The paper argues that two distinct and independent notions of plurality are involved in natural language anaphora and quantification: plural reference (the usual non-atomic individuals) and plural discourse reference, i.e., reference to a quantificational dependency between sets of objects (e.g., atomic/non-atomic individuals) that is established and subsequently elaborated upon in discourse. Following van den Berg (PhD dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 1996), plural discourse reference is modeled as plural information states (i.e., as sets of variable assignments) in (...) a new dynamic system couched in classical type logic that extends Compositional DRT (Muskens, Linguistics and Philosophy, 19, 143-186, 1996). Given the underlying type logic, compositionality at sub-clausal level follows automatically and standard techniques from Montague semantics become available. The idea that plural info states are semantically necessary (in addition to non-atomic individuals) is motivated by relative-clause donkey sentences with multiple instances of singular donkey anaphora that have mixed (weak and strong) readings. At the same time, allowing for non-atomic individuals in addition to plural info states enables us to capture the intuitive parallels between singular and plural (donkey) anaphora, while deriving the incompatibility between singular (donkey) anaphora and collective predicates. The system also accounts for empirically unrelated phenomena, e.g., the uniqueness effects associated with singular (donkey) anaphora discussed in Kadmon (Linguistics and Philosophy, 13, 273-324, 1990) and Heim (Linguistics and Philosophy, 13, 131-177, 1990) among others. (shrink)

In recent literature on plurals the claim has often been made that the move from singular to plural expressions can be iterated, generating what are occasionally called higher-level plurals or superplurals, often correlated with superplural predicates. I argue that the idea that the singular-to-plural move can be iterated is questionable. I then show that the examples and arguments intended to establish that some expressions of natural language are in some sense higher-level plurals fail. Next, I argue (...) that these and some other expressions should instead be classified as plurals whose reference is articulated, an idea explained and elaborated in the paper. I also show that the related categories of plural and superplural predicates collapse to that of ordinary predicates. In the process we also see that the law of substitutivity salva veritate should be elaborated for cases involving expressions more complex than singular ones. (shrink)

A vagueness-based approach to the mass/count distinction was developed in Chierchia. Liebesman argues against Chierchia’s proposal developing four arguments against it. He furthermore tries to make a case that regardless of the details of C’s proposal no vagueness-based account of the distinction is viable. In this paper I show that Liebesman’s arguments against C don’t go through and that a line of investigation on the mass count contrast in terms of vagueness is not only viable but also perhaps a source (...) of insight on the nature of this much debated distinction and on the relations between grammar and metaphysics in general. The outcome of the present discussion is of interest beyond the question of who is right in this debate, as it puts into sharper focus several issues pertaining to mass vs. count, plural vs. singular, and the role of vagueness in natural language semantics. (shrink)

Italian and English factives differ from each other in interesting and puzzling ways. English emotive factives license Negative Polarity Items, while their Italian counterparts don’t. Moreover, when factives of all kinds occur in the scope of negation in Italian an intervention effect emerges that interferes with NPI licensing way more robustly than in English. In this paper, I explore the idea that this contrast between Italian and English may be due to a difference in the Complementizer -system of the two (...) languages that parallels a difference that has been noted in the literature between the singular and the plural definite determiner the with respect to NPI licensing. Understanding how factives differ across languages with respect to polarity phenomena is not only interesting in its own right, but also because it sheds further light on how logical contradictions may affect grammaticality judgments. (shrink)

The rise of surrogacy in India over the last decade has helped individuals across the world to realize their parenting aspirations. In the macro-context of poverty in India and the hierarchical and patriarchal family set-up, concerns are expressed about coercion of women to participate in surrogacy. While the ethical issues engulfing surrogacy are widely discussed, not much is known about the role women play in the decision-making to participate in surrogacy. The paper aims to addresses this gap and is based (...) on a part of a larger ethnographic study conducted at a surrogacy clinic in Anand, Gujarat, India. We explored experiences of forty-one surrogate mothers using in-depth interviews and analysed the narratives to identify women’s own perceived role in the decision-making to participate in surrogacy. Narratives describing the decision-making process were identified and treated as a preliminary unit of analysis. We examined the use of singular and plural pronouns like “I,” “me,” and “mine” versus “we,” “us,” and “our,” along with the use of active and passive voice to determine whether women assumed responsibility for the decision to participate in surrogacy or they attributed the decision to others. Findings unravelled the complexities of the decision-making process and indicated that eighty-five percent of the women played an active role in the decision-making to participate in surrogacy, albeit with new avenues of exploitation in the commercial market space and raised serious bioethical concerns. (shrink)

