Pt. I. Writings on the theory of logic: I. Pure logic or the logic of quality apart from quantity. II. The substitution of similars. III. On the mechanical performance of logical inference. IV. On a general system of numerically definite reasoning.--Pt. II. John Stuart Mill's philosophy tested: I. On geometrical reasoning. II. On resemblance. III. The experimental methods. IV. Utilitarianism. V. On the method of difference.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

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The Victorian polymath William Stanley Jevons is generally and rightly venerated as one of the great innovators of economic theory and method in what came to be known as the 'marginalist revolution'. This book is an investigation into the cultural and intellectual resources that Jevons drew upon to revolutionize research methods in economics. Jevons's uniform approach to the sciences was based on a firm belief in the mechanical constitution of the universe and a firm conviction that (...) all scientific knowledge was limited and therefore hypothetical in character. Jevons's mechanical beliefs found their way into his early meteorological studies, his formal logic, and his economic pursuits. By using mechanical analogies as instruments of discovery, Jevons was able to bridge the divide between theory and statistics that had become more or less institutionalized in mid nineteenth-century Britain. (shrink)

This paper shows that William Stanley Jevons was not precursor of logical positivism despite his attempt to build up a unified science. His mechanical reductionism was directed towards this project, and Jevons tried to found mathematics on logic through the development of a theory of number. We show that his attempts were unsuccessful, and that his errors remain visible within the totality of his mechanical system, including his economics. We argue that both his logic and his economics (...) are comprehensible only when interpreted in terms of extent of meaning, and that Jevons? system gives rise to difficulties when interpreted in terms of intent of meaning. We argue that Jevons? methodological recommendations were intended to bridge the gap between extent and intent of meaning. Although Jevons did not succeed in establishing a unified science, his flawed methodology resulted in one of the first applications of statistics to the social sciences. (shrink)

The impressive young scholar Bert Mosselmans, analyzing the theory and policy of Jevons, a major figure in the field of the history of economics, has put together a volume with broad international appeal, particularly in Europe, North America and Japan, that offers a synthetic approach to Jevons’ economic theory, applied economics and economic policy. Adopting a relativist approach to his subject, Mosselmans focuses on all aspects of Jevons’ theory, tying the different strands together where appropriate and discriminating (...) where necessary. Examining the relation between theory and practise he situates Jevons within the history of economic thought and in relation to his logic, ethics, religion and aesthetics. Ideal for scholars working in the fields of philosophy and history as well as economics, this ambitious and insightful work offers a comprehensive analysis of one of the founding fathers of modern economic thought, whose work marked a new chapter in its history, bridging the gap between classical and neo-classical economics. (shrink)

First published in 1988. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

According to the nineteenth-century polymath William Stanley Jevons, natural phenomena were a series of combinations and permutations. The similarity between Jevons’s account and other instances of ars combinatoria has already been noticed, although this topic has never been extensively addressed in the literature. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of Jevons’s logic and philosophy of science as an art of combinations. Jevons’s position shall be compared with other theorizers in the ars combinatoria tradition. (...) This study will show that Jevons’s art of combinations differed from some of the examples here investigated because he did not believe that language could refer to the primal constituents of reality. Rather, his art of combinations relied on the order of combinations, displaying a syntactical nature. Consequently, I will argue that Jevons’s logic presents some relevant similarities to Leibniz’s characteristica. Moreover, this analysis offers a contribution to the study of Jevons’s logic, highlighting the ontological implications embedded in his logical thought. (shrink)

Although the existence of correspondence between George Boole (1815?1864) and William Stanley Jevons (1835?1882) has been known for a long time and part was even published in 1913, it has never been fully noted; in particular, it is not in the recent edition of Jevons's letters and papers. The texts are transcribed here, with indication of their significance. Jevons proposed certain quite radical changes to Boole's system, which Boole did not accept; nevertheless, they were to become (...) well established. (shrink)

William Stanley Jevons was a self-proclaimed revolutionary, whose struggle under what he called the 'Noxious authority' of John Stuart Mill in economic circles is well-known. He was highly critical of the labour theory of value and the wages fund theory attributed to David Ricardo, and offered his own theory of exchange value which he contrasted to the 'mazy and preposterous' notions of English Classical economists.

