Simion and Kelp explain the trustworthiness of an AI based on that AI’s disposition to meet its obligations. Roughly speaking, according to Simion and Kelp, an AI is trustworthy regarding its task if and only if that AI is obliged to complete the task and its disposition to complete the task is strong enough. Furthermore, an AI is obliged to complete a task in the case where the task is the AI’s etiological function or design function. This account has a (...) strength in that it can provide a unificatory rationale for the trustworthy-making properties of AIs. According to this account, being explainable, being safe, and being transparent are the trustworthy-making properties of an AI because an AI can fulfill its etiological or design functions in the case where it is explainable, safe, and transparent. This paper shows that though Simion and Kelp’s account has a strength, this account is not satisfactory for two reasons. The first reason is that an AI’s trustworthiness is not determined just by the AI’s disposition to meet obligations, and the second reason is that it is difficult to explain how an AI’s etiological function and design function have to do with that AI’s obligations. To provide a full-fledged account, Simion and Kelp should dismiss these concerns. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce Robert Brandom’s Inferentialism (Inferential theory of meaning) and Fodor and Lepore’ compositionality objection, and to protect Inferentialism from the objection based on compositionality. According to Inferentialism, To grasp or understand a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences in which it is involved. However, Fodor and Lepore oppose Inferentialism by offering the compositionality objection. They argue that compositionality is needed to explain productivity, systematicity and learnability of language, meaning is compositional. (...) Since inferential role is not compositional, however, meaning is not an inferential role. Against Fodor and Lepore’s objection, I present Brandom’s responses and develop my own views. (shrink)

Tandis que « Matière et mémoire » de Bergson est aujourd’hui bien connu et relativement bien analysé, « Les maladies de la mémoire » de Ribot est presque oublié malgré son originalité et nouveauté dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Mais dans le domaine de la science, notamment dans des recherches sur la mémoire, la pensée de Ribot est toujours vivante. Dans cet article, nous voulons d’abord voir la relation entre deux pensées sur la mémoire, celle de Ribot et celle de (...) Bergson, et ensuite nous vérifierons comment traiter aujourd’hui l’héritage de la pensée de Ribot et de Bergson dans le domaine de la philosophie et de la science. A travers ces recherches, nous allons comprendre que le désaccord de Bergson avec Ribot vient de la différence méthodologique entre deux philosophes et que cette différence suscite deux pensées complètement différentes l’une à l’autre. (shrink)

Introduction The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohlbergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reasoning, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity. Objectives Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model or (...) 3-factor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlbergian theory. Methods We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2 manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included the SGMJ in addition to the three factors. Results In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices. Conclusion We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development, can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study. (shrink)

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are (...) not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground. (shrink)

It is often said that a correct logical system should have no counterexample to its logical rules and the system must be revised if its rules have a counterexample. If a logical system (or theory) has a counterexample to its logical rules, do we have to revise the system? In this paper, focussing on the role of counterexamples to logical rules, we deal with the question. -/- We investigate two mutually exclusive theories of arithmetic - intuitionistic and paraconsistent theories. The (...) paraconsistent theory provides a (strong) counterexample to Ex Contradiction Quodlibet (ECQ). On the other hand, the intuitionistic theory gives a (weak) counterexample to the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) of the paraconsistent theory. If any counterexample undermines the legitimate use of logical rules, both theories must be revised. -/- After we investigate a paraconsistent counterexample to ECQ and the intuitionist’s answer against it, we arrive at the unwelcome conclusion that ECQ has both a justification and a counterexample. Moreover, we argue that if a logical rule were abolished whenever it has a counterexample, a promising conclusion would be logical nihilism which is the view that there is no valid logical inference, and so a correct logical system does not exist. Provided that the logical revisionist is not a logical nihilist, we claim that not every counterexample is the ground for logical revision. While logical rules of a given system have a justification, the existence of a counterexample loses its role for logical revision unless the rules and the counterexample share the same structure. (shrink)