An important question within psycholinguistic research is whether grammatical features, such as number values on nouns, are probabilistic or discrete. Similarly, researchers have debated whether grammatical specifications are only set for individual lexical items, or whether certain types of noun phrases (NPs) also obtain number valuations at the phrasal level. Through a corpus analysis and an oral production task, we show that conjoined NPs can take both singular and plural verb agreement and that notional number (i.e., the numerosity (...) of the referent of the subject noun phrase) plays an important role in agreement with conjoined NPs. In two written production tasks, we show that participants who are exposed to plural (versus singular or unmarked) agreement with conjoined NPs in a biasing story are more likely to produce plural agreement with conjoined NPs on a subsequent production task. This suggests that, in addition to their sensitivity to notional information, conjoined NPs have probabilistic grammatical specifications that reflect their distributional properties in language. These results provide important evidence that grammatical number reflects language experience, and that this language experience impacts agreement at the phrasal level, and not just the lexical level. (shrink)

During October 1953, Hannah Arendt made a short list, divided into two columns, which represents what she sought to move away from, singularity, and what she was moving towards, plurality. The purpose of the present contribution is to interpret her concept of the duality of the two-in-one as a middle term which opens up an ambiguous field that can either facilitate the movement towards plurality and human worldliness or turn the human soul towards itself, withdrawing it from the world. Exemplified (...) by such phenomena as thinking and friendship, the duality of the two-in-one will prove to be precisely as double and dual as its name indicates. Despite Arendt’s scepticism about the capacity of thinking and friendship to bring about a common, plural world, it will be argued, in a critical discussion of her views, that she needs and treasures both phenomena enough to give them a significant role to play in the movement towards plurality. (shrink)

Dentre os vários modelos normativos de democracia elaborados na Filosofia Política, um dos mais influentes é o da democracia deliberativa, cuja característica mais essencial é a exigência de justificação pública. John Rawls, ao estabelecer as bases do que ele chamou de razão pública, tornou-se um dos principais marcos teóricos desse modelo democrático. Atrelado à razão pública, Rawls tratou do dever de civilidade, um dever moral coerente com ela e com a sua ideia de democracia. O cidadão que o cumpre colabora (...) com a construção e manutenção da própria democracia. O escopo do presente artigo é, à luz da teoria rawlsiana, estabelecer quatro componentes de naturezas distintas e aparentemente contraditórias (singular, plural, subjetivo e objetivo) que, somados, completam o dever de civilidade, tornando-o essencial para o regime democrático. (shrink)

A growing number of philosophers and logicians advocate for plural languages in which we can refer to and quantify over pluralities of individuals. Some go further, advocating for higher-level languages in which we can refer to and quantify over, not just pluralities of individuals, but pluralities of pluralities, pluralities of pluralities of pluralities, and so on. These languages suggest a metaphysical picture on which even a small pool of individuals gives rise to a potentially infinite hierarchy of distinct pluralities. (...) Most higher-levellists would be loathe to take that picture seriously, but avoiding it turns out to be more difficult than it appears. Fortunately, we can develop a ‘one-level’ plural language which has all the benefits of higher-level ones but which avoids any commitment to the hierarchy. (shrink)

This book, by one of the most innovative and challenging contemporary thinkers, consists of an extensive essay from which the book takes its title and five shorter essays that are internally related to “Being Singular Plural.” One of the strongest strands in Nancy’s philosophy is his attempt to rethink community and the very idea of the social in a way that does not ground these ideas in some individual subject or subjectivity. The fundamental argument of the book is (...) that being is always “being with,” that “I” is not prior to “we,” that existence is essentially co-existence. Nancy thinks of this “being-with” not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a mutual abandonment and exposure to each other, one that would preserve the “I” and its freedom in a mode of imagining community as neither a “society of spectacle” nor via some form of authenticity. The five shorter essays impressively translate the philosophical insight of “Being Singular Plural” into sophisticated discussions of national sovereignty, war and technology, identity politics, the Gulf War, and the tragic plight of Sarajevo. The essay “Eulogy for the Mêlée,” in particular, is a brilliant discussion of identity and hybridism that resonates with many contemporary social concerns. As Nancy moves through the exposition of his central concern, being-with, he engages a number of other important issues, including current notions of the “other” and “self” that are relevant to psychoanalytic, political, and multicultural concepts. He also offers astonishingly original reinterpretations of major philosophical positions, such as Nietzsche’s doctrine of “eternal recurrence,” Descartes’s “cogito,” and the nature of language and meaning. (shrink)

