Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, (...) so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently. (shrink)

The general issue addressed in this dissertation is: what do the models of formal model-theoretic semantics represent? In chapter 2, I argue that those of first-order classical logic represent meaning assignments in possible worlds. This motivates an inquiry into what the interpretations of first-order quantified model logic represent, and in Chapter 3 I argue that they represent meaning assignments in possible universes of possible worlds. A possible universe is unpacked as one way model reality might be. The problem arises (...) here as to how we are to understand the distinction between the actual and the possible as it relates to modal reality. ;Along with the development of the main arguments in Chapters 2 and 3, the dissertation assesses the status of semantic accounts or logical properties and relations. Specifically, what does the model-theoretic account of a logically possible situation add to the syntactic account ? ;Proofs of invalidity in terms of the models of formal semantics do not establish that it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, since a formal model is merely given by a consistent set of sentences. Unless there is some way to generate a non-formal model from a formal one, such proofs do not really go beyond syntactic notions. The dissertation ends by concluding that there is no way to generate a non-formal model from a formal one without relying on logical intuitions that are syntactical. ;Hence efforts to construct a semantic basis for model logic independent of syntactic commitments are misguided. However, in classical logic the independence of the semantic account from the syntactic one is grounded on the intuition that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a denumerably infinite totality of objects. (shrink)

This paper is a study of a distinctively chemical notion of possibility. This is the notion of possibility that occurs in chemical discourses when chemists speak of the possibility or impossibility of achieving a given result through chemical means. This notion pertains to the possibility of processes, not of compounds, so it differs from the kind of chemical possibility mentioned in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations or the kinds discussed in the literature on Putnam's Twin Earth argument. I argue that this process-oriented (...) notion of possibility cannot be reduced in a simple way to physical possibility, and that standard possible worlds semantics does not allow a natural analysis of this notion. I suggest an extension of possible worlds semantics that may overcome this limitation. I finish by pointing out some open questions about chemical possibility. (shrink)

If semantic consequence is analyzed with extensive games, logical reasoning can be accounted for by looking at how players solve entailment games. However, earlier approaches to game semantics cannot achieve this reduction, by want of explicitly dened preferences for players. Moreover, although entailment games can naturally translate the idea of argumentation about a common ground, a cognitive interpretation is undermined by the complexity of strategic reasoning. We thus describe a class of semantic extensive entailment game with algorithmic players, who (...) have preferences for parsimonious spending of computational resources and thus compute partial strategies under qualitative uncertainty about future histories. We prove the existence of local preferences for moves and of strategic fixpoints that allow to map game-trees to tableaux proofs, and exhibit a strategy prole that solves the fixpoint selection problem, and can be mapped to systematic constructions of semantic trees, yielding a completeness result by translation. We then discuss the correspondence between proof heuristics and strategies in our games, the relations of our games to gts, and possible extensions to other entailment relations. We conclude that the main interest of our result lies in the possibility to bridge argumentative and cognitive models of logical reasoning, rather than in new meta-theoretic results. All proofs are given in appendix. (shrink)

A brief account of David K. Lewis's argument for possible worlds in Counterfactuals and his elaboration of it in On the Plurality of Worlds.

Chapter 7 explores the question: Are there or could there be, possible but non‐existent objects? In the first half of the chapter, I critically assess the claim that an applied semantics for modal logic commits us to the claim that there are non‐existent possible objects. I conclude that it does commit us to there being some possible world distinct from the actual world that contains some object distinct from anything that exists in the actual world; but it does not, (...) however, commit us to the claim that there really are some things that do not exist. In the second half of the chapter, I develop a historically based argument for the conclusion that there are non‐existent possible objects, which I call the Classical Argument. Importantly, the Classical Argument presupposes that singular negative existentials are possible. I end the chapter by showing that certain objections to the possibility of singular negative existentials fail, and that such existentials are indeed possible. (shrink)

This paper discusses the 'master argument' of diodorus cronos from a semantic perspective. An argument is developed which suggests that proposition (1), 'every proposition true about the past is necessary', May have provided the principal motivation for diodorus denial of proposition (3), I.E., His equation of possibility with present-Or-Future truth. It is noted that (1) and (3) are jointly inconsistent only given the assumption of a linear ordering of time. It is further noted that diodorus' fatalism "could" be employed to (...) justify this additional assumption. However, To then use the conclusion of the 'master' to argue for fatalism would obviously be circular. I suspect, Rather, That diodorus' assumption of temporal linearity was implicit and uncritical. (shrink)

First we have individual variables, as usual in first-order logics. (We do not have individual constants, but this is a minor point.) The propositional logic LP has justification constants, but in FOLP these are generalized to allow individual variables as arguments. Thus we have as justification constants c, c(x), c(x, y), . . . . Similarly LP has justification variables, but in FOLP these can be parametrized with individual variables p, p(x), p(x, y), . . . . To keep terminology (...) in line with past papers, we will still refer to things as justification constants and justification variables, even though they have structure to them. As in LP, justification terms are built up from justification constants and justification variables using ·, +, ! as usual. In addition there is a new constructor, genx, introduced by Artemov, and there is one further new constructor, exsx, introduced in this paper. If t is a justification term and x is an individual variable, genxt and exsxt are justification terms. An individual variable x is free in a justification term unless it is bound by genx or exsx. More specifically, the free variables of p(x, y, . . .) and of c(x, y, . . .) are {x, y, . . .}, the free variables of s · t and of s + t are the free variables of s together with the free variables of t, the free variables of !s are the free variables of s, and the free variables of genxt and of exsxt are the free variables of t except for x. Formulas are built up from atomic formulas, including ⊥, in the way standard in first-order logic, together with the additional formation rule: t:X is a formula provided t is a justification term, X is a formula, and all free variables of X occur in t. We assume ⊃, ⊥, and ∀ are basic, with other connectives and quantifier defined. The axiomatization used here is a combination of an LP axiomatization and a standard axiomatization of first-order logic, together with a version of the Barcan formula, and one additional axiom that corresponds to the converse Barcan formula.. (shrink)

