While constitutionalism is generally reduced to the idea of limited government, little has been said to its contribution to the juridification of the social sphere. The article shows the significance of constitutionalism for the institutionalization of modern civil societies. Modern civil societies, it is argued, can only flourish in a form of modern state that has undergone a process of internal differentiation in the direction of a separation of powers. Through the analysis of the process of self‐ (...) class='Hi'>constitution of Argentine civil society, I show how the erosion of the constitutional components of the state by populist democratizing movements resulted in the disintegration of civil society. (shrink)

This paper discusses justice as an inherent aspect of life in traditional African societies. It further examines the degree to which constitutions of African countries recognise and promote the traditions and customary practices. It is noted that of late, in the desire to contextualise justice, human rights has to a large extent become the yardstick. This universal idea often creates conflicts with African customary practices which indeed represent the expectations of individuals or groups within such customary traditions. It is therefore (...) possible in the modern context to have customary practices that are at variance with the contents of human rights. The paper cautions that any effort therefore to transform customary practices to fall in line with the universal human rights imbued idea of justice could result in a situation where traditional societies are forced to conform to standards of justice that become impositions. (shrink)

The theory of the separation of powers between a legislature, an executive and a judiciary is still the foundation of modern representative democracy. It was developed by Montesquieu and came to replace the older theory of the mixed constitution which goes back to Plato, Aristotle and Polybios: there are three types of constitution: monarchy, oligarchy and democracy; when institutions from each of the three types are mixed, an interplay between the institutions emerges that affects all functions of (...) state: legislation, implementation of laws and jurisdiction. Today Montesquieu's separation of powers is riddled with so many exceptions that it is an obstacle rather than a help to understand the structure of modern democracy. The mixed constitution deserves to be revived as a corrective to the prevailing view that Western states are pure democracies and that democracy is rule by the people. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill is the father of modern liberalism. His most remembered work, On Liberty, which was published in 1859, changed the course of the liberal tradition. What is less well-known is that his ideas have profoundly influenced the American constitutional rights tradition of the latter half of the twentieth century. Mill's 'harm principle' inspired the constitutional right to privacy recognized in Griswold v Connecticut, Roe vs Wade and other cases. His defense of freedom of expression influenced Justices Holmes, (...) Brandeis, Douglas, Brennan and others and led to greatly expanded freedom of speech in the twentieth century. Finally, Mill was an ardent feminist whose last important work, The Subjection of Women, was a full-scale and, for its time, radical defense of complete gender equality. This is a book for lawyers who want to understand the intellectual origins of modern constitutional rights, and for political philosophers interested in the constitutional implications of Mill's conception of freedom. (shrink)

The modern constitution is predominantly understood as a way of instituting and limiting power, and is expected to contribute to (societal) stability, certainty, and order. Constitutions are hence of clear sociological interest, but until recently they have received little sociological attention. I argue that this is unfortunate, as a sociological approach has much to offer in terms of a complex and historically sensitive understanding of constitutions and constitutionalism. Constitutional sociology has particular relevance in contemporary times, in which the (...) meaning of constitutions and constitutionalism is uncertain, and subject to contestation, and possible transformation. The constitutional sociology developed here is phenomenologically inspired and stresses the importance of understandings of the modern constitution as ‘embedded’ in constitutional imaginaries. Rather than as a visible and rationally designed construct, constitutional sociology understands constitutionalism as ultimately a ‘field of knowledge’. The suggestion is that this field of knowledge or ‘modern constitutional horizon’ is characterized by a tension between two ultimate markers, in terms of what Castoriadis has identified as the social imaginary significations of mastery and autonomy. Mastery and autonomy form prominent constitutional orientations, historically taking the form of solidified, instituted meanings, identified here as the modernist and the democratic imaginaries. In the last section, the two instituted constitutional imaginaries will be ‘unpacked’ in specific components (state sovereignty, absoluteness, fabrication, endurance, and distrust regarding the modernist imaginary; indeterminacy, creativity, dynamism, self-government and popular sovereignty regarding the democratic one). In conclusion, I suggest that constitutional sociology might significantly help elucidating the potential losses and heteronomous tendencies that may result from the contemporary uncertainty and possible metamorphosis that affects the modern constitution. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to examine the place of the people in the constitutions of democratic nations. While the meaning of democracy and the degree to which it is achieved vary within the family of nations considered democratic, the idea common to all is that the people are self-governing. In its origins, the idea is tied to liberty: not to be self-governing is to be subject to the will of another and so not to be free. What constitutes (...) self-government is open to interpretation, although this is not the place to examine the possible meanings. Nor is this the place to set out the history of the idea or to show how it became central to modern constitutions, except to note the number of nations qualifying as democratic has steadily increased in recent years to just under a half of the total. It seems reasonable to assume that a democratic nation, a self-governing people, would want to make sure that the constitution, the basic of government and of relations between the people and government, provide for and protect self-government and hence democracy. (shrink)

