Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages (...) from Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystica Theologia. ‘God is ineffable’ is a metalinguistic statement concerning propositions about God: not all propositions about God are expressible in a human language. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are indispensable and irreducible metaphors in religious language and that this does not threaten a realist interpretation of religion. I first sketch a realist theory of religious language and argue that we cannot avoid addressing the problems metaphor poses to semantics. I then give a brief account of what it means for a metaphorical sentence to be true and how metaphors can refer to something even if what they mean is not expressible in (...) literal terms. Finally, I discuss how this realist theory of metaphor influences our understanding of negative theology and gives a new perspective on religious pluralism. (shrink)

Two theses are defended: First, that realism is a semantic thesis; second, that religious language ought to be interpreted realistically. The first part from chapter 1 to 4 is concerned with the first thesis, the second part from chapter 5 to 6 with the second. I first give an overview on the subject of realism and antirealism explaining the core problem of the debate that any satisfying interpretation of realism should be able to solve. Then I develop a solution based (...) on Dummetts theory of semantic realism, so that metaphysical problems can be translated into semantic ones. Subsequently I discuss several arguments against this theory and develop my own, improved theory of semantic realism, which is able to resist the critique. Finally, I present and refute two arguments by Dummett intended to show that the semantic interpretation of realism already shows realism to be inconsistent. Having developed these semantic tools, I show how debates in philosophy of religion may be described and classified and how semantic criteria may be used to determine which theory is antirealist and which is not. Finally, I analyse and discuss the arguments in the current debate on religious antirealism and present a few new arguments based on the semantic interpretation of realism, to show the inconsistency of religious antirealism. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, (...) and we should make a distinction between weak and strong ineffability. Weak ineffability is rooted in the deficiencies of a particular language while strong ineffability stems from the structure of a particular cognitive system and its capacities for conceptual mental representation. Mental contents are only sayable if we are able to conceptualize them and then create signs to represent them in communication. (shrink)

It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics’ pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by arguing that even if (...) all experience is interpreted through concepts, there could still be a common core. Those who reject the common core thesis usually argue that no distinction between experience and interpretation can be made since all experience is per se already interpreted. The notion of an uninterpreted experience is self-defeating. Drawing on current research on nonconceptual mental content, I argue that experiences can have nonconceptual content; that interpretation must be understood as conceptualization and that conceptualization presupposes a raw mental content that is not conceptualized. This raw content is not experienced as nonconceptual. Rather, the nonconceptual, uninterpreted common core is an abstraction which shows itself only through reflection. Thus, the existence of a common core is compatible with the fact that all experiences are interpreted. (shrink)

This paper explains the Buddhist concept of suffering and its relation to the Christian problem of evil. Although there is no problem of evil in Buddhism, the Buddhist understanding of the origin and causes of suffering will help us to find new approaches to the problem of evil. More specifically, I argue that the concept of evil can be interpreted in terms of dukkha; that the existence of suffering or dukkha is necessarily inevitable for finite beings, given the metaphysical structure (...) of the world and ourselves; and that this reasoning can be interpreted as a defense against the problem of evil. (shrink)

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

An introduction to the Buddha's thought in the language of contemporary philosophy. 'The Philosophy of the Buddha' is an intro to Buddhist thinking which doesn't assuming any prior knowledge. This book introduces key concepts of Buddhist philosophy such as suffering, karma, or nirvana, and explains the fundamentals of Buddhist thought using these concepts. It demonstrates that the central ideas of Buddha are understandable in the present day and can be discussed and understood as a philosophy, independent of religious affiliations. Real-life (...) examples and questions for further discussion and reflection provide opportunities for deeper engagement with the text. (shrink)

Summary This paper deals with the structure of the so-called c-inductive arguments in Richard Swinburne’s book The Existence of God and attempts to criticize their central concepts and assumptions. One of these concepts is simplicity: it is argued that Swinburne’s concept of simplicity is not unambiguous and that there is no reason to assume a positive correspondence between simplicity and probability. Furthermore, the theistic hypothesis cannot be said to be simple in any sense relevant to Swinburne. The second important concept (...) is explanatory power. It is argued that the method of determining a theory’s probability by means of its explanatory power cannot be applied to the case of theism. Finally, polytheism is considered and it is argued that according to his own principles Swinburne has actually no sufficient reason to prefer monotheism. (shrink)

Could you survive your bodily death by uploading your mind?

