Is sociobiology a new paradigm? A number of people have claimed that it is. I argue that, sociologically speaking, it may well be. But epistemologically, it is not. The case rests on one's interpretation of the major Darwinian evolutionary mechanism, natural selection. In this note, it is shown that sociobiology relies on an orthodox understanding of selection. Thus, in crucial epistemological respects, sociobiology is continuous with the rest of Darwinian evolutionary theory.

A great deal has been written during the past decade about the subject of sociobiology. The appearance of E. O. Wilson’s massive text, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, set off interdisciplinary tremors whose vibrations are still being felt in such exotic parts of the academic world as philosophy. Yet despite all the attention directed toward sociobiology within and beyond the university by both its admirers and detractors, some very basic issues pertaining to the subject remain notably obscure.

The essay explores the development of sociobiology, its basic tenets, and its contributions to the study of human nature as well as ethics. It insists that Darwinism is more than a biological theory and presents a possibility of interpreting sociobiology as manifesting not the triumph of the selfish gene but, on the contrary, the only way in which the expansion of altruism was possible.

Moral philosophers aside, people sustain a vital interest in the results of ethical theorizing only on the hope that these results will eventually provide satisfying, clear, and univocal answers to essential moral questions like: What is Right Action? What is Good? But whatever else might be said of this century’s labors in moral philosophy, they have failed utterly to nurture this hope. Instead, the overwhelming perception has been that this sort of answer to these questions is beyond our ken, (...) or else that the questions themselves are somehow unintelligible. It would not be unrealistic to forecast a dismal and lonely future for the discipline of ethics should this perception continue to be the dominant one. (shrink)

welcomed by a new generation of students and scholars in all branches of learning.

In the years leading up to the Second World War the ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, created the tradition of rigorous, Darwinian research on animal behavior that developed into modern behavioral ecology. At first glance, research on specifically human behavior seems to exhibit greater discontinuity that research on animal behavior in general. The 'human ethology' of the 1960s appears to have been replaced in the early 1970s by a new approach called ‘sociobiology’. Sociobiology in its turn appears (...) to have been replaced by an approach calling itself Evolutionary Psychology. Closer examination, however, reveals a great deal of continuity between these schools. At present, whilst Evolutionary Psychology is the most visible form of evolutionary psychology, empirical and theoretical research on the evolution of mind and behavior is marked by a diversity of ideas and approaches and it is far from clear which direction(s) the field will take in future. (shrink)

When the sociobiology debate erupted in 1975, there were almost too many contributions to the heated exchanges between sociobiologists and their critics to count. In the fall of 1976, a Canadian educational film entitled _Sociobiology: Doing What Comes Naturally_ sparked further controversy due to its graphic visuals and outrageous narration. While critics claimed the film was a promotional tool to further the sociobiological agenda in educational settings, sociobiologists quickly distanced themselves from the film and, in turn, accused the critics (...) of consciously misrepresenting sociobiology by organizing showings of the film. Using audio, video, archival, and published sources, this paper explores the complicated history of _Sociobiology: Doing What Comes Naturally_ and demonstrates how the public debate about the film reflects the positions, polemics, and polarization of the sociobiology debate as a whole. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Despite its excesses, sociobiology can make a useful contribution to ethics, if it is recognised that it need not impinge on free‐will, and if the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ can be avoided. This contribution is the central concept of evolutionary stability, and the implication which can be drawn from it, that concern for the future is a basic part of human nature. In stable societies, such concern is manifested as fear of change, or strict adherence to tradition, but modern ideas (...) of progress have engendered a cavalier attitude to the more distant future, and current ethical systems cannot get to grips with duties towards future generations. It is suggested that the popularity of sociobiology and the present‐day interest in conservation both reflect an aspect of human nature which has too long been neglected by moralists. (shrink)

Among the numerous criticisms of sociobiology is the criticism that it is not genuine science. This paper defends sociobiology against this criticism. There are three aspects to the defense. First, it is argued that the testability criterion of pseudoscience is generally problematic as a criterion and that even if accepted it fails to mark sociobiology as a pseudoscience. Second, it is argued that Thagard's more comprehensive and sophisticated criterion of pseudoscience fails to mark sociobiology as a (...) pseudoscience. Third, a positive case for accepting sociobiology as genuine science is presented. (shrink)