There are two problematic assumptions in Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism. Assumption 1 is that the referential relation of a name to an object is only an objective or metaphysical relation between language and the world; it has nothing to do with the understanding of the name by our linguistic community. Assumption 2 is that descriptivism has to hold that, if name a has its meaning and the meaning is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, the description (...) should supply a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining what a designates; and that it is possible for us to find out such a setof conditions. Emphasizing the sociality, intentionality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning, this paper rejects Assumption 1, and argues that Assumption 2 is an unfair interpretation of descriptivism, and it is not necessary for descriptivists to hold Assumption 2. This paper finally concludes that Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism fails. (shrink)

Semantic noise, the effect ensuing from the denotative and thus functional variability exhibited by different terms in different contexts, is a common concern in natural language processing (NLP). While unarguably problematic in specific applications (e.g., certain translation tasks), the main argument of this paper is that failing to observe this linguistic matter of fact as a generative effect rather than as an obstacle, leads to actual obstacles in instances where language model outputs are presented as neutral. Given that a common (...) and long-standing challenge in NLP is the interpretation of ambiguous – i.e., semantically noisy – cases, this article focuses on an exemplar ambiguity-resolution task in NLP: the problem of anaphora in Winograd schemas. The main question considered is: to what extent is the standard approach to disambiguation in NLP subject to a stagnant “image of language”? And, can a transdisciplinary, dynamic approach combining linguistics and philosophy elucidate new perspectives on these possible conceptual shortcomings? In order to answer these questions we explore the term and concept of noise, particularly in its presentation as semantic noise. Owing to its definitional plurality, and sometimes even desirable unspecificity, the term noise is thus used as proof of concept for semantic generativity being an inherent characteristic in linguistic representation, and its concept is used to interrogate assumptions admitted in the resolution of Winograd schemas. The argument is speculative and theoretical in method, and the result is an analysis which provides an account of the fundamentally dialogical and necessarily open-ended effects of semantic noise in natural language. (shrink)

The property common to three kinds of paradoxes (logical, semantic, and cultural) is the underlying presence of an exclusive disjunction: even when it is put to a check by the paradox, it is still invoked at the level of implicit discourse. Hence the argumentative strength of paradoxical propositions is derived. Logical paradoxes (insolubilia) always involve two contradictory, mutually exclusive, truths. One truth is always perceived to the detriment of the other, in accordance with a succession which is endlessly repetitive. (...) A check is put on the principle of the excluded middle by the logical paradoxes, because self-reference leads to an endlessly repeating circle, out of which no resolution is conceivable. Logical paradoxes are to be compared with the `objective ambiguity' prevalent in oracles (Gallet, 1990). Semantic paradoxes are contextually-determined occurrences, whose resolution at the metalinguistic level is made possible by the discovery of a middle term. They express a wilful ambiguity, in which the interlocutor is invited to take an active part in the construction of sense, since what must be found is the unexpected sense thanks to which A and not-A can be asserted simultaneously. Cultural paradoxes play about doxa (`common sense') and openly challenge common opinion because of their character as inopinata (`unexpected'). My aim is to show that even cultural paradoxes hide sometimes a flaw of argumentation similar to logical or semantic paradox; they too imply an exclusive disjunction leading to the disappearance of the middle terms. Finally, basing myself on the theory of topoi (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), a tentative resolution of the cultural paradoxes will be suggested. (shrink)

It is common belief that semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties: no two possible worlds can be non-semantic duplicates and fail to be semantic duplicates. The view enjoys somewhat of an orthodoxy status in contemporary philosophy of language and metaphysics, and is often assumed without argument. Yet, work by Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor has claimed that it is vulnerable to a variant of the classical arguments against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical. This paper does three things: (...) it clarifies what semantic supervenience is about, it responds to the objections that have been leveled against it, and provides a new battery of arguments in its favor. I argue that the thesis of semantic supervenience is safe from classical anti-supervenience arguments, and show that its rejection generates unwelcome consequences. I conclude that there are substantial reasons to embrace the received wisdom: semantic properties supervene. (shrink)

We explore some possibilities for developing epistemic logic using truthmaker semantics. We identify three possible targets of analysis for the epistemic logician. We then list some candidate epistemic principles and review the arguments that render some controversial. We then present the classic Hintikkan approach to epistemic logic and note—as per the ‘problem of logical omniscience’—that it validates all of the aforementioned principles, controversial or otherwise. We then lay out a truthmaker framework in the style of Kit Fine and (...) present six different ways of extending this semantics with a conditional knowledge operator, drawing on notions of implication and content that are prominent in Fine’s work. We demonstrate that different logics are thereby generated, bearing on the aforementioned epistemic principles. Finally, we offer preliminary observations about the prospects for each logic. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Some Important Distinctions Are Referential Semantics for I‐languages Possible? Language/World Isomorphism Chomsky's Arguments against LWI Aspects of the World Conclusion.

