Results for 'Susanna Rich'

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  1.  16
    Grandmother sausages (poem).Susanna Rich - 2002 - Feminist Studies 28 (2):416-417.
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  2.  25
    On Writing.Susanna Rich - 1993 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 11 (4):2-2.
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  3. Rich or thin?Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-80.
    Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties.
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  4.  25
    Mary to Veronica: John Audelay's Sequence of Salutations to God-Bearing Women.Susanna Fein - 2011 - Speculum 86 (4):964-1009.
    Literary historians have been working productively in recent years to reclaim the texture of early-fifteenth-century English poetry in contexts of politics and religion. To the list of major authors we should add John Audelay, chaplain of Knockin , setting him equally beside his contemporaries Thomas Hoccleve, John Lydgate, and Margery Kempe. As a vernacular poet with a name, a provenance, and a rich body of work, Audelay warrants serious regard. His oeuvre displays an artistry that is different from, but (...)
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  5.  49
    Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. [REVIEW]Susanna Goodin - 1996 - Review of Metaphysics 50 (1):143-143.
    Working under the structure of his three main topics of determinism, theism, and idealism, Adams has produced a work on Leibniz of outstanding significance. Adams deftly handles the massive historical resources now available to Leibniz scholars, producing a major philosophical work which is a joy to read. Discussions are rich with references to heretofore little known documents, correspondence, and revisions, and Adams uses these texts to full advantage. He argues for a Leibniz deeply engaged with his contemporaries, a Leibniz (...)
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  6. State of the Art of Audio- and Video-Based Solutions for AAL.Slavisa Aleksic, Michael Atanasov, Jean Calleja Agius, Kenneth Camilleri, Anto Cartolovni, Pau Climent-Perez, Sara Colantonio, Stefania Cristina, Vladimir Despotovic, Hazim Kemal Ekenel, Ekrem Erakin, Francisco Florez-Revuelta, Danila Germanese, Nicole Grech, Steinunn Gróa Sigurđardóttir, Murat Emirzeoglu, Ivo Iliev, Mladjan Jovanovic, Martin Kampel, William Kearns, Andrzej Klimczuk, Lambros Lambrinos, Jennifer Lumetzberger, Wiktor Mucha, Sophie Noiret, Zada Pajalic, Rodrigo Rodriguez Perez, Galidiya Petrova, Sintija Petrovica, Peter Pocta, Angelica Poli, Mara Pudane, Susanna Spinsante, Albert Ali Salah, Maria Jose Santofimia, Anna Sigríđur Islind, Lacramioara Stoicu-Tivadar, Hilda Tellioglu & Andrej Zgank - 2022 - Alicante: University of Alicante.
    It is a matter of fact that Europe is facing more and more crucial challenges regarding health and social care due to the demographic change and the current economic context. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has stressed this situation even further, thus highlighting the need for taking action. Active and Assisted Living technologies come as a viable approach to help facing these challenges, thanks to the high potential they have in enabling remote care and support. Broadly speaking, AAL can be referred (...)
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  7.  73
    Visual Contents: Beyond Reach?Kristjan Laasik - 2015 - Philosophical Forum 46 (2):193-204.
    Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable (...)
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  8. Presentation and Content.John Bengson - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):795-807.
    Susanna Siegel's _The Contents of Visual Experience_ (2010) offers a novel defense of the thesis that experiences have representational content. Her argument aims to move from an observation about *all experiences presenting properties* to the conclusion that *all experiences convey content*. While Siegel's emphasis on presentation is an important contribution, I argue that her argument fails. For there are _two_ types of presentation, 'contentful' and 'objectual,' and Siegel's reasoning does not apply to both. I conclude by discussing an implication (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Aspect‐switching and visual phenomenal character.Richard Price - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):508-518.
    John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect‐switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect‐switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect‐switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural‐kind properties, such (...)
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  10.  89
    Anticipation and variation in visual content.Michael Madary - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.
    This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and (...)
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  11. The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
    What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces (...)
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  12. The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    There is an important division in the human mind between perception and reasoning. We reason from information that we have already, but perception is a means of taking in new information. Susanna Siegel argues that these two aspects of the mind become deeply intertwined when beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudice influence what we perceive.
  13. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
  14. The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our (...)
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  15. (1 other version)Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  16. (1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  17. Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  18. Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
    This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying the relevant sense of “should,” I point out advantages that Equal Treatment has over both simple and subtle evidentialist alternatives, including versions that distinguish what one should believe from what one should get oneself to believe. I then discuss views on which there is a distinctively epistemic sense (...)
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  19. Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  20. Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can (...)
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  21. The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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  22. Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):434-453.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 2, Page 434-453, March 2022.
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  23. The Rationality of Perception : Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):764-771.
    My replies to Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton's commentaries on The Rationality of Perception (2017).
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  24. The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  25. (1 other version)The Epistemology of Perception.Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  26. Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
    Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons (...)
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  27. Affordances and the Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 39-76.
  28. The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.
    I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their (...)
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  29. Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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  30. Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
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  31. Do visual experiences have contents?Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.
  32. The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 199-219.
  33. Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  34. Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
    I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and (...)
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  35. Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
    Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...)
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  36. Action and self-location in perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):603-632.
    I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that (...)
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  37. The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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  38. (1 other version)Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.
    In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
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  39. (2 other versions)The visual experience of causation.Susanna Siegel - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):519-540.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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  40. Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
    A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations (...)
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  41. The Rationality of Perception: Reply to Begby, Ghijsen, and Samoilova.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analysis (Reviews).
    Includes a summary of my book *The Rationality of Perception* (Oxford, 2017) and replies to commentaries on it by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. These commentaries and my summary and replies will be published soon in Analysis Reviews. Begby focuses on my analysis of the epistemic features of the interface between individual minds and their cultural milieu (discussed in chapter 10 of *The Rationality of Perception*), Ghijsen focuses on the notion of inference and reliabilism (chapters 5 and 6), (...)
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  42. Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligence of the (...)
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  43. Capacities First.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):744-757.
  44. How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.
    Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they're generated, as well as the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this long-standing view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. I criticize a powerful (...)
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  45. Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...)
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  46. (1 other version)How can we discover the contents of experience?Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-42.
    In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I.
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  47. How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):408-435.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
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  48. The Polysemy of 'I'.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Orthodoxy assumes that the first-person thoughts of an individual are anchored to a stable object. I challenge this assumption by arguing that “I” is polysemous. The perspectival anchor of a first-person thought could be the bearer of the thought, the agent, the bearer of perception, or a body, to name just a few options. These different possible anchors do not form a unity. So, a unified or minimal self cannot, without argument, be posited as the stable anchor of on individual’s (...)
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  49. Reasoning One's Way out of Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations. Boston: Brill. pp. 240-264.
    Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately committed to (...)
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  50. A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...)
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