Although classical evolutionary theory, i.e., population genetics and the Modern Synthesis, was already implicitly ‘gene-centred’, the organism was, in practice, still generally regarded as the individual unit of which a population is composed. The gene-centred approach to evolution only reached a logical conclusion with the advent of the gene-selectionist or gene’s eye view in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas classical evolutionary theory can only work with fitness differences between individual organisms, gene-selectionism is capable of working with fitness differences among genes (...) within the same organism and genome. Here, we explore the explanatory potential of ‘intra-organismic’ and ‘intra-genomic’ gene-selectionism, i.e., of a behavioural-ecological ‘gene’s eye view’ on genetic, genomic and organismal evolution. First, we give a general outline of the framework and how it complements the—to some extent—still ‘organism-centred’ approach of classical evolutionary theory. Secondly, we give a more in-depth assessment of its explanatory potential for biological evolution, i.e., for Darwin’s ‘common descent with modification’ or, more specifically, for ‘historical continuity or homology with modular evolutionary change’ as it has been studied by evolutionary developmental biology during the last few decades. In contrast with classical evolutionary theory, evo-devo focuses on ‘within-organism’ developmental processes. Given the capacity of gene-selectionism to adopt an intra-organismal gene’s eye view, we outline the relevance of the latter model for evo-devo. Overall, we aim for the conceptual integration between the gene’s eye view on the one hand, and more organism-centred evolutionary models on the other. (shrink)

What is the relation of the biological to the social sciences? Fierce battles are being currently fought over this question and much hangs on the answer. If society (or culture) is taken as an irreducible category which can only be understood in its own terms, the social sciences can feel safe from the sinister designs of other disciplines. Yet it is a commonplace that cultures vary, and we humans are prone to look at the differences rather than the similarities between (...) them. The result can be a thoroughgoing relativism. If culture cannot be understood by means of any non-cultural categories, cultural differences themselves can be accepted as the ultimate truth about man. When everything is cultural, even the notion of a non-cultural category can seem to be a ludicrous contradiction in terms. The categories with which we think are the product of our culture, or so we are told. Instead of our being able to understand culture in terms of anything beyond itself, our understanding appears totally moulded by the society to which we belong. Any theory can thus be seen as merely the expression of the beliefs of a particular society. (shrink)

This book examines sociobiology’s validity and significance, using the sociobiological theory of the evolution of mating and parenting as an example. It identifies and discusses the array of factors that determine sociobiology’s effort to become a science, providing a rare, balanced account—more critical than that of its advocates and more constructive than that of its critics. It sees a role for sociobiology in changing the way we understand the goals of evolutionary biology, the proper way to evaluate (...) emerging sciences, and the deep structure of scientific theories. The book’s premise is that evolutionary biology would not be complete if it did not explain evolutionarily significant social facts about nonhumans and humans. It proposes that explanations should be evaluated in terms of their basis in underlying theories, research programs, and conceptual frameworks. (shrink)

In Microeconomic Laws, Rosenberg defended neoclassical economic theory against the charge that it at best provides ad hoc truisms concerning economic action. This defense was carried out within realist and empiricist confines; Rosenberg rejected attempts to defend microeconomics by either instrumentalist or rationalist analyses. While Microeconomic Laws was optimistic regarding the legitimacy and success of empiricist microeconomics, Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science is the opposite, and is directed at all social science. Empiricist social science, Rosenberg claims, is (...) sterile. It has failed to provide more than ad hoc generalizations, and there is reason to think it will never do better. This is not to suggest rationalist or non-realist analyses of social science; rather, it is grounds to forego traditional social science and take up sociobiology. (shrink)

