A person's cognitive map, or knowledge of large‐scale space, is built up from observations gathered as he travels through the environment. It acts as a problem solver to find routes and relative positions, as well as describing the current location. The TOUR model captures the multiple representations that make up the cognitive map, the problem‐solving strategies it uses, and the mechanisms for assimilating new information. The representations have rich collections of states of partial knowledge, which support many of the performance (...) characteristics of common‐sense knowledge. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION When Karl Popper published in' his definition of closer-to-the- truth this was an important intellectual event, but not a shocking one. ...

This monograph presents new ideas in nomic truth approximation. It features original and revised papers from a philosopher of science who has studied the concept for more than 35 years. Over the course of time, the author's initial ideas evolved. He discovered a way to generalize his first theory of nomic truth approximation, viz. by dropping an unnecessarily strong assumption. In particular, he first believed to have to assume that theories were maximally specific in the sense that they did not (...) only exclude certain conceptual possibilities, but also that all non-excluded possibilities were in fact claimed to be nomically possible. Now, he argues that the exclusion claim alone, or for that matter the inclusion claim alone, is sufficient to motivate the formal definition of being closer to the nomic truth. The papers collected here detail this generalized view of nomic truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Besides this, the book presents, in adapted form, the relation with several other topics, such as, domain revision, aesthetic progress, abduction, inference to the best explanation, pragmatic aspects, probabilistic methods, belief revision and epistemological positions, notably constructive realism. Overall, the volume presents profound insight into nomic truth approximation. This idea seeks to determine how one theory can be closer to, or more similar to, the truth about what is nomically, e.g. physically, chemically, biologically, possible than another theory. As a result, it represents the ultimate goal of theory oriented empirical science. Theo Kuipers is the author of Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism and Structures in Science. He is the volume-editor of the Handbook on General Philosophy of Science. In 2005 there appeared two volumes of Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, entitled Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation and Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry. (shrink)

1. Cornelius Valerius en Sebastianus Foxius Morzillus als bronnen van Coornhert.

In the debate surrounding the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing in prenatal screening programmes, the concept of routinisation is often used to refer to concerns and potential negative consequences of the test. A literature analysis shows that routinisation has many different meanings, which can be distinguished in three major versions of the concept. Each of these versions comprises several inter-related fears and concerns regarding prenatal screening and particularly regarding NIPT in three areas: informed choice, freedom to choose and consequences for (...) people with a disability. Three of the strongest arguments raised under the flag of routinisation are assessed for their validity: the threat that NIPT poses to informed choice, the potential increase in uptake of first-trimester prenatal screening and its consequences for social pressure to participate in screening or terminate affected pregnancies, and the negative consequences for disabled people. These routinisation arguments lack empirical or normative ground. However, the results of this analysis do not imply that no attention should be paid to possible problems surrounding the introduction of NIPT. At least two problems remain and should be addressed: there should be an ongoing debate about the requirements of informed choice, particularly related to an expanded scope of prenatal screening. Also, reproductive autonomy can only be achieved when expecting parents’ options are variegated, real and valuable, so that they can continue to choose whether or not to screen or to terminate a pregnancy. (shrink)

Assuming that the target of theory oriented empirical science in general and of nomic truth approximation in particular is to characterize the boundary or demarcation between nomic possibilities and nomic impossibilities, I have presented, in my article entitled “Models, postulates, and generalized nomic truth approximation” :3057–3077, 2016. 10.1007/s11229-015-0916-9), the ‘basic’ version of generalized nomic truth approximation, starting from ‘two-sided’ theories. Its main claim is that nomic truth approximation can perfectly be achieved by combining two prima facie opposing views on theories: (...) the traditional view: theories are postulates that exclude certain possibilities from being realizable, enabling explanation and prediction and the model view: theories are sets of models that claim to represent certain realizable possibilities. Nomic truth approximation, i.e. increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content, becomes in this way revising theories by revising their models and/or their postulates in the face of increasing evidence. The basic version of generalized nomic truth approximation is in many respects as simple as possible. Among other things, it does not take into account that one conceptual possibility may be more similar to another than a third one. However, for example, one theory may include a possibility that is more similar to a wrongly not included possibility than another theory can offer. Similarly, for wrongly not excluded possibilities. In this article it will be shown that such ‘refined’ considerations can be taken into account by adapted clauses based on a ternary similarity relation between possibilities. This allows again abductive conclusions about refined truth approximation if a theory is persistently more successful in the refined sense than another. It will also be indicated and illustrated that this refined approach enables a specification to the effect that refined truth approximation can be obtained by the method of idealization and subsequent concretization. Finally, the basic and the refined approach will be evaluated with regard to some general principles and objections that have been discussed in the literature. (shrink)