La Universidad es el espacio en el que los diversos saberes pueden reconocerse como participantes de un mismo proceso de conocimiento. La naturaleza fronteriza de la Universidad la lleva a ubicarse en el cruce de intereses nacionales y de una vocación universal, tensión que se manifiesta en su doble tarea de formar profesionales y de preparar el suelo para un sistema del saber. Aún más, en tanto que obedece a un interés nacional económico-político, la Universidad traslada la lógica de la (...) división del trabajo y de la especialización al ámbito del saber, lo cual genera la atomización de los saberes. La consigna de la interdisciplina busca remediar estas consecuencias, pero supone la interdisciplina como una meta a alcanzar. En este ensayo, propongo pensar, en cambio, a la interdisciplina como la naturaleza de todo saber. Los saberes no son totalidades cerradas y autosuficientes, sino el resultado de una interrelación entre todos los discursos. La noción de un saber singular plural expresa esta naturaleza relacional del conocimiento. Las Humanidades ayudan a volver sobre esta común pertenencia de todo discurso a los demás gracias a que enfatizan la raigambre de todos ellos en la experiencia vivida, su articulación en el orden simbólico, y su motivación pragmática: de ese modo invita a todo saber a reconocerse también como una expresión contingente de un determinado sistema del saber, también de carácter histórico. La naturaleza interdisciplinar de todo discurso nos lleva a pensar la Universidad como un espacio cenobítico, en el que todos los saberes son convocados a una misma celebración, en una vida que es esencialmente relacional y en el que el saber puede florecer. (shrink)

No one would think of denying that literary texts lend themselves to “plural” readings, as we say today: the studies collected in this issue are one more proof, as is the title of the collection. Tens of thousands of pages have already been written on Shakespeare and on Montaigne, which does not preclude the enjoyment of those that are offered us here; and the idea would not occur to anyone that this process of re-writing could ever come to an (...) end, aside from the apocalyptic end of all human things, written and unwritten. (shrink)

One of the strongest strands in Nancy's philosophy is an attempt to rethink community and the very idea of the social in a way that does not ground these ideas in some individual subject or subjectivity. The fundamental argument of this book is that being is always 'being with', that 'I' is not prior to 'we', that existence is essentially co-existence. He thinks this being together, not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a mutual abandonment and (...) exposure to each other, one that would preserve the 'I' and its freedom in a mode of imagining community as neither a 'society of spectacle' nor via some form of 'authenticity'. (shrink)

According to some philosophers and social scientists, mainstream economic theories currently play an unprecedented role in shaping human societies. This phenomenon can be linked to the dissemination of methodological individualism, where common goods are interpreted as reducible to aggregates of individuals' well-being. Nonetheless, some emergent difficulties of economics in coping with global institutional issues have encouraged some authors to revise that paradigm. In the last three decades, there has been a parallel growing philosophical interest in investigating social sciences' epistemological and (...) ontological foundations. Unfortunately, these two research trends have often not communicated systematically enough to understand the specific ontology of collective aims. It is still unclear whether some irreducible social goods exist and how the answer to this question can set up a consistent understanding of cooperative actions. This dissertation addresses this issue, drawing on philosophical investigations about collective intentionality. It claims that a coherent ontological taxonomy of irreducible and reducible social goods is theoretically viable and can reframe prevailing approaches to collective action dilemmas influenced by the traditional economic categorisation of goods. The research begins by analysing how the influential theory of public goods has paved the way for some social and moral impasses. Furthermore, some theoretical proposals suggesting the existence of relational goods and common-pool resources are scrutinised. Hence, a refutation of the ontological reduction of all social goods to individual ones is developed, arguing that a specific form of cooperation, grounded in we-intentions and we-reasoning, shows the plausibility of the existence of some kinds of irreducible collective goods. Expanding on that view, a refinement of this categorisation of social goods is put forward by underlying the function of some relational entities, such as trust and shared sensemaking processes, in making cooperation robust in uncertain environments. Finally, by applying the taxonomy to collective action gridlocks regarding climate change, digital information, and public education, the consistency of this hypothesis is tested, showing that a pluralistic ontological account of social goods might improve the moral understanding of current social dilemmas. (shrink)