The term 'sociobiology' was introduced in E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) as the application of evolutionary theory to social behavior. Sociobiologists claim that many social behaviors have been shaped by natural selection for reproductive success, and they attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary histories of particular behaviors or behavioral strategies. This survey attempts to clarify and evaluate the aim of sociobiology. Given that a neutral account is impossible, this entry does the next best thing. It (...) takes sociobiology as well as its critics seriously. On the one hand, by demonstrating that current studies of evolution and human behavior are based on Darwin's arguments for evolution (properly updated), we gain a strong rationale for thinking that something closer to sociobiology than to disconnectionism is needed to properly understand human sociality. Nevertheless, this survey reconstructs sociobiology in its best light, according to its aims. Consequently, criticism of sociobiology as it is actually practiced is not ignored or dismissed. This approach reveals what is best about sociobiology, while remaining sensitive to many of the problems it has generated. (shrink)

Michael Bradie challenges the assumption, common among sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, that it is to science, not philosophy, that we must look if we wish to answer the fundamental questions of ethics.

Politics is a part of human life, and biology is the study of life. All political beings are biological organisms. These are truisms, but they might suggest lines of investigation. Sociobiology, the name suggests, means social theory taken as a branch of the life sciences. Human sociobiology, then, would apply biological theory to human society. How might this be done?

The semantic view of scientific theories has been defended as more adequate than the “received” view, especially with respect to biological theories (Beatty 1980, 1981; Thompson 1983). However, the semantic view has not been evaluated on its own terms. In this paper I first show how the theory of sociobiology propounded by E.O. Wilson (1975) can be understood on the semantic approach. I then discuss the criticism that Wilson’s theory is beset by the problem of unreliable generalizations. I suggest (...) that this problem results from the use of the model-building strategy in theory. I conclude that the problem is pressing enough to impugn the semantic view as an adequate account of sociobiological theory.According to proponents of the semantic view of theories, scientific theories function to specify a class of “models,” interpretations, or representations of their postulates. (shrink)

Recent deconstructive developments in ecology (doubts about the existence of unified communities and ecosystems, the diversity-stability hypothesis, and a natural homeostasis or “balance of nature”; and an emphasis on “chaos,” “perturbation,” and directionless change in living nature) and the advent of sociobiology (selfish genes) may seem to undermine the scientific foundations of environmental ethics, especially the Leopold land ethic. A reassessment of the Leopold land ethic in light of these developments (and vice versa) indicates that the land ethic is (...) still a viable environmental ethic, if judiciously updated and revised. (shrink)

In this essay I defend functional explanations in sociobiology against the charge that they are exercises in speculative story-telling. I distinguish proximate and ultimate biological functions, and discuss their role in functional explanations. I characterize functional explanations as a kind of "consequence explanation", and argue that sociobiologists need to justify a "functional fact" in addition to a "consequence law". Two methods used to supply evidence for functional hypotheses, the technique of optimality analyses and the comparative method, are discussed and (...) illustrated with examples. I argue that adequate evidence for hypothesis about the function of a trait can be provided by the method of comparison, but not by optimality analyses. The comparative method contains an inductive phase that provides independent warrant for, and so serves to establish the high probability of, functional hypotheses. Independent warrant cannot be provided by optimality analyses alone: the model-building approach itself mandates the sacrifice of the truth of a hypothesis to its predictive power. I conclude that while the sociobiologist may wish to employ the optimality analysis as a heuristic strategy, reliable functional explanations are better sought through the use of the comparative method. (shrink)

Sociobiologists explain human social behavior as genetically adapative. The intervention of cultural learning into the processes of the acquisition and transmission of human behavior makes such explanation prima facie unjustified. William Durham has developed a theory of coevolution which claims that although the processes of genetic evolution and cultural evolution are independent, the results of the two processes are "functionally complementary." In this paper I characterize the conditions necessary for giving an explanation by adaptation of human behavior and argue that (...) Durham's defense of functional complementarity cannot be justified until further evidence of the causal background conditions of cultural transmission and selection are presented. (shrink)

Edward O. Wilson's forays into human sociobiology have been the target of persistent, vehement attack by his Harvard colleague in evolutionary biology, Richard C. Lewontin. Through examination of existing documents in the case, together with in-depth personal interviews of Wilson, Lewontin, and other biologists, the reasons for Wilson's stance and Lewontin's criticisms are uncovered. It is argued that the dispute is not primarily personally or politically motivated, but involves a conflict between long-term scientific-cum-moral agendas, with the reductionist program as (...) a key issue. It is concluded that it is in the interest of both disputants to keep the controversy alive. (shrink)

