The essay offers a Jewish account of education in nonviolence by examining the first of Emmanuel Levinas' Talmudic readings ‘Toward the Other.’ I begin by exploring Levinas' unique philosophy of religious education, which nurtures responsibility for the other, as part of an alternative to enlightenment-orientated modern Jewish thought pioneered by the likes of Gershom Scholem, Martin Buber, and Franz Rosenzweig. I then consider a question raised by Yusef Waghid and Zehavit Gross at the 2012 meeting of the Philosophy of (...) Education Society of Great Britain in Oxford concerning whether one must forget in order to forgive great wrong doing such as South African Apartheid or the Holocaust of European Jewry. Through an examination of Levinas' treatment of several Talmudic passages, I argue that the Jewish tradition takes a paradoxical approach to this question. We should forget in order to remember wrong doing. The spiritual process that both perpetrators and victims must undergo in order to embrace this paradox, I contend, is a genuine education in nonviolence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In reference to the article by Hanan Alexander ‘Education in nonviolence’, the text takes up the issue of reading Emmanuel Levinas’s Talmudic texts for the philosophy of education. It intends to positively answer the question about the value and potential of such inspiration, focusing on concepts from two of Levinas’s Talmudic readings. The first part of the text is devoted to the characteristics of the intellectual output of the thinker. The second part analyses and discusses Alexander’s (...) commentary on one of Levinas’s Talmudic readings, ‘Toward the Other’. Alexander aims to show the specificity of the idea of education in nonviolence, heavily indebted to the Jewish tradition and thought. The third part of the text is an extension of Alexander’s comment, focuses on another Talmudic reading by Levinas, ‘Cities of Refuge’, and aims to outline the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of the pedagogy of asylum. (shrink)

Ronna Burger’s Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates argues that the Nicomachean Ethics is a unified whole. Her reading runs against the tide of most contemporary scholarship. In particular, Book X.7–8, Aristotle’s valorization and near apotheosis of the “contemplative life,” has been taken to be a Platonic intrusion in a work otherwise characterized by a resolute “anthropocentrism,” as Nussbaum puts it. To account for such an apparent fracture commentators have attributed both chronological development and later editorship to the corpus. Burger, by (...) contrast, offers a “Talmudic reading.” She treats the Nicomachean Ethics as a work of integrity that dialectically culminates in, rather than is interrupted by, X.7–8. This essay situates her argument in a larger context that explores the nature of philosophical reading as such. (shrink)

Levinas's Talmudic readings have played an important role in defending the claim that the discipline of modern Jewish philosophy cannot be reduced to a list of assimilationist thinkers. This article argues that this claim is defendable, but only if the premise of the claim ceases to be the content of Levinas's Talmudic readings: "The Temptation of Temptation" wrongly takes its sugya as representative of Judaism as a whole, the differing mathematical calculations between Levinas and the sugya he treats (...) in "The Pact" suggest that the Talmud assumes a Rousseauian amour-propre , and "And God Created Woman" implies that Jewish ethics is not opposed to Jews' assimilation. I instead suggest that Levinas's Talmudic readings serve to promote the fecundity of Judaism; it is only through such "bad" readings that historical determinism can be conquered, and a messianic future becomes possible. (shrink)

Originally published in Hebrew, this book examines Levinas's contributions to Jewish thought, concentrating specifically on his talmudic readings in the context of contemporary midrash.

This study presents a reconsideration of Levinas's concept of the feminine. This reconsideration is facilitated by a philosophically informed analysis of Levinas's Talmudic readings on that subject.The innovation of this research is in its methodology, which combines the two corpora of Levinas' writings as important components of an integrated system of thought. Two main phenomena are derived here from Levinas' Talmudic readings and raise main principles of his ethics. In the heart of the discussion on Eros we find (...) a statement of the differentiation between feminine and masculine in Levinas's thought, and its implication for gender and for the ethics of otherness. In the center of Levinas's terminology of maternity we uncover his phenomenology of pregnancy, and its ethical implication regarding responsibility to the other. The extreme responsibility committed to the other since there is a immanent conflict between parents and their child. (shrink)

In this rich intellectual history of the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic lectures in Paris, Ethan Kleinberg addresses Levinas's Jewish life and its relation to his philosophical writings while making an argument for the role and importance of Levinas's Talmudic lessons. Pairing each chapter with a related Talmudic lecture, Kleinberg uses the distinction Levinas presents between "God on Our Side" and "God on God's Side" to provide two discrete and at times conflicting approaches to Levinas's Talmudic (...) readings. One is historically situated and argued from "our side" while the other uses Levinas's Talmudic readings themselves to approach the issues as timeless and derived from "God on God's own side." Bringing the two approaches together, Kleinberg asks whether the ethical message and moral urgency of Levinas's Talmudic lectures can be extended beyond the texts and beliefs of a chosen people, religion, or even the seemingly primary unit of the self. Touching on Western philosophy, French Enlightenment universalism, and the Lithuanian Talmudic tradition, Kleinberg provides readers with a boundary-pushing investigation into the origins, influences, and causes of Levinas's turn to and use of Talmud. (shrink)

The exegesis of sacred rites in the Talmud is subject to a restriction on the iteration and composition of inference rules. In order to determine the scope and limits of that restriction, the sages of the Talmud deploy those very same inference rules. We present the remarkable features of this early use of self-reference to navigate logical constraints and uncover the hidden complexity behind the sages? arguments. Appendix 11 contains a translation of the relevant sugya. 1Hebrew and Aramaic transliteration approximates (...) traditional Sephardic pronunciation, which is closer to academic standard transliteration than the various Ashkenazic pronunciations, yet is legible. Specific references follow the convention of folio (number), side (a or b), number of lines from the top or (if negative) bottom of the page. (shrink)

