Contemporary architecture is increasingly grounded in science and mathematics. Architectural discourse has shifted radically from the sometimes disorienting Derridean deconstruction, to engaging scientific terms such as fractals, chaos, complexity, nonlinearity, and evolving systems. That's where the architectural action is -- at least for cutting-edge architects and thinkers -- and every practicing architect and student needs to become conversant with these terms and know what they mean. Unfortunately, the vast majority of architecture faculty are unprepared to explain them to students, not (...) having had a scientific education themselves. Here is an architecture book by an architect/scientist, just in time to help architects in the new millennium. Alexander discusses many of the scientific terms arising in cutting-edge architecture, and explains them to those who don't have scientific training or advanced mathematical knowledge. We find discussions of the evolution of forms; the importance of process in design; iteration; genetic algorithms; sequences of transformations; different levels of scale (i.e. fractals); etc. They are explained here by an architect who is also a scientist, because he wants to change the way architects think and build. Alexander is not merely popularizing other scientists' results and making them accessible to architects: he is in fact presenting new and original scientific work that ties many of these concepts together in a way that will be useful to architects. (shrink)

Using data on submitted and published manuscripts in Feminist Economics from 1995 to 2019, we examine differences in method and scope used by authors residing in the Global North and Global South. We specifically focus on research methods, intersectional analyses, region of analysis, and co-authorship status. Further, using logistic regression models, we examine the relationship between authors’ location and use of research methods. We find authors in the Global South are more likely to engage in empirical and mixed-methods papers compared (...) to Global North authors in our sample. Moreover, a greater share of Global South authors engage in intersectional analysis and exhibit geographical focus on developing countries. Drawing insights from the Feminist Economics manuscripts data, we argue that encouraging Global South research can contribute to the goals of the field of feminist economics – aimed at inclusivity, diversity of standpoints, and plurality in research methods, thereby improving overall economic research. (shrink)

The identity predicate can be defined using second-order quantification: a=b =df ∀F(Fa↔Fb). Less familiarly, a dyadic sentential operator analogous to the identity predicate can be defined using third-order quantification: ϕ≡ψ =df ∀X(Xϕ↔Xψ), where X is a variable of the same syntactic type as a monadic sentential operator. With this notion in view, it is natural to ask after general principles governing its application. More grandiosely, how fine-grained is reality? -/- I will argue that reality is not structured in anything (...) like the way that the sentences we use to talk about it are structured. I do so by formulating a higher-order analogue of Russell’s paradox of structured propositions. I then relate this argument to the Frege-Russell correspondence. When confronted with the alleged paradox, Frege agreed that reality was not structured, but maintained that propositions (i.e. thoughts) were structured all the same. Russell replied that his paradox showed Frege’s theory of structured thoughts to be inconsistent, to which Frege replied that Russell’s argument failed to heed the distinction between sense and reference. Most recent commentators have sided with Russell. In defense of Frege, I establish the consistency of one version of his rejoinder. I then consider and reject some ways of resisting the argument against a structured conception of reality. I conclude that, if propositions are structured, this is because they correspond not to distinctions in reality, but rather to ways in which those distinctions can be represented. (shrink)

Exploration of a hypothetical model of the structure of the Emergent Event. -/- Key Words: Emergent Event, Foundational Mathematical Categories, Emergent Meta-system, Orthogonal Centering Dialectic, Hegel, Sartre, Badiou, Derrida, Deleuze, Philosophy of Science.

Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) claims that structure exists independently of objects that may instantiate it. Critics of ROSR contend that this claim is conceptually incoherent, insofar as, (i) it entails there can be relations without relata, and (ii) there is a conceptual dependence between relations and relata. In this essay I suggest that (ii) is motivated by a set-theoretic formulation of structure, and that adopting a category-theoretic formulation may provide ROSR with more support. In particular, I consider how a (...) category-theoretic formulation of structure can be developed that denies (ii), and can be made to do work in the context of formulating theories in physics. Keywords: structural realism, category theory, general relativity.. (shrink)

This book identifies the Romantic notion of the whole as the fundamental epistemological source of the notion of structure in the thinking of the Prague Linguistic Circle, primarily its Russian representatives, and studies what amounted to the slow.

