Les saṃskāra et leurs fonctions, dans le brâhmanisme et l'hindouisme, dans la tradition bouddhique. Les six darsana principaux.

This review addresses issues regarding the very shaping of Hinduism and the resistance that such shaping faces from non-Hindus. Non-Hindu polemic is challenged using Western methods.

Perception is a very complex cognitive process that yields a unique picture of the world, a picture that may be quite different from reality. A number of factors operate to shape and sometimes distort perception. These factors can reside in the perceiver, in the object or target being perceived, or in the context of the situation in which perception is made. Understanding the complex process of perception is very important in the study of Organizational Behaviour as human behaviour is based (...) on their perception of what reality is and not on reality itself. Recognition of the difference between perceptual world and the real world is not only vital to the understanding of Organizational Behaviour but also essential for any individual to achieve the ultimate goal (that is, Moksha). This article explores the understanding of perception process in the spiritual perspective. The objective of the article is to synchronize the psychological perspective with the scriptures’ perspective of the perceptual process. Incorrect perceptions known as illusions (caused by Maya) and reasons underlying the perception distortions can be better examined, understood and controlled by the underlying philosophies in the Vedic literature, Bhagwad Gita and various Indian scriptures. The concept of Samskara, Sthitaprajna and Anaasakti mentioned in scriptures provide an insight for improving perception. (shrink)

The Pauṣkara briefly discusses the meaning-expressing nature of śabda (constituted of phonemes, varṇa) and the means to the cognition of word and sentence meaning. According to this dualistic Śaiva Tantra, meaning is denoted by nāda, a capacity of varṇas. Varṇas also are the means to the cognition of meaning through a capacity (saṃskāra) manifested in them. Although the meaning-denoting capacity is natural to varṇas, the relation of words (which are nothing but groups of varṇas) with objects is fixed by convention. (...) This article translates and analyzes the relevant passages from the sixth and eighth chapters. Certain arguments of plagiarism levelled against the eighth chapter of the Pauṣkara are examined in the concluding part of the article. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perceiving Particulars Blindly:Remarks on a Nyāya-Buddhist ControversyStephen H. PhillipsIntroductionThe discussion by Mark Siderits in this issue—"Perceiving Particulars"—and two pieces by Monima Chadha—the first her article "Perceptual Cognition: A Nyāya-Kantian Approach" (Chadha 2001) and the second her reply to Siderits in this issue—have taught me much.1 I have little to add beyond agreeing on the whole with Siderits and making a few tweaks concerning Nyāya. Chadha astutely captures the insight (...) of Gaṅgeśa, the fourteenth-century Naiyāyika cited by her (and by Siderits): indeterminate perception does not have a "particular as such" as its object (viṣaya), but only, as she says, a non-particular individual such as a universal or another qualifier that is in principle recurrent (recurrent out in the world), perceivable [End Page 389] again, and thus expressible by a (repeatable) word. Nevertheless, the holism of Wilfred Sellars and Kant and the attack on the "given" are not in the spirit of the Nyāya approach to epistemology, which is thoroughly externalist, as Siderits suggests. In several places (one presented below), Gaṅgeśa shows us controversy within Nyāya about indeterminate perception, including a rival Naiyāyika opinion that bare particulars are indeterminately grasped. This is not his own view, which is that positing indeterminate perception of qualifiers and not also of qualificanda is all that we need. But all in all the issue is not such a big deal, since perception does generate determinate knowledge of particulars, although these are always at least barely clothed.The notion of a "bare particular"—that is, the qualificandum thought about as distinct from all of its qualifiers—is an abstraction from what we directly perceive. We know it only by inference (specifically, by an inference of the sāmānyato dṘṣṭa type). Indeterminate perception is also known only by inference. Even in Navya Nyāya, the big deal is what is known determinately in perception, which is the principal way we know anything (the jyeṣṭa pramāṇa). And, clearly, determinate perceptual awareness is often of a particular—"The pot is blue" and "That's a pot," for instance. The particular known—indeed, the bare particular—is an intrinsic part of the viṣayatā, "intentionality," which is the relation between the knowing cognition and the world known.2Contrary to what Chadha says in her first article, "seeing as" does not require mental construction, according to Nyāya. The property bearer (dharmin = viśeṣya, "qualificandum") is grasped by the sense organ and is known directly in determinate perception as well as the qualifier and the qualificative relation. In two subtypes of perceptual awareness, (a) recurrent experience and (b) the recognition of something perceived previously, Chadha is right: the mind is operative, responsive to the firing of saṃskāra, "memory impressions," and fusing previous perceptual data into a current perceiving: (a) "A cow," "Another," "Another," and (b) "This is that Devadatta (I saw yesterday)." But hardly all cases of determinate perception require the mind (in Chadha's sense). The object known is minimally a complex of a property bearer (the particular as such), property, and an ontological relation tying them up, a-inherence-pothood (where "a" designates the pot as bare particular, "the subject of qualification"); the determinate perception, "That's a pot," makes that particular as qualified known.So, you say, I am agreeing with Chadha, whose argument is directed against the particular as such being known (either determinately or indeterminately) in perception. Yes, but the point is that the particular is known in perception; the particular-as-such is known in perception, although it would be fantasy to think it even possible that we could ever see her, this property bearer, well, not so much bare as disembodied. A rough analogy is seeing a door. We say we "see the door" when we see only one side of it, not the back. We see the thing as a door without grasping everything about the door that its being a door entails.Indeterminate perception of qualifiers is a controversial posit that does various work for Gaṅgeśa and other... (shrink)