Levinas’s conception of listening for the “trace” of the infinite implies that the human spirit grows when it comes into contact with something greater than it had previously known. When Levinas reads the Talmud, sourcebook of Jewish Law, he tries to enter into conversation with it, allowing the meaning of the text to expand to touch his own contemporary concerns. At the flip side of this expansion, however, lies my worry that the text junctions as a “totality,” assimilating all contemporary (...) concerns to its discussions. At this time of rebuilding in Jewish history, Jews cannot afford narrow conceptions of Jewish practice. This essay does not attempt to elucidateLevinas’s thought, but to use some insights gained from reading his work to think about contemporary Judaism. (shrink)

This monograph uses deconstruction—a philosophical movement originated by Jacques Derrida—to read the most authoritative book in Judaism: the Talmud. Examining deconstruction in comparison with Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies, the volume argues that the movement opens an innovative debate on Jewish Law. -/- First, the monograph interprets deconstruction within the major streams of continental philosophy; then, it criticizes many aspects of Foucault’s and Agamben’s philosophy, rejecting their notion of law. On these premises, the research delivers a close examination of many fundamental (...) aspects of the Talmud. Consequently, it provides a short history of Rabbinic literature, a history of the dissemination of the Talmud from Babylon to Northern France, and an analysis of Talmudic vocabulary from a deconstructive perspective. Each key concept of the Talmud is analysed according to the deconstructive dialectics between orality and writing. Closing with a comparison between the Talmud and Derrida’s most enigmatic text, Glas, the study argues that deconstruction dismantles the traditional notion of the Talmud to outline a new approach to Jewish Law. -/- Reading the Talmud through deconstruction, this new angle makes the volume an essential resource for students and scholars interested in Jewish studies, continental philosophy, and the Middle East. (shrink)

This volume looks at tractate Menachot, which is concerned mostly with grain offered at the Temple to atone for various misdeeds. Fogel approaches the text, page by page, commenting with doses of humor and comparisons in a manner meant to explain the text for contemporary readers.

I will argue that the underlying rationale for the talmudic list of trades disqualified from legal testimony is aesthetic. These trades involved professional mimicry, which as such incapacitated what R. Neis has termed “homovisuality” or self-referential witnessing in the Talmud. Reading talmudic laws of conjoined testimony and the induction of witnesses in light of Deleuze’s and Blanchot’s philosophy, I will argue that homovisuality entailed the witness’s reincarnation as the subject of the event, thus re-signifying rather than reporting (...) the event. The judge, transformed into a witness, could capture the truth of the event at a glance, in a manner both prior to and irreducible to trial procedures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Talmud Meets Church HistoryDaniel Boyarin (bio)Virginia Burrus. Chastity as Autonomy: Women in the Stories of the Apocryphal Acts. New York: Edwin Mellen, 1987.———. ‘“Equipped for Victory’: Ambrose and the Gendering of Orthodoxy.” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4.4 (1996): 461–75.———. The Making Of A Heretic: Gender, Authority, And The Priscillianist Controversy. Berkeley: U of California P, 1995.———. “Reading Agnes: The Rhetoric of Gender in Ambrose and Prudentius.” (...) Journal of Early Christian Studies 3.1 (1995): 25–46.———. “Word and Flesh: The Bodies and Sexuality of Ascetic Women in Christian Antiquity.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 10.1 (1994): 27–51.[1] Prologue: Morningside Heights, 1941—A Talmudist Meets a Church HistorianIn 1944, my teacher Saul Lieberman published a classic essay in which he treated talmudic martyrology in the context of patristic literature. 1 The article had been written under the inspiration of his meeting and friendship with Henri Gregoire, the great Belgian church historian, then a refugee from the Nazis in the Morningside Heights neighborhood in New York, where Lieberman, the great Lithuanian talmudist, had also found refuge and where the two met. Nearly a half-century later, this student of Lieberman’s met another church historian, Virginia Burrus, in Morningside Heights under happier circumstances, when both of us were participants at a conference on asceticism at Union Theological Seminary, and a similar intellectual interaction began. This paper represents some of the first fruits of that second encounter and aspires to modestly continue the enterprise begun by the first.[2] Intertextuality and InterdisciplinarityAveril Cameron has recently written:The myth of early Christianity as the resort of the poor and underprivileged is precisely that, and a very convenient one it has been. It is a myth that rests, moreover, on the fallacy of an original Christianity uncontaminated by external influences; but its holders then have to explain how this “new” faith could make [End Page 52] the leap to center stage. Thus, we have been told, “the naiveté of the early Christian speech came in the course of time to wed itself to the cultures of the world.” But while much of current New Testament scholarship is directed at the internal (that is, theological) articulation of the texts, there is also a perceptible trend towards a mode of interpretation that balances the external and internal factors operative in the literary texts. It is thus less a question of the degree of “influence” of Greco-Roman or Jewish literary or philosophical elements on early Christian writing than of their integral relationship.[37–38]Judaism also (and Jewish scholarship) has had a stake in inscribing itself as pure and uncontaminated, for reasons that Philip Alexander has articulated: “The attempt to [lay down a norm for Judaism in the first century] barely conceals apologetic motives—in the case of Christianity a desire to prove that Christianity transcended or transformed Judaism, in the case of Jews a desire to suggest that Christianity was an alien form of Judaism which deviated from the true path” [3]. Indeed, the very distinctness of Judaism has been articulated by Jews as precisely its distance from a “syncretistic” Christianity whose defining feature is that it is somehow a composite of Judaism and Hellenism. 2In this essay, in conversation with some of the work of Burrus, I wish to begin to suggest a few of the ways that study of the Talmud can be further enriched through the engagement of talmudic scholars with the recent sophisticated (and especially gender-oriented) work being done on early Christianity. Indeed, I will be hinting (and in future work explicitly arguing) that we have to begin seriously thinking about Judaeo-Christianity as a single cultural system: contentious, dialectical, polemical, and sometimes friendly, but—I hasten to add—not moralistic in the homogenized “family values” sense implied by the modern usage of this term. I put forth here, as a case in point, that the richest contexts for understanding the sets of cultural tensions that gave rise to a particular talmudic text are to be uncovered in contemporary patristic literature. From the point of view of a New Historicist approach to talmudic literature, this suggests that the... (shrink)

