike. The resolution to this conundrum is to identify the defining elements of world-systems analysis as a perspective for understanding human society, then to evaluate propositions based on these defining elements as theories that have been conceptualized from a world-systems (...) perspective. In this paper five defining elements of world-systems analysis are identified that together support a central theorem that the core-periphery hierarchy of the modern world-system can best be understood in terms of state strength and cultural integration. A further conjecture is made that the successor world-system to the current capitalist world-economy is more likely to be an American world-empire than the socialist world-government craved by many world-systems analysts. (shrink)

My intention is not to get into specific, detailed historical observation about the ways that led the term ‘democracy’ to take on its current meaning, in science as much as in politics, but rather to establish a comparison between the models that political science proposes and interprets as important for the existence of democracy and those that science illustrates as indicators of scientific knowledge constructed in a democratic form. The debate about the contemporary meaning of democracy has generated an extraordinary (...) diversification of models of democracy: from technocratic conceptions of government to conceptions of social life that include widespread political participation. And it is exactly for this reason that the assumption of a specific point of view on the question we are dealing with inevitably brings with it the choice of a model suitable to describe democratic form as a form of politics without further explanation, that is, as a political system with which science measures itself as a cultural category. In this sense, we can consider the passage from the concept of democracy to that of politics and generally of science to be a peaceful one, since politics has been appointed with that set of behaviours and democratic practices (including science) that political culture demands for the social benefit. This demand can be met only on condition that structural obstacles are removed and new cultural and epistemological mediators are introduced. (shrink)

In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or that neither (...) is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front. (shrink)

We construct an explicit covariant Majorana formulation of Maxwell electromagnetism which does not make use of vector 4-potential. This allows us to write a “Dirac” equation for the photon containing all the known properties of it. In particular, the spin and (intrinsic) boost matrices are derived and the helicity properties of the photon are studied.

In linguistics, the dominant approach to the semantics of plurals appeals to mereology. However, this approach has received strong criticisms from philosophical logicians who subscribe to an alternative framework based on plural logic. In the first part of the article, we offer a precise characterization of the mereological approach and the semantic background in which the debate can be meaningfully reconstructed. In the second part, we deal with the criticisms and assess their logical, linguistic, and philosophical significance. We identify four (...) main objections and show how each can be addressed. Finally, we compare the strengths and shortcomings of the mereological approach and plural logic. Our conclusion is that the former remains a viable and well-motivated framework for the analysis of plurals. (shrink)

Semantic interpretations of both natural and formal languages are usually taken to involve the specification of a domain of entities with respect to which the sentences of the language are to be evaluated. A question that has received much attention of late is whether there is unrestricted quantification, quantification over a domain comprising absolutely everything there is. Is there a discourse or inquiry that has absolute generality? After framing the debate, this article provides an overview of the main arguments for (...) and against the possibility of unrestricted quantification, highlighting some of the broader implications of the debate. (shrink)

Se è spontaneo associare i concetti di immagine e immaginario, in quanto sembrano due nozioni strettamente legate, non è affatto semplice determinare il modo in cui si configura il loro rapporto. Per tracciare i distingua di tale relazione e i metodi che possono aiutarci a chiarirla, partiremo dalla descrizione della coscienza d’immagine — si tratta di un termine husserliano — per arrivare al mito. La nostra riflessione si dividerà in diversi fasi. Analizzeremo infatti la struttura fenomenica dell’immagine mentale, del segno (...) e del simbolo e seguiremo, brevemente, anche il cammino inverso che va dal simbolo all’immagine. I punti salienti della nostra dimostrazione saranno i seguenti: il rapporto immagine-immaginario non può essere definito in modo univoco, in quanto cambia in base al tipo di immagine; a livello della coscienza d’immagine, un approccio psicologico può rivelarsi utile, poiché il supporto percettivo costituisce un momento essenziale dell’immagine reale; nel caso della phantasia o immagine mentale, il metodo psicoanalitico sembra quello più appropriato, poiché l’assenza del supporto percettivo rende le immagini mentali libere da ogni costrizione. Pertanto la comprensione delle dinamiche affettive-desiranti può fornire una spiegazione al corso apparentemente sregolato di associazioni che qui si manifestano. Per quanto riguarda il segno, il simbolo e il mito, le dimensioni affettiva, percettiva, transizionale e fantastica sono strettamente correlate. Questo tipo di immagini sembrano insistere su “schermi” diversi e pertanto si richiede un approccio metodologico variegato. (shrink)

Im this paper I argue that Rawls distinguishes two different ways in which a system can be inconsistent with justice as fairness. The first concerns those systems that are based on principles that simply deny justice as fairness, as in the case of capitalism. The second concerns systems that, while pursuing aims similar to those of justice as fairness, are structured in ways that cause them to work very differently from their intended aims. Following Esping-Andersen’s identification of different “worlds” of (...) welfare states, I will show which specific kind of welfare state falls under Rawls’s first argument. (shrink)

Summary This paper concentrates on the literary sources of the battle of Delion and reopens the debate on the relevance of Euripides’ Supplices for the narrative of this event. Thucydides is read with a particular focus on the speech of Pagondas, which can be understood through the current reconstruction of the history of Boiotia in the latter half of the fifth century BCE. Finally, Diodorus is considered as a useful source for a few pieces of information on the aftermath of (...) the battle that have previously been disregarded. (shrink)

Quine maintained that philosophical and scientific theorizing should be conducted in an untyped language, which has just one style of variables and quantifiers. By contrast, typed languages, such as those advocated by Frege and Russell, include multiple styles of variables and matching kinds of quantification. Which form should our theories take? In this article, I argue that expressivity does not favour typed languages over untyped ones.

A prominent objection against the logicality of second-order logic is the so-called Overgeneration Argument. However, it is far from clear how this argument is to be understood. In the first part of the article, we examine the argument and locate its main source, namely, the alleged entanglement of second-order logic and mathematics. We then identify various reasons why the entanglement may be thought to be problematic. In the second part of the article, we take a metatheoretic perspective on the matter. (...) We prove a number of results establishing that the entanglement is sensitive to the kind of semantics used for second-order logic. These results provide evidence that by moving from the standard set-theoretic semantics for second-order logic to a semantics which makes use of higher-order resources, the entanglement either disappears or may no longer be in conflict with the logicality of second-order logic. (shrink)

The paradox that appears under Burali-Forti’s name in many textbooks of set theory is a clever piece of reasoning leading to an unproblematic theorem. The theorem asserts that the ordinals do not form a set. For such a set would be—absurdly—an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals. In this article, we argue that the paradox of Burali-Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets. We contend, furthermore, that some (...) hundred years after its discovery the paradox is still without any fully satisfactory resolution. A survey of the current literature reveals one key assumption of the paradox that has gone unquestioned, namely the assumption that ordinals are objects. Taking the lead from Russell’s no class theory, we interpret talk of ordinals as an efficient way of conveying higher-order logical truths. The resulting theory of ordinals is formally adequate to standard intuitions about ordinals, expresses a conception of ordinal number capable of resolving Burali-Forti’s paradox, and offers a novel contribution to the longstanding program of reducing mathematics to higher-order logic. (shrink)