The paper discusses the issue of psychophysical agency in the context of Indian philosophy, focusing on the oldest preserved texts of the classical tradition of Sāṃkhya–Yoga. The author raises three major questions: What is action in terms of Sāṃkhyakārikā (ca. fifth century CE) and Yogasūtra (ca. third century CE)? Whose action is it, or what makes one an agent? What is a right and morally good action? The first part of the paper reconsiders a general idea of action – including (...) actions that are deliberately done and those that ‘merely’ happen – identified by Patañjali and Ῑśvarakṛṣṇa as a permanent change or transformation (pariṇāma) determined by the universal principle of causation (satkārya). Then, a threefold categorization of actions according to their causes is presented, i.e. internal agency (ādhyātmika), external agency (ādhibhautika) and ‘divine’ agency (ādhidaivika). The second part of the paper undertakes the problem of the agent’s autonomy and the doer’s psychophysical integrity. The main issues that are exposed in this context include the relationship between an agent and the agent’s capacity for perception and cognition, as well as the crucial Sāṃkhya–Yoga distinction between ‘a doer’ and ‘the self’. The agent’s self-awareness and his or her moral self-esteem are also briefly examined. Moreover, the efficiency of action in present and future is discussed (i.e. karman, karmāśaya, saṃskāra, vāsanā), along with the criteria of a right act accomplished through meditative insight (samādhi) and moral discipline (yama). (shrink)

If, as I argue, the law of karma is a special application of the causal law to moral causation, then one has to account for the differences between the two laws. One possibility is to distinguish between "phalas" (immediate effects actions produce in the world) and "samskaras" (invisible dispositions or tendencies to act or think), and to suggest that karma produces the latter but not the former. This subjectivist account, however, raises questions concerning the relation between a person's "samskaras" and (...) the environmental conditions that cause him pleasure and pain. (shrink)

The 'wall' that differentiates two different kinds of attitudes of the same person at different points of time denotes, as the author envisages, Conscious Attitudinal Infringement Area (CAIA), where moral dilemmas take birth to bridge the two different kinds of attitudes to give way to attitudinal interrelatedness. In order to 'reinforce' CAIA to narrow the gap between personal behaviour and public behaviour, lead a moral life and behave ethically in public, there has to be harmony between the inner life of (...) thoughts, feelings and emotions, and the circumstances and events in the person's outer environment. After discussing the corporate scenario in India in brief, the author has put forward a model called Action By Objectives (ABO) as the basis of the harmonization approach. Drawing inspiration from the ethical aspects of Buddhism, Sufism, Sikhism and Vedanta in this context, he suggests an abhyasa yoga (perfection through disciplined practice) menu for refining samskaras (inner predispositions) and reaching the ultimate level of positive, inspiring leadership. (shrink)