Leibniz’s interest in the Talmud and in Jewish philosophy and theology in general, is well established in the scholarly literature. In this paper, we suggest a short comparative study of Leibniz’s concept of the monad and the Talmudic idea of “Malchut.” Our study is based, specifically, on a tractate of the Talmud titled Yoma. This tractate is mainly focused on the Jewish Atonement Day, in which Jews are judged by God for their sins in the previous year. In particular, (...) in pages 38a-b of Yoma, the Talmud reads: “By your name they shall call you, and in your place they shall seat you, and from your own they shall give you; No person may touch that which is prepared for another, and one Malchut does not touch another even to the extent of a hairbreadth.” The Talmud suggests here that even though we somehow influence one another’s life, one cannot directly affect others’ predetermined place in the world or interfere in the individual paths prepared for others. In this paper, we aim to indicate the similarities between such Talmudic notions and Leibniz’s ideas in the Monadology – such as the ideas that monads have “no windows” and that a pre-established harmony is set among all monads by God – as a ground for future research. (shrink)

A single document, the Talmud of Babylonia – that is to say, the Misha, a philosophical law code that reached closure at ca 100 C.E., as read by the Gemara, a commentary to thirty-seven of the sixty-three tractates of that code, compiled in Babylonia, reaching closure by ca 600 C.E. – from ancient times to the present day has served as the medium of instruction for all literate Jews, teaching, by example alone, the craft of clear thinking, compelling argument, correct (...) rhetoric. That craft originated in Athens with Plato’s Socrates for the medium of thought, and with Aristotle for the method of thought, and predominated in the intellectual life of Western civilization thereafter. When we correlate the modes of thought and analysis of the Talmud with the ones of classical philosophy that pertain, we see how the Talmud works, by which I mean, how its framers made connections and drew conclusions, for the Mishnah and Gemara respectively. And when we can explain how the Talmud works, I claim, we may also understand why it exercised the remarkable power that it did for the entire history of Judaism from its closure in the 7th century into our own time. These two questions – how it works, why it won – define the task of this presentation. (shrink)

This article approaches Levinas’s 1963 Talmudic reading entitled “Messianic Texts” in light of the metaphoric numbers 0, 1, and 2. “Zero” will refer to unforeseen silences in the Talmudic text in question (here, Rabbi Eleazar’s sudden silence in the debate about the conditions of redemption, as well as commentator Rashi’s silence on Talmudic discussions about a certain “identity” of the messiah. The number “one” concerns a textual hapax: Rabbi Hillel’s historicist dismissal of the messiah as promise (...) and open future—a position virtually anathema to rabbinics (inter alia) but nevertheless preserved by the Talmud. My metaphoric numbers strategy turns, finally, to the curious presence of “allegorical doubles” in the Bible, which Levinas describes as a configuration of textual “eidetics.” Using my three numbers (0, 1, 2) as an elementary analytic grid, I turn from Levinas’ “Messianic Texts” to André Neher’s biblical commentary on Levinas’s presentation—a commentary similarly concerning messianism but no longer in the Talmud. My purpose is dual: to sketch the context of this complex Talmudic reading, to offer one (idiosyncratic) reading-strategy focusing on two events of “silence,” the future anterior of the “messiah” who will have been but will come no more, and finally the play of identity-in-difference in the biblical doubles. Keywords: “Messianic Texts,” Vladimir Jankélévitch, André Neher, messianisms, world-to-come, the Samozvanetz. (shrink)

Of the stories describing the adventures full of deep significances of the various rabbis from the glorious Talmudic era, the most famous but also the most exploited is undoubtedly that of the “four sages who entered the Pardes”. If in the Talmudic-Midrashic literature it was used to point out the dangers and achievements that were related to speculations, rather than experiences, and in the mystical literature it was used to point out the dangers that could befall the mystic (...) on his way to God, to the kabbalists, Pardes was an unexplained parable for an unrevealed secret, a generalized metaphor for the danger zones of religious experience, seen as something which was good for the few, but pernicious for others. This article traces the manner in which Moshe Idel analyzes, in his books and lectures, the meanings of this legend, taking the reader on a fascinating journey in time and space, throughout various types of kabbalistic thinking and even maimonidean philosophy. (shrink)

The Babylonian Talmud has reached us in multiple versions in medieval manu- scripts, early printed editions, and in citations in the works of medieval and early modern scholars. The field of Talmud criticism has developed criteria for working with these materials and the scholar E. S. Rosenthal famously theorized about the implications of textual variants for the history of the Talmud’s redaction. Tractate Temurah of the Babylonian Talmud received special attention due to the frequency and, at times, unique usage of (...) the term, lishana ’aḥarina, meaning “alternative textual reading,” found in it. In Temurah the term lishana ’aḥarina does not only signal a difference in formulation, as in other tractates of the Talmud, but some- times also seems to introduce a separately redacted text of the tractate that was integrated into a widespread and known base text. (shrink)