This paper argues that even Crane’s modified account of belief doesn’t do justice to all varieties of religious belief. Particularly beliefs associated with ritual behavior don’t seem to match the criteria of Crane’s alternative account. So, the question remains whether these beliefs should still be called beliefs, or whether the standard model of belief is even more false than Crane suspects.

When we were on the subway back from his lecture, I said to Robin: “I’m not sure there actually are any religious fictionalists.” We keep talking about them in papers and lectures, acting as if fictionalism in religion is a real possibility, but to be honest, I haven’t been able to spot one in the wild so far. The only potential candidate who comes to mind is Don Cupitt, who wrote things like: “I still pray and love God, even though (...) I fully acknowledge that no God actually exists.”[1] Perhaps this is as fictionalist as it gets. But then again, Cupitt never explicitly declared himself a fictionalist. Moreover, on other occasions he sounds more like an expressivist than a fictionalist, e.g. when he says: “The Christian doctrine of God just is Christian spirituality in coded form.”[2] So, if there are any actual fictionalists out there, please step forward.[1] Don Cupitt, After God: The Future of Religion, 85.[2] Don Cupitt, Taking leave of God, 14. (shrink)

Presents Ricoeurs theory of metaphor as an attempt to give a conceptual analysis of metaphor and discusses various criticisms.

This paper discusses the project of a globalised philosophy of religion as proposed recently by Yujin Nagasawa, Victoria Harrison, and others. While this project is a laudable attempt to overcome the strict focus on theistic forms of religion in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, it is argued that current proposals for a globalised philosophy of religion have ignored the important role of theism for giving the discipline its structure. Therefore, any viable global approach to philosophy of religion needs to delineate (...) a concept of religion that doesn’t draw on the concept of a theistic god. The paper argues that the best choice for this is a cluster concept of religion so that, even if the phenomena covered by the term ‘religion’ have no common core, the term isn’t meaningless, and philosophy of religion can still be a meaningful academic project. (shrink)

What is religion? Is it rational to have religious beliefs? Do science and religion contradict each other? Is there a god? Are we immortal? Questions like these are discussed in the philosophy of religion. This book provides provides an accesible and comprehensive introduction to philosophy of religion. In 14 chapters, it describes and discusses classical and modern approaches to core issues in philosophy of religion. This book is primarily intended as a textbook for students of philosophy, theology and religious studies, (...) but will also appeal to general readers interested in philosophy and religion, and can be used as a textbook in an introductory course on philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nonconceptual theory of mystical ineffability which claims that mystical experiences can’t be expressed linguistically because they can’t be conceptualized. I discuss and refute two objections against it: (a) that unconceptualized experiences are impossible, and (b) that the theory is ad hoc because it provides no reason for why mystical experiences should be unconceptualizable. I argue against (a) that distinguishing different meanings of ‘object of experience’ leaves open the possibility of non-empty but objectless nonconceptual experiences. I show (...) that (b) is a valid objection but can be countered by a new theory of mystical non-conceptuality: mystical experiences are not conceptual because the specific mode of mystical consciousness prevents conceptualization. The dissolution of the subjectivity of consciousness during mystical experiences undermines the very foundation of the possibility of conceptual thought and thus renders them ineffable. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the concept of a spirituality without religion. I argue that spirituality is best understood as a specific attitude that a subject has towards the totality of existence, characterized by a certain emotional, evaluative and noetic quality. The spiritual attitude typically involves a shift in the way a subject interprets their relation to themselves and to the whole of reality. Understood this way, religious and non-religious spiritualities are varieties of the same core phenomenon. Religious beliefs are compatible with, (...) but not necessary for spiritual attitudes. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of non-personal immortality. Non-personal theories of immortality claim that even though there is no personal or individual survival of death, it is still possible to continue to exist in a non-personal state. The most important challenge for non-personal conceptions of immortality is solving the apparent contradiction between on the one hand accepting that individual existence ends with death and on the other hand maintaining that death nevertheless is not equal to total annihilation. I present two (...) theories of non-personal immortality found in Schopenhauer and William James and derive a set of systematic core theses from them. Finally, I discuss whether the notion of non-personal immortality is consistent, and whether a non-personal afterlife could be desirable. (shrink)

