This paper introduces a logical analysis of convex combinations within the framework of Łukasiewicz real-valued logic. This provides a natural link between the fields of many-valued logics and decision theory under uncertainty, where the notion of convexity plays a central role. We set out to explore such a link by defining convex operators on MV-algebras, which are the equivalent algebraic semantics of Łukasiewicz logic. This gives us a formal language to reason about the expected value of bounded random variables. As (...) an illustration of the applicability of our framework we present a logical version of the Anscombe–Aumann representation result. (shrink)

In this paper I want to suggest that, while the argued philosophical distinction between logic, epistemolgoy and ontology is one of the many achievements of Aristotle, his predecessor Parmenides was in fact already operating with a theory of knowledge and an elementary propositional logic that are of abiding philosophical interest. As part of the thesis I shall be obliged to reject a number of interpretations of particular passages in his poem, including one or two currently fashionable ones. Since so much (...) turns on points of translation, I note for purposes of comparison what seem to be significant alternatives to my own in any particular instance. The line numbers are those of the DK text. (shrink)

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly "generalized," remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) (...) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self-understanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) policy for health and wellness apps is ethically problematic. Currently, the FDA does not regulate health and wellness apps that are not intended for medical use. As a result of this hands‐off policy, preventing harm to consumers is left primarily to developers and app marketplaces. We argue that the FDA’s duties to prevent harm and maintain accountability to the American public require that they play a much stronger role. We also (...) discuss concerns about efficiency and fostering innovation, and argue that while they should help shape FDA regulation of health and wellness apps, they do not justify complete absence of FDA involvement. -/- . (shrink)

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when (...) the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties. (shrink)

Arabic language; grammar; syntax; linguistics.