A collection of Plato's work showing the unsurpassed power of his writing, which ultimately lies in the fact that he was as much a literary as a philosophic genius.

The essays in this book criticise the new positivism in education policy, whereby education is systematically reduced to those things that can be measured by so-called 'objective' tests. School curricula have been narrowed with an emphasis on measurable results in the 3 R’s and the ‘quality’ of university departments is now assessed by managerial exercises based on commercial audit practice. As a result, the traditional notion of liberal arts education has been replaced by utilitarian productivity indices.

Interest is growing in the relocalization of staple crops, including wheat, in western Washington (WWA), a nontraditional wheat-growing area. Commercial bakers are potentially important food chain intermediaries in the case of relocalized wheat production. We conducted a mail survey of commercial bakers in WWA to assess their interest in sourcing wheat/flour from WWA, identify the characteristics of bakeries most likely to purchase wheat/flour from WWA, understand the factors important to bakers in purchasing regionally produced wheat/flour, and identify perceived barriers to (...) making such purchases. Sixty-one percent of survey respondents were interested in purchasing WWA wheat/flour. Bakers who used retail strategies to market their products were more likely to be interested in WWA wheat/flour compared to those not using retail methods. Bakers’ current purchases of Washington wheat/flour were not related to their interest in purchasing WWA flour. The most important factors bakers would consider in purchasing regionally produced wheat/flour were consistency of flour quality, quality of flour, and reliability of supply. Cost was the most frequently mentioned barrier to the purchase of regionally produced wheat/flour. Our results are relevant for other areas attempting to reconnect grain producers, commercial bakers, and consumers in mutually beneficial ways. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books 1–5Stephen M. WheelerWilliam S. Anderson, ed. Ovid’s Metamorphoses: Books 1–5. With introduction and commentary. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997. vi 1 578 pp. Cloth $49.95; paper, $21.95.For those who labor in the vineyard of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the vintage of 1997 should be a memorable one. One of the year’s most notable releases is Anderson’s second installment to his Oklahoma text and commentary. The first volume—introduction, (...) text, and commentary to books 6–10—appeared hysteron proteron in 1972. The new edition, covering books 1–5, resembles its older sibling in format and conception but also benefits from developments in Ovidian scholarship since 1972. The introduction follows the same basic framework as its predecessor in surveying Ovid’s career, subsequent reception of the Metamorphoses, plan and tone of the poem, poet at work, manuscript tradition, and selected bibliography. But the contents of each section are [End Page 170] updated, and exemplary discussions are recast to reflect the material of books 1–5. The Latin text is, of course, different too. Now Anderson reprints, without critical apparatus, the sixth edition of his Ovidius, Metamorphoses (Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1993), which, incidentally, incorporates illa instead of illas at 1.2. After the text come the notes, which run to 420 pages. The average of one page of commentary per ten lines of poetry equals the rate of the earlier volume. This may seem a lot at first sight, especially given the compact format of the pages. Yet if one compares Anderson’s ratio of commentary to text with that of other commentaries on individual books of the Metamorphoses, there is little significant difference (Bömer is the exception!). Finally, the volume is equipped with a ten-page index.The format of the new commentary is more reader-friendly than the old. In addition to the headings (in capitals) for major episodes, Anderson now inserts subheadings (in italics) for individual scenes, which help to articulate what he takes to be the structural units within each book. Moreover, he introduces each book with a survey of its contents, and he prefaces each myth or scene with background information about sources, literary models, and Ovid’s own innovations. The notes themselves offer a reasonably current and welcome alternative to the existing English-language commentaries that cover books 1–5: A. G. Lee (book 1); J. Moore-Blunt (book 2); A. A. R. Henderson (book 3); and the briefer notes of D. E. Hill to books 1–4 and 5–8. Of these, the most closely comparable with Anderson are the school commentaries of Lee and Henderson. While Anderson cites Lee frequently in his comments on book 1, the differences of approach and interpretation between the two are so great that there is little danger of duplication and plenty of room for dialogue. Henderson’s commentary, which receives no notice from Anderson, is pitched primarily to the sixth-form pupil and first-year university student. Anderson aims a little higher: high enough indeed that he keeps his reader abreast of Bömer’s commentary. But Anderson generally refrains from citing secondary literature, even though his views are clearly informed by the work of scholars such as Bernbeck, Otis, Segal, Galinsky, and Solodow.Nowhere in the new edition does Anderson actually state who his audience is. Perhaps it goes without saying that such a commentary is directed toward students. But perceptive readers will realize that Anderson engages a multiple audience that includes teachers and scholars as well. It may therefore be helpful to spell out what level of competence Anderson expects of his readers. In the first place, thorough familiarity with Latin morphology is required, because Anderson provides few prompts. Naturally, rare verb forms receive explanation, and odd items, such as Greek declensional endings, are clarified. If Anderson is sparing in morphological assistance, he is quite generous in matters of syntax, regularly explaining case usage and complex verbal constructions. He also draws attention to characteristic syntactic features of Ovid’s style, such as the pluperfect tense to set a scene, participial subordination, or the relative [End Page 171] clause placed before... (shrink)

