The nature of concepts is a subject of study of various disciplines, from philosophy to cognitive sciences, leading to fragmented understandings and conceptual dissociations. Legal concepts have been studied in an interdisciplinary manner across all these disciplines, suffering from similar fragmentation. Recently, the interdisciplinary crossroads between law and cognitive sciences have brought forward the notion of legal concepts as mental representations. However, this approach largely overlooks the systemic, historical, and societal elements essential to comprehending legal concepts. The aim of this (...) paper is to advocate for the Social Representations Theory as a useful framework that bridges cognitive and socio-cultural dimensions of meaning and can provide a holistic approach to understanding legal concepts. This paper unfolds in three sections. The first section contextualizes the social representations approach within the law and language framework, emphasizing the societal influences on thought and meaning. The second section explains the notion of social representations, building upon Serge Moscovici’s definitions and Ivana Marková’s arguments for the necessity of this approach to accommodate the social dimension of meaning. The third and last section underscores the claim that legal concepts are, in essence, social representations, advocating for the usefulness of this approach in legal scholarship, both paradigmatically and methodologically, consequently arguing for an inclusion for a stronger focus on the social dimension of legal meaning. (shrink)

In a related project, the social representation of public order among legal professionals has been explored by means of semi-structured interviews (Smejkalová et al. 2022). The participants of this research represent public order, inter alia, as a stable safeguard of fundamental social values while recognizing its vagueness and inherent propensity for change. This contradiction between its purpose to provide stability while being subject to social or temporal contexts seems akin to the structural approach to social representations. The social representations approach (...) (Moscovici 1961, 2001) is an approach used in social psychology, rooted in the idea that social objects or phenomena must be represented by a social group in order to perform any kind of social function. Within this approach, a structural (Abric 1993) differentiation between a stable, normative central core of a social representation, and flexible periphery has been developed. The contradictions between the stability and dynamics of public order the participants talk about are not dissimilar from the theoretical considerations of the structural approach to social representation. Moreover, Moscovici’s (2001) and Wachelke’s (2012) framing of social representations especially resonates when applied to public order, pointing towards its role as a system facilitating communication and orientation within a social group. The present study utilizes the data available from the transcripts of these interviews with a single focus on the themes of dynamics and stability. It aims to discuss these themes across various disciplines, offering links that might have been overlooked. This study further underscores the usefulness of the social representation approach in legal conceptualization, advocating for the necessity of more synthetic approaches merging philosophy, linguistics (semiotics), social psychology, and law to enrich further understanding in this domain. (shrink)

It has been claimed that to fully understand the law, one must know the language of normative texts and the relevant rules governing its use. It usually means that normative texts do not seem to be comprehensible enough to persons without formal legal training. In an on-going research project, we are focusing on the process of writing texts of legal regulations, conducting semi-structured interviews with those involved in drafting normative texts. In this paper, we focus on lawyers as a speech (...) community of legal language speakers and we discuss why and to what extent this speech community may be considered an elite in a society. We show that competent usage of special – legal – language in regulating the whole society may help create a special group of persons wielding an important segment of cultural capital: the knowledge of legal language, and, in consequence, competent knowledge of law. Given the fact that this language is used to exercise (legal) power in a society, lawyers appear to be in the advantageous position of an elite. We argue that those who draft new legal texts reproduce writing rules and customs, constantly re-creating legal language as a language mostly incomprehensible to a non-competent speaker, and, in consequence, creating lawyers as an elite speech community. (shrink)