There are several approaches implementing reasoning based on conditional knowledge bases, one of the most popular being System Z (Pearl, Proceedings of the 3rd conference on theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, TARK ’90, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 121–135, 1990). We look at ranking functions (Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) in general, conditional structures and c-representations (Kern-Isberner, Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision: Considering (...) Conditionals as Agents, vol. 2087 of LNCS, Springer, Berlin, 2001) in order to examine the reasoning strength of the different approaches by learning which of the known calculi of nonmonotonic reasoning (System P and R) and Direct Inference are applicable to these inference relations. Furthermore we use the recently proposed Enforcement-postulate (Kern-Isberner and Krümpelmann, Proceedings of the 22nd international joint conference on artificial intelligence, vol. 2, IJCAI’11, AAAI Press, pp. 937–942, 2011) to show dependencies between these approaches. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction for anti-realism pull in opposite directions. Structural Realism---the position that the mathematical structure of mature science reflects reality---relieves this tension.

The structure of pluralist arguments -- The inadequacy of multiculturalism -- The incompatibility of subsidiarity -- Associative democracy and the corporatist temptation -- Two conceptions of sovereignty -- A positivist pluralism? -- Law as intelligibility -- Pluralist authority -- This unity of life and action -- The personality of associations -- Property, personality, and public justification -- The spectre of intractability.

Well-Structured Mathematical Logic does for logic what Structured Programming did for computation: make large-scale work possible. From the work of George Boole onward, traditional logic was made to look like a form of symbolic algebra. In this work, the logic undergirding conventional mathematics resembles well-structured computer programs. A very important feature of the new system is that it structures the expression of mathematics in much the same way that people already do informally. In this way, the new (...) system is simultaneously machine-parsable and user-friendly, just as Structured Programming is for algorithms. Unlike traditional logic, the new system works with you, not against you, as you use it to structure--and understand--the mathematics you work with on a daily basis. The book provides a complete guide to its subject matter. It presents the major results and theorems one needs to know in order to use the new system effectively. Two chapters provide tutorials for the reader in the new way that symbols move when logical calculations are performed in the well-structured system. Numerous examples and discussions are provided to illustrate the system's many results and features. Well-Structured Mathematical Logic is accessible to anyone who has at least some knowledge of traditional logic to serve as a foundation, and is of interest to all who need a system of pliant, user-friendly mathematical logic to use in their work in mathematics and computer science. (shrink)

Structural realism is arguably one of the most influential movements to have emerged in philosophy of science in the last decade or so. Advocates of this movement attempt to answer epistemological and/or ontological questions concerning science by arguing that the key to all such questions is the mathematical formalism of a theory. This is so, according to structural realists, because the mathematical formalism encodes all and only what is important about a theory’s target domain, namely its structure. Almost without exception, (...) discussions of structural realism centre on the natural sciences and in particular on modern physics. Given that a number of other sciences are less – indeed in some cases much less – mathematised than modern physics, does structural realism have anything informative to say about them? In this talk, I take up the task of articulating what structural realists ought to say about the social sciences if they are to consider themselves as offering a coherent philosophy for the whole of science. (shrink)

Much of ordinary memory is autobiographical; memory of what one saw and did, where and when. It may derive from your own past experiences, or from what other people told you about your past life. It may be phenomenologically rich, redolent of that autumn afternoon so long ago, or a few austere reports of what happened. But all autobiographical memory is first-person memory, stateable using ‘I’. It is a memory you would express by saying, ‘I remember I . . .’.

Over the last three decades, social theory has become an increasingly important subdiscipline within sociology. Social theory has attempted to elucidate the philosophical basis of sociology by defining the nature of social reality. According to social theory, society consists of objective institutions, structure, on the one hand, and individuals, agency on the other, it promotes human social relations, insisting that in every instance social reality consists of these relations.

This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn't arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the $\lambda$-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist had independent reasons to reject these underlying assumptions. The theory is given (...) both a diagrammatic representation, and a logical representation in a novel language. In the latter half of the paper I turn to some technical questions concerning the treatment of quantification, and demonstrate various equivalences between the diagrammatic and logical representations, and a fragment of the $\lambda$-calculus. (shrink)

The central problem of social theory is 'structure and agency'. How do the objective features of society influence human agents? Determinism is not the answer, nor is conditioning as currently conceptualised. It accentuates the way structure and culture shape the social context in which individuals operate, but it neglects our personal capacity to define what we care about most and to establish a modus vivendi expressive of our concerns. Through inner dialogue, 'the internal conversation', individuals reflect upon their social situation (...) in the light of current concerns and projects. On the basis of a series of unique, in-depth interviews, Archer identifies three distinctive forms of internal conversation. These govern agents' responses to social conditioning, their individual patterns of social mobility and whether or not they contribute to social stability or change. Thus the internal conversation is seen as being the missing link between society and the individual, structure and agency. (shrink)

