Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on the generality (...) of multiple realization in the cognitive sciences. They argue that mind-brain identities have played an important role in the growth and achievements of the cognitive sciences, and suggest that there is little prospect for multiple realization in an empirically-based theory of mind. This leads Polger and Shapiro to offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, as well as in chemistry, biology, and other non-basic sciences. (shrink)

One of the more distinctive features of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism about arithmetic is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint – roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. In particular, they maintain that, if adopted, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation – Hume’s Principle – and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind-Peano axioms. In what follows we establish two main claims. First, we show (...) that, if sound, Hale and Wright’s arguments for Frege’s Constraint at most establish a version on which the relevant application of the naturals is transitive counting – roughly, the counting procedure by which numerals are used to answer “how many”-questions. Second, we show that this version of Frege’s Constraint fails to adjudicate in favor of Hume’s Principle. If this is the version of Frege’s Constraint that a foundation for arithmetic must respect, then Hume’s Principle no more – and no less – meets the requirement than the Dedekind-Peano axioms do. (shrink)

When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann’s experimental arguments against the inheritance of acquired characters. This conception of how epiphenomenalism ought to be developed helps clarify some mistakes in two recent epiphenomenalist positions – Jaegwon Kim’s (1993) arguments against mental causation, and the arguments developed by Walsh (2000), Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002), and Matthen and Ariew (2002) that natural selection (...) and drift are not causes of evolution. A manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003) leads naturally to an account of how macro- and micro-causation are related and to an understanding of how epiphenomenalism at different levels of organization should be understood. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel to another well-known part of that project, namely, metaethics. We then argue that these projects all center on the same task: explaining how a certain part of thought, talk, and reality fits into reality overall. Metalegal inquiry aims to explain how legal thought, talk, and reality fit into reality. General jurisprudence (...) is the part of metalegal inquiry that focuses on universal legal thought, talk, and reality. (shrink)

We present a computational analysis of de re, de dicto, and de se belief and knowledge reports. Our analysis solves a problem first observed by Hector-Neri Castañeda, namely, that the simple rule -/- `(A knows that P) implies P' -/- apparently does not hold if P contains a quasi-indexical. We present a single rule, in the context of a knowledge-representation and reasoning system, that holds for all P, including those containing quasi-indexicals. In so doing, we explore the difference between reasoning (...) in a public communication language and in a knowledge-representation language, we demonstrate the importance of representing proper names explicitly, and we provide support for the necessity of considering sentences in the context of extended discourse (for example, written narrative) in order to fully capture certain features of their semantics. (shrink)

Most philosophers are familiar with the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and the clay. A sculptor begins with some clay, eventually sculpting a statue from it. Are the clay and the statue one and the same thing? Apparently not, since they have different properties. For example, the clay could survive being squashed, but the statue could not. The statue is recently formed, though the clay is not, etc. Godehart Link 1983’s highly influential analysis of the count/mass distinction recommends that English (...) draws a distinction between uncountable “stuff” and countable “things”. There are two mereological relations, related in specific ways. Our primary question here is whether an empirically adequate account of the mass/count distinction really does require distinguishing “things” from “stuff”, and thus postulating two corresponding mereological relations, or if instead positing only one sort of entity and corresponding mereological relation is sufficient, as other semantic theories would have it. This question is meant to be one of what we call natural language mereology. We are asking about the mereological commitments of English, or perhaps competent speakers of English, and not about ultimate reality as such. There is no pretense that we will definitively solve the metaphysical puzzle of the statue and clay. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is show that second-order logic, as understood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory, or some other general theory of interpretations, structures, or whatever. Contra Quine, this does not disqualify second-order logic from its role in foundational studies. To wax Quinean, why should there be a sharp border separating mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics?

