In 1947 Donald Cary Williams claimed in The Ground of Induction to have solved the Humean problem of induction, by means of an adaptation of reasoning first advanced by Bernoulli in 1713. Later on David Stove defended and improved upon Williams’ argument in The Rational- ity of Induction (1986). We call this proposed solution of induction the ‘Williams-Stove sampling thesis’. There has been no lack of objections raised to the sampling thesis, and it has not been widely accepted. In our (...) opinion, though, none of these objections has the slightest force, and, moreover, the sampling thesis is undoubtedly true. What we will argue in this paper is that one particular objection that has been raised on numerous occasions is misguided. This concerns the randomness of the sample on which the inductive extrapolation is based. (shrink)

I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a (...) person meets these criteria. (shrink)

It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the (...) conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport, which the constitution view—which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being)—has great trouble with. (shrink)

In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend (...) upon a trivial fact. (shrink)

Frank Jackson in Perception uses the relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that we (...) don't, , see objects, are also false. (shrink)

In his early lecture courses, Martin Heidegger exhibited an abiding interest in human life. He believed that human life has philosophical import while it is actually being lived; language has philosophical import while it is being spoken. In this book, Scott Campbell traces the development of Heidegger's ideas about factical life through his interest in Greek thought and its concern with Being. He contends that Heidegger's existential concerns about human life and his ontological concerns about the meaning of Being crystallize (...) in the notion of Dasein as the Being of factical human life. Emphasizing the positive aspects of everydayness, Campbell explores the contexts of meaning embedded within life; the intensity of average, everyday life; the temporal immediacy of life in early Christianity; the hermeneutic pursuit of life's self-alienation; factical spatiality; the temporalizing of history within life; the richness of the world; and the facticity of speaking in Plato and Aristotle. He shows how Heidegger presents a way of grasping human life as riddled with deception but also charged with meaning and open to revelation and insight. (shrink)

It is thought by some philosophers that certain arguments developed by Peter Strawson in Individuals show that Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that experiences can be referred to without referring to persons is incoherent. In this paper I argue that Parfit's claim is not threatened by these arguments.

RÉSUMÉ: L’«argument de la mort» de David Mackie prétend montrer que le critère psychologique de l’identité personnelle ne peut pas être adéquat, vu que les cadavres sont des gens et ne sont pourtant pas dotés de psychologie. Mackie soutient que les tenants du critère psychologique ne peuvent pas se contenter d’affirmer que le terme «personne» désigne tout simplement quelque chose qui a nécessairement des capacités psychologiques, car ce serait là, prétend-il, commettre une pétition de principe à l’encontre de sa position. (...) Et il prétend, de plus, que le langage ordinaire corrobore sa façon de voir. Je soutiens, cependant, que cet appui du langage ordinaire n’est guère concluant, et que la théorie psychologique a les ressources nécessaires pour rendre compte du discours sur les personnes mortes. (shrink)

The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for what matters in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have what matters in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and what matters (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis (...) acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would ‘embody’ or ‘constitute’ a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of what matters in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory. (shrink)

For more than 10 years, Ulrich Beck has dominated discussion of risk issues in the social sciences. We argue that Beck's criticisms of the theory and practise of risk analysis are groundless. His understanding of what risk is is badly flawed. His attempt to identify risk and risk perception fails. He misunderstands and distorts the use of probability in risk analysis. His comments about the insurance industry show that he does not understand some of the basics of that industry. And (...) his assertions about the wrongness of allowing acceptable levels of exposure to toxic chemicals do not stand up to scrutiny. Key Words: Beck • risk analysis • risk perception • probability • insurance. (shrink)

I argue for a version of the causal analysis of seeing which I call the 'potential information' analysis. I proceed initially by considering some standard causal analyses, those of Tye and Jackson. I show that these analyses are too weak, for they allow cases of hallucination to count as seeing. I argue that what is central to seeing is that our visual experiences provide a means of gaining true beliefs about objects. This, however, does not mean that we must actually (...) gain true beliefs about objects in any particular case. Rather, what must be the case is that a perceiver of our sort could gain true beliefs about objects on the basis of experiences like ours. I defend this analysis against various objections, making important qualifications to it as I do so. (shrink)