A number of natural language constructions seem to provide access to structured pluralities — that is, pluralities of pluralities. A body of semantic work has debated how to model this additional structure and the extent to which it depends on pragmatics. In this article, after controlling for the distinction between ambiguity and underspecification, we present new data showing that structured pluralities are sometimes but not always available, depending on the form of the plural noun phrase used. We show that (...) these results challenge two longstanding theories of plurality. We sketch two different ways to account for these data and describe some of the diverging predictions they make. (shrink)

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote (...) Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system. (shrink)

Ofrecemos en este trabajo un estudio de contraste entre la descripción que hace Sībawayhi, el más reconocido de los gramáticos árabes, de los esquemas de plural fracto de uno de los esquemas de singular, faʿal (a modo de ejemplo) y los datos extraídos de algunas obras lexicográficas árabes y del corpus de textos árabes reunidos en algunas bases de datos disponibles. Una vez analizado el método del gramático de Basora en la recogida y sistematización de datos, el objetivo (...) es comprobar si la información que proporciona coincide con la aportada por los diccionarios y textos árabes. Estudiamos de forma particular el tratamiento de los casos de alomorfía, esto es, el uso de varios plurales para un mismo singular, tratando de dilucidar si se trata de una alomorfía libre o motivada. (shrink)

Si bien existen algunos intentos de repensar el tema de la tecnología desde la filosofía de Søren Kierkegaard, no existe todavía un diálogo directo con la postura transhumanista. En este artículo proponemos un acercamiento inédito, entendido como una crítica, desde el pensamiento de Kierkegaard al transhumanismo y su concepto de singularity. Primero, analizamos el modo en el que los transhumanistas entienden el concepto de singularity y sus limitaciones; después, apoyándonos en la filosofía de Kierkegaard, defendemos que la única singularidad posible (...) y real es la persona humana como relación primigenia, fuente de angustia y libertad, pecado y amor, espíritu. Defendemos también que esta relación no puede ser replicada por una creación artificial. (shrink)

At the opening of the first volume of his Deconstruction of Christianity, Nancy argues that “The much discussed ‘return of the religious,’ which denotes a real phenomenon, deserves no more attention than any other ‘return’” (1). This statement may seem paradoxical in light of Nancy’s extensive study of the logic of the return – including, of the divine – in texts such as “Of Divine Places,” Noli me tangere, Dis-Enclosure and Adoration. Nancy does pay considerable attention to something that, according (...) to him, deserves none. In this paper, I examine Nancy’s critique of the “return of religion” in detail and argue that it would be a mistake to assume that Nancy’s understanding of the logic of the “return” is limited to the – largely uninteresting and even dangerous, indeed – return of the Same, just as it is a mistake to assume that the phenomenon known as the “return of religion” merely consists of the dialectical resurgence of a past religious fervour, a step backwards in history. According to Nancy, religion today returns in a way that radically breaks with the logic of the return of the Same and testifies to an eternal return of difference which, paraphrasing Nancy, opens religion to the limitlessness that constitutes its truth. It does, therefore, deserve our attention, yet only insofar as, paraphrasing Nancy, it opens religion to the limitlessness that constitutes its truth (Dis-Enclosure 1), thereby providing us with new resources to think religion in the singular-plural today. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a unified semantics for singular and plural superlative expressions that makes use of the ‘**’ (“double star”) distributivity operator (an operator whose role is to pluralize 2-place predicates). The analysis aims to solve two problems: (a) the distributivity problem (the fact that a superlative expression doesn’t distribute over the atomic parts of the plural individual it is predicated of); and (b) the cut-off problem (the fact that a plural superlative expression cannot (...) simultaneously be predicated of two distinct yet overlapping plural individuals). We argue that any solution to these problems that posits two distinct superlative morphemes, one corresponding to a superlative operator for singular individuals and one corresponding to a superlative operator for plural individuals, is challenged by the lack of cross-linguistic morphological evidence. We provide a unified analysis, and account for the differences between plural and singular superlative expressions by appealing to pragmatic principles. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafe Dinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho, morafe ke yo tee fela; ke morafe wa batho. Ya go bitjwa DNA ka Sekgowa e laetja go sena pelaelo gore batho kamoka ke bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee. Ka bjalo, morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao. Bophelong bja ka metlha re bona gore ba gona bao ba gananago le taba ye. (...) Ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi. Go ya ka bona, merafe ye e a fapafapana ebile tlhago e laetja gore go nale merafe ya kua godimo le ya kua fase. Go nale merafe yewe e tlhabologilego le ye esa tlhabologang. Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo. Ke yona e tlholago dintwa. E ganana le phedisano yeo e ithekgilego godimo ga toka le khutjo magareng ga batho. Ka fao taodiso ye e shireletja maemo a gore go nale morafe yo tee fela; morafe yo ebego lelapa le tee fela la batho kamoka. [Race is an indivisible singular but practice insists it is a frangible plural Biological anthropology suggests that there is only one human race. Studies of the DNA have confirmed that there is only one human family marked by a variety of differences such as the type of hair, the color of eyes and skin. Instead of accepting the scientific finding that the human race is one, humanity is involved in an absurd but deadly race to prove that there are many races arising from a preestablished ontological hierarchy. According to this imaginary hierarchy, races are graded on a scale of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization” and “barbarism.” The thesis defended in this article is that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations. The human race is an indivisible singular and not a frangible plural.]. (shrink)