This essay deals with property rights in body parts that can be exchanged in a market. The inquiry arises in the following context. With some exceptions, the laws of many countries permit only the donation, not the sale, of body parts. Yet for some years there has existed a shortage of body parts for transplantation and other medical uses. It might then appear that if more sales were legally permitted, the supply of body parts would increase, because people would have (...) more incentive to sell than they currently have to donate. To allow sales is to recognize property rights in body parts. To allow sales, however, makes body parts into “commodities”—that is, things that can be bought and sold in a market. And some view it as morally objectionable to treat body parts as commodities. (shrink)

We agree with Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland’s (2023) assessment that the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) should be viewed as an essential requirement of the organ donation process, and that the essence of the r...

One of the largest ongoing debates in scholarship on Avicenna concerns his epistemology of the first acquisition of intelligible forms or concepts. “Emanationists” hold that intelligibles are emanated by the separate Active Intellect directly into human minds. “ionists” hold that intelligibles are abstracted by the human intellect from sensory images. Neither of these positions has a satisfactory grip on Avicenna’s philosophy. I propose that the two positions can be reconciled because Avicenna states in many texts that what the AI emanates (...) is a power, and not the various intelligible forms. I argue that this can only be the power of abstraction itself. This new interpretation does greater justice to Avicenna’s system and reveals his unique place in the history of epistemology. (shrink)

In this foundational work on the theory of linguistic and mental representation, Stephen Schiffer surveys all the leading theories of meaning and content in the philosophy of language and finds them lacking. He concludes that there can be no correct, positive philosophical theory or linguistic or mental representation and, accordingly advocates the deflationary "no-theory theory of meaning and content." Along the way he takes up functionalism, the nature of propositions and their suitability as contents, the language of thought and (...) other sententialist theories of belief, intention based semantics, and related issues in ontology. Stephen Schiffer is Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one's puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to answer both of these questions. I also suggest ways in which our account of scientific rationality might benefit from having a better sense of the (...) kind of epistemic goal we are trying to realize, when we engage in our explanatory inquiries. Two Senses The Need for Explanation An Example Proto-understanding Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.

This chapter shows even tighter textual and conceptual connections between these philosophers, delineating how Spinoza drew from Avicenna on the definition of essence and the essence/existence distinction. Spinoza departs from Avicenna, potentially regarding the tendency of essences for existence and especially regarding their universality and particularity. Multiple doses of Avicennianism likely made their way into Spinoza's bloodstream. Avicenna's Najāt and the IP are the most likely sources for Maimonides's own knowledge of Avicenna. In medieval philosophy, including Avicenna accidents are real (...) beings and are isomorphic to Spinoza's modes. As may already be clear and is well‐attested, Avicenna and Spinoza agree that the essence/existence distinction only holds for things other than God. Spinoza's apparent insistence on essence as particular in itself seems to a more fundamental contrast with Avicenna and a more obviously modern/late medieval innovation than Spinoza's utilization of God's nominal essence in an ontological proof. (shrink)