This innovative study sees the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem through the lens of the Platonic dialogues and the Talmud. Howland argues that these texts are animated by comparable conceptions of the proper roles of inquiry and reasoned debate in religious life, and by a profound awareness of the limits of our understanding of things divine. Insightful readings of Plato's Apology, Euthyphro and chapter three of tractate Ta'anit explore the relationship of prophets and philosophers, fathers and sons, and gods and (...) men, bringing to light the tension between rational inquiry and faith that is essential to the speeches and deeds of both Socrates and the Talmudic sages. In reflecting on the pedagogy of these texts, Howland shows in detail how Talmudic aggadah and Platonic drama and narrative speak to different sorts of readers in seeking mimetically to convey the living ethos of rabbinic Judaism and Socratic philosophising. (shrink)

In this book, Lynn Kaye examines how rabbis of late antiquity thought about time through their legal reasoning and storytelling, and what these insights mean for thinking about time today. Providing close readings of legal and narrative texts in the Babylonian Talmud, she compares temporal ideas with related concepts in ancient and modern philosophical texts and in religious traditions from late antique Mesopotamia. Kaye demonstrates that temporal flexibility in the Babylonian Talmud is a means of exploring and resolving legal uncertainties, (...) as well as a tool to tell stories that convey ideas effectively and dramatically. Her book, the first on time in the Talmud, makes accessible complex legal texts and philosophical ideas. It also connects the literature of late antique Judaism with broader theological and philosophical debates about time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:READING HALACHICALLY AND AGGADICALLY: A RESPONSE TO REUVEN KIMELMAN Sandor Goodhart Purdue University Professor Kimelman's talk is a hard act to follow. I also find myself in a difficult situation because this is the first moment in our gathering in which someone who is genuinely from outside the COV&R group has come in to speak to us. So there is always the potential for the activation ofthe processes (...) ofthe sacred that we know all too well. We'll try to resist that activation, however, and I will attempt to offer my response to Professor Kimelman's paper with humor, although I may not always be entirely successful in my efforts. Part I. Mandatory, discretionary, and holy warfare Professor Reuven Kimelman's paper, "Warfare and its Restrictions in the Jewish Tradition," is a testament to the author's erudition and deep knowledge ofthe Jewish tradition and in particular the Talmudic tradition on the matter of mandatory and discretionary warfare and its relation to ethical conduct. No one who reads Professor Kimelman or who hears him speak can come away without having learned something new, something that will in turn confer new knowledge in other areas and thus contribute to the overall understanding ofTorah and thereby to the goal ofthe ancient Rabbis who compiled these halachic and aggadic materials which is to see Torah as a blueprint of the world. The paper is brimming with the understanding and references appropriate to the subject matter he has chosen to examine, and from the perspective from which he has chosen to read that subject matter. But therein also lies its difficulty. The problem from my point of view is that it is difficult to see how, in the form in which I read his text two weeks ago, it has anything to say to Girardian theory, either in general, or Sandor Goodhart65 with specific relevance to this conference. Moreover, and this is perhaps more troublesome to me, steeped as his paper is within one major tradition of reading within Jewish history, namely, the legalistic tradition of Talmudic reading, it is difficult to see how his paper has anything to say to the other major tradition ofreading within the history ofJudaism, namely, the prophetic tradition. Let me elaborate. It is difficult to see how Professor Kimelman's paper has anything to say to Girardian theory in at least three different ways. (1 ) The paper seems to be largely unaware of Girardian theory and one wonders why this paper is being read here. (2) The paper seems to be largely unaware of the purpose of this particular conference, which is to think about and discuss the institution of violence read from a Girardian perspective. (3) The paper seems to be largely unaware ofthe dynamics of mimetic phenomena whether from a Girardian perspective or from any other. Rather the paper seems to be largely focused on a realpolitik of ethical life in context of mandatory and discretionary warfare as discussed in the Talmud to the virtual exclusion of the mimetic aspect of things, the political to the exclusion ofthe ethical (at least in the sense that I am going to speak about it), the public conception of the ethical to the exclusion of the personal conception of the ethical. Perhaps more troubling, however, is that the paper seems to be largely without commentary upon an alternative understanding of scriptural phenomena, which is, namely, that they are scriptural phenomena, textual phenomena, and not matters of historical reality, of what really happened, or even matters of moral reality, except as that reality passes through Scripture. As an exclusion of this scriptural dimension, and an abstraction of the issues of mandatory and discretionary warfare from their scriptural context, the paper appears to be the product of what I would call a literalist imagination and therefore potentially of theodicy. Why, then, is Reuven Kimelman here? Presumably Bob Daly has told him what this conference is to be about, that it is focused upon Girardian theory, either in general or in specific guise ofthe topic: namely, violence and institution in Judaism. Presumably, Reuven Kimelman also knows about the other tradition of Judaism beside the legalistic tradition from which he reads since he... (shrink)

In Levinas’s philosophy, “nature” refers to two distinct and sometimes opposed concepts. Most often it stands for being and perseverance in being (i.e., conatus): it is what is and wants to be. In some places, however, “nature” indicates the limits of human power, violence, or hubris, and reveals the uncanny unlimitedness of transcendence. In other words, “nature” designates primarily the ontological character of Creation but also sometimes the otherness beyond ontology. It expresses the egoistic but also sometimes the altruistic. It (...) commonly discourages ethics but also sometimes encourages it. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these two meanings of “nature” meet and contradict each other in Levinas’s philosophy, and to interpret their meeting and contradiction. Levinas never offers a studied reflection on nature per se. However, his Talmudic Readings include descriptions of nature as both ontological and inspiring the ethical. Reinterpreting some of the Readings I show that, for Levinas, nature is associated with war, conquest and destruction, but is sometimes presented as the cure for these ontological evils. In other words, its function is similar to that of politics. It embodies a necessity that must be moderated by an ethics which, in a way, comes from nature itself. (shrink)