Our task will be to demonstrate that there are instructive parallels between Hebrew and Buddhist concepts of self. There are at least five main constituents (skandhas in Sanskrit) of the Hebrew self: (1) nepe as living being; (2) rah as indwelling spirit; (3) lb as heart-mind; (4) bāār as flesh; and (5) dām as blood. We will compare these with the five Buddhist skandhas: disposition (samskāra), consciousness (vijñāna), feeling (vedanā), perception (samjñā), and body (rpa). Generally, what we will discover is (...) that both Buddhists and Hebrews have a 'bundle' theory of the self; both see the body as an essential part of personal identity; both overcome the modernist distinction of the inner and the outer; and both avoid language about the will as a distinct faculty. In sum, both present us with a fully somatic and nondualistic view of being human. (shrink)

The 'wall' that differentiates two different kinds of attitudes of the same person at different points of time denotes, as the author envisages, Conscious Attitudinal Infringement Area (CAIA), where moral dilemmas take birth to bridge the two different kinds of attitudes to give way to attitudinal interrelatedness. In order to 'reinforce' CAIA to narrow the gap between personal behaviour and public behaviour, lead a moral life and behave ethically in public, there has to be harmony between the inner life of (...) thoughts, feelings and emotions, and the circumstances and events in the person's outer environment. After discussing the corporate scenario in India in brief, the author has put forward a model called Action By Objectives (ABO) as the basis of the harmonization approach. Drawing inspiration from the ethical aspects of Buddhism, Sufism, Sikhism and Vedanta in this context, he suggests an abhyasa yoga (perfection through disciplined practice) menu for refining samskaras (inner predispositions) and reaching the ultimate level of positive, inspiring leadership. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the (...) factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory. RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar um esboço da maneira na qual Nāgārjuna aborda a ideia de 'relação'. O conceito de 'relação' que encontramos nas fontes pāli é aqui sistematizado teoricamente conforme três padrões: 1. lógico, 2. existencial estritamente subordinativo, 3. existencial não estritamente subordinativo. Após ter discutido a recepção e o tratamento nagarjunianos desses três padrões, este estudo dedica atenção especial à relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa. Esse tipo de relação visa descrever a maneira na qual os fatores da cooriginação condicionada estão ligados entre eles, e é tipificada por Nāgārjuna pelo exemplo da ligação pai-filho. Para explicar a doutrina da cooriginação condicionada à luz do exemplo pai-filho, um modo possível aqui sugerido é por meio do recurso à teoria do 'Cambridge change'. Embora no cânone pāli se diga que o modelo de relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa se aplique a todos os outros fatores da cooriginação condicionada, não há nenhuma evidência direta de que ele concerna também à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras. Será mostrado como Nāgārjuna, ao aplicar esse modelo à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras, pareça introduzir uma nova perspectiva na teoria da cooriginação condicionada. (shrink)

O presente estudo pretende salientar o trânsito das grandes formulações da concepção da temporalidade na tradição hindu: do tempo (kāla) à sua compreensão como instantâneo (kṣaṇa). Num ponto preliminar, salientam-se as condições linguísticas do pensar indo-europeu e a "gramática" sanscrítica a propósito do tempo. Sublinham-se de seguida os enquadramentos rituais e míticos, tanto ligados com a ciclicidade (saṃsāra), como com o imutável e eterno (ānantya). Depois percorrem-se, de forma sintética, os vários "sistemas" filosóficos salientando respectivamente: a concepção metafísica (no Vedānta (...) e Mīmānsā), a recorrência e irrealidade já num plano gnosiológico (no Sāṃkhya e no Yoga), e a formulação psicológica (tanto no Vaiśeṣika, como no Nyāya, além disso presente no Jainismo). Enfim, na última parte, faz-se menção aos principais traços característicos da doutrina budista da instantaneidade (muito característica sobretudo das escolas "subitistas"). Valoriza-se conclusivamente esta instância de um "agora" também como lição da espiritualidade hindu em geral. (shrink)