To what extent is the development of modern constitutional democracy as a state form in the West and its spread around the world implicated in western imperialism? This has been a leading question of legal scholarship over the last thirty years. James Tully draws on this scholarship to present a preliminary answer. Part I sets out seven central features of modern constitutional democracy and its corresponding international institutions of law and government. Part II sets out three major imperial (...) roles that these legal and political institutions have played, and continue to play. And finally, Part IIsIu rveys ways in which the persisting imperial dimensions can be de-imperialized by being brought under the shared democratic authority of the people and peoples who are subject to them. (shrink)

The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three (...) responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom. (shrink)

Popular sovereignty - the doctrine that the public powers of state originate in a concessive grant of power from 'the people' - is perhaps the cardinal doctrine of modern constitutional theory, placing full constitutional authority in the people at large, rather than in the hands of judges, kings, or a political elite. Although its classic formulation is to be found in the major theoretical treatments of the modern state, such as in the treatises of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, (...) this book explores the intellectual origins of this doctrine and investigates its chief source in late medieval and early modern thought. Long regarded the principal source for modern legal reasoning, Roman law had a profound impact on the major architects of popular sovereignty such as François Hotman, Jean Bodin, and Hugo Grotius. Adopting the juridical language of obligations, property, and personality as well as the model of the Roman constitution, these jurists crafted a uniform theory that located the right of sovereignty in the people at large as the legal owners of state authority. In recovering the origins of popular sovereignty, the book demonstrates the importance of the Roman law as a chief source of modern constitutional thought. (shrink)

In this article, an important set of general themes will be examined in relation to the ongoing problematization of the legitimacy of modern constitutionalism within a body of work that largely draws on Carl Schmitt’s political theology. In particular, however, the themes discussed in this article will focus on the later, post-war stages of his work contained in the brief, but dense volume entitled, Political Theology II. This work involves a sustained confrontation with the theologian Erik Peterson and the (...) historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg, a confrontation which helps to shed light on the broader significance of Schmitt’s work. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the essential role that public memory plays in the establishment and maintenance of the political arena and its space of appearance. Without this space and the shared memory that allows it to appear, Hannah Arendt argues, transience and finitude would consume the excellence of word and deed—just as the "natural ruin of time" consumes its mortal performer. The modern era displays a kind of mnemonic failure, however, a situation arising not only from technological developments (...) that "outsource" memory but from several normative breakdowns that Arendt describes as characteristic of modernity. The consequence is the individual's loss of personal, living access to the community's memories, and the community's own failure to engage in the difficult choice of what counts as worthy of preservation. In failing to ask this question, however, the community abdicates responsibility for establishing the shared norms by which it will govern itself in times of crisis. (shrink)

Summary The politeia established in Athens in 317 after a covenant between Cassander and Demetrius of Phalerum was variously described by ancient authors as a tyranny, an oligarchy, and a democracy. Even among modern scholars there is no agreement about its definition. A close study of the architecture of the so-called regime of Demetrius and a comparison with the almost contemporary constitution of Cyrene, imposed on the African town by Ptolemaeus I, lead us to characterize it as a (...) mixed constitution, which balanced elements from the three principal types of political organisation. This experiment had a strong impact on the Hellenistic and Roman political traditions, as testified by Cicero, who recalled Demetrius as the last great Athenian lawgiver and inventor of the blended constitution. (shrink)