Informed consent is a key condition for prenatal screening programmes to reach their aim of promoting reproductive autonomy. Reaching this aim is currently being challenged with the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in first-trimester prenatal screening programmes: amongst others its procedural ease—it only requires a blood draw and reaches high levels of reliability—might hinder women’s understanding that they should make a personal, informed decision about screening. We offer arguments for a renewed recognition and use of informed consent compared to (...) informed choice, and for a focus on value-consistent choices and personalized informational preferences. We argue for a three-step counselling model in which three decision moments are distinguished and differently addressed: (1) professionals explore women’s values concerning whether and why they wish to know whether their baby has a genetic disorder; (2) women receive layered medical-technical information and are asked to make a decision about screening; (3) during post-test counselling, women are supported in decision-making about the continuation or termination of their pregnancy. This model might also be applicable in other fields of genetic (pre-test) counselling, where techniques for expanding genome analysis and burdensome test-outcomes challenge counselling of patients. (shrink)

Informed consent is a key condition for prenatal screening programmes to reach their aim of promoting reproductive autonomy. Reaching this aim is currently being challenged with the introduction of non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in first‐trimester prenatal screening programmes: amongst others its procedural ease—it only requires a blood draw and reaches high levels of reliability—might hinder women’s understanding that they should make a personal, informed decision about screening. We offer arguments for a renewed recognition and use of informed consent compared to (...) informed choice, and for a focus on value‐consistent choices and personalized informational preferences. We argue for a three‐step counselling model in which three decision moments are distinguished and differently addressed: (1) professionals explore women’s values concerning whether and why they wish to know whether their baby has a genetic disorder; (2) women receive layered medical‐technical information and are asked to make a decision about screening; (3) during post‐test counselling, women are supported in decision‐making about the continuation or termination of their pregnancy. This model might also be applicable in other fields of genetic (pre‐test) counselling, where techniques for expanding genome analysis and burdensome test‐outcomes challenge counselling of patients. (shrink)

This collection of 17 articles offers an overview of the philosophical activities of a group of philosophers (who have been) working at the Groningen University. The meta-methodological assumption which unifies the research of this group, holds that there is a way to do philosophy which is a middle course between abstract normative philosophy of science and descriptive social studies of science. On the one hand it is argued with social studies of science that philosophy should take notice of what scientists (...) actually do. On the other hand, however, it is claimed that philosophy can and should aim to reveal cognitive patterns in the processes and products of scientific and common sense knowledge. Since it is thought that those patterns can function as guidelines in new research and/or in research in other disciplines, philosophy can nevertheless hold on to the normative aim which is characteristic of 'classical' philosophy of science. Compared to this common assumption, there is a diversity of subjects. Some papers deal with general problems of science, knowledge, cognition and argumentation, others with topics relating to foundational problems of particular sciences. Therefore this volume is of interest to philosophers of science, to philosophers of knowledge and argumentation in general, to philosophers of mind, as well as for scientists working in the physical and applied sciences, biology, psychology and economy who are interested in the foundations of their disciplines. After a foreword by Leszek Nowak and a general introduction by the editors, the book is divided into four parts, with special introductions. - I: Conceptual Analysis in Service of Various Research Programmes (Henk Zandvoort, Rein Vos, Rick Looijen, Gerben Stavenga, Renée Dalitz); - II: The Logic of the Evaluation of Arguments, Hypotheses, Default Rules, and Interesting Theorems (Erik Krabbe, Theo Kuipers, Alfons Keupink, Maarten Janssen/Yao-Hua Tan, Bert Hamminga); - III: Three Challenges to the Truth Approximation Programme (Sjoerd Zwart, Hinne Hettema/Theo Kuipers, Roberto Festa); - IV: Explicating Psychological Intuitions (Anne-Ruth Mackor, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lex Guichard, Michel ter Hark). The Groningen research group was recently qualified, by an official international assessment committee, as one of the best philosophy research groups in the Netherlands. (shrink)

