According to a poet such as Gottfried Benn or a philosopher such as Arthur Schopenhauer, our experience of happiness is based on an illusion that doesn't agree with the gruesome facts of life. The crucial question is, then, whether such illusions can, as they seem to believe, ever be totally unmasked. Or are there illusions which are so deeply rooted in our psychological and anthropological economy that they are as incorrigible as optical illusions: delusions that can only be uncovered and (...) explained but can never be removed definitively? The insight that such 'necessary illusions' exist may lead to the acceptance of a modest kind of subjectivity — far remote from the conscious, autonomous subject of the Enlightenment — in which the subject is aware of its involuntary illusions, without that awareness being able to submit those illusions to the subject's own discretion. For Nietzsche our illusive way of experiencing serves our self-preservation: it protects us against the terrible truth about our existence. In his view, art is paradigmatic for those life-preserving illusions and therefore deserves priority over knowledge. (shrink)

Is de herhaling mogelijk? Deze ogenschijnlijk simpele vraag vormt het uitgangspunt van De herhaling. Een proeve van experimenterende psychologie door Constantin Constantius (1843), een van de meest curieuze geschriften uit het oeuvre van Søren Kierkegaard. In dit artikel worden twee aspecten aan de orde gesteld die De herhaling tot een nog altijd belangrijk boek maken: 1) De ongewone filosofische stijl die in dit boek ontwikkeld wordt en 2) De eigenzinnige opvatting over vrijheid en subjectiviteit die er onder de noemer (...) 'de herhaling' in naar voren wordt gebracht. Zoals de ondertitel 'een proeve van experimenterende psychologie' al aangeeft, is De herhaling geen klassieke filosofische verhandeling waarin op systematische wijze wordt uitgelegd wat er onder de herhaling - als filosofische begrip - verstaan moet worden. Integendeel, het is een uiterst experimenteel boek waarin een nieuwe filosofische stijl wordt geïntroduceerd. Er wordt zodoende nergens een eenduidige definitie gegeven van de herhaling in filosofische zin die ik in het vervolg zal aanduiden als de 'existentiële herhaling'. Sterker nog, de twee verschijningsvormen van de herhaling - de alledaagse en de existentiële herhaling - worden telkens welbewust met elkaar verward. Pas in de afsluitende brief aan de echte lezer van dit boek wordt duidelijk in welke richting we het verschil tussen deze twee vormen van herhaling moeten zoeken. [In English: Is repetition possible? This seemingly simple question forms the starting point of "Repetition: A Venture in Experimental Psychology" by Constantin Constantius (1843), one of the most curious writings in the oeuvre of Søren Kierkegaard. This article addresses two aspects that make Repetition a still relevant book today: 1) The unusual philosophical style developed in this work, and 2) The unconventional view of freedom and subjectivity presented under the concept of 'repetition.' As the subtitle "a venture in experimental psychology" suggests, "Repetition" is not a classical philosophical treatise systematically explaining what should be understood by repetition as a philosophical concept. On the contrary, it is an extremely experimental book in which a new philosophical style is introduced. Consequently, nowhere is a clear definition given of repetition in the philosophical sense, which I will henceforth refer to as 'existential repetition.' Moreover, the two manifestations of repetition—the everyday repetition and the existential repetition—are deliberately confused with each other throughout the work. Only in the concluding letter to the true reader of this book does it become clear in which direction we should look to find the difference between these two forms of repetition.]. (shrink)

The double subjectivity of conscience and the need to test conscientious objections -/- Abstract In spite of the collapse of the traditional objective concept of conscience and the subsequent subjectivation of conscience, conscientious objections are still often considered as a valid ground for exemption from legal and professional obligations. Conscientious objections are seen as more serious than ordinary moral objections. It is not evident why this is so. I argue, with Niklas Luhmann, that the function of conscience is to protect (...) the moral core of a person’s identity. Overruling conscientious objections threatens this core. Claims of conscience are usually founded on the right of freedom of conscience. This right is not absolute. I discuss the view of Richard Arneson who rejects the right of freedom of conscience and defends the right against conscience. I agree with Arneson that, at the one hand, conscientious objectors may constitute a threat to the social and legal order when their objections are not recognised and, at the other hand, too easy giving in to conscientious objections may also threaten the viability of social and legal order. That is why it is needed to determine when conscientious objections cannot be taken at face value, but should be subjected to a series of tests. The aim of these tests is to contain the number of objectors. I discuss 6 criteria for determining whether conscientious objections ground an exemption to legal and professional obligations. At the end of the article I discuss the conscientious objections of medical doctors. (shrink)

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Freud and especially Lacan understand the sexual identity of the human subject as an effect of a law. The article emphasizes that this symbolic law is arbitrary and it sketches the consequences of this insight for both a symbolic determination of the sexual difference and of the sexual interaction among different sexual desires. When the sexual difference is reduced to a dual opposition (suspended in sexual intercourse) and when the sexual desire is understood as a conscious straining after the appropriate (...) and attainable object, then the symbolic identity of the desiring subject is misunderstood and replaced by an imaginary presentation of it. Traditional philosophy and contemporary pornography are examples of such a misunderstanding : they both try to overcome the impossibility to fully understand a deferring difference and to avoid the symbolic dependency on a foreign desire that cannot be controlled. (shrink)

