Earlier algebraic semantics for Belnapian modal logics were defined in terms of twist-structures over modal algebras. In this paper we introduce the class of BK -lattices, show that this class coincides with the abstract closure of the class of twist-structures, and it forms a variety. We prove that the lattice of subvarieties of the variety of BK -lattices is dually isomorphic to the lattice of extensions of Belnapian modal logic BK . Finally, we describe invariants determining a twist-structure over a (...) modal algebra. (shrink)

And so that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I shall say on this matter, I should like that those not versed in anatomy should take the trouble, before they read this, to have cut up before their eyes the heart of some large animal that has lungs—for it is in all respects sufficiently similar to the heart of man….

The article deals with the problem of compatibility of the extended mind thesis with the concept of epistemic responsibility. This compatibility problem lies at the intersection of two current trends in Virtue Epistemology (VE): the study of extended cognition, and the return of VE to the topic of epistemic responsibility. I give objections to two seemingly independent positions; their acceptance makes it difficult or even impossible to make the concept of epistemic responsibility applicable to the agents of digital society whose (...) cognition is extended. The core of both positions can be illustrated by the following thesis: “Since the subject cannot voluntarily change his/her beliefs, we cannot ascribe to him/her either epistemic responsibility or intellectual virtues that allow him/her to take responsibility”. The counter-arguments to this thesis are based on the distinction between the causal (responsibility-in) and normative (responsibility-for) components of responsibility. The absence of the former allows us to characterize the subject as not responsible, the absence of the latter as irresponsible. I propose two conceptual foundations that can make possible the consistent talk about the epistemic responsibility of an extended subject. 1) The subject may not be responsible for the beliefs taken from the epistemic environment, but the subject bears significant responsibility for what environment he finds himself in. 2) Being epistemically responsible means deliberately reducing the number of possible causal excuses – excuses based on agent’s unresponsibiity due to his causal dependence on his epistemic environment (‘cognitive extensions’). (shrink)

We prove here that the intuitionistic theory $T_{0}\upharpoonright + UMID_{N}$ , or even $EEJ\upharpoonright + UMID_{N}$ , of Explicit Mathematics has the strength of $\prod_{2}^{1} - CA_{0}$ . In Section I we give a double-negation translation for the classical second-order $\mu-calculus$ , which was shown in [ $M\ddot{o}02$ ] to have the strength of $\prod_{2}^{1}-CA_{0}$ . In Section 2 we interpret the intuitionistic $\mu-calculus$ in the theory $EETJ\upharpoonright + UMID_{N}$ . The question about the strength of monotone inductive definitions in (...) $T_{0}$ was asked by S. Feferman in 1982, and - assuming classical logic - was addressed by M. Rathjen. (shrink)

Prozorov reinterprets the familiar principles of community, equality and freedom in ontological terms as attributes of pure being, subtracted from all positive determinations, and presents them as axioms of universalist politics valid in any world whatsoever.

The article analyzes the philosophical concept of the “porous self” of J. Rivera. The originality of this concept in the post-phenomenological project is determined by the role of theological constructions that modify the primal experience of self-consciousness. This modification allows us to interpret the phenomenological description of the human self as different from the classical — “porous” temporality, i.e., correlating through “two entrances”—the internal and external—with eternity. Within this approach, the primary phenomenon of the constitution of the "porous" self becomes (...) the inner word, which in the appeal to eternity turns out to be the original self-awareness of the self as a temporality. The secondary phenomenon of the constitution of the “porous” self is not the mundane temporality of M. Heidegger, but Epektasis as an intense striving towards the end of time in General. The worldly temporality of the self, transformed by faith, is phenomenologically revealed as open to eternity in each of its moments. The third phenomenon of the temporality of the self is Memoria, whose interpretation reveals how the structure of the inner consciousness of time by E. Husserl can be framed ontologically and harmoniously integrated into the theological concept. The article shows how, based on this understanding of both the internal and external openness of the “porous” self for eternity, the integral structure of its temporality is formed. The temporality of the porous self is a modification of Husserl’s time diagrams and the intertwining of two streams of temporality at the same time from past to future and from future to past, which itself constitutes a phenomenal field of events of self. This understanding of temporality sets new perspectives for the phenomenological analysis of subjectivity. (shrink)