This dissertation provides a model-theoretic semantics for English sentences atttributing a property or action to a group of objects, either collectively or distributively. It is shown that certain adverbial expressions select for collective predicates; therefore collective and distibutive predicates must be distinguishable. This finding is problematic for recent accounts of distributive predicates which analyze such predicates as taking group-level arguments, and hence as not distinguishable from collective predicates. ;A group-level treatment of distributives is possible, however, if predicate denotations are (...) relativized to a set of events for which a part/whole relation is defined. An event in which a group performs an action distributively will have subevents in which each of the group's members perform the same action; an event in which the group performs the action collectively will not. ;This analysis also makes possible an account of the fact that adverbials expressing collective action commonly have an additional use expressing spatial proximity, both in English and cross-linguistically. . A spatial "trace" function on the set of events allows formal definitions for the spatial uses of such adverbials to exactly parallel the definitions for the collectivizing uses. ;The dissertation also provides arguments for a set-theoretic model for plurality, in which the group membership relation is distinct from the subgroup relation. ;Certain quantifiers are shown sensitive to distinction between different sorts of group-level event. To accommodate this fact, it is suggested that verbal denotations provide, for each event, both an "inclusion set" and an "exclusion set"--corresponding roughly to positive and negative denotations. If the inclusion and exclusion sets are allowed under certain circumstances not to complement each other, correct results obtain. ;The splitting of verbal denotations into inclusion and exclusion sets also allows the solution of certain problems in previous accounts of the semantics of subject-verb agreement for number. The dissertation closes with a defense of the hypothesis that agreement is conditioned primarily by the semantics. (shrink)

In this work, we question the ability of existing ranking-based semantics to capture persuasion settings, emphasising in particular the phenomena of procatalepsis and of fading. Some widely accepted principles of ranking-based semantics are incompatible with a faithful treatment of these phenomena, which means that no existing ranking-based semantics can capture these two principles together. This motivates us to introduce a new parametrized ranking-based semantics based on the notion of propagation which extends the existing propagation semantics (...) 139–150) by adding an additional parameter allowing us to gradually decrease the impact of arguments when the length of the path between two arguments increases. We show that this parameter gives the possibility of choosing if one wants to satisfy the property Void Precedence or not and to control the scope of the impact of the arguments. We also propose an experiment to show that the new semantics remains stable when this parameter varies and an axiomatic evaluation to compare it with existing ranking-based semantics in the literature. (shrink)

The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. (...) But the options are not exclusive. This paper develops a theory of the semantics and assertability of conditionals that is both selectional and informational. The theory vindicates the signature inferences of both selectional and informational theories, including so-called Conditionals Excluded Middle and principles about the interplay between conditionals and ‘might’. It also predicts some interesting and puzzling facts about the assertion of conditionals. (shrink)

Ever since Saul Kripke and others developed a semantic interpretation for modal logic, 'possible worlds' has been a much debated issue in contemporary metaphysics. To propose the idea of a possible world that differs in some way from our actual world - for example a world where the grass is red or where no people exist - can help us to analyse and understand a wide range of philosophical concepts, such as counterfactuals, properties, modality, and of course, the notions of (...) possibility and necessity. This book examines the ways in which possible worlds have been used as a framework for considering problems in logic and argument analysis. The book begins with a non-technical introduction to the basic ideas of modal logic in terms of Kripke's possible worlds and then moves on to a discussion of 'possible for' and 'possible that'. The central chapters examine questions of meaning, epistemic possibility, temporal logic, metaphysics, and impossibility. Girle also investigates how the idea of a possible world can be put to use in different areas of philosophy, the problems it may raise, and the benefits that can be gained. (shrink)

In this work, we question the ability of existing ranking-based semantics to capture persuasion settings, emphasising in particular the phenomena of procatalepsis (the fact that it is often efficient to anticipate the counter-arguments of the audience) and of fading (the fact that long lines of argumentation become ineffective). Some widely accepted principles of ranking-based semantics (like Void Precedence) are incompatible with a faithful treatment of these phenomena, which means that no existing ranking-based semantics can capture these two (...) principles together. This motivates us to introduce a new parametrized ranking-based semantics based on the notion of propagation which extends the existing propagation semantics (In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA’16) ( 2016 ) 139–150) by adding an additional parameter allowing us to gradually decrease the impact of arguments when the length of the path between two arguments increases. We show that this parameter gives the possibility of choosing if one wants to satisfy the property Void Precedence or not (and then capture procatalepsis) and to control the scope of the impact of the arguments (and then to capture fading principle). We also propose an experiment to show that the new semantics remains stable when this parameter varies and an axiomatic evaluation to compare it with existing ranking-based semantics in the literature. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, the semantic reference of the uses of demonstratives is fixed, at least partly, by the speaker’s referential intention. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of the existence of a semantic convention of this sort. My argument is placed in the Lewisian framework of signaling games and consists of several steps that correspond to four anti-intentionalist arguments, already present in the literature, that have proven inconclusive when employed separately and without being set in the mentioned framework.