Judaic Logic is an original inquiry into the forms of thought determining Jewish law and belief, from the impartial perspective of a logician. Judaic Logic attempts to honestly estimate the extent to which the logic employed within Judaism fits into the general norms, and whether it has any contributions to make to them. The author ranges far and wide in Jewish lore, finding clear evidence of both inductive and deductive reasoning in the Torah and other books of the Bible, and (...) analyzing the methodology of the Talmud and other Rabbinic literature by means of formal tools which make possible its objective evaluation with reference to scientific logic. The result is a highly innovative work – incisive and open, free of clichés or manipulation. Judaic Logic succeeds in translating vague and confusing interpretative principles and examples into formulas with the clarity and precision of Aristotelean syllogism. Among the positive outcomes, for logic in general, are a thorough listing, analysis and validation of the various forms of a-fortiori argument, as well as a clarification of dialectic logic. However, on the negative side, this demystification of Talmudic/Rabbinic modes of thought (hermeneutic and heuristic) reveals most of them to be, contrary to the boasts of orthodox commentators, far from deductive and certain. They are often, legitimately enough, inductive. But they are also often unnatural and arbitrary constructs, supported by unverifiable claims and fallacious techniques. Many other thought-processes, used but not noticed or discussed by the Rabbis, are identified in this treatise, and subjected to logical review. Various more or less explicit Rabbinic doctrines, which have logical significance, are also examined in it. In particular, this work includes a formal study of the ethical logic (deontology) found in Jewish law, to elicit both its universal aspects and its peculiarities. With regard to Biblical studies, one notable finding is an explicit formulation (which, however, the Rabbis failed to take note of and stress) of the principles of adduction in the Torah, written long before the acknowledgement of these principles in Western philosophy and their assimilation in a developed theory of knowledge. Another surprise is that, in contrast to Midrashic claims, the Tanakh (Jewish Bible) contains a lot more than ten instances of qal vachomer (a-fortiori) reasoning. In sum, Judaic Logic elucidates and evaluates the epistemological assumptions which have generated the Halakhah (Jewish religious jurisprudence) and allied doctrines. Traditional justifications, or rationalizations, concerning Judaic law and belief, are carefully dissected and weighed at the level of logical process and structure, without concern for content. This foundational approach, devoid of any critical or supportive bias, clears the way for a timely reassessment of orthodox Judaism (and incidentally, other religious systems, by means of analogies or contrasts). Judaic Logic ought, therefore, to be read by all Halakhists, as well as Bible and Talmud scholars and students; and also by everyone interested in the theory, practise and history of logic. (shrink)

According to Emmanuel Levinas, the individual bears an infinite obligation to the other person. In the Talmudic reading “Judaism and revolution,” Levinas suggests that we move from the ethical encounter to social relationships using contracts—both particular contracts and the social contract. So social relationships are created by limiting obligation, and as a result these relationships can only be practically acceptable, not ethical. Jewish religious practice for Levinas should also be understood as a set of negotiated limits to our (...) infinite obligation. (shrink)

Distinguished historian of Judaism Jacob Neusner here ventures for the first time into constructive theology. Taking the everyday life of contemporary Judaism as his beginning, Neusner asks when in the life of the living faith of the Torah does Israel, the holy community, meet God? Where does the meeting take place? What is the medium of the encounter? In his attempt to answer these questions, Neusner sets forth the character and the form of the Torah as sung theology. Israel, the (...) holy community, meets God in the synagogue, while at prayer, and in the yeshiva, when studying the Torah—at the moment in each setting when the Torah is received. In both circumstances people do not read but sing out its words. With the written part of the Torah sung in the synagogue, and the oral part declaimed in centers of sacred learning, music provides the medium for Judaism's theological voice. Neusner identifies a reciprocal exchange between the holy community Israel and God: Israel sings to God when the Torah is studied, and God sings to Israel when the Torah is declaimed. Through the metaphor of music, Neusner offers an account of how he believes those faithful to the Torah meet God in the Torah, and how they should listen to the melody of God's self-revelation. The result is an original theological reflection that will interest all students of Judaism. (shrink)

Levinas establishes an intriguing connection between idolatry and ontology. This connection is aptly illustrated by the biblical character of Balaam, the ambiguous Mesopotamian prophet or sorcerer of Numbers 22-24, who is almost never mentioned in Levinas's work but who is present, albeit hidden, in the talmudic reading “Contempt for the Torah as Idolatry.“ A deconstruction of this talmudic reading uncovers Balaam's footprints. It also clarifies different meanings of idolatry—exposing its ontological violence, but also, perhaps, its necessity (...) for ethics and law. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of messianic thought on political philosophy in the theory of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’s work enables us to consider the political not only in terms of contemplation of the tension between the political and the ethical and of the ethical limits of politics but as an attempt to create ethical political thought. Discussion of the tension between the political and the ethical intensifies in wartime and in the context of militaristic thinking. At the same time, (...) it lends itself to new meanings of peace. At the heart of this article lies an examination of the role of the political discourse articulated in Levinas’s influential work Totality and Infinity and of the possibility of understanding this discourse in light of the Levinasian reading of the Talmud. (shrink)