A paper in this journal by Fraser MacBride, ‘Can Ante Rem Structuralism Solve the Access Problem?’, raises important issues concerning the epistemological goals and burdens of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and perhaps philosophy of science and other disciplines as well. I use a response to MacBride's paper as a framework for developing a broadly holistic framework for these issues, and I attempt to steer a middle course between reductive foundationalism and extreme naturalistic quietism. For this purpose the notion of entitlement (...) is invoked along the way, suitably modified for the present anti-foundationalist setting. (shrink)

In response to points raised by our critics in this book symposium, we offer some clarifications about how to understand the role of science in assessing the multiple realization thesis. We also consider the connection between functionalism and multiple realization in the contexts of both psychological and biological sciences.

We are more used to thinking of medicine in relation to the ways that it alleviates the effects of violence. Yet an important thread in the academic literature acknowledges that medicine can also be responsible for perpetuating violence, albeit unintentionally, against the very individuals it intends to help. In this essay, I discuss definitions of violence, emphasizing the importance of understanding the term not only as a physical perpetration but as an act of power of one person over another. I (...) next explore the paradox of a healing profession that is permeated with violence sometimes necessary, often unintentional, and almost always unrecognized. Identifying the construct of “physician arrogance” as contributory to violence, I go on to identify different manifestations of violence in a medical context, including violence to the body; structural violence; metaphoric violence; and the practice of speaking to or about patients (and others in the healthcare system in ways that minimize or disrespect their full humanity. I further suggest possible explanations for the origins of these kinds of violence in physicians, including the fear of suffering and death in relation to vicarious trauma and the consequent concept of “killing suffering”; as well as why patients might be willing to accept such violence directed toward them. I conclude with brief recommendations for attending to root causes of violence, both within societal and institutional structures, and within ourselves, offering the model of the wounded healer. (shrink)

Graham Priest introduces an informal but presumably rigorous and sharp ‘provability predicate’. He argues that this predicate yields inconsistencies, along the lines of the paradox of the Knower. One long-standing claim of Priest’s is that a dialetheist can have a complete, decidable, and yet sufficiently rich mathematical theory. After all, the incompleteness theorem is, in effect, that for any recursive theory A, if A is consistent, then A is incomplete. If the antecedent fails, as it might for a dialetheist, then (...) the consequent may also fail to hold. One somewhat friendly purpose of my ‘Incompleteness and inconsistency’ was to improve the technical situation for the dialetheist, eschewing reliance on an informal provability predicate. Another, less friendly purpose was to bring out what I took to be some untoward consequences of the situation. It seems that Priest accepted at least some of the improvements that I attempted. In the second edition of In contradiction, he responded to the alleged untoward consequences. One purpose of this note is to revisit the technical and philosophical situation. There were some errors in my original presentation, brought out by discussion with Priest and by Hartry Field’s analysis of the second incompleteness theorem in such contexts. A second task here is to present a sort of Curry version of the Gödel incompleteness situation. I tentatively conclude that even for a dialetheist, an interesting and complete theory is not as easy to come by as it may look—at least not for theories of arithmetic that are plausible for a dialetheist. (shrink)

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned it to something that is his own, and thereby (...) makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by his labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, section 27. (shrink)

According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...) relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon. (shrink)

This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for (...) the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of “ofness” come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions. (shrink)

Recent high-profile lawsuits have supported competing narratives that alternately depict civil litigation as an essential instrument of the rule of law and a threat to the ideal. This essay argues that each narrative captures an important element of truth and that Gerald Postema’s account of the rule of law in his book Law’s Rule helps us (albeit unwittingly) to see why. While Postema presents recourse for alleged abuses of power as a universal and enduring facet of the rule of law, (...) his conception of recourse turns out to resemble core features of the kind of adversarial litigation process exemplified by the U.S. federal civil justice system. Yet such a system both promises to promote and threatens to undermine each of the three principles that Postema claims are entailed by his understanding of the rule of law—namely, sovereignty, equality, and fidelity. Realizing recourse thus requires confronting difficult tradeoffs within each of those principles, as well as within the overarching rule-of-law ideal. And if the rule of law can’t be instantiated unequivocally in any particular set of institutions, then perhaps we should be more willing to treat the ideal as a subject of politics rather than just a constraint on it. (shrink)

