ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Mosheh mi-Drogiṭshin -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Avraham me-Ulinov -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Shelomoh Leyb mi-Lenṭshna -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Meʼir mi-Primishla -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Avraham mi-Miḳalyov -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Daṿid mi-Zovliṭov -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Shmelḳe mi-Sasov -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Yeshaʻy. Shor -- ha-R. ha-ḳ. R. Yeḥiʼel Mikhal.

Avne Shelomoh -- Zikhron Shelomoh -- Daʻat Shelomoh.

ḥeleḳ 1. Oraḥ ḥayim. Mikhtavim -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hadrakhot be-ʻinyene Talmud-Torah ṿe-ḥinukh ... -- ḥeleḳ 3. Liḳuṭim, mikhtavim --.

Śiḥot maran ha-Mashgiaḥ Mohari Leṿinshṭain, zatsal -- Ḥidushe torato ʻa. Mas. B.ḳ. ṿe-liḳuṭim -- Leḳeṭ mi-maʼamraṿ mi-moreshet Daṿid Heber ṿe-ʻinyene ha-shaʻah.

[1] ʻAl ʻinyene ḥinukh ha-banim ṿeha-banot ṿi-yeme ha-baḥarut-- [2] ʻAl ʻinyene derekh ha-Ḥasidut lesayeaʻ le-zulato be-ruḥaniyut ṿe-nilṿeh elaṿ mikhteve ḳodesh be-ʻinyan zeh.

This paper connects the debate regarding perceptual representation of high-level properties and the debate regarding non-conceptual perceptual representation. I present and defend a distinction between representationally-complex properties and properties that are simpler to represent and offer ways of assessing whether a property is representationally complex. I address conditions under which such a property might be non-conceptually represented and conclude that most representationally-complex properties are simply too complex to be non-conceptually represented. Thus, most mental states that represent representationally-complex properties must be (...) conceptual. This conclusion is relevant for a variety of philosophical theories (perception, ethics, emotions, pain) and is especially dramatic with respect to accounts according to which a mental state can non-conceptually represent such properties. As a test case for applying my argument I consider a group of such accounts: non-conceptual perceptual views of emotions, which my argument entails are false. I end by considering the implications my argument has for different theories. -/- . (shrink)

-- -- ḥeleḳ 3. Shaʻar ha-teḥinah -- ḥeleḳ 4. Shaʻar ha-segulot.

The “Assyrian Century,” the period of Assyrian rule in the Levant, is usually regarded as an era of prosperity and economic progress. As far as the southern Levant is concerned, this reconstruction more or less reflects the reality on the southern edge of the region—in the areas of Philistia, Judah, and Edom. But what was the situation in the northern part of the country, in the territories of the former kingdom of Israel and adjacent territories, regions that had become Assyrian (...) provinces? It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the archaeological data from these regions in order to shed light on the settlement and demographic reality in those provinces, and furthermore to reassess Assyrian policy in the west. After summarizing previous research, the article will present the available archaeological data, which will then be compared with that from the southern part of the country in order to enable a reexamination of the Assyrian empire’s policy in the west. (shrink)

The article examines the relation between two kinds of ontological relations that hold together the building blocks of Spinoza’s metaphysics: “being in” and “affection of.” It argues that in order to speak of existence in a single sense, Spinoza equivocates on the notion of affection. On the one hand, substance is in itself in the same sense that every other existing thing is in substance. On the other hand, substance is not the affections of itself, affections of substance are not (...) related to substance in the same sense that affections of modes are related to modes, and affections of modes, which are affections of affections of substance, cannot, at least in some cases, be regarded as affections of substance. Thus, although “God is without passions,” the passions themselves exist in the same sense that God, human beings, and other modes exist, that is, in the sense that they are all in nature; but while the meaning of “being” remains the same, the meaning of “being affected,” or “feeling,” necessarily changes as the Ethics unfolds. (shrink)

The movement known as Deutsche Physik (German physics) evolved hand in hand with National Socialism. It represented a marginal but vocal group of German scientists and science scholars who profiled themselves as defenders of “Aryan” science and called for the elimination of the “Jewish spirit” that they saw as epitomized by Albert Einstein’s relativity theory and as dominating the natural sciences, even in Nazi Germany. This infamous movement is most associated with the Nobel laureate physicists Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, (...) who founded it and gave it its initial political impetus during the early years of the Third Reich. However, in its main and final phase, between 1937 and 1943, the movement was no longer led by Lenard and Stark but by the philosopher of science Hugo Dingler (1881–1954) and his Munich-based circle. Tracing the development of his career until 1937, this article examines how Dingler came to play this role both despite and because of the significant differences between his and the better known Lenard-Stark strand of Deutsche Physik. Special attention is paid to Dingler’s subversive use of theoretical principles—particularly his framing of his work as a radical search for certainty—to advance the movement’s antiscientific agenda. (shrink)

Torat Yesharim -- Tehilat Yesharim -- Avot Yesharim -- Sheʼelat Yesharim.

ḥeleḳ 1. Maʼamar rishon -- ḥeleḳ 2. Maʼamar sheni -- ḥeleḳ 3. Maʼamar shelishi -- ḥeleḳ 4. Maʼamar reviʻi-ḥamishi.