ExcerptEmmanuel Levinas's Talmudic readings were given as lectures at the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Française, a conference that has been held every year in Paris since 1957. His commentaries on the Talmud purported to be non-technical, accessible, and popular adaptations of his philosophical thinking, which had been developed in difficult books written in the technical language of Husserlian phenomenology.1 In fact, however, a full understanding of these Talmudic readings often requires knowledge of their philosophical assumptions. Conversely, (...) Levinas used his biblical and Talmudic interpretations to formulate philosophical arguments: There are two ways of reading a…. (shrink)

The 'nations' of the title are the 'seventy nations': in the Talmudic idiom, the whole of humanity surrounding Israel. In this major collection of essays, Levinas considers Judaism's uncertain relationship to European culture since the Enlightenment, problems of distance and integration. It also includes five Talmudic readings from between 1981 and 1986, essays on Franz Rosenzweig and Moses Mendelssohn, and a discussion with Francoise Armengaud which raises questions of central importance to Jewish philosophy in the context of general (...) philosophy. This work brings to the fore the vital encounter between philosophy and Judaism, a hallmark of Levinas's thought.". (shrink)

This volume contains the speech given by Derrida at Emmanuel Levinas's funeral on December 27, 1995, and his contribution to a colloquium organized to mark the first anniversary of Levinas's death. For both thinkers, the word _adieu_ names a fundamental characteristic of human being: the salutation or benediction prior to all constative language and that given at the moment of separation, sometimes forever, as at the moment of death, it is also the _a-dieu_, for God or to God before and (...) in any relation to the other. In this book, Derrida extends his work on Levinas in previously unexplored directions via a radical rereading of _Totality and Infinity_ and other texts, including the lesser-known talmudic readings. He argues that Levinas, especially in _Totality and Infinity,_ bequeaths to us an "immense treatise of hospitality," a meditation on the welcome offered to the other. The conjunction of an ethics of pure prescription with the idea of an infinite and absolute hospitality confronts us with the most pressing political, juridical, and institutional concerns of our time. What, then, is an ethics and what is a politics of hospitality? And what, if it ever _is,_ would be a hospitality surpassing any ethics and any politics we know? As always, Derrida raises these questions in the most explicit of terms, moving back and forth between philosophical argument and the political discussion of immigration laws, peace, the state of Israel, xenophobia—reminding us with every move that thinking is not a matter of neutralizing abstraction, but a gesture of hospitality for what happens and still may happen. (shrink)

In Totality and Infinity, Levinas says that the primordial expression of alterity is “though shall not commit murder”. The other expresses an infinity “stronger than murder”. In this paper I propose a reading of this passage elaborated against the backdrop of “The Temptation of Temptation” in his Talmudic Readings. I will argue, that as the law in the Talmudic elucidation of Exodus 24:7, this demand is pre-conceptual and because of this putative primordiality one is forced to “do (...) before hearing”. -/- I will also argue that, as the other’s “first word”, the demand not to murder operates in a fashion similar to natural law, which does not prescribe but rather defines the limits of the possibilities for the totalizing power of the Same. On this account, this primordial demand is constitutive of the Same and, as such, of its ontological aspirations. Finally, I will claim that as the law in the Talmudic reading, the demand does not rely on free-will but is the very condition of its possibility. (shrink)