Das Themenfeld "Religion und Pluralismus" hat sich in den letzten Jahren bedeutend weiterentwickelt. Der Band führt deutschsprachige LeserInnen in die bislang vorwiegend auf Englisch geführte Debatte ein und entwickelt grundlegende Fragen und Impulse für die weitere Forschung. Internationale ForscherInnen beleuchten zentrale Fragestellungen der Debatte über Pluralismus und Religion: z.B. die epistemischen Herausforderungen des peer-disagreement, neurotheologische und religionspsychologische Argumente für einen kulturübergreifenden Kern religiöser Erfahrung, oder das Potenzial des religiösen Fiktionalismus als Antwort auf die Unvereinbarkeit religiöser Wahrheitsansprüche und um die Anforderungen (...) der Toleranz angesichts der realen Pluralität von Religionen. (shrink)

This paper argues against Davidson’s claim that there is no distinction between conceptual schemes and their content and derives the implications for the debate on realism and antirealism. Starting from a semantic conception of realism, I discuss Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes and untranslatable languages. I argue that the idea of an untranslatable language is consistent since language attribution is essentially normative. Untranslatable languages are metaphysically possible, but epistemically unrecognizable. This leads to a Berkeleyan argument against antirealism: if antirealism is (...) conceived of as dependence from a total language (instead of merely some actual language), the distinction between realism and antirealism vanishes: antirealism is realism. (shrink)

This chapter argues that both Berkeley and Vasubandhu accept a kind of metaphysical idealism: while Berkeley’s theistic idealism claims that all of reality exists only in the mind of God, Vasubandhu teaches that external objects have no intrinsic existence and exist only as objects of perception; mind is the ultimate reality. This chapter explores the possibility of reading both these doctrines as a kind of idealist panentheism. Specifically, it will address two questions: (1) in what sense are Berkeley’s and Vasubandhu’s (...) theories idealist philosophies? (2) Is it justified to interpret them as panentheists? More precisely, the second question has two parts: (2a) Should Berkeley’s idealism be regarded as a kind of panentheism? (2b) Can the theism-part of panentheism justly be applied to Vasubandhu’s notion of mind as ultimate reality? The answer will be mostly negative: Berkeley is not a panentheist, and labeling Vasubandhu as a panentheist stretches the concept of God beyond the limits of reasonable application. Finally, though, it is argued that a Yogācārin reading of Berkeley’s idealism opens an interesting possibility for idealist panentheism. (shrink)

Most philosophers of religion subscribe to some variety of religious realism: they believe that religious statements aim at capturing a mind-independent reality and are true precisely if they successfully do so. Curiously, most religious realists also believe that at least some of our religious beliefs are rationally justified. In this paper, I argue that these positions are actually at odds with each other. Religious realists should rather be religious skeptics. I first argue that realism always implies the possibility of our (...) beliefs being false. Then, I develop a Copernican argument to show that we have no reason to believe that we are in an epistemically privileged position where we could be confident that our particular belief is justified while all competing beliefs are not. This seems impossible for two reasons: (a) From a probabilistic point of view (adopting a principle of mediocrity), it is highly unlikely that current humans have the maximum of epistemic capacities possible. Rather, our ability to understand reality is limited, so we should expect at least some parts of religious reality to remain unknown to us. (b) From a deep-time perspective, humanity has not pondered religious questions for long. We are probably still in the early stages of our cognitive evolution, and so we should treat our religious beliefs as provisional and open to revision. (shrink)