Under the influence of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, the theme of absolute alterity still dominates the thinking of the ethical in Continental philosophy. This article examines an alternative ethical démarche, Jean-Luc Nancy's ‘singular plurality’, which refuses to start with the opposition of same and other, arguing instead for a primacy of relation, the ‘in-common’ and the ‘with’. The article first distinguishes Nancy's ‘singular plural’ from other recent attempts to disengage ethical thinking from the Levinasian framework, before (...) showing how Nancy proceeds otherwise than in terms of sameness and alterity while still maintaining an ethical impetus. Foregrounding what is politically and philosophically at stake in the difference between Nancy and the Levinasian/Derridean model, the article concludes by considering how Nancy can be defended against critics who mistakenly argue that he discounts alterity. (shrink)

Bare plurals (dogs) behave in ways that quantified plurals (some dogs) do not. For instance, while the sentence John owns dogs implies that John owns more than one dog, its negation John does not own dogs does not mean “John does not own more than one dog”, but rather “John does not own a dog”. A second puzzling behavior is known as the dependent plural reading; when in the scope of another plural, the ‘more than one’ meaning of (...) the plural is not distributed over, but the existential force of the plural is. For example, My friends attend good schools requires that each of my friends attend one good school, not more, while at the same time being inappropriate if all my friends attend the same school. This paper shows that both these phenomena, and others, arise from the same cause. Namely, the plural noun itself does not assert ‘more than one’, but rather the plural denotes a predicate that is number neutral (unspecified for cardinality). The ‘more than one’ meaning arises as an scalar implicature, relying on the scalar relationship between the bare plural and its singular alternative, and calculated in a sub-sentential domain; namely, before existential closure of the event variable. Finally, implications of this analysis will be discussed for the analysis of the quantified noun phrases that interact with bare plurals, such as indefinite numeral DPs (three boys), and singular universals (every boy). (shrink)

Extension of the logical language to deliver plural reference and the logical relations that constitute knowledge of the singular and plural acquires empirical bite just in case it conforms with increasing precision to the syntax of the natural language and affords explanation of what speakers know about the distribution and meaning of plural expressions in their language. As for the syntax of natural language, this discussion, being none too precise, is guided throughout by just two considerations (...) and their immediate consequences, which is discussed at greater length in this article. The first, morpheme univocality, is that a morpheme despite its various syntactic and morphological contexts has a single meaning that supports all its occurrences. (shrink)