The argument from convention contends that the regular use of definite descriptions as referential devices strongly implies that a referential semantic convention underlies such usage. On the presumption that definite descriptions also participate in a quantificational semantic convention, the argument from convention has served as an argument for the thesis that the English definite article is ambiguous. Here, I revisit this relatively new argument. First, I address two recurring criticisms of the argument from convention: its alleged tendency to overgenerate and (...) its apparent evidential inadequacy. These criticisms are found wanting. Second, following Zacharska, I argue that while the argument from convention does alter the landscape of logical possibilities insofar as it provides good grounds for treating Donnellan’s referential–attributive distinction as having truth-conditional consequences, the argument from convention nonetheless fails to demonstrate that ‘the’ requires two lexical entries. (shrink)

According to Semantic Minimalism, every use of "Chiara is tall" (fixing the girl and the time) semantically expresses the same proposition, the proposition that Chiara is (just plain) tall. Given standard assumptions, this proposition ought to have an intension (a function from possible worlds to truth values). However, speakers tend to reject questions that presuppose that it does. I suggest that semantic minimalists might address this problem by adopting a form of "nonindexical contextualism," according to which the proposition invariantly expressed (...) by "Chiara is tall" does not have a context-invariant intension. Nonindexical contextualism provides an elegant explanation of what is wrong with "context-shifting arguments" and can be seen as a synthesis of the (partial) insights of semantic minimalists and radical contextualists. (shrink)

More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute all versions of moral naturalism by offering the open question argument (OQA) followed by the “naturalistic fallacy” charge (NF).1 Although there is consensus that this extended inference fails to undermine all varieties of moral naturalism, OQA is often vindicated as an argument against analytical moral naturalism. By contrast, NF usually finds no takers at all. ln this paper we argue that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by (...) Frank Jackson and Michael Smith does after all rest on a mistake — though perhaps not the NF. Analytical moral naturalism is roughly the doctrine that some moral predicates and sentences are a priori equivalent to predicates and sentences framed in non-moral terms (Jackson 2003: 558). Given moral naturalism, it is at least possible that there are some such a priori or conceptual equivalences. But a properly construed OQA challenges this reductive strategy by showing that it is open to doubt on a priori grounds. We further contend that, in the dialectical context created by our OQA, a "digging in the heeis" defense of the strategy would beg the question. ll.. (shrink)

Argument from analogy is a common and formidable form of reasoning in law and in everyday conversation. Although there is substantial literature on the subject, according to a recent survey ( Juthe 2005) there is little fundamental agreement on what form the argument should take, or on how it should be evaluated. Th e lack of conformity, no doubt, stems from the complexity and multiplicity of forms taken by arguments that fall under the umbrella of analogical reasoning in argumentation, dialectical (...) studies, and law. Modeling arguments with argumentation schemes has proven useful in attempts to refine the analyst’s understanding of not only the logical structures that shape the backbone of the argument itself, but also the logical underpinning of strategies for evaluating it, strategies based on the semantic categories of genus and relevance. By clarifying the distinction between argument from example and argument from analogy, it is possible to advance a useful proposal for the treatment of argument from analogy in law. (shrink)

L'ouvrage présente, argumente et illustre la sémantique des possibles argumentatifs, une théorie et un modèle de fonctionnement du sens linguistique à l'interface de ses deux formes de manifestation : la signification des expressions linguistiques, en particulier des mots, et le sens discursif, produit dans et par les occurrences de parole. Cette approche, que l'auteur construit depuis une vingtaine d'années et qui a été déjà investie dans de nombreuses recherches en analyse du discours et des (inter)actions verbales, s'inscrit à la fois (...) dans la filiation des sémantiques argumentatives et dans celle des sémantiques du stéréotype, et adhère à la vision cognitiviste, expérientialiste du langage. Trois éléments polarisent dans l'ouvrage l'argumentation des apports de la théorie SPA et du modèle qu'elle habilite. Le premier pose l'hétérogénéité de la signification des mots et l'entrelacement argumentatif, d'une part, entre le noyau et l'ensemble ouvert de stéréotypes qui lui sont attachés, et, d'autre part, entre le mot et l'ensemble ouvert de ses potentialités de sens discursif. Le second concerne le potentiel du sens discursif qui déploie les significations des mots de confirmer et régénérer, ou de déconstruire et reconstruire ces significations. Le troisième est le cinétisme permanent du sens linguistique dans l'espace de rencontre des possibles argumentatifs de la signification et des déploiements discursifs de celle-ci. Le cinétisme sémantique est envisagé comme une réponse à l'injonction paradoxale du langage : contrainte du potentiel argumentatif des expressions linguistiques sur la construction du sens discursif et contrainte de celui-ci sur la (re)construction de la signification de ces expressions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Arguments and conditionals are powerful means language provides us to reason about possibilities and to reach conclusions from premises. These two kinds of constructions exhibit several affinities—e.g., they both come in different varieties depending on the mood; they share some of the same connectives (i.e., ‘then’); they allow for similar patterns of modal subordination. In the light of these affinities, it is not surprising that prominent theories of conditionals—old and new suppositionalisms as well as dynamic theories of conditionals—as well (...) as certain reductive theories of arguments tend to semantically assimilate conditionals and arguments. In this paper, I shall marshall some linguistic evidence as well as some theoretical considerations for thinking that, despite these similarities, arguments and conditionals should be given a different semantics and I shall lay out a framework that can capture at least some of their affinities while accounting for their outstanding differences. (shrink)

This paper gives a semantics for schematic logic, proving soundness and completeness. The argument for soundness is carried out in ontologically innocent fashion, relying only on the existence of formulae which are actually written down in the course of a derivation in the logic. This makes the logic available to a nominalist, even a nominalist who does not wish to rely on modal notions, and who accepts the possibility that the universe may in fact be finite.