Der Glaube an Unsterblichkeit ist Bestandteil praktisch aller Religionen und seit ihren Anfängen ein zentrales Thema der Philosophie. Dieser Sammelband bietet einen Überblick zum aktuellen Stand klassischer Debatten über Unsterblichkeit (Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Wiedergeburt, Auferstehung), bringt aber auch neue und bisher vernachlässigte Aspekte mit in die Diskussion (z.B. digitale Unsterblichkeit, Unsterblichkeit und Gender, Unsterblichkeit der Tiere). Die Beiträge skizzieren den Stand der philosophischen Forschung und entwickeln eigene Positionen der Autorinnen und Autoren. Der Band richtet sich an Forschende und Studierende in (...) den Bereichen Religionsphilosophie, Theologie und Religionswissenschaft und eignet sich nicht nur als Grundlage für Lehrveranstaltungen, sondern auch für eine wissenschaftliche Einarbeitung in das Thema. (shrink)

What is spirituality? What is the relationship between spirituality and religion? Are they inseparable or just coincidentally connected? Does spirituality need a reference to God or is true spirituality perhaps only possible without religion? How do different forms of spirituality affect the lives of individuals and society? This book is dedicated to these questions and thus comprehensively explores the broad field of philosophical research on spirituality for the first time.

This article replies to criticism of my article, “Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?” by Sebastian Gäb, Eva Schmidt and Michael Scott.

Sebastian Franck hat Teile von Agrippas De Vanitate Scientiarum übersetzt und kommentiert. Von daher ist der Einfluss der Philosophie von Agrippa auf Franck bekannt. Es gab allerdings bisher keine ausführlichen Untersuchungen zu den Einflüssen von Agrippa auf Franck. Diese Lücke versucht dieser Aufsatz zu schließen. Beim Vergleich der metaphysischen Systeme von Franck und Agrippa stellt sich heraus, dass es bedeutende Einflüsse im Bereich der Seelenlehre und der Christologie gab. Sowohl Agrippa als auch Franck sind Anhänger der platonischen Lehre der (...) drei Seelenteile. Die Seele besteht nach dieser Lehre aus Geist, Seele und Körper. Der Geist ist der unsterbliche göttliche Teil im Menschen. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Agrippa und Franck kann darin gesehen werden, dass Agrippas Synkretismus stärker den Neuplatonismus betont und Franck`s Synkretismus die Gnosis. Die Weltseele ergibt im Konzept von Franck nur wenig Sinn, während diese bei Agrippa ganz zentral ist. Franck lehnt den Gedanken ab, die Welt werde durch eine Vernunft geleitet. Sein pessimistisches Bild von der Welt und vom Menschen verträgt sich nicht mit diesem Gedanken. Da es keine Vernunft gibt, ist auch die Astrologie, die Mantik oder die Kabbalistik nicht wichtig für Franck. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Franck nirgends die Occulta philosophia zitiert, sondern immer nur De Vantitate Scientiarum Der Synkretismus von Agrippa beinhaltet Astrologie, Mantik, Kabbala und Neuplatonismus. Am ehesten spielt bei Franck noch die Hermetik eine Rolle. Franck meint, Christus habe im Pimander mit Hermes Trismegistos kommuniziert. Diesen Gedanken findet man nicht nur bei Franck, sondern auch bei Agrippa. Die für Franck so wichtige Lehre des inneren Christus ist ebenfalls Teil der Seelenlehre von Agrippa. Wenn der Mensch seinen Geist oder seinen inneren Christus erkennt, dann erkennt er Gott. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Franck nur diejenigen Dinge von dem „weisen Agrippa“ übernommen hat, die in sein Konzept passen. (shrink)