Examples of hypotheses about the number of planets are frequently used to introduce the topic of (actual) truthlikeness but never analyzed in detail. In this paper we first deal with the truthlikeness of singular quantity hypotheses, with reference to several ‘the number of planets’ examples, such as ‘The number of planets is 10 _versus_ 10 billion (instead of 8).’ For the relevant ratio scale of quantities we will propose two, strongly related, normalized metrics, the proportional metric and the (simplest and (...) hence favorite) fractional metric, to express e.g. the distance from a hypothetical number to the true number of planets, i.e. the distance between quantities. We argue that they are, in view of the examples and plausible conditions of adequacy, much more appropriate, than the standardly suggested, normalized absolute difference, metric. Next we deal with disjunctive hypotheses, such as ‘The number of planets is between 7 and 10 inclusive is much more truthlike than between 1 and 10 billion inclusive.’ We compare three (clusters of) general ways of dealing with such hypotheses, one from Ilkka Niiniluoto, one from Pavel Tichý and Graham Oddie, and a trio of ways from Theo Kuipers. Using primarily the fractional metric, we conclude that all five measures can be used for expressing the distance of disjunctive hypotheses from the actual truth, that all of them have their strong and weak points, but that (the combined) one of the trio is, in view of principle and practical considerations, the most plausible measure. (shrink)

Met als hoofdgedachte dat begrip voor het gevoel en het lijden van de mens centraal moet staan, geeft een psychiater zijn inzichten over de wetenschappelijke basis van de psycho-analyse en over de bestaande psychoanalytische theorieën.

For human interaction, it is important to understand what emotional state others are in. Especially the observation of faces aids us in putting behaviours into context and gives insight into emotions and mental states of others. Detecting whether someone is nervous, a form of state anxiety, is such an example as it reveals a person’s familiarity and contentment with the circumstances. With recent developments in computer vision we developed behavioural nervousness models to show which time-varying facial cues reveal whether someone (...) is nervous in an interview setting. The facial changes, reflecting a state of anxiety, led to more visual exposure and less chemosensory (taste and olfaction) exposure. However, experienced observers had difficulty picking up these changes and failed to detect nervousness levels accurately therewith. This study highlights humans’ limited capacity in determining complex emotional states but at the same time provides an automated model that can assist us in achieving fair assessments of so far unexplored emotional states. (shrink)

Richard Rorty is one of the most oft-cited yet least understood philosophers of the twentieth century. This book offers an overview and introduction to Rorty's ideas, key writings and contributions to the various fields of philosophy. Chronologically organized, the book traces the development of Rorty's thought and examines all the key topics, and controversies, central to his work. Ronald A. Kuipers introduces Rorty's complex thought through the exploration of three Rortyan personas: The Philosophical Therapist, The Liberal Ironist, and the Anticlerical (...) Prophet. This exploration of Rorty's multivalent yet deeply coherent intellectual identity is set against the background of Rorty's personal motivations for studying philosophy, and for pursuing the controversial questions he did. The book portrays how, in conversation with the traditions of American Pragmatism, Analytic Philosophy, and Continental Thought, Rorty weaves his own unique and original philosophy. Rorty's originality resides in his fresh approach to interrelated social and political problems, revealing a thinker who has important reasons for wading into controversial intellectual waters. This is the ideal companion to study of this hugely influential thinker. (shrink)

In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.

In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.