: Suppose a scientist discovers a new, unpredicted phenomenon. How can one ascertain the causes, properties and laws of the phenomenon? How can one plan the investigation of the circumstances that affect the phenomenon, and of the effects that the new phenomenon could produce? If the phenomenon is completely unexpected and does not fit any previous theory, it is impossible to provide a theoretical prediction of its likely properties. In the empiricist tradition, therefore, the recommended method was to investigate all (...) possibilities, because in such cases it is impossible to exclude a priori anything. William Stanley Jevons provided a clear criticism of this method. It is impossible to investigate all possibilities, because they are boundless. Is it then impossible to plan the research of unexpected new phenomena? No. Jevons pointed out an alternative. According to Jevons, a scientist confronting a new, unexpected phenomenon, should compare it to other known phenomena to establish analogies. This comparison should allow the researcher to find out one or several known phenomena similar to the new one. This paper will present and discuss Jevons’ proposal in the context of late 19th century methodology of science. Keywords: scientific method; empirical research; analogy; Jevons, William Stanley. (shrink)

William Stanley Jevons occupies a pivotal position in the history of economic thought, spanning the transition from classical to neo-classical economics and playing a key role in the Marginal Revolution. The breadth of Jevons's work is examined here which: * includes a detailed consideration of a wide range of his work-policy, theoretical, methodological, applied and empirical * relies on textual exegis * takes account of a wide range of secondary sources A new approach to the 'Jevonian revolution' (...) is adopted, which emphasizes the link between poverty and economics and focuses on the nature and meaning of rationality in Jevonian economics. (shrink)

This paper discusses the role of analogy in pre-theoretical experimental research, studying a particular historical case (the discovery and early investigation of X rays) and using the methodological ideas of William Stanley Jevons. The historical data and Jevons’ analysis suggest that the discovery of a completely new phenomenon is due to chance, but soon afterwards it is necessary that some assumptions provide a guidance to the research – otherwise, observations and experiments would occur at random, and that (...) would sendom lead to significant results. It is impossible to study all the factors that could possibly affect a give phenomenon, and hence the attention of the researcher must focus upon a small number of features. This choice, in a pre-theoretical context, must be guided by analogies. Contrary to tradicional analyses, this paper associates a peculiar epistemological status with analogies used in that kind of investigation: they are interpreted as originating desiderata, instead of probable hypotheses. RESUMO: A partir do estudo de um caso histórico particular (descoberta e investigação preliminar dos raios X), utilizando as concepções metodológicas de William Stanley Jevons, este artigo analisa o papel das analogias no processo de pesquisa experimental pré-teórica. A análise de Jevons e os dados históricos indicam que a descoberta de um fenômeno totalmente novo se dá ao acaso, porém logo em seguida é necessário que algumas suposições guiem a pesquisa, caso contrário as observações e experimentos seriam realizados totalmente ao acaso, o que dificilmente levaria a algum resultado. É impossível estudar todos os fatores que podem influenciar um fenômeno, e assim a atenção do pesquisador deve ser focalizada apenas sobre alguns aspectos, e essa escolha, em um contexto pré-teórico, deve ser guiada por analogias. Ao contrário das análises tradicionais, este artigo atribui um status epistemológico diferente às analogias empregadas nesse tipo de investigação, interpretando-as como geradoras de desiderata e não de hipóteses prováveis. (shrink)

While it is well known that Carl Menger and Stanley Jevons adopted very different views on the role of mathematics in economics1, it is usually admitted that their respective views on the theory of value were relatively close. Indeed, both strongly objected to the classical theory of value which is based on objective costs of production, whether these be labour or capital costs. Moreover, each elaborated, roughly at the same time, an alternative economic theory based on a comparison (...) between the various degrees to which needs are fulfilled thanks to goods whose effect tends progressively to diminish with the fulfilment of these needs. Furthermore, each managed to ground a theory of economic exchange on the fact that people are rational enough to choose which of two goods will provide them with the greatest benefit. In the face of such similarities, it is tempting to conclude that, while using very different terminologies, these two economists developed quite similar analyses whose key element is a subjective theory of value which was opposed to the objective theory of the classical economists. It is true that specialists of Austrian economics have often underscored the originality of Menger's position and its differences with those of the two other fathers of the so-called marginalist revolution, but while they have seriously questioned the.. (shrink)