Die Sebastian Franck-Forschung hat sich bisher recht ausführlich mit den Themen "Sebastian Franck als Historiker" oder "Sebastian Franck als Kritiker der Theologie" beschäftigt. Weniger Aufmerksamkeit bekam bisher der Gnostizismus im Denken des radikalen Reformers. Seit der Jahrtausendwende ist allerdings ein stärkeres Interesse an einer bestimmten Strömung des Gnostizismus zu erkennen, nämlich der Hermetik. Es gab einige Arbeiten, die den Einfluss von Hermes Trismegistos bzw. der hermetischen Schriften auf Franck aufzeigen konnten. Dieser Aufsatz geht der Frage des Einflusses (...) des christlichen Gnostizismus auf die Metaphysik von Franck nach. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass speziell Basilides und Valentinus einen starken Einfluss auf Franck hatten, der bisher nicht gesehen wurde. Eine große Bedeutung kommt dabei der gnostischen Soteriologie zu. Genauso wie Basilides und Valentinus nimmt Franck die platonische Dreiteilung der Seele in Geist, Seele und Körper an. Der Geist ist göttlich und ist weder entstanden noch kann er vergehen. Diesen Geist oder Christus findet man im Inneren von allen Kreaturen. Durch die Erkenntnis des Geistes oder Christus im Menschen, (=Gnosis) kann sich der Mensch von der Welt befreien. Ebenfalls christlich-gnostisch inspiriert ist der Gottesbegriff und die Lehre von Christus. Franck´s Christologie ist stark von der Nous-Christologie von Basilides beeinflußt, wobei er nicht exakt dem gleichen Doketismus folgt wie Basilides. Dass die Welt vom Demiurgen und nicht von Gott erschaffen wurde, wie Valentinus glaubt, sagt Franck nicht explizit. Franck glaubt aber der Teufel (Demiurg oder böser Engel) habe den Tod und damit die Seele erschaffen, während der unsterbliche Geist des Menschen nicht erschaffen wurde. (shrink)

I am very grateful to Natalja, Jacob and Sebastian for their kind attention to my paper, and for their many insights on this topic, which have materially helped me get clearer about some of the issues. All the points of disagreement are constructive and it has been both a pleasure and an education to engage with them. I’m also happy to note some points of agreement, too! Here I attempt to reply to some of the objections.

The 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage (...) singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland’s recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails. The paper also suggests that even if heightened blood testosterone levels do differ relevantly from other types of biological advantage, the regulation is further challenged by studies indicating that athletes with blood testosterone at the high end of the normal range have a competitive advantage over athletes with blood testosterone levels at the low end of it. Finally, the paper contends that the premises of the fairness-based argument do not unequivocally support the conclusion that DSD athletes with heightened levels of testosterone should diminish those levels, since, just as powerfully, they support allowing athletes with normal levels of testosterone to use performance-enhancing drugs in the name of fairness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, DavosSebastian LuftPeter E. Gordon. Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 448. Cloth, $39.95.Much ink has been spilled on the dispute between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger that took place in the Swiss resort town Davos in 1929—famous since Thomas Mann staged his Magic Mountain there—and which has since been referred to as the “Davos Dispute.” While the debate (...) itself and accounts accompanying it have been widely known to historians [End Page 508] of philosophy, Harvard historian Peter E. Gordon shows in this marvelous new book how memory has shaped the event into something much larger than anyone could have foreseen. It is, Gordon claims, the silent work of memory that has made this debate, rather innocuous at the time, into what can be retrospectively be considered the truly earth-shattering philosophical event of the twentieth century.In hindsight, the symbolism of the debate between a German who became a leading Nazi philosopher in 1933 and a Jew who, in the same year, was dismissed from his professorship and forced to flee Germany, could not be greater. It only grows if one connects the historic events with their respective philosophies: on the one side the liberal modern Cassirer, whose philosophy allegedly glorified the Weimar stalemate, and on the other side the radical Heidegger, whose call for “authentic existence” took on a bone-chilling reality as he embraced Hitler in 1933 as the führer to lead Germany back to its authentic roots.Two volumes—the 1999 collection, 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation, edited by E. Rudolph and D. Kaegi, and, in 2000, A Parting of the Ways by Michael Friedman—were the first to delve into the debate’s symbolic meaning. It was Friedman’s thesis that the fateful “parting of the ways” between Continental and Analytic philosophy could be traced to this meeting, which was also attended by Rudolf Carnap. Despite these studies, there has until now not been a comprehensive treatment that pulls together all threads into one narrative, covering the entire intellectual, historical, cultural, and philosophical landscape of the time. Gordon’s book achieves just that and will be, for years to come, the landmark work on this encounter.The book begins from the background in post-World War I philosophy in Germany, which was perceived, along with culture, as being in crisis (ch. 1), to “set the stage” on the “Magic Mountain” (ch. 2). It proceeds to summarize the individual lectures by Cassirer and Heidegger, giving a detailed interpretation of the protocol prepared by students of the interlocutors (chs. 3–4). The author then takes a deep breath in chapter 5 to place the debate in the larger context of Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies. But the story does not end there, as chapter 6 examines the relation between both thinkers after the debate. Finally, in chapter 7, Gordon assesses the newer debates concerning this dispute up to the debate between Bourdieu and Habermas concerning Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, though it does not re-engage with Friedman’s thesis, as might have been desired.Regarding his interpretation, Gordon juxtaposes Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s philosophies along the Kantian distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, where both paradigms make different claims on the “normative image of humanity” (5 ff.). Whether humanity is interpreted as spontaneous and world-creating, in optimistic Enlightenment terms (Cassirer), or as receptive and open to the world, i.e. as the “shepherd” rather than the “lord of being” (Heidegger), both are answering the fourth of Kant’s questions, “What is man?” While this distinction is useful for understanding the basic relation between them, it is also—as the author would concede—somewhat too coarse to do justice to their mutual differences and commonalities. Were one to assert a systematic critique, Gordon does not really make up his mind as to the true significance of these paradigms: are they mutually exclusive oppositions or, as he implies elsewhere, two alternative versions of philosophical modernism with a common ground? There is evidence for both readings. This question, however, is for the philosopher to answer—the philosopher who wants to push... (shrink)