Ordinary English contains different forms of quantification over objects. In addition to the usual singular quantification, as in 'There is an apple on the table', there is plural quantification, as in 'There are some apples on the table'. Ever since Frege, formal logic has favored the two singular quantifiers ∀x and ∃x over their plural counterparts ∀xx and ∃xx (to be read as for any things xx and there are some things xx). But in recent decades (...) it has been argued that we have good reason to admit among our primitive logical notions also the plural quantifiers ∀xx and ∃xx. More controversially, it has been argued that the resulting formal system with plural as well as singular quantification qualifies as ‘pure logic’; in particular, that it is universally applicable, ontologically innocent, and perfectly well understood. In addition to being interesting in its own right, this thesis will, if correct, make plural quantification available as an innocent but extremely powerful tool in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophical logic. For instance, George Boolos has used plural quantification to interpret monadic second-order logic and has argued on this basis that monadic second-order logic qualifies as “pure logic.” Plural quantification has also been used in attempts to defend logicist ideas, to account for set theory, and to eliminate ontological commitments to mathematical objects and complex objects. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the implications of Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of the subject for educational philosophy by connecting his re-interpretation of Descartes to his later thinking on what he names the ontological singular plural. Nancy’s re-imagining of the Cogito coalesces around the figure of the mouth through which the subject enunciates itself within the world. Reading this extension of the ego through the mouth as an enunciation of ontological singular plurality exposes a speaking subject that communicates (...) via a sharing of its own being with other singular subjects. The article concludes that Nancy’s singular plural holds potential for affirming a substance-less subjectivity that can nevertheless serve as a locus of meaning in the classroom. (shrink)

In ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions', Keith Donnellan claimed that Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson ignored referential uses of definite descriptions. The intense debate that followed Donnellan's paper focused on the contrast between Donnellan and Russell, leaving Strawson aside. In this paper, I focus on the contrast between Donnellan and Strawson. By focusing on this contrast, my aim is, first, to clarify the nature of Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and, second, to argue that a proper (...) understanding of referential uses holds the key to a proper understanding of direct reference. Contrary to the standard view, the crucial issue is not the nature of the proposition expressed (singular versus general) but how a speaker comes to talk about an object. (shrink)

This paper explores the semantics of bare singulars in Turkish, which are unmarked for number in form, as in English, but can behave like both singular and plural terms, unlike in English. While they behave like singular terms as case-marked arguments, they are interpreted number neutrally in non-case-marked argument positions, the existential copular construction, and the predicate position. Previous accounts 20:1–15, 2010; Görgülü, in: Semantics of nouns and the specification of number in Turkish, Ph.d. thesis, Simon Fraser (...) University, 2012) propose that Turkish bare singulars denote number neutral sets and that morphologically plural marked nouns denote sets of pluralities only. This approach leads to a symmetric correlation of morphological and semantic markedness. However, in this paper, I defend a strict singular view for bare singulars and show that Turkish actually patterns with English where this correlation is exhibited asymmetrically. I claim that bare singulars in Turkish denote atomic properties and that bare plurals have a number neutral semantics as standardly assumed for English. I argue that the apparent number neutrality of bare singulars in the three cases arises via singular kind reference, which I show to extend to the phenomenon called pseudo-incorporation and a construction that I call kind specification. I argue that pseudo-incorporation occurs in non-case-marked argument positions following Öztürk and the existential copular construction, whereas kind specification is realized in the predicate position. The different behaviors of bare singulars in Turkish and English stem from the fact that singular kind reference is used more extensively in Turkish than in English. Furthermore, while there are well-known asymmetries between singular and plural kind reference cross-linguistically, Turkish manifests a more restricted distribution for bare plurals than English in the positions where pseudo-incorporation and kind specification are in evidence. I explain this as a blocking effect, specific to Turkish, by singular kind terms on plural kind terms. (shrink)

I explore the possibility that the feminine, like art, can be thought in terms of Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of the singular plural. In Les Muses, Nancy claims that art provides for the rethinking of a technë not ruled by instrumentality. Specifically, in rethinking aesthetics in terms of the debates laid out by Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, he resituates the ontological in terms of the specificity of the techniques of each particular artwork; each artwork establishes relations particular to its (...) world or worlds. What is at stake in the singular plural is the multiplicity of relations that are lost in the unifying gestures that arise out of radical oppositions. I rethink the singular plural through a phenomenological encounter with Barb Hunt’s artwork, Antipersonnel, a collection of hand-knitted replicas of antipersonnel landmines. (shrink)