The project of constructing a logic of scientific inference on the basis of mathematical probability theory was first undertaken in a systematic way by the mid-nineteenth-century British logicians Augustus De Morgan, George Boole and William Stanley Jevons. This paper sketches the origins and motivation of that effort, the emergence of the inverse probability (IP) model of theory assessment, and the vicissitudes which that model suffered at the hands of its critics. Particular emphasis is given to the influence which (...) competing interpretations of probability had on the project, and to the role of the 'lottery' or 'ballot box' metaphor in the philosophical imagination of the proponents of the IP model. (shrink)

On which philosophical foundations is the attribution of numerical magnitudes to qualitative phenomena based? That is, what is the philosophical basis for attributing, through measurement operations, numbers to empirical qualities that our senses perceive in the outside world? This question, nowadays rarely addressed in such a way, actually refers to an old debate about the quantification of qualities. A historical analysis reveals that it was a major issue in the “context of discovery” of the first attempts to mathematize new fields (...) of knowledge, whereas the “context of justification” leading our contemporary perspective on such episodes often overlooks such problems. As a consequence, little attention has so far been given to tracing its emergence back to its original context, leaving in the shadows an important debate about measurement. In this respect, the work of William Stanley Jevons is worth analysis. As a preliminary step toward his ambitious project to mathematize economics, he first attempted to understand the mechanism underlying measurement in physics, through a very innovative approach. Its main merit consisted in trying to overcome the Aristotelian distinction between quantities and qualities. In this article, I will strive to highlight the significance of his work for the history of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Joan Robinson was one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century and a fearless critic of free-market capitalism. A major figure in the controversial 'Cambridge School' of economics in the post-war period, she made fundamental contributions to the economics of international trade and development. In Economic Philosophy Robinson looks behind the curtain of economics to reveal a constant battle between economics as a science and economics as ideology, which she argued was integral to economics. In her customary vivid and (...) pellucid style, she criticizes early economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and neo-classical economists Alfred Marshall, Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras, over the question of value. She shows that what they respectively considered to be the generators of value - labour-time, marginal utility or preferences - are not scientific but 'metaphysical', and that it is frequently in ideology, not science, that we find the reason for the rejection of economic theories. She also weighs up the implications of the Keynesian revolution in economics, particularly whether Keynes's theories are applicable to developing economies. Robinson concludes with a prophetic lesson that resonates in today's turbulent and unequal economy: that the task of the economist is to combat the idea that the only values that count are those that can be measured in terms of money. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Sheila Dow. (shrink)

During 1881, the British logicians John Venn and Hugh MacColl engaged in a brief dispute in Nature about ‘symbolical logic’. The letters to the editor shed interesting light on the early reception of MacColl’s contributions to logic and his position in the logical community of the Victorian era. Drawing on the correspondence between Venn and William Stanley Jevons, this paper analyzes the background and context of these letters, adding to the recent interest in the social dimensions of the (...) development of British algebraic logic in the confusing intermediary period between the 1870s and 1890s. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the selections into (...) several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

The term ‘substitution’, given minimal attention in thinking, became important in modern logic, but its treatment is highly technical. After a short review of its conceptual-historical background, the article discusses two important contemporary social and cultural theorists of substitution, Roberto Calasso and Michel Serres. It then turns to William Stanley Jevons, who first took up Boole’s logic, formulated the principle ‘substitution of similars’, the presumed heart of reasoning itself, constructed the first computer, and was a founder of neoclassical (...) economics. The coincidence of these innovations in Jevons, through ‘substitution’, captures the way the modern world was set on its current trajectory, progressing towards a ‘substitution society’. The article concludes that as the key values of human life cannot be substituted, substitution as a general principle applied to human existence is absurd; economic theory, however, as shown in the ideas of Jevons, is founded on the exclusion of such genuine and meaningful concerns. (shrink)