Historians and theoreticians of nationalism and nationalist movements are perplexed by the fact that so much of what nationalists believe is evidently not the case. One example of this concerns the ontological or metaphysical status of the nation: whether nations as a form of political community are in the very nature of things or whether they are rather a recent way of imagining the political community.I question the meaning terms such as 'natural', 'imagined' and 'objective'/'subjective' have when we are talking (...) about the nation as the foundation of political legitimacy. Ido this by explaining what meaning those terms have in the philosophical reconstruction of interpretation and communication by the American philosopher Donald Davidson. (shrink)

This article describes my VENI project on the reconceptualization of community. It argues that the idea of a socially situated subject has not become obsolete in times of globalization, but that a rethinking of the concept of community is now required: how to account for the simultaneous transience and persistence of belonging? It then explains that by staging a conversation between Jean-Luc Nancy and Stanley Cavell, an account can be developed that meets both criteria for thinking community today.

‘Non-Fascist Living’: Identity, Subjectivity, Resistance This article explores a recent form of academic and artistic resistance to contemporary modalities of fascism. This form of resistance is premised upon the argument that fascism lodges itself in the deepest recesses of the self, manifesting as fascist desires and beliefs. As such, traces of fascism are present in everyone, including people who do not otherwise hold fascistic ideas. This position goes on to argue that any critic of fascism must accordingly identify and eradicate (...) such traces inside her own subjectivity, by means of an ethics of ‘non-fascist living’. Critically examining the philosophical presuppositions of this position, the article asks what implicit conception of the subject and its relation to resistance is at work here. It brings this position into conversation with Michel Foucault, upon whose work it draws but whose understanding of resistance, it is argued, it reconceptualises. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of this form of resistance for critical philosophical practice. (shrink)

Pleidooi voor de beleving als kennis-instrument.

Filosofische ponering van de subjectiviteit van elke interpretatie.

In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht hoe het vrouwelijke wordt ingezet bij een herwaardering van de menselijkheid. Daarvoor wordt de betekenis van het vrouwelijke in de filosofie van Emmanuel Levinas bestudeerd. In zijn werk zijn met name drie vrouwelijke gestalten die de weg van de subjectiviteit tot de transcendentie markeren. Aan elk van die gestalten wordt een deel van de studie gewijd. Tevens wordt ter vergelijking een tekst van Hegel besproken en twee teksten van Luce Irigaray geanalyseerd.

Het denken van Levinas verdedigt op een uiterst kritische manier de subjectiviteit van de mens en geeft nieuwe inhoud aan de humanistische idealen van vrijheid en waardigheid. Dat verklaart wellicht de populariteit ervan. Na de dood van de metafysische God brengt Levinas bovendien opnieuw, zij het ‘met de knipoog van het raadsel’, God ter sprake . Met eenzelfde knipoog zou men daarom Levinas ‘theoloog’ kunnen noemen. Maar dan wel in heel bepaalde zin.

In dit opstel neemt Scruton stelling tegen het diep ingesleten nihilisme dat ook ons denken over kunst vergiftigt. De ontwikkeling die in gang werd gezet door Marcel Duchamps urinoir en leidde tot een aanhoudende stroom geschriften over de vraag wat kunst is, heeft ertoe geleid dat zo’n beetje alles voor kunst mag doorgaan, waarmee de kunst feitelijk haar zin verliest. Alles lijkt even belangrijk, Shakespeare of technorock. Scruton betoogt daarentegen dat we kunst moeten blijven onderwerpen aan een kritisch oordeel en (...) als uitdrukking van zedelijk leven moeten blijven beschouwen. We moeten onderscheid durven maken tussen verwerpelijke en verheffende kunst, juist omdat die kritische blik inherent is aan het mens-zijn en we alleen hierdoor contact houden met het transcendente – ‘het punt op de rand van ruimte en tijd dat de subjectiviteit van deze wereld uitmaakt’. (shrink)

Een van de recente ontwikkelingen binnen evolutiepsychologie is het onderzoek naar evolutionaire esthetica, of darwinistisch geïnspireerd onderzoek naar de kwalitatieve beoordeling van natuurlijke en artificiële stimuli. Esthetica wordt in de westerse traditie echter traditioneel vanuit filosofisch en speculatief oogpunt benaderd. Ik illustreer de ontwikkeling van evolutionaire esthetica binnen een groter kader van wetenschappelijk en empirisch onderzoek, en argumenteer dat schijnbare tegenstellingen zoals deze tussen objectiviteit en subjectiviteit in esthetische oordelen geen stand houden. De kritieken die ten aanzien van evolutionaire (...) esthetica worden geuit, gaan verkeerdelijk uit van de vermeende onverzoenbaarheid van de filosofische en wetenschappelijke studie van esthetica. One of the more recent developments in the field of evolutionary psychology is research on evolutionary aesthetics, otherwise stated: darwinian inspired inquiries into qualitative judgements of natural and aesthetic stimuli. Western thought traditionally approaches aesthetics from a philosophical and conjectural point of view. I illustrate the development of evolutionary aesthetics within a broader framework of scientific and empirical research, and argue that apparent contrasts such as objectivity and subjectivity in aesthetic judgement do not turn out to be valid. Critiques of evolutionary aesthetics wrongly assume the conflicting nature of philosophical and evolutionary aesthetics. (shrink)