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...) debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems. (shrink)

Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural representations do not meet the job description challenge. This is because even our most demanding account of their functional profile is satisfied by at least some receptors, which paradigmatically fail the job description challenge. Hence, (...) the functional profile typically associated with structural representations does not identify representational posits. After a brief introduction, I present, in the second section of the paper, the job description challenge. I clarify why receptors fail to meet it and highlight why, as a result, they should not be considered representations. In the third section I introduce what I take to be the most demanding account of structural representations at our disposal, namely Gładziejewski's account. Provided the necessary background, I turn from exposition to criticism. In the first half of the fourth section, I equate the functional profile of structural representations and receptors. To do so, I show that some receptors boast, as a matter of fact, all the functional features associated with structural representations. Since receptors function merely as causal mediators, I conclude structural representations are mere causal mediators too. In the second half of the fourth section I make this conclusion intuitive with a toy example. I then conclude the paper, anticipating some objections my argument invites. (shrink)

Dynamic Structure of Reality makes available in English some of the most mature thought of the modern Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri. He first presented this material as a set of 1968 public lectures in Madrid. They were collected, edited, and published in 1989 as Estructura dinámica de la realidad. In 1962 Zubiri had published Sobre la esencia, a work of metaphysics that was praised by critics with one qualification: its treatment of reality was too static. The 1968 course was devised (...) as a response to those critics. Dynamic Structure of Reality retraces the road Hegel traveled concerning the creation of a self and how that self is realized by an interplay between spirit and nature. Like his great predecessor José Ortega y Gasset, and like his great Jewish contemporary Emmanuel Levinas, Zubiri takes religion in all seriousness and locates its questions within the questions of modern philosophy. In harmony with science, he advances a new idea of becoming. Reality, not being, becomes. As reality’s traits are revealed, in different degrees, reality resembles God, the universal self-giver. Zubiri systematically touches on many disciplines to show the varieties of self-giving--throughout the universe--of structural dynamism. (shrink)

Semantic Structures is a large-scale study of conceptual structure and its lexical and syntactic expression in English that builds on the theory of Conceptual...

In this paper I focus on the impact on structuralism of the quantum treatment of objects in terms of symmetry groups and, in particular, on the question as to how we might eliminate, or better, reconceptualise such objects in structural terms. With regard to the former, both Cassirer and Eddington not only explicitly and famously tied their structuralism to the development of group theory but also drew on the quantum treatment in order to further their structuralist aims and here I (...) sketch the relevant history with an eye on what lessons might be drawn. With regard to the latter, Ladyman has explicitly cited Castellani's work on the group-theoretical constitution of quantum objects and I indicate both how such an approach needs to be understood if it is to mesh with Ladyman's 'ontic' form of structural realism and how it might accommodate permutation symmetry through a consideration of Huggett's recent account. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of sortal (...) plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those that use interpretive rules to map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which (...) a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically. (shrink)

Ontic Structural Realism is a version of realism about science according to which by positing the existence of structures, understood as basic components of reality, one can resolve central difficulties faced by standard versions of scientific realism. Structures are invoked to respond to two important challenges: one posed by the pessimist meta-induction and the other by the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics, which arises in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. We argue that difficulties in the proper understanding of what a structure is (...) undermines the realist component of the view. Given the difficulties, either realism should be dropped or additional metaphysical components not fully endorsed by science should be incorporated. (shrink)

This volume brings together a collection of essays, many of them scholarly classics, which form part of the debate around three questions central to criminal law theory: firstly, what conduct should be necessary for criminal liability, and what sufficient? Secondly, what culpability should be necessary for criminal liability, and what sufficient? Finally, essays consider the question of how criminal law rules should be best organized into a coherent and clarifying doctrinal structure.

The article is concerned with the question of how legal institutions are structured with the use of constitutive, institutive, consequential, and terminative rules. To that end, the regulation of international treaties as laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 is analysed. This leads to the discovery of two additional categories of rules: content rules and invalidating rules. Finally, the special status of unique legal institutions is investigated. Unique legal institutions – for example, heads (...) of state, parliaments, and supreme courts – enjoy validity in a legal system to the exclusion of the validity of any other legal institution of the same category in that system. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

Hayden White suggested that narratives achieve coherence through literary types of emplotment. Generally, this is not the case. I contrast simple narratives, whose coherence lies in their subject and chronological structure; reflective narratives, which give an account of a trend; and genetic narratives, designed to explain and outcome. Some narratives do more than one of these things. Each kind of narrative is constrained by its function, but this constraint seldom if ever ensures its complete objectivity.