The debate between critics of syntactic and semantic approaches to the formalization of scientific theories has been going on for over 50 years. I structure the debate in light of a recent exchange between Hans Halvorson, Clark Glymour, and Bas van Fraassen and argue that the only remaining disagreement concerns the alleged difference in the dependence of syntactic and semantic approaches on languages of predicate logic. This difference turns out to be illusory.

Why do we seek out and enjoy uncertain success in playing games? Game designers and researchers suggest that games whose challenges match player skills afford engaging experiences of achievement, competence, or effectance—ofdoing well. Yet, current models struggle to explain why such balanced challenges best afford these experiences and do not straightforwardly account for the appeal of high- and low-challenge game genres like Idle and Soulslike games. In this article, we show that Predictive Processing (PP) provides a coherent formal cognitive framework (...) which can explain the fun in tackling game challenges with uncertain success as the dynamic process of reducing uncertainty surprisingly efficiently. In gameplay as elsewhere, people enjoydoing better than expected, which can track learning progress. In different forms, balanced, Idle, and Soulslike games alike afford regular accelerations of uncertainty reduction. We argue that this model also aligns with a popular practitioner model, Raph Koster’sTheory of Fun for Game Design, and can unify currently differentially modelled gameplay motives around competence and curiosity. (shrink)

Should artificial agents (such as robots) be granted moral status? This seems like an important question to resolve, given that we will encounter a growing number of increasingly sophisticated artificial agents in the not too distant future. However, many will think that before we can even start to tackle questions about the moral status of artificial agents, we first need to solve tricky issues in the philosophy of mind. After all, most orthodox views about moral status imply that only entities (...) with a mental life are eligible for moral status. But, whether an unfamiliar entity like an artificial agent has a mental life raises controversial questions in the philosophy of mind. Given this, one might hope that we can resolve questions about the moral status of robots via “minimalist” views that give sufficient conditions for granting moral status to an entity that we can know to be satisfied without knowing whether the entity in question has a mind. This paper argues that we should be pessimistic about the prospects of minimalist views avoiding controversial questions in the philosophy of mind, by arguing that minimalist sufficient conditions are only plausible if combined with assumptions in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Autor omawia ontologię polityczną współczesnego anarchizmu, nawiązujący przy tym do klasycznego anarchizmu oraz do myślicieli postanarchizmu, w szczególności do Saula Newmana. Wskazuje przy tym, jak współcześni filozofowie związani z postanarchizmem pracują nad statyczną ontologią polityczna anarchizmu poprzez myśl poststrukturalną oraz jak za pomocą współczesnych pojęć filozoficznych dekonstruują oświeceniowe podstawy anarchizmu. Zamiarem tekstu jest wskazanie nie tylko na różnice pomiędzy anarchizmem a postanarchizmem, ale raczej dostrzeżenie pomiędzy nimi silnej zależności. Tekst stanowi przegląd i omówienie koncpecji postanarchizmu w kontekście ontologii politycznej, współczesnej (...) filozofii politycznej oraz historii idei. (shrink)

