Objective: The main purpose of this study was the psychometric assessment of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale among Iranian older population. Methods: Using a standard “forward-backward” translation procedure, the original English version of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale was translated into Persian. Internal consistency of the scale was checked by the Cronbach’s α coefficient. Convergent validity of the instrument was appraised by the Social Skills Scale and General Health Questionnaire. Factor structure of the Iranian version of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale and possible (...) interplay between its subscales were checked through recruiting a convenient sample of 300 Iranian older people and performing the confirmatory factor analysis. Findings: The estimated Cronbach’s α and intraclass correlation coefficients for the Iranian version of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale were in the vicinity of acceptable range, that is, 0.87 and 0.93, respectively. The output of confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a four-factor model best fitted the study data (χ2 = 323.49; df = 129; p < 0.001; comparative fit index = 0.913; Tucker–Lewis index = 0.901; root mean square error approximation = 0.074; standardized root mean square residual = 0.078). Rasch estimates of item difficulty ranged from –1.28 (less difficult) to 1.33 (more difficult). No significant cross-gender differences were observed regarding the Iranian version of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale’s items indicating its invariant psychometric properties for use in the Iranian men and women subgroups. Ethical Considertaion: This study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Tabriz university of medical science. Informed consent, information confidentiality, and voluntary participation were guaranteed. Conclusion: The study findings were indicative of applicability of the Iranian version of Jacelon’s Attributed Dignity Scale as a reliable tool in measurement of the perceived social dignity among Iranian and probably other Persian-speaking older populations. (shrink)

In Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such (...) situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga’s reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived. (shrink)