I motivate and characterize an intensional semantics for ‘ought’ on which it does not behave as a universal quantifier over possibilities. My motivational argument centers on taking at face value some standard challenges to the quantificational semantics, especially to the idea that ‘ought’-sentences satisfy the principle of Inheritance. I argue that standard pragmatic approaches to these puzzles are either not sufficiently detailed or unconvincing.

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context (...) is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values. (shrink)

In the current paper we re-examine the concepts of attack semantics and collective attacks in abstract argumentation, and examine how these concepts interact with each other. For this, we systematically map the space of possibilities. Starting with standard argumentation frameworks (which consist of a directed graph with nodes and arrows) we briefly state both node semantics and arrow semantics (the latter a.k.a. attack semantics) in both their extensions-based form and labellings-based form. We then proceed with (...) SETAFs (which consist of a directed hypergraph of nodes and arrows, to take into account the notion of collective attacks) and state both node semantics and arrow semantics, in both their extensions-based and labellings-based form. We then show equivalence between the extensions-based and labellings-based form, for node semantics and arrow semantics of AFs, as well as for node semantics and arrow semantics of SETAFs. Moreover, we show equivalence between node semantics and arrow semantics for AFs, and equivalence between node semantics and arrow semantics for SETAFs (with the notable exception of semi-stable). We also provide a novel way of converting a SETAF to an AF such that semantics are preserved, without the use of any “meta arguments”. Although the main part of our work is on the level of abstract argumentation, we do provide an application of our theory on the instantiated level. More specifically, we show that the classical characterisation of Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) can be seen as an instantiation based on a SETAF, whereas the contemporary characterisation of ABA can be seen as an instantiation based on a standard AF. Our theory of how to convert a SETAF to an AF can then be used to account for both the similarities and the differences between the classical and contemporary characterisations of ABA. Most prominently, our theory is able to explain the semantic mismatch for semi-stable semantics that arises in the ABA instantiation process. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure and the defeasibility conditions of argument from analogy, addressing the issues of determining the nature of the comparison underlying the analogy and the types of inferences justifying the conclusion. In the dialectical tradition, different forms of similarity were distinguished and related to the possible inferences that can be drawn from them. The kinds of similarity can be divided into four categories, depending on whether they represent fundamental semantic features of the (...) terms of the comparison or non-semantic ones, indicating possible characteristics of the referents. Such distinct types of similarity characterize different kinds of analogical arguments, all based on a similar general structure, in which a common genus is abstracted. Depending on the nature of the abstracted common feature, different rules of inference will apply, guaranteeing the attribution of the analogical predicate to the genus and to the primary subject. This analysis of similarity and the relationship thereof with the rules of inference allows a deeper investigation of the defeasibility conditions. (shrink)

In the last decade the enterprise of formal semantics has been under attack from several philosophical and linguistic perspectives, and it has certainly suffered from its own scattered state, which hosts quite a variety of paradigms which may seem to be incompatible. It will not do to try and answer the arguments of the critics, because the arguments are often well-taken. The negative conclusions, however, I believe are not. The only adequate reply seems to be a constructive one, which (...) puts several pieces of formal semantics, in particular dynamic semantics, together again.In this paper I will try and sketch an overview of tasks, techniques, and results, which serves to at least suggest that it is possible to develop a coherent overall picture of undeniably important and structural phenomena in the interpretation of natural language. The idea is that the concept of meanings as truth conditions after all provides an excellent start for an integrated study of the meaning and use of natural language, and that an extended notion of goal directed pragmatics naturally complements this picture. None of the results reported here are really new, but we think it is important to re-collect them. (shrink)

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of “non-existing” objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth (...) non unlike the notion of “truth at world” found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization). (shrink)

This paper argues for tlie claims that a) a natural language such as English is semanticaly closed b) semantic closure implies inconsistency. A corollary of these is that the semantics of English must be paraconsistent. The first part of the paper formulates a definition of semantic closure which applies to natural languages and shows that this implies inconsistency. The second section argues that English is semeantically closed. The preceding discussion is predicated on the assumption that there are no truth (...) value gaps. The next section of the paper considers whether the possibility of these makes any difference to the substantive conclusions of the previous sections, and argues that it does not. The crux of the preceding arguments is that none of the consistent semantical accounts that have been offered for solving the semantical paradoxes is a semantic ofEnglish. The final section of the paper produces a general argument as to why this must always be the case. (shrink)