This essay provides a brief history of how Asian American Christian ethics came to be and sketches the main themes and questions with which this new theological-ethical discipline has grappled since its inception. It then provides an account of two interrelated issues that continue to shape the development of Asian American Christian ethics: whether there is a distinctive Asian American perspective and how the racial marginalization of Asian Americans in Christian ethics and society as a whole might inform this perspective. (...) This essay proposes that as long as Asian Americans continue to be made invisible as model minorities, the goal of racial and social justice will fall short. (shrink)

It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (⊥). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ⊥. It is, however, not the (...) problem of the intuitionistic approaches to the liar-type paradoxes but the lack of expressive power of the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system. We introduce a meta-level negation for a given system and a meta-level absurdity, ⋏, to the intuitionistic system. We shall show that in the system, the inference to ⊥ is not given without the assumption that the system is complete. Moreover, we consider the Double Meta-Level Negation Elimination rules (DMNE) which implicitly assume the completeness of the system. Then, the restriction of DMNE can rule out the inference to ⊥. (shrink)

The lack of attention to sustainability, as a concept with multiple dimensions, has presented a developmental gap in green marketing literature, sustainability, and marketing literature for decades. Based on the established premise of customer–corporate (C–C) identification, in which consumers respond favorably to companies with corporate social responsibility initiatives that they identify with, we propose that consumers would respond similarly to companies with sustainability initiatives. We postulate that consumers care about protecting and preserving favorable economic environments (an economic dimension of sustainability) (...) as much as they care about natural environments. Thus, we investigate how two sustainability dimensions (i.e., environmental and economic) and price can influence consumer responses. Using an experimental method, we demonstrate that consumers favor sustainability in both dimensions by giving positive evaluations of the company and purchase intent. In addition, consumers respond more negatively to poor company sustainability than to high company sustainability. In comparison, consumers respond more negatively to the company’s poor commitment to caring for the environment than to the company’s poor commitment to economic sustainability. We also find that consumers do not respond favorably to low prices when they have information about the firm’s poor environmental sustainability. Finally, we find support for an interaction effect between consumer support for sustainability and corporate sustainability; that is, consumers evaluate a company more favorably if the company shares the consumers’ social causes. Overall, we conclude, from our empirical study, support for the idea that consumers do respond to multiple dimensions of sustainability. (shrink)

Why would God institute the practice of efficacious petitionary prayer? Why would God not simply give us what we need before we ask? I examine recently proposed solutions to this puzzle and argue that they are inadequate to explain why an omniscient and perfectly good God would act differently in response to prayer. I propose that God has reasons to not always maximize a creature’s good, even in a sinless world, and that petitionary prayer functions as a means to reward (...) those who trust God, to enable us to actively love those we cannot otherwise help, and to give the petitioner personal evidence of God’s existence and care for her, creating a virtuous cycle of increasing faith. I refine this proposal by responding to several objections involving human responsibility and the epistemology of divine action. Along the way, I offer several ways petitioners can recognize God’s having answered a prayer and how God might help us with some common obstacles to prayer. (shrink)

Advocates of the conserved quantity (CQ) theory of causation have their own peculiar problem with conservation laws. Since they analyze causal process and interaction in terms of conserved quantities that are in turn defined as physical quantities governed by conservation laws, they must formulate conservation laws in a way that does not invoke causation, or else circularity threatens. In this paper I will propose an adequate formulation of a conservation law that serves CQ theorists' purpose.

The advance of medical and biological science and technology has presented us with new ethical and legal issues. Is embryonic stem cell research morally justified and legally allowed? What moral status do embryos have? Who can be a morally appropriate user of In Vitro fertilization? Who can use donated sperm and/or egg? What is the scope of reproductive liberty?” What is the meaning of a family and that of reproduction? How far does our genetic intervention go?”Scientists, lawyers, and laymen are (...) waiting for clear answers from philosophers. Unfortunately, philosophers have not seemed to give satisfactory answers to them. We may have various reasons. One of main reasons, however, seems to me that the above philosophical questions have not been the main research topics for philosophers since philosophy gave up metaphysical and/or religious questions. Thus, I argue that biomedical ethical issues urge philosophers tochange the philosopher’s attitude of doing philosophy. Those issues make them consider and rethink our fundamental concepts of life, death, family, and values pursued by human beings. In addition, it is easy to find conflicting ethical and philosophical answers to the above questions. Thus, it is very hard to reach consensus on the above ethical issues. This makes philosophers consider how we make a group decision over ethical issues showing conflicting but reasonable ethical answers in a plural society. This requires philosophers, especially scholars of ethics, develop a new ethics and its relevant concepts. This ethics must be able to work in a plural society where reasonable comprehensive belief systems coexist. In these respects, I argue that bioethics has to struggle with a newchallenge to philosophy. (shrink)