This fourth article in a six-part series correlating Kant’s philosophy with the Yijing begins by summarizing the foregoing articles: both Kant and the Yijing’s 64 hexagrams (gua) employ “architectonic” reasoning to form a four-level system with 0+4+12+(4x12) elements, the fourth level’s four sets of 12 correlating to Kant’s model of four university “faculties”. This article explores the second twelvefold set, the law faculty. The “idea of reason” guiding this wing of the comparative analysis is immortality. Three of Kant’s “quaternities” correspond (...) to three sets of four gua in the Yijing: the fourfold nature of the soul in rational psychology (as substantial, simple, unified, spatially related) corresponds to gua 47, 6, 58, 10, respectively; the three “Definitive Articles” and fourth, “Secret Article”, in Perpetual Peace correspond to gua 16, 35,51, 21; and the four objective relations of law to duty in Metaphysics of Morals correspond to gua 45, 12, 17, 25. (shrink)

Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of "grasping" that seems to be characteristic of understanding (...) differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge. Zagzebski's account Kvanvig's account Two problems Comanche cases Unreliable sources of information The upper-right quadrant So is understanding a species of knowledge? A false choice. (shrink)

Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the Aristotelian world. It also describes man's abilities and prospects in managing his life, and considers how far Aristotle's treatment of time and history licenses the sort of dynamic interpretation of his doctrines that have been given. The ontological model that explains much of Aristotle's conclusions and methods is one of life-worlds, (...) in which the material universe of scientific myth is no more than an abstraction from lived reality, not its transcendent ground. (shrink)

I defend the claim that understanding is the goal of explanation against various persistent criticisms, especially the criticism that understanding is not truth-connected in the appropriate way, and hence is a merely psychological state. Part of the reason why understanding has been dismissed as the goal of explanation, I suggest, is because the psychological dimension of the goal of explanation has itself been almost entirely neglected. In turn, the psychological dimension of understanding—the Aha! experience, the sense that a certain explanation (...) “feels right”, and so on—has been conspicuously overemphasized. I try to correct for both of these exaggerations. Just as the goal of explanation includes a richer psychological—including phenomenological—dimension than is generally acknowledged, so too understanding has a stronger truth connection than is generally acknowledged.Keywords: Understanding; Explanation; Philosophy of science; Epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the value of invertebrates to human society. I initially examine various ecological, utilitarian, scientific, and cultural benefits provided by invertebrate organisms. I then explore the extent of appreciation and understanding of these values among the American public. This assessment was based on a study of residents of the state of Connecticut, including randomly selected members of the general public, farmers, conservation organization members, and scientists. The general public and farmers were found to view most invertebrates (...) with aversion, anxiety, fear, avoidance, and ignorance. Far more positive and knowledgeable attitudes toward invertebrates and their conservation were observed among scientists and, to a lesser extent, among conservation organization members. I finally examine the motivational basis for hostile attitudes toward invertebrates, particularly arthropods, among the general public. Important factors include the possibility of an innate learning disposition, the association of many invertebrates with disease and agricultural damage, differences in ecological scale between humans and invertebrates, the multiplicity of invertebrates, the apparent lack of a sense of identity and consciousness among invertebrates, the presumption of mindlessness among invertebrates, and the radical autonomy of invertebrates from human control. (shrink)

Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into (...) persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational. (shrink)

Every country's law permits medical experimentation on animals. While some countries protect particular kinds of animals from being subject to experimentation—notably great apes and endangered species—very few place concrete limitations on what researchers may cause animals to suffer, given sufficient scientific justification. What laws do, instead, is establish standards for the humane treatment and housing of animals in labs, and they encourage researchers to limit or seek alternatives to the use of animals, when doing that is consistent with the scientific (...) goals of their research.The system that has evolved in the United States combines elements of sometimes competing regulatory philosophies. The result is a complex, multilayered system that addresses the most important concerns, but, partly because of historical accident, also leaves some gaps. Even proponents of medical research on animals can see obvious ways in which the regulatory structure could be changed to benefit animals. Perhaps more important, though, is the fact that the existing regulatory structure, imperfect though it may be, is elastic enough to accommodate substantial changes that could reduce unnecessary animal suffering. (shrink)

This is a chapter in the book titled 'Mind that Abides' published in 2009 by John Benjamins and edited by David Skrbina. It introduces a view of panpsychism as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness motivated by insights from cognitive science, neuroscience, and general systems. It contrasts with the incomplete anthropocentric NCC (neural correlates of consciousness) view that dominates in neuroscience, and suggests experimental and conceptual methods of verification.