This paper discusses the epistemological and methodological bases of a scientific theory of meaning and proposes a detailed version of a formal theory of argumentation based on Anscombre and Ducrot's conception. Argumentation is shown to be a concept which is not exclusively pragmatic, as it is usually believed, but has an important semantic body. The bridge between the semantic and pragmatic aspects of argumentation consists in a set of gradual inference rules, called topoi, on which the argumentative movement is (...) based. The content of each topos is determined at the pragmatic level, while the constraints on the forms of the topoi attached to a sentence are determined at the semantic level. Applications and possible applications toartificial intelligence and to cognitive sciences are discussed. In particular, the gradual models used to account for argumentation are shown to be extremely promising for Knowledge management, a discipline which includes knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation, transmission of knowledge (communication, interfaces, etc.), knowledge production (decision help, reasoning, etc.). A first formal model is presented and discussed: it is shown in details how it accounts for most of the argumentative features of sentences containing but, little and a little, and how it can be extended to describe sentences containing other argumentative connectives. However, this model is shown to be too simple and to violate the compositionality principle, which is shown, in the first section, to bean important methodological principle for any scientific theory. After a detailed analysis of the possible reasons for this violation, an improved model is proposed and its adequacy is discussed. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is, from a semiotic perspective, arguing for the recognizing of a semantic role of the imagination as a necessary condition to our linguistic experience, regarded as an essential feature of the relations of our thought with the world through signification processes ; processes centered in but not reducible to discourse. The text is divided into three parts. The first part presents the traditional position in philosophy and cognitive sciences that had barred until recent times (...) the possibility to investigate the semantic function performed by imagination, mainly due to the anti-psychologist arguments on which it is based. After that, I situate my perspective inside of the recent research panorama in philosophy and cognitive science. The second part presents the semiotic framework on the relation between thought, language, and world, conceived through the concepts of signification processes and sense-conditions. Within this framework, I introduce the concept of linguistic experience, characterizing semantic imagination as one of its sense-conditions. In the third part, several pieces of evidence for corroborating the semantic function of imagination are discussed. These pieces come from the fields of phenomena denoted as diagrammatic thought and counterfactual thought. Diagrammatic thought, briefly discussed, points out the semantic work of imagination in the semi-discursive sign systems constructed in mathematics, logic, and natural science. After defending a widening of the concept of counterfactual thought, and its intrinsic relation with semantic imagination, the role of semantic imagination is briefly discussed in some types of counterfactual thought found in our conceptions of modal concepts, in thought experiments, in apagogical arguments, and in the creative discursive devices. (shrink)

This dissertation is about Semantic Uniformity. Semantic Uniformity is the claim that what is true for some expressions is true for them all—at least, when it comes to semantics. In particular, I defend three claims in three chapters, in this order: First, all simple linguistic expressions, and not just some, are non-descriptive. That is, their referents are not determined by fit with our beliefs. Second, all simple linguistic expressions are rigid. Relative to each possible world, construed as a world (...) of evaluation, every expression has one and the same referent. These two claims point toward a general picture of why simple expressions refer to what they do. Simple expressions have their referents determined by the causal, informational, or lawful connections they bear to objects and properties in the world. Furthermore, this referential connection is 'direct‘ in that it doesn‘t depend on the distribution of objects and properties at a world; simple expressions simply refer, and that explains their rigidity. In the third chapter I defend the view that the same holds for complex expressions. Consensus has it that complex expressions derive their meanings from the meanings of their parts and how those parts are combined. But, I argue, a better account assumes that complex expressions have their referents determined by the causal, informational, or lawful connections they bear to objects and properties in the world, just like simple expressions. In the background of all this is the Referentialist thesis, that there is no further aspect to meaning than reference. If Referentialism is accepted, then the argument of the dissertation is that we can have a "complete" theory of meaning simply by extending a direct causal theory of reference to all expressions. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the semantic contents of some linguistic and mental representations are determined by factors independent of a person’s bodily makeup. Arguments derived from Hilary Putnam’s seminal Twin Earth thought experiment have been especially influential in establishing that belief. I claim that there is a neglected version of the mind-body relation which undermines those arguments and also excludes the possibility of zombies. It has been neglected because it is counterintuitive but I show that it can nonetheless be (...) intelligibly worked out in detail and all obvious objections met. This suggests that we may be faced with a choice between embracing a counterintuitive interpretation of the mind-body relation or accepting that a currently very promising theory in cognitive science, Prediction Error Minimization, faces a fundamental problem. Furthermore, blocking that threat entails that any physicalist/materialst theory of mind is freed from the spectre of zombie worlds. The proposal also makes the ideas of personal teleportation of mind uploading more plausible. (shrink)

What are our constitutional possibilities? The importance of this question is illustrated by the striking breadth of recent discussions, ranging from the interpretation of the United States Constitution as a guarantee of fundamental economic equality and proposals to restore the lost constitution to arguments for the virtual abandonment of structural provisions of the Constitution of 1789. Such proposals are conventionally understood as placing constitutional options on the table as real options for constitutional change. Normative constitutional theory asks the question (...) whether these options are desirable - whether political actors (citizens, legislators, executives, or judges) should take action to bring about their plans for constitutional reform or revolution. Frequently, normative constitutional theories are criticized on the ground that they are undesirable, unwise, on inconsistent with the best theories of political morality and legitimate legal authority, but sometimes one hears a very different form of criticism, expressed in locutions such as the following: That is unrealistic. That's not possible. That is pie in the sky. You are imagining castles in the air. Your suggestion is utopian. That isn't feasible. These objections invoke the idea of ephemeral constitutional possibility - constitutional options that are not real or actual possibilities. What are our constitutional possibilities? How should we think about the feasible choice set for constitutional change? What are the differences between ideal and nonideal theory? What role should the ideas of path dependency and second best play in constitutional theory? These inquiries cross the lines between normative, positive, and conceptual constitutional theory. At the conceptual level, we can ask what phrases like constitutional possibility, ideal theory, and the feasible choice set mean. At the level of positive constitutional theory, we can ask about the forces and institutions that condition constitutional possibility. At the level of normative constitutional theory, we can ask about the implications of constitutional possibility for political morality. Constitutional Possibilities proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the idea of ephemeral constitutional possibilities. Part II will cobble together a conceptual toolkit for thinking about possibility and necessity in constitutional theory: the tools include: (a) the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, (b) the notion of a constitutional second best, and (c) an introduction to possible-worlds semantics. Part III will explore the implications of the resulting proto-theory of constitutional possibility in two stages: stage one will investigate the normative implications, whereas stage two will reconnoiter a set of standards for making modal claims in constitutional arguments. Part IV provides a case study in constitutional possibility by examining Sanford Levinson's proposal for a constitutional convention. Part V concludes with the problem of false constitutional necessity. (shrink)