The well known conference of Paul Ricœur ‘Love and Justice’, pronounced when he received Leopold Lucas award in 1989, shows a dialectical tension between those two notions, and searches deeper in the philosophical –and even theological– basis that reveals love as rectification and safeguard of justice; without love, justice would be cruel, utilitarian and, paradoxically, unfair, remembering us the old Roman adage: “summum ius, summa iniuria”. Moreover, Levinas, in his “Talmudic Lesson on Justice”, compiled after in New Talmudic (...) Readings, presents a less intuitive position, but no less interesting: justice is the place of forgiveness and love, it becomes humane everything it touches, and that’s why it doesn’t need correction; a justice that needed love, had maybe never been true justice. Here lies a critic that complements and improves both, the theory exposed by Paul Ricœur and its Rawlsian basis. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Levinas’s understanding of the social as distinguished from the political. In his neo-phenomenological work, Levinas never conceptualized the difference between the political and the social, because he was more interested in the difference between the ethical and everything else. In his Talmudic Readings, however, with the help of examples or paradigms, he offers a vision of a social domain distinct from the political one. This paper concentrates on the Talmudic Readings to delineate those situations (...) in which Levinas distinguishes such a specifically social realm. It analyzes Levinas’s understanding of the city as paradigm of liberalism’s shortcomings and elaborates on the absence of the social in Levinas’s conception of a good life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Levinas versus Levinas:Hebrew, Greek, and Linguistic JusticeOona EisenstadtI argue in this paper that Levinas's philosophical writings and his Jewish writings are not easily read as compatible. But I do not make the argument on what might seem to be the obvious grounds, namely, that the philosophical writings represent what Levinas calls the "Greek" while the Jewish writings represent what he calls the "Hebrew." On the contrary, my claim is (...) almost precisely the opposite. As Levinas uses the terms "Greek" and "Hebrew," each refers to a "sub-textual... way of thinking and speaking" (Richard Kearney, quoted in Cohen 1986, 18–19). The "Greek" is the ontological mode that seeks to describe the whole—this is essentially the mode I believe Levinas works the reader toward in the Jewish writings. The "Hebrew" is the dialogical mode that is never complete and preserves dissent—this is the mode he works the reader toward in the philosophical works. The first half of this paper contains a general discussion of the meaning of the two terms, the way in which Jacques Derrida brings out what is at stake in their use with the introduction of the more critically clarified terms "Jewgreek" and "Greekjew," and, finally, the beginning of my argument that Levinas is at odds with himself. The second half illustrates the argument with brief examinations of text: we look first at the "Hebrew" or "Jewgreekish" Levinas of the final chapter of Otherwise than Being, a Levinas in many ways comparable to Plato's dialogical Socrates; and second, at the "Greek" or "Greekjewish" Levinas of the Talmudic reading "The Pact," a Levinas who praises universality, universal translatability, mutuality, and reciprocality.As is well known, the juxtaposition Greek/Hebrew, as Levinas uses it, does the same work as several other juxtapositions he employs, including same/other, politics/ethics, said/saying, and totality/infinity. In each of these formulations, the first term refers to a way of thinking that pulls things [End Page 145] together into a larger order, and the second term to a rupture that operates as thought's origin and at the same time thought's challenge. On a first reading of Levinas, the reader has the impression that the juxtaposed elements stand in opposition to one another, but as one reads more one sees that this is only part of how he intends the juxtapositions to be understood; in particular, one sees that justice of any kind requires both elements. The reasons for this can be variously described. There are, for instance, the concrete organizational requirements of justice: a just society must, on the one hand, treat people as parts of ordered wholes (as citizens, as members of family groups or income groups, and so forth) and, on the other hand, allow those designations to be called into question by the rupturing ipseity of individuals. And there are, to introduce an example more pertinent to this paper, the concrete linguistic requirements of justice. A just discourse, or a good book, places its elements into a coherent order; this can be described by saying that it assumes or imposes a certain sameness by addressing its readers as a group, or that it stands as a said, but is most simply described by saying that the book speaks in Greek. However, it must also remain open to rupture by readers and writers who came before its having been written and readers and writers yet to come; this can be described as an other-in-the-same or a saying-in-the-said, but is most simply described, in Levinas's shorthand, as the incorporation or preservation of the Hebrew in the Greek.At the end of his first essay addressed to Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida plays, in a serious way, with the Greek/Hebrew distinction, and especially with the fact that the two sides depend on one another. This mutual dependence rests not only on the requirements of justice, but also, and first, on what seems to be a contradiction in Levinas's thinking. Levinas says (repeatedly, in almost all of his works) that it is the experience of rupture that calls us, in the first place, to totalize, which... (shrink)

This essay supports Annabel Herzog’s argument that a positive politics can be found in Levinas’s Talmudic readings, often signaled by a discussion of hunger. It also raises doubts about the concreteness of this politics, noting that the moments where Levinas points to a better universal are quite gestural. Finally, it suggests that this strain of political thinking might best be understood as part of Levinas’s account of the nature of Judaism.

State of Others: Levinas and Decolonial Israel explores the relations between post-Holocaust Jewish thought and postcolonial thought through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. In the last decade, thinkers have criticized Levinas for his Eurocentrism; however, author Elad Lapidot argues that Levinas anticipated this critique and, from the 1960s onward, began setting the foundations for decolonial Jewish thought-and for decolonial Zionism. State of Others offers an innovative analysis of Levinas's intellectual project as articulated around a turn in the year 1968. This (...) turn relates to the relationship between Judaism and Western civilization. Prior to 1968, Levinas considered the historical Jewish collective, Israel, as the avant-garde of Western humanism. After 1968, with the rise of decolonial discourse, Levinas's concept of Israel shifts roles and becomes the paradigmatic victim of Western imperialism. State of Others demonstrates how Levinas simultaneously developed his dual narratives-before and after the pivotal year of 1968-across his philosophical and Jewish writings, with a special emphasis on the Talmudic Readings. It presents for the first time a cohesive overview of Levinas's writings, both early and late, as interconnected components of a singular intellectual endeavor. The ethical principles concerning the other, as articulated by Levinas, are conceptually linked to his reflections on the State of Israel. (shrink)