Dans La structure de l'apparence, Nelson Goodman met en place les principaux themes philosophiques qui feront de lui un penseur singulier: constructivisme, nominalisme, phenomenalisme et pluralisme s'entrecroisent ici dans l'elaboration d'une pensee aussi subtile que complexe. Ce livre propose une premiere traduction (inedite) d'un texte fondateur de la philosophie analytique.

Neoplatonism has sometimes been seen as a species of mysticism. This volume shows that Neoplatonism has, on the contrary, a characteristic and definable structure.

The present volume contains 14 contributions presented at a colloquium on "Structure and Approximation in Physical Theories" held at Osnabruck in June 1980. The articles are presented in the revised form written after the colloquium and hence also take account of the results of the discussion at the colloquium. It is a striking feature that the problem of approximation in physical theories has only recently found some attention in the philosophy of science, although the working physicist is con stantly confronted (...) with those questions. No interesting theory of exact science exactly fits its experimental data; almost every relation between different theories is an approximate one. There fore an adequate reconstruction of physical theories must take into account and conceptualize the moment of approximation. The majority of the articles in this book is centered around this subject. There are at least two elaborate, 'structuralistic' approaches to the formalization of physical theories in which the aspect of approximation has been incorporated: the approach due to P. Suppes, J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller ("S-approach") and the approach of G. Lud wig and his co-workers ("L-approach"). The articles in this book correspondingly fall into three classes: presentation, elaboration and critique of the L-approach [Hartkamper/Schmidt, Ludwig, Neumann, Werner, Schmidt, Mayr, Kamiah, Majer, Grafe] or of the S-approach [Moulines, Balzer, Cooke], and articles referring to both approaches or concerned with related matters [Scheibe, Pfarr, Castrigiano]. Of course, this is only a rough classification and each article must be appraised in its own right. (shrink)

The principal theme of the book is the fundamental problem of Marxist studies: the development of a theory of history that is an "epistemological reflection of materialist historical thought" and from which a rigorous methodology can evolve. In particular, Schmidt advances a view of history that reaffirms the reality and value of the actual content of historical experience. In the first half of the book, Schmidt returns to the historical texts of Hegel and Marx, and presents an original and suggestive (...) account of Marx's appropriation of Hegel, and most importantly, of the concept of "dialectical mediation" of logic and history. These sections focus on the perennial opposition of "logic," "theory," "system", and "structure," on the one hand, and "history-as-narrative" on the other, and argue that holding with only one side of this opposition—either structure without history or history without structure—is unfaithful to Marx and also makes for inadequate history. The final half of the book presents the opposing sides of the current debate between the two most influential streams of Marxist theory—structuralism vs. critical theory—and enters the debate by outlining the critical-theoretic arguments against the structuralists and what Schmidt sees as the modern loss of the sense of history and historical consciousness, as well as by appropriating for Marxist historiography what is of value in structuralism. This debate is given concrete form through the discussion of the writings of the French structuralist Louis Althusser and of the dialectically contradictory outlook of Antonio Gramsci. (shrink)

Learning to argue in a computer-mediated and structured fashion is investigated in this research. A study was conducted to compare dyads that were scripted in their computer-mediated collaboration with dyads that were not scripted. A process analysis of the chats of the dyads showed that the scripted experimental group used significantly more words, engaged in significantly more broadening and deepening of the discussion, and appeared to engage in more critical and objective argumentation than the non-scripted control group.

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Une étude des structures de l'œuvre et de la détermination du mouvement qui les anime. « Copyright Electre » Pages de début Introduction Première partie - Problématique Chapitre premier - L'œuvre et son unité Chapitre II - (...) L'auto-mouvement du contenu Chapitre III - Les corrélations internes Chapitre IV - Les totalisations successives Deuxième partie - L'organisation des expériences Chapitre premier - De la conscience individuelle à l'universalité de la raison Chapitre II - L'esprit dans l'élément de la conscience Chapitre III - L'esprit dans l'élément de la conscience de soi Chapitre IV - Le savoir absolu Troisième partie - Retour au sens Chapitre premier - Logique et chronologie Chapitre II - Phénoménologie et système Conclusion Appendices Note sur levocabulaire de Hegel et sur la traduction de quelques termes Pages de fin. (shrink)

In this paper I demonstrate that theories which postulate a strict tree structure of discourse on either the intentional or attentional level are not totally adequate for handling spontaneous dialogues. I use as..