My three projects here explore some semantic and metaethical problems that are unique to normative language and our normative reasoning. Ch.1 argues that the notion of a contrary-to-duty obligation and its role in normative discourse and reasoning are not adequately captured in the standard semantics for ought-statements, developed by Angelika Kratzer and David Lewis. I show this by presenting a new puzzle, the CTD Trilemma, using a famous example from Chisholm’s Paradox. I claim that two different roles played by (...) ought-statements in normative discourse and reasoning have to be captured in any satisfactory semantic account for normative language. I draw the distinction between axiological and deontological ought-statements in my version of deontic update semantics and how this distinction nicely solves the puzzles about CTD obligations. Ch.2 discusses the challenge that the possibility of moral dilemmas poses to the ordering semantic account of ought-statements. I critically discuss and compare the advantages and disadvantages of two ordering semantic analyses of ought-statements when it comes to moral dilemmas: the conflict and disjunctive accounts. I conclude that in order to adequately describe one’s normative predicament and reasoning in a dilemma situation, two kinds of ought-statements defined by the two accounts have to be captured in a single semantic framework. And, I show how it can be done in the ordering semantic framework. Ch.3 critically evaluates the real force of the Disagreement-Based Argument in metaethics, exemplified by R.M. Hare’s cannibals argument and Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth argument. I analyze the structure of the DBA and defuse its direct threat to descriptivism by disproving its most problematic assumption : that genuine disagreement between two parties requires that the parties agree in what they mean by the key terms in the dispute. I argue that the disagreement data the DBA elicits from thought experiments does not put real pressure on descriptivism, because the proponents of descriptivism can explain the data away by showing how two different linguistic communities can genuinely disagree about what to do and how to live. (shrink)

The motivation of this study is that Reiter’s default theory as well as assumption-based argumentation frameworks corresponding to default theories have difficulties in handling disjunctive information, while a disjunctive default theory ( ddt) avoids them. This paper presents the semantic correspondence between generalized assumption-based argumentation (ABA) and extended disjunctive logic programming as well as the correspondence between ABA and nonmonotonic reasoning approaches such as disjunctive default logic and prioritized circumscription. To overcome the above-mentioned difficulties of ABA frameworks corresponding to default (...) theories, we propose an assumption-based framework (ABF) translated from an extended disjunctive logic program (EDLP) since an EDLP can be translated into a ddt. Our ABF incorporates explicit negation and the connective of disjunction “|” to Heyninck and Arieli’s ABF induced by a disjunctive logic program. In this paper, first, we show how arguments are constructed from disjunctive rules in our proposed ABF. Then, we show the correspondence between answer sets of an EDLP P and stable extensions of the ABF translated from P with trivialization rules. After defining rationality postulates, we show answer sets of a consistent EDLP are captured by consistent stable extensions of the translated ABF with no trivialization rules. Finally, we show the correspondence between ABA and disjunctive default logic (resp. prioritized circumscription). The relation between ABA and possible model semantics of EDLPs is also discussed. (shrink)

I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we (...) are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Possible Worlds in the Tahâfut al-tahâfut:Averroes on Plenitude and PossibilityTaneli Kukkonen1.It has become customary to credit John Duns Scotus with having first systematically laid out the basis for treating the modal terms as referring to synchronic alternative states of affairs. This has been viewed as constituting a genuine shift in modal paradigms, as no former model had included the idea of genuine synchronic alternative possibilities. Historians of modal (...) logic and contemporary logicians alike have found it interesting that certain key features of Duns Scotus's theory and subsequent late medieval work markedly resemble the so-called possible worlds semantics approach of modern modal theory.1Duns Scotus' innovations were not completely without precedent. Several key elements in Scotus' theory were foreshadowed by twelfth-century developments. Perhaps somewhat amusingly, one of the most important forerunners to the Latin discussion was one in whose context the expression "possible worlds" would have made sense in a very special way.2 This is the medieval Arabic debate on the eternity of the world and its modal status. In this paper I propose to take stock of the positions the Arabs reached, and to do so by way of [End Page 329] consulting one of the documents central to the debate, the Tahâfut al-tahâfut or the "Incoherence of the Incoherence," by Abû al-Walîd Ibn Rushd (the Latin "Averroes," 1126-1198). In the first part I examine Averroes' exposition of the received Aristotelian tradition; in the second I assess the revisions to modal theory suggested by al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111), in the latter's comprehensive critique of philosophical doctrine. Though the two inquiries are obviously complementary, they can be accomplished independently of each other.It will be seen that Averroes' and his formidable adversary's views on the interpretation of the modal concepts differ quite fundamentally. What makes the ensuing debate, often fraught with misunderstandings and misrepresentation, so engaging is that both parties, in spite of their differences, refer to a common Aristotelian backdrop in questions of terminology and mode of argumentation. Both Averroes and al-Ghazâlî are well-placed to present a considered and balanced account of what they take to be crucial in the issues involved. It is on account of this that the complex interplay between the old and the new comes to the fore with exceptional force and clarity in the Tahâfut debates.2.The Tahâfut al-tahâfut, first published in 1180, is a philosophical rejoinder to an attack on philosophy, Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî's Tahâfut al-falâsifa or "The Incoherence of the Philosophers" (1095). In that celebrated work al-Ghazâlî had claimed to expose certain philosophical doctrines as not only contrary to orthodox Muslim belief, but also internally incoherent.3 Averroes' reply in turn was written in order "to show the different degrees of assent and conviction attained by the assertions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, and to prove that the greater part has not reached the degree of evidence and of truth."4 The work is thus of a doubly dialectical nature. Whereas al-Ghazâlî tries to show the philosophers' reasoning to be defective, Averroes has to show both that al-Ghazâlî is likewise lacking in intellectual rigor and that philosophy, properly understood, is innocent of the charges leveled at it. If the Islamic philosophers (al-Fârâbî and, above all, Avicenna) have in fact erred, this is only to the extent that they have misrepresented correct Aristotelian doctrine. [End Page 330]Averroes' presentation is appropriately delicate considering the complexity of the task at hand. Averroes quotes al-Ghazâlî exclusively in full, lengthy passages, with the result of incorporating almost all of the Tahâfut al-falâsifa in his own work. In so doing he gives us an adequate and comparably fair representation of al-Ghazâlî's views. Averroes then goes on to discuss what al-Ghazâlî says both in the philosophers' name and in his own, and points out their respective deviations from Aristotelian doctrine. The text thus comes laid out in three successive layers, with Averroes' own... (shrink)