Observations of ultrafast cognition in human performance challenge intuitive information processing and computation metaphors of cognitive processing. Instances of ultrafast cognition are marked by ultrafast response times of reliable, accurate responses to a relatively complex stimulus. Ultrafast means response times that are as fast as a single feedforward burst of activity across the nervous system connecting eye to hand. Thus the information processing and computation metaphors in question are those in which some amount of time is required to decide and (...) initiate a response, over and above the minimum time required, physiologically, for the eye-hand chain of action potentials—these are metaphors in which the brain does work that has a measurable duration in time. Ultrafast cognition can be explained by synergies spanning the mind and body. Synergies are temporary dynamical structures that anticipate context-appropriate behaviour. An anticipatory state poises the mind and body in symmetry among equivalent options for behaviour, and only a minimal change in context, favouring one option over any other, is sufficient to break symmetry and enact an ultrafast cognitive response. (shrink)

Die öffentliche Diskussion um die „personalisierte Medizin“ legt nahe, dass mit diesem medizinischen Ansatz hohe Erwartungen an einen Beitrag zur klinischen Versorgung verbunden werden. Über die Wahrnehmungen und Bewertungen klinisch tätiger Ärzte ist jedoch wenig bekannt. Die vorliegende qualitative Interviewstudie gibt einen Einblick bezüglich des Einflusses „personalisierter Medizin“ auf die klinische Praxis aus ärztlicher Perspektive. Die Ärzte im vorliegenden Sample nehmen „personalisierte Medizin“ zwar als einen medizinischen Fortschritt wahr, sehen allerdings keine grundsätzliche Veränderung der bisherigen medizinischen Praxis. Als zentrales Problem (...) wird die Handhabung und Verwertung von molekulargenetischen Informationen für Diagnose und Therapie in der klinischen Praxis thematisiert. In Anbetracht der Ergebnisse muss infrage gestellt werden, ob „personalisierte Medizin“ nicht das Gegenteil von dem, was ihr Name nahe legt – eine personenorientiertere Medizin – bewirkt. Die Strategien im Umgang mit den Informationsmassen produzieren selbst neue Herausforderungen, die ein Hindernis für eine personenorientierte Medizin darstellen könnten. (shrink)

The 'late' Foucault and his purported 'return to the subject' is a much discussed issue. Over the past twenty years, various suggestions have been made as to how to integrate Foucault's ethics into his oeuvre as a whole. This paper holds that there is a 'conceptual continuity', rather than a break, between Foucault's earlier works on normalizing power, and his later works on ethical self-constitution. On the basis of a conceptual framework, which is developed in Section II, a reading of (...) two themes concerning certain practices of the self is offered in the following sections (namely, dietetics and spiritual guidance). The material, drawn from the recently published lecture series L'herméneutique du sujet as well as from other published works, is related back to Foucault's ideas on the process of 'subjectivation', in order to support the claim that 'fabrication' and 'self-constitution' are but two aspects of subjectivation. Keywords: late Foucault, ethics, practices of the self, self-constitution, discipline, power, surveillance, spiritual guidance, meditation, parrhesia, dietetics, art of living, aesthetics of existence, return of the subject, subjectivation, relation to self. (shrink)

A relatively detailed review (~ 4000 words) of Christopher Mole's (2010) book "Attention is Cognitive Unison". I suggest that Mole makes a good case against many types of reductivist accounts of attention, using the right kind of methodology. Yet, I argue that his adverbialist theory is not the best articulation of the crucial anti-reductivist insight. The distinction between adverbial and process-first phenomena he draws remains unclear, anti-reductivist process theories can escapte his arguments, and finally I provide an argument for why (...) no personal level adverbialism can provide a complete and unified theory of attention. Despite my disagreements, I have learned a lot from engaging with Mole's book. It's a central contribution to the new philosophical literature on attention. (shrink)