_The New Bergson_ Edited by John Mullarkey Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999 ISBN 0719053803 hb; 0719055539 pb 235 pp.

Meaning in life has been widely recognized as a hallmark of psychological well-being and positive youth development. The goal of this study was to validate the Korean version of the Meaning in Life in Children Questionnaire utilizing the framework suggested by the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing. Data were obtained from 277 fifth graders aged 10–11 in three elementary schools in Seoul and Gyeonggi through a paper-and-pencil survey. We translated the MIL-CQ, a 21-item self-report measure developed based on Frankl’s (...) “meaning triangle,” into Korean. Psychological well-being measures were also assessed. Validity and reliability data were collected. The content of domains and items was appropriate for measuring MIL among children. A three-factor model consisting of attitude, creativity, and experience pathways was extracted via exploratory factor analysis, and a three-factor hierarchical model including attitude, creativity, and experience as first-order factors and MIL as a second-order factor was confirmed via confirmatory factor analysis. Higher levels of MIL were related to higher levels of satisfaction with life, self-esteem, positive affectivity, and lower levels of negative affectivity. All item fit statistics were acceptable based on the Rasch model. The analysis of the measurement invariance of each item showed that the responses to one item varied by gender, suggesting that additional items might facilitate better measurement of MIL in children. This study provides validity and reliability evidence that K-MIL-CQ is appropriate for measuring MIL among South Korean elementary school students. (shrink)

The present paper traces the trajectory of the development of Husserl’s phenomenology from its incipient eidetic phase over the transcendental to the lifeworld-phenomenological, and ascertains that, in spite of all their complexities, the idea of Zu den Sachen selbst is the very objective of all those ‘phenomenological’ investigations. The search after the ‘immediately given’ (Vorgegebenheiten) finally discovers that the concrete cultural life-worlds are the authentically ‘immediately pre-given’ and all kinds of knowledge and sciences (higher cultural configurations) are nothing but idealizations (...) of those floor-like concrete life-worlds. Phenomenology previously as rigorous first science is now re-oriented as phenomenology as rigorous (i.e., transcendental) regional studies. Transcendental regional studies (i.e., life-world phenomenology), I’d like to argue, is the very key to the resolution of the ambiguities of the concept of life-world as well as the key to the understanding of the vague future direction of phenomenological philosophizing that Husserl himself left open. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is an unprecedented task to interpret Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy of happiness. Although happiness has been discussed in many psychologies, Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology defines happiness as “flow”, a psychic state of ongoing immersion guided by intrinsic motivations and rewards. In this paper, I interpret our transcendental consciousness as a radical “flow” maker and claim that in our transcendental life, happiness is what we ourselves are. Then, I propose this not only as an appeal to a change (...) of attitude for happiness, but also as a deep hermeneutics of the mental skills and activity designs suggested by positive psychology. In this way, worldly happiness dictums can be profoundly re-examined. Understood as such, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology leaves us the task of how to make a concrete form of qualitative or hermeneutical research on happiness out of it. (shrink)

In this paper I put forward a counterexample against Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of fragility and then refute a possible response by Lewis. And I go on to argue that Lewis can overcome the counterexample by excluding fragility-mimickers from the stimulus appropriate to the concept of fragility.

To answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such (...) meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it. (shrink)

Inequality in income and wealth distribution in society is said to be a great concern to many social critics. Rarely is the issue of inequality in income or wealth distribution, as such, a concern for the majority of Americans as individuals, however.