Historical entitlement theories of property rights, which claim that individuals can acquire moral property rights over natural resources by appropriating them, traditionally face a strong objection: it is widely implausible that a single individual can unilaterally impose duties on everyone around him and yet, apparently, this is exactly what such theories allow. In this essay, I argue that the same problem appears in all other theories of distributive justice and if this problem was a reason to reject historical entitlement theories, (...) it would also be a reason to reject all rival theories. Which means that as long, as one is committed to any theory of distributive justice at all, she, at the risk of inconsistency, cannot rely on the aforementioned objection to criticize historical entitlement theories. (shrink)

I argue that teaching evaluation tools may function as ethical codes, and answer certain demands that ECs cannot sufficiently fulfill. In order to be viable, an EC related to the teaching profession must assume a different form, and such a form is already present in several of the contemporary TETs. The TET matrix form allows for certain features that are incompatible with the EC form. The TET’s benchmark scale – ranging from below the acceptable to the ideal level across the (...) dimensions of teachers’ competence – allows it to answer the demands upon ECs, raised by the EC critics. TETs embrace both minimal requirements and lofty ideals, while ECs of different types have a hard time combining these two features. TETs relate to different dimensions of teacher competence, connecting ethical and professional components with didactical, managerial and cognitive components, without lumping them together. (shrink)

The study serves as an introduction to the publication of B. Baradin’s (1878-1937) theses for the lecture by A. Dorzhiev (1853-1938), which was to be read at the international Buddhist exhibition planned in Leningrad in 1927. The author dwells in detail on the biographies of the Buryat academic scientist B. Baradin, as well as his Buddhist mentor Geshe A. Dorzhiev, at whose request he compiled theses. Turning to the history of the first Buddhist exhibition, which took place during the Civil (...) War in 1919, the author notes the contribution of academic scientists S.F. Oldenburg, B.Ya. Vladimirtsov, F.I. Shcherbatsky and O.O. Rosenberg. The role of Shcherbatsky, who sought to present Buddhism as a completely unique religion, consonant with modern science and not based on blind faith, is particularly emphasized. This was supposed to put Buddhism in a favorable light before the Bolsheviks and the Soviet government and prevent persecution against it. Shcherbatsky’s contribution to the ideology of the Buddhist renewal movement, whose leaders sought to cooperate with the atheistic authorities, was noted. The historical circumstances in which the second, already international, exhibition was being prepared and the reasons why it could not take place are discussed. Focusing on the content of Baradin’s theses, the author emphasizes that the main thing in them was the proximity of Buddhism to the ideology of the West and modern science. In conclusion, the author notes that the theme of the convergence of Buddhism and science has anticipated modern Western scientific research on Buddhist meditation practices, as well as discussions between Western scientists and the Dalai Lama about the benefits of Buddhist psychopractics for the modern world. (shrink)

Early normative studies of human behavior revealed a gap between the norms of practical rationality (what humans ought to do) and the actual human behavior (what they do). It has been suggested that, to close the gap between the descriptive and the normative, one has to revise norms of practical rationality according to the Quinean, engineering view of normativity. On this view, the norms must be designed such that they effectively account for behavior. I review recent studies of human perception (...) which pursued normative modeling and which found good agreement between the normative prescriptions and the actual behavior. I make the case that the goals and methods of this work have been incompatible with those of the engineering approach. I argue that norms of perception and action are observer-independent properties of biological agents; the norms are discovered using methods of natural sciences rather than the norms are designed to fit the observed behavior. (shrink)