Developed as the text for the basic computer architecture course at MIT, Computation Structures integrates a thorough coverage of digital logic design with a comprehensive presentation of computer architecture.

Three experiments investigated whether the similarity of relational structures influences the interpretation of spatial representations. Adults were shown diagrams of hand gestures paired with simple statements and asked to judge the meaning of new gestures. In Experiment 1 the gestures were paired with active declarative statements. In Experiment 2, the gestures were paired with conjunctive and disjunctive relations. Experiment 3 used statements similar to those used in Experiment 1, but eliminated the initial object‐to‐object mapping provided in Experiments 1 and 2. (...) In all three experiments, most participants chose an interpretation that set up a parallel relational structure between the gesture and its meaning: spatial elements were paired with conceptual elements and spatial relations were paired with conceptual relations. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that similarity of relational structures influences spatial reasoning, and have implications for analogical reasoning, diagrammatic reasoning, and language processing. (shrink)

Few phenomena have found such divergent descriptions in sociological lit­ erature as have social inconsistencies. They were studied by George Herbert Mead as eruptive "natural" events constituting a social temporality. Alfred SchUtz described them as "explosions" of the individual actor's anticipatory action patterns. Talcott Parsons attempted to grasp social inconsistencies into his frame of "pattern variables," while Erving Goffman dealt with them as disruptions of "fostered impressions of reality" maintained by one or the other dominant team. The present study traces (...) these divergent approaches back to various un­ checked assumptions concerning the structure and the constitution of social types. Thus, to further clarify the relationship between social types and the relevance structure of interactional situations has been my first objective. This initially rather limited intention widened when the role of social incon­ sistencies for analysing the differences between play, game, and social action proper in the immediate context of social interaction became apparent. The structure of social inconsistencies seems to hold a key to unifying the theo­ ries of play and social,action. (shrink)

In chapter 1, I begin the task of giving a semantical theory which is appropriate for the general indeterministic context and which can profitably be applied to the special context of quantum mechanics. I treat the notion of indeterminism, and discuss tree structures. In the second chapter, I consider several theories of tense meant for the indeterministic context. All presuppose tree structures. I defend one of these as the best rendering of simple English future tense. ;In the third chapter, I (...) begin discussing counterfactual conditionals. It is the burden of this chapter to show that one well known analysis of counterfactuals, Stalnaker's theory, is not appropriate for the context of quantum mechanics. I show that his analysis leads all too easily to a contradiction of experimental evidence. Stalnaker's analysis--like many theories of counterfactuals--is based on the relation of comparative similarity between worlds. Recently this basis has been questioned. In chapter 4, I step back a bit from the project of analyzing counterfactuals and consider the foundations for any such analysis. I first argue that the similarity approach is still a promising one. But I go on to argue that a similarity approach requires a non-ordinary notion of 'similarity'. So 'similarity' is in need of explication. This, I argue, is something that should be done on a piecemeal basis. ;In the fifth chapter, I attempt to unify the results of earlier chapters by relating them to the quantum mechanical context. I begin by defending an analysis of counterfactuals which is given in terms of similarity between worlds. I try to show that this theory is a natural one for the quantum mechanical context. And I discuss how, for purposes of the analysis of counterfactuals, 'similarity' is to be understood in the quantum mechanical context. Also, I consider the logical form of quantum mechanical attribution of probability. These attributions, I argue, involve counterfactuals and tense in interesting ways. Utilizing the results of chapters 1 and 2, I argue for a somewhat novel rendering of these quantum mechanical attributions. (shrink)

In this book the authors introduced the notions of soft neutrosophic algebraic structures. These soft neutrosophic algebraic structures are basically defined over the neutrosophic algebraic structures which means a parameterized collection of subsets of the neutrosophic algebraic structure. For instance, the existence of a soft neutrosophic group over a neutrosophic group or a soft neutrosophic semigroup over a neutrosophic semigroup, or a soft neutrosophic field over a neutrosophic field, or a soft neutrosophic LA-semigroup over a neutrosophic LAsemigroup, or a soft (...) neutosophic loop over a neutrosophic loop. It is interesting to note that these notions are defined over finite and infinite neutrosophic algebraic structures. These structures are even bigger than the classical algebraic structures. This book contains five chapters. Chapter one is about the introductory concepts. In chapter two the notions of soft neutrosophic group, soft neutrosophic bigroup and soft neutrosophic N-group are introduced and many fantastic properties are given with illustrative examples. (shrink)