It has been argued that if non-human animals had rights we should be obliged to defend them against predators. I contend that this either does not follow, follows in the abstract but not in practice, or is not absurd. We should defend non-humans against large or unusual dangers, when we can, but should not claim so much authority as to regulate all the relationships of wild things. Some non-human animals are members of our society, and the rhetoric of 'the land (...) as a community' is an attempt, paralleling that of humanism, to create the moral ideal of Earth's Household. But wild animals should be considered as Nozick's 'independents' and have correspondingly fewer claims on our assistance than members of our society. They still have some claims, often strong ones. (shrink)

After summarizing the content of Philip Rossi’s book, The Ethical Commonwealth in History: Peace-Making as the Moral Vocation of Humanity, I pose two main questions. First, does politics or religion play a more important role in Kant’s philosophy when it comes to the task of ushering humanity to the realization of its ultimate vocation, the establishment of a lasting peace for human society? I argue that Kant portrays politics as a means to a religious end, whereas Rossi tends to reverse (...) their Kantian order of priority. Second, what concrete details does Kant give in defense of his theory that establishing an ethical community is a universal duty of humankind? As Rossi tends to overlook Kant’s details, I provide an overview. Kant argues that the ethical community can only be established in the form of a church and that the rational content constituting the core of the true church consists of four requirements: universality, integrity, freedom, and unchangeableness. After challenging Rossi’s claim that Kantian hope is necessarily social, I conclude with two minor questions: Is Kant’s theory of human nature dualist or monist? and Must the church create a political form of peace that applies to all human beings? (shrink)

In this book, Stephen R.L. Clark defends the primary faith of humankind, that there is a real world which is more than a shadow of our desires and fancies, and which can be discovered through right reason. Focusing on the way in which we can "turn aside" to the Truth from the normal delusions of self-concern, Clark offers a properly worked, Platonic metaphysics as the key to identifying that reality. This book is the final volume of Limits and Renewals, (...) a trilogy based on the author's Stanton lectures, delivered at Cambridge between 1986 and 1989, and his Wilde lectures, delivered at Oxford in 1990. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, people thought only cranks or sentimentalists could be seriously concerned about the treatment of non-human animals. However, since then philosophers, scientists and welfarists have raised public awareness of the issue; and they have begun to lay the foundations for an enormous change in human practice. This book is a record of the development of 'animal rights' through the eyes of one highly-respected and well-known thinker. This book brings together for the first time Stephen R.L. Clark's major (...) essays in one volume. Written with characteristic clarity and persuasion, Animals and Their Moral Standing will be essential reading for both philosophers and scientists, as well as the general reader concerned by the debates over animal rights and treatment. (shrink)

Bosnian translation of "How 'Chinese' Was Kant?" (abridged version).

Published as Book Two of the Philopsychy Trilogy; translated by Zhai Pengxiao.

Given his emphasis on deontological ethics, Kant is rarely regarded as a friend of prudence. For example, he is often interpreted as an opponent of so-called “historical faiths”. What typically goes unnoticed is that in explaining the legitimate role of historical faiths in the moral development of the human race, Kant appeals explicitly to their prudential status. A careful examination of Kant’s main references to prudence demonstrates that the prudential status of historical faith is the key to understanding both its (...) limitations and its real value. The wise person adopts some form of historical faith, because to abandon any and all prudential appeals to a faith-based vehicle for morality would render the goal of living a good life virtually impossible for embodied beings to achieve. (shrink)

In this chapter, Immanuel Kant turns his attention back to the theme that was his earlier focus: the biblical scholars who tend to obscure the natural religion that lies at the heart of Jesus’ teaching. First, he argues that viewing unphilosophical clergy as spiritual guides is bound to promote delusory ways of being religious. Then, Kant claims that true service of God must be guided not by clergy but by conscience. According to Kant, the church leaders portray their preferred tradition (...) in a way that enables them to control people toward nonmoral ends. He states the same basic point in terms of the distinction between virtue and “godliness”. Properly interpreting the latter term, holds the key to unlocking the mystery of how religion can serve as a path to realizing the former, universal human duty. Yet misinterpreting this same term leads straight to idolatry. (shrink)

Averroes is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress, and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might (...) be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect. (shrink)

A description and analysis of attitudes to non-human animals in classical and late antique Mediterranean thought.