We define a semantics for conditionals in terms of stochastic graphs which gives a straightforward and simple method of evaluating the probabilities of conditionals. It seems to be a good and useful method in the cases already discussed in the literature, and it can easily be extended to cover more complex situations. In particular, it allows us to describe several possible interpretations of the conditional and to formalize some intuitively valid but formally incorrect considerations concerning the probabilities of conditionals (...) under these two interpretations. It also yields a powerful method of handling more complex issues. The stochastic graph semantics provides a satisfactory answer to Lewis’s arguments against the PC = CP principle, and defends important intuitions which connect the notion of probability of a conditional with the notion of conditional probability. It also illustrates the general problem of finding formal explications of philosophically important notions and applying mathematical methods in analyzing philosophical issues. (shrink)

To what extent are meaning, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other, determined by aspects of the 'outside world'? Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents twelve specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and the connections between them. In so doing, it examines how issues connected with the nature of mind and language bear on issues about the nature of knowledge and justification. Topics discussed include the compatibility of semantic externalism and epistemic (...) internalism, the variety of internalist and externalist positions, semantic externalism's implications for the epistemology of reasoning and reflection, and the possibility of arguments from the theory of mental content to the theory of epistemic justification. (shrink)

A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths about truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory-gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion. My view is that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if (...) one is very careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic premises to modal conclusions , and from there to ontological conclusions. Here, the crucial issue is the link between the epistemic and modal domains. How can one reason from theses about what is knowable or conceivable to theses about what is necessary or possible? To bridge the epistemic and modal domains, the framework of two-dimensional semantics can play a central role. I have used this framework in earlier work to mount an argument against materialism. Here, I want to revisit the argument, laying it out in a more explicit and careful form, and responding to a number of objections. In what follows I will concentrate mostly on the conceivability argument. I think that very similar considerations apply to the other arguments mentioned above, however. In the final section of the paper, I show how this analysis might yield a unified treatment of a number of anti-materialist arguments. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a view that inclusive positivists share with Ronald Dworkin. According to the Moral Incorporation Thesis (MIT), it is logically possible for a legal system to incorporate moral criteria of legality (or “grounds of law,” as Dworkin puts it). Up to this point, the debate has taken the shape of attacks on the coherence of MIT with the defender of MIT merely attempting to refute the attacking argument. I give a positive argument for MIT. I (...) begin with an explanation of the logic of establishing possibility claims, such as MIT. At the outset, it is worth noting that the logic of establishing possibility claims is very different from the logic of establishing contingent descriptive claims or necessary claims. For this reason, some explication of the relevant features of the semantics of modal logic will be necessary here. Once the structural framework is adequately developed, the argument for MIT will be grounded on the strength of a thought experiment of a surprisingly simple kind. Indeed, the argument is inspired by a Razian argument for the possibility of a legal system without coercive enforcement machinery; on his view, a society of angels could still have a system of law without any coercive machinery. My argument will possess two theoretically important qualities that are also possessed by Raz’s powerfully simple, but ultimately unsuccessful, argument. (shrink)

According to non-cognitivism, moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. This paper presents an empirical argument against this view. We begin by showing that non-cognitivism entails the prediction that after some reflection competent ordinary speakers’ semantic intuitions favor that moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. At first sight, this prediction may seem to have been confirmed by previous research on folk metaethics. However, a number of methodological worries (...) lead us to doubt this interpretation. We, therefore, conducted a psychological study that alleviates these worries as far as possible. It turned out that competent ordinary speakers’ reflective semantic intuitions dominantly fail to favor that moral sentences do not aim to represent how things morally are. This challenge to non-cognitivism is defended and supplemented by considering deflationary theories of moral truth and middle ground theories in the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate. (shrink)