Modern socialist economic reforms which center on the establishment of a commodity based economic system, demand a reconsideration of human nature. Marxism and human sociobiology give different answers to questions about human nature, but neither is complete in itself. It seems timely, therefore, to suggest that a combination of biological understanding with a Marxist-based social understanding would produce a more adequate notion of human nature, thereby helping us to resolve a number of problems posed by reforms currently taking place (...) in socialist countries. We might also hope to face new challenges posed in the future. (shrink)

T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) was not only an active protagonist in the religious and scientific upheaval that followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution but also a harbinger of the sociobiological debates about the implications of evolution that are now going on. His seminal lecture Evolution and Ethics, reprinted here with its introductory Prolegomena, argues that the human psyche is at war with itself, that humans are alienated in a cosmos that has no special reference to their needs, and (...) that moral societies are of necessity in conflict with the natural conditions of their existence. Seen in the light of current understanding of the mechanisms of evolution, these claims remain as controversial today as they were when Huxley proposed them. In this volume George Williams, one of the best-known evolutionary biologists of our time, asserts that recent biological ideas and data justify a more extreme condemnation of the "cosmic process" than Huxley advocated and more extreme denial that the forces that got us here are capable of maintaining a viable world. James Paradis, an expert in Victorian studies, has written an introduction that sets the celebrated lecture in the context of cultural history, revealing it to be an impressive synthesis of Victorian thinking, as well as a challenge to eighteenth-century assumptions about the harmony of of nature. With Huxley's lecture as a focal point, the three parts of this book unite philosophy and science in a shared quest that recalls their common origins as systems of knowledge. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Inclusive fitness theory provides conditions for the evolutionary success of a gene. These conditions ensure that the gene is selfish in the sense of Dawkins (The selfish gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976): genes do not and cannot sacrifice their own fitness on behalf of the reproductive population. Therefore, while natural selection explains the appearance of design in the living world (Dawkins in The blind watchmaker: why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design, W. W. Norton, New York, (...) 1996), inclusive fitness theory does not explain how. Indeed, Hamilton’s rule is equally compatible with the evolutionary success of prosocial altruistic genes and antisocial predatory genes, whereas only the former, which account for the appearance of design, predominate in successful organisms. Inclusive fitness theory, however, permits a formulation of the central problem of sociobiology in a particularly poignant form: how do interactions among loci induce utterly selfish genes to collaborate, or to predispose their carriers to collaborate, in promoting the fitness of their carriers? Inclusive fitness theory, because it abstracts from synergistic interactions among loci, does not answer this question. Fitness-enhancing collaboration among loci in the genome of a reproductive population requires suppressing alleles that decrease, and promoting alleles that increase the fitness of its carriers. Suppression and promotion are effected by regulatory networks of genes, each of which is itself utterly selfish. This implies that genes, and a fortiori individuals in a social species, do not maximize inclusive fitness but rather interact strategically in complex ways. It is the task of sociobiology to model these complex interactions. (shrink)

Sociobiologists claim that there are important constraints on human behavior that are the result of genetic factors. Some of them also claim that this has important implications for ethics, and even more generally for determining how persons ought to behave. In this paper I shall defend these two claims, though I shall not be defending the views of any particular sociobiologist, unless one is prepared to count Hobbes as a sociobiologist.

I offer some proposals for how human sociobiology might be transformed from a collection of unsupported claims into a rigorous successor discipline. The achievement of behavioral ecology in providing functional descriptions of animal behavior suggest that the goal of human sociobiology ought to be to give functional characterizations of human behavior. Much traditional human sociobiology tries to be more ambitious, attempting to build grand theories of human nature. I argue that these ventures fail, and that pursuit of (...) the more modest task of achieving functional descriptions will require that human sociobiologists undergo a four-stage process. The four stages involve: the liberalization of evolutionary theory, the construction of precise models and the development of systematic data, the recognition of the effects of cultural transmission, and the integration of evolutionary ideas with considerations about proximate and developmental mechanisms. Only the first two stages are treated in any detail. (shrink)