These essays unfold a complex picture from phenomenology to Talmudic readings. It shows how radically Levinas expanded genetic phenomenology toward preconscious and intersubjective affectivity. It discusses Levinas' appropriation of Heidegger's early hermeneutics as secular revelation of what-is toward a phenomenology of the unseen, adapting Maimonides' conception of language. The book examines the sources of the ontological difference in Eckhart, and explores the Maimonidean source of negative theology. It then explores two strains of biblical hermeneutics: a Hassidic source, via Buber, (...) and a rationalist one, through Levinas. It closes with a consideration of politics, both revolutionary and that of "difference.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.2 (2003) 456-470 [Access article in PDF] Ethics without Exit:Levinas and Murdoch Bob Plant Hearts open very easily to the working class, wallets with more difficulty. What opens with the most difficulty of all are the doors of our own homes. —Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings... there is no debt to acquit. From the outset, I am not exonerated. I am originally in default. —Emmanuel (...) Levinas, God, Death, and TimeIN HIS RECENT ARTICLE "Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics as Exit?," C. Fred Alford highlights a number of insightful comparisons—and many important contrasts—between the respective conceptions of ethics proffered by Levinas and Murdoch. Alford's avowed objective is to "criticize Levinas sympathetically," or to "disrupt" what has come to be known as "the Levinas Effect" and the tendency of many commentators to make Levinas "become everything to everyone." 1 Given what one commentator calls "the facile 'postmodern' temptation to lump together all differences under the general rubric of the 'Other,'" 2 Alford's objective is, I believe, wholly commendable. (As Arthur Schopenhauer pithily remarks: "the man who is everyone's friend is no one's friend." 3) Nevertheless, in the following discussion I want to "disrupt" Alford's own reading of Levinas; not, I hope, to make the latter simply a conduit for saying "whatever.... [I] wanted to say in the first place" (p. 24), but to present a fuller picture of Levinas's singularly difficult, evocative and often puzzling philosophy. I shall do this by critically responding to and developing a number of points [End Page 456] Alford explicitly raises. To what extent my reading of Levinas aligns him with Murdoch, I leave for others far better qualified to assess.Let us be clear from the start, Levinas is—as Hilary Putnam rightly notes—a "moral perfectionist." 4 But this is not to say that Levinas's work is "otherworldly." Although Alford does not use this latter term, it is clearly implied in his analysis. Thus, contrasting Levinas and Murdoch, he remarks that, "like Levinas, Murdoch's goal is to go beyond the limits of the self. Unlike Levinas, Murdoch is content to remain within a world of beings" (p. 37), and likewise, that Murdoch wants us to "climb the ladder of love only high enough to be free of their vanity and egoism, but never so high as to leave the world behind" (p. 38). According to Alford, "the other is an abstraction for Levinas.... Only at a distance is the other abstract enough to remind us of infinity" (p. 25)—indeed, a "barely contained passion for otherness, exit, and transcendence runs through Levinas" (p. 40). In a similar vein we are told that, for Levinas, "the self is remarkably real, a tangible fleshy thing.... and a barrier to infinity," and it is "for this reason,... a shattering experience is necessary, like that of Saul on the road to Damascus, an experience that does not bring me closer to my deliverer.... Only this can open me up—not to reality, but to infinity" (p. 38). More pointedly still, Alford asserts: "Levinas was never interested in the concrete reality of the other person, whose fleshy reality can only get in the way of transcendence" (p. 37). Thus, although he acknowledges that Levinas "often writes about ethical relationships as though they were real relationships with real people" ("what is not true is that Levinas is talking about some Other more august and transcendent than real other people.... we know the infinite only through other people"), Alford nevertheless defends his own "turning to Murdoch" on the grounds that she is "a theorist who remains strictly within the realm of everyday life, finding there subtleties of knowing, caring, and being that Levinas believes come only by way of the infinite" (p. 34).While Levinas's attitude toward the "everyday" or "ordinary" is hardly transparent (after all, the imperative of the other's face is said to come "from most high outside the world" 5 ), Alford overstates the "otherworldly" aspect of the former's ethics. Against the allegation that Levinas... (shrink)

In his earlier texts Levinas uses justice to describe the ethical meeting between the ego and the other, in which the ego is immediately and absolutely responsible for the other. In later texts, he turns to justice to express the socio-political relationship of the ego with many others, in which responsibility can never be absolute. An examination of the texts in which Levinas specifically focuses on justice, that is, his Talmudic readings, reveals a third understanding, one in which justice (...) is never either purely ethical or purely political. Throughout the corpus of the Talmudic readings, justice represents a concrete relation between ethics and politics. This article discusses justice as the relationship between ethics and politics, focusing on Levinas’s Talmudic examples dedicated to the question of mercy. (shrink)

Levinas’ thought concerning God continues the philosophical discussion – how to speak about the divine within human language. His thought takes into account Heidegger’s Ontology and Rosenzweig’s exploration of revelation and the meaning of Divinity. Levinas sees the meaning of God’s names as an ethical commandment toward the Beyond – toward the other person. By using the Talmudic writings, Levinas describes the custom of Jewish wisdom to talk about God’s names and attributes as referring the subject towards other persons. (...) As this paper suggested, Levinas’ thought reaches its full implications with his treatment towards the importance of writing and erasure of the Divine Names. -/- . (shrink)

This article reads Levinas’s “And God Created Woman” in light of its socio-political context, Mai soixante-huit. It explores themes from his “Judaism and Revolution,” in which he reframed concepts of revolution, exegesis, the revolutionary, and human alienation. Following these themes, which run subtly through his Talmudic remarks on women and indirectly on feminism, I examine his arguments about a “signification beyond universality” and the fraught relationship between formal equity in gender relations and the practice of justice, as embodied by (...) the Antigone-like Rizpah bath Aiah and analyzed in Levinas’s Talmudic reading “Toward the Other.” I summarize the Rabbinic debate about the meaning of an extra yod in the term often translated as “to create” in Genesis, turning to the significance of dissymmetry between the Hebrew names of “man” and “woman,” Ish and Isha. In light of this, Biblicist and psychoanalyst Daniel Sibony opens further insights into gender, naming, and identity. (shrink)

Rabbinic Talmudic tradition is marked by chains of tradition, integrating written Scripture and oral Traditions. The interrelation of word, voice, and instruction is paramount. Levinas’s reading of Talmudic texts follows this format and continues this tradition, by superimposing his voice and philosophical concerns. I have chosen his reading of Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Makkot 10a as an exemplum. In the process, Levinas’s style and method can be seen as a contemporary meta-commentary on the ancient rabbinic source.

Dr. Zaslavsky has gathered together forty essays that represent the fruits of his lifetime of reading and teaching. The essays exemplify a method of reading substantive works that has been called Talmudic. The essays examine works by Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Moses Maimonides, Kant, DeQuincey, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Donne, Milton, Keats, Poe, Melville, Dickinson, Frost, Sherwood Anderson, Fitzgerald, cummings, Neruda, Arthur Miller, and Faulkner. In addition, there are essays on the Bible, the Constitution, and detective fiction. In every instance, (...) the examined author is treated as a highly deliberate, conscious craftsperson whose intention it is the reader’s task to discern. (shrink)