Lebensphilosophie, central to nineteenth-century philosophical thought, is concerned with the meaning, value and purpose of life. In this much-needed study, historical lebensphilosophie is returned to the core of philosophical investigations and revealed in the contemporary ascendency of 'life' in philosophical thinking. Scholars from aesthetics, bioethics and ontology examine how the notion of life has made its way into contemporary philosophical discussions. They identify three main themes: the shift toward biological and technological views of life, altering Dilthey and Nietzsche's emphasis on (...) historical life over biological life; the relationship between biopolitics and political liberalism and the re-emergence of the idea of life - so important for the traditional life-philosophers - in recent discussions about care of the self, existential gratitude skepticism and the emotions. Anticipating new directions of philosophical thinking, this study restores a vital school of thought to crucial discussions about the dangers of contemporary politics and the threat of new technologies. (shrink)

Spending time alone is a virtually inevitable part of daily life that can promote or undermine well-being. Here, we explore how the language used to describe time alone – such as “me-time”, “solitude”, or “isolation” – influences how it is perceived and experienced. In Study 1 (N = 500 U.S adults), participants evaluated five common labels for time alone. Descriptive and narrative evidence revealed robust interindividual variability and significant mean differences in how these labels were evaluated. Overall, “me-time” was rated (...) most positively, and “isolation” was rated least positively (but not negatively). In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated the linguistic framing of time alone, describing it as either “me-time” or “isolation”. Participants (N = 176 U.S undergraduates) then spent 30 min physically alone without in-person or digital interaction. Notably, positive affect increased for “me-time” participants but decreased for “isolation” participants. Negative affect decreased in both conditions, but the magnitude of the decrease was greater after “me-time”. People’s beliefs about being alone improved after “me-time” but not after “isolation”. Further, we explored participants’ behaviours and thoughts while alone. These findings demonstrate meaningful variation in how people perceive different time alone labels and provide preliminary evidence that simple linguistic shifts may enhance subjective experiences of time alone. (shrink)

In my view there were two great under-appreciated geniuses of twentieth century philosophy. The first was D. C. Williams. The second was a man who greatly admired Williams, David Stove. Both have paid for having conservative views and presenting them polemically, but this is a great pity, for not only are their political views worth listening to, their nonpolitical work is brilliant, more so, I suspect, than even some of their aficionados realize. Now Stove’s following is on the up, with (...) the release of this compilation from a new admirer, Roger Kimball. (shrink)

The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake.

The greatest philosopher of the twentieth century may not have been Wittgenstein, or Russell, or Quine (and he certainly wasn’t Heidegger), but he may have been a somewhat obscure and conservative Australian named David Stove (1927-94). If he wasn’t the greatest philosopher of the century, Stove was certainly the funniest and most dazzling defender of common sense to be numbered among the ranks of last century’s thinkers, better even—by far—than G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. The twentieth century was (...) not a period in which philosophers distinguished themselves as essayists, or even as capable of writing interestingly on any subject outside their speciality (or even within it). Stove, though, was an essayist, polemicist, and wit of the highest order, rather like a super-intelligent H. L. Mencken. A heavyweight admirer was once led to write that “Reading Stove is like watching Fred Astaire dance. You don’t wish you were Fred Astaire, you are just glad to have been around to see him in action.”. (shrink)

The following essay compares and contrasts Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time with an earlier lecture course that he delivered in the Winter Semester of 1919/2020 entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Heidegger says explicitly that the pre-phenomenal basis for his analysis in Being and Time is “entities” in their equipmental totality. He calls these the “preliminary theme” for his analysis of Dasein. While the analytic of Dasein is the first step in posing the question of Being, the pre-phenomenal basis for the (...) analytic of Dasein is, he says, “entitities” or “equipment”. I argue that this can lead to certain misunderstandings, especially when he talks about nature and human relationships. In Basic Problems, Heidegger’s focus is not on “entities” or “equipment” but rather on experiences. In this earlier work, he is trying to develop a language that can capture the intensity of lived-experience, suggesting an experiential vibrancy to Dasein that is implicit but not thematized in Being and Time. I aim to show that while Heidegger turns away from the term “life” in Being and Time, his understanding of Dasein can still draw on the intensity and immediacy of experience so prominent in this early lecture course. (shrink)