According to the Categories, predicates can be ‘said of’ their subjects or they can be ‘present in’ their subjects. The said-of relation has received relatively little scholarly attention, and scholars disagree on the answers to four foundational questions about the relation. (i) What is it? (ii) Is it an essential relation? (iii) How is it related to predication? (iv) Is it primitive? I argue that A is said-of B just in case A is a formal part of B. On this (...) account, said-of is an essential relation and it is definable, but it is not defined in terms of predication. (shrink)

Philosophers look to the realization relation as a way to make sense of the possibility that special science kinds are physical, yet not reducible to kinds in physics. A realized property fails to reduce because it can be realized in multiple ways, thus blocking its identification with lower-level properties. One prominent analysis of realization, subset realization, distinguishes multiple realizers on the basis their “left-over powers,” that is, those that don’t contribute to the individuative powers of the realizer. However, I argue, (...) the subset analysis of realization fails to mark an important distinction between different ways that a property might be realized, and also makes questions about the reducibility of kinds—presumably an empirical issue—tractable from the armchair. I offer as an alternative mechanistic multiple realization, which avoids both these problems. (shrink)

Regulation of the cytoplasmic stability of mRNAs has recetly been identified as a major control mechanism which governs mRNA levels in a variety of eukaryotic systems. In this review we discuss what is known about several experimental systems that exhibit regulated mRNA stability, describe the mechanisms that cells may use to achieve control of mRNA degradation, and suggest areas of future investigation likely to provide new insights into this process.

The Modern Synthesis was based on Darwin’s gradualist view of evolution and early twentieth Century Mendelian and population genetics. Although early results in microbial and molecular genetics seemed to solidify MS views through the Central Dogma of Molecular Biology, accepting their basic concepts as permanent truths blinded MS proponents to the importance of incompatible discoveries in the second half of the 20th and early 21st Centuries. Discoveries based largely on the DNA record have provided a radically different view of genome (...) complexity and biologically-mediated evolutionary change. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that the extensions of most, perhaps all, vague predicates vary with such features as comparison class and paradigm and contrasting cases. My view proposes another, more pervasive contextual parameter. Vague predicates exhibit what I call open texture: in some circumstances, competent speakers can go either way in the borderline region. The shifting extension and anti-extensions of vague predicates are tracked by what David Lewis calls the “conversational score”, and are regulated by what Kit Fine calls penumbral (...) connections, including a principle of tolerance. As I see it, vague predicates are response-dependent, or, better, judgement-dependent, at least in their borderline regions. This raises questions concerning how one reasons with such predicates. In this paper, I present a model theory for vague predicates, so construed. It is based on an overall supervaluationist-style framework, and it invokes analogues of Kripke structures for intuitionistic logic. I argue that the system captures, or at least nicely models, how one ought to reason with the shifting extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague predicates, as borderline cases are called and retracted in the course of a conversation. The model theory is illustrated with a forced march sorites series, and also with a thought experiment in which vague predicates interact with so-called future contingents. I show how to define various connectives and quantifiers in the language of the system, and how to express various penumbral connections and the principle of tolerance. The project fits into one of the topics of this special issue. In the course of reasoning, even with the external context held fixed, it is uncertain what the future extension of the vague predicates will be. Yet we still manage to reason with them. The system is based on that developed, more fully, in my Vagueness in Context , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, but some criticisms and replies to critics are incorporated. (shrink)

Since the founding of psychophysics in the latter half of the nineteenth century, controversy has raged over the subject matter of psychophysical laws. Originally, Fechner characterized psycho physics as the science describing the relation between physical magnitudes and the sensations these magnitudes produce in us. Today many psycho-physicists would deny that sensation is or could be a topic of psycho-physical investigation. I consider Savage's (1970) influential objections to the possibility of such an investigation and argue that they depend upon (i) (...) holding psychophysics to higher standards than those to which we hold other sciences; and (ii) misrepresenting Fechner's stated goals for psychophysics. (shrink)

For nearly a century, the French have entertained an unshakable conviction that their ability to recognize themselves-to know and transmit the essence of Frenchness-depended on the teaching of the history of France. In effect, history was a discourse on France, and the teaching of history-"la pédagogie centrale du citoyen"-the means by which children were constituted as heirs and carriers of a common collective memory that made them not only citizens, but family. In this essay, I examine the rhetorical and conceptual (...) effects on history writing that emerge out of this preoccupation with the elaboration of a continuous, coherent national identity. Focusing on schoolbooks, I begin by looking at the dominant, nearly hegemonic model of French history created by Ernest Lavisse in the 1890s-a model informed by the dream of a unified, unitary French nation, embodied in and articulated through the history of France-and at the disruption of this paradigm in the aftermath of the Great War. I then consider a text written in the 1990s specifically to repudiate the kind of nationalist narratives that prevailed for most of this century-a new supranational history of Europe. I argue that, in their different experiments with fixing history, both Lavisse and the contemporary textbook authors did not so much repair a deficient history as produce a historical fixation, creating mythicized histories that are complete, closed, predictable, and at bottom ahistorical. Finally, I turn to a recent World War I novel, A Very Long Engagement by Sébastien Japrisot, in order to suggest ways in which the narrative strategies of a fiction writer may be useful to historians in thinking about a different kind of historical project. (shrink)

Recent studies have characterized R. Hayyim of Volozhin as actively preparing for the messianic redemption. Contrary to this, I maintain that R. Hayyim was concerned with the immediate potential of the world in the context of historical time , rather than with a world-to-come, in the context of messianic time . To R. Hayyim, the existence of the cosmos and the stability of a dynamic life-giving universe are fraught with contingency because of the interdependent organic naturality shared by man and (...) world. This contingency is constant, placing man's conduct as the central determinant of the world's future. R. Hayyim's theory and practice attest to a concern for the immanent and transcendent aspects of this world and for the meanings of our everyday experienced relationship to its variegated pragmata. (shrink)

Let ƒ be a real number. It is well known [7] that the set of rational numbers which are less than ƒ is a recursive set if and only if ƒ is representable as the limit of a recursive, recursively convergent sequence of rational numbers. In this paper we replace the condition that the set of rational numbers less than ƒ is recursive by the condition that this set is at various points in the Kleene hierarchy, and we replace the (...) recursive, recursively convergent limit by a variety of other recursive limiting processes. (shrink)

The socialist calculation debate is a debate about whether rational economic decisions can be made without markets, or without markets in production goods. Though this debate has been simmering in economics for over 65 years, most philosophers have ignored it. This may be because they are unaware of the debate, or perhaps it is because they have absorbed the conventional view that one side decisively won. This is the side represented by economists such as Oskar Lange and Fred Taylor who, (...) in opposition to free-market economists like Fredrich Hayek, allegedly showed that their version of market socialism is, in principle, as efficient as capitalism. (shrink)

The insistence of the sublime -- When the earth moves: toward a political sublime -- The racial sublime -- The nuclear sublime -- The industrial sublime -- The 9/11 terror sublime -- Afterword: It's all about duration.

Behind the dramas and conflicts, there exists a quiet inner place where meditation and mindfulness can help us reside. This book shares personal insights from visionary leaders -- the Dalai Lama, Jon Kabat-Zinn, and Marianne Williamson among them -- who discuss their methods of maintaining mental health and happiness. Their teaching can help you transform your life from the inside out and discover innate strength, kindness, and courage.

Irrational people create problems not only for themselves and those around them, but also for those who study them. They cause trouble for social scientists because their actions are inexplicable, at least according to generally accepted models of explanation. Explanations in the social sciences normally assume the form of rationalizations: actions are explained by showing that, relative to what the subjects believe and desire, the actions were done for good reasons. Conversely, when good reasons cannot be found for why someone (...) acted as they did, their behavior remains inscrutable. Irrational people, therefore, stymie social scientists because their actions do not reveal the rationality needed to produce adequate explanations. (shrink)