This article recovers a largely forgotten and quite surprising argument about the origins of political liberty in Britain: that the Norman Conquest, by making possible an extremely powerful absolute monarchy, paradoxically set in motion the historical process which would later lead to the emergence of limited constitutional monarchy. The article shows how the eighteenth-century writer Jean Louis de Lolme initially made this argument to explain the divergent constitutional orders of Britain and France. De Lolme’s hypothesis was then taken up by (...) numerous historians and political theorists. François Guizot and his fellow Doctrinaires, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill were among the writers who further developed his historical explanation of the British constitution. The liberal philosophy of history in the nineteenth century sprang from De Lolme's account of how absolute monarchy leads paradoxically to constitutional liberty. (shrink)

Hierarchy has been a central concern of work on the modern political imaginary. The need to elucidate hierarchy’s deeper sources and its legitimations were some of the motivations behind Cornelius Castoriadis’ development of the notion of the imaginary. The work of Claude Lefort on the political imaginary similarly commences from a critical analysis of the hierarchical form of bureaucracy and its place in the constitution of totalitarian political regimes. In a different vein, Charles Taylor’s conception of the imaginary (...) details a long-term process of the erosion of preceding forms of hierarchy and their justifications. In the contemporary period, the opposition to hierarchy has penetrated organisations and institutions that had previously been shaped by it, like the family, the capitalist firm, the school, and the political movement. Despite the potentials that these initiatives suggest of a change in the political imaginary, it will be argued that forms of hierarchy have, to varying degrees, been reconstituted and that the problem of hierarchy appears in new ideological forms, both with respect to institutionalised power and the legitimating justifications for how things are organised. The critique of hierarchy was once associated with the radical democratic imaginary, however, there have recently been perverse mobilisations. (shrink)

In an age of constitutional revolutions and reforms, theory and practice are moving in opposite directions. As a matter of constitutional practice, human dignity has emerged in jurisdictions around the world as the organizing idea of a groundbreaking paradigm. By reconfiguring constitutional norms, institutional structures and legal doctrines, this paradigm transforms human dignity from a mere moral claim into a legal norm that persons have standing to vindicate. As a matter of constitutional theory, however, human dignity remains an enigmatic idea. (...) Some explicate its meaning in abstraction from constitutional practice, while others confine themselves to less exalted ideas. The result is a chasm that separates constitutional practice from a theory capable of justifying its innovations and guiding its operation. By expounding the connection between human dignity and the constitutional practices that justify themselves in its light, Jacob Weinrib brings the theory and practice of constitutional law back together. (shrink)

At first, despairing of justifying the Court's new-found rights as the products of interpreting the Constitution, many of the Court's supporters bit the bullet and proclaimed the legitimacy of "noninterpretivism." As an approach to justifying purportedly constitutional decisions, however, noninterpretivism's oxymoronic quality made it an easy target for the Court's detractors, who asserted that noninterpretivism was nothing more than rule by a federal judiciary unrestrained by any positive law.

Secular nationalism and Islamism constitute a major political polarization in current day Turkey. The proponents of both political orientations use the trope of the veiled woman, in order to advance their respective ideologies. However, the instrumentalization of women’s bodies in this way not only proves inefficient in adequately addressing many of the problems that women face today, but it is also linked to the relentless state control and regulation over our bodies. The following essay gives an account of the ways (...) in which both secular nationalists and Islamists are not hesitant about policing our bodies at the service of theirideology. This is a call for solidarity and a true feminist pluralism outside the confines of this divide within which women’s interests always take the back seat to nationalist projects. (shrink)

Originally the constitution was expected to express and channel popular sovereignty. It was the work of freedom, springing from and facilitating collective self-determination. After the Second World War this perspective changed: the modern constitution owes its authority not only to collective authorship, it also must commit itself credibly to human rights. Thus people recede into the background, and the national constitution becomes embedded into one or other system of 'peer review' among nations.This is what Alexander Somek (...) argues is the creation of the cosmopolitan constitution. Reconstructing what he considers to be the three stages in the development of constitutionalism, he argues that the cosmopolitan constitution is not a blueprint for the constitution beyond the nation state, let alone a constitution of the international community; rather, it stands for constitutional law reaching out beyond its national bounds. This cosmopolitan constitution has two faces: the first, political, face reflects the changed circumstances of constitutional authority. It conceives itself as constrained by international human rights protection, firmly committed to combating discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and to embracing strategies for managing its interaction with other sites of authority, such as the United Nations. The second, administrative, face of the cosmopolitan constitution reveals the demise of political authority, which has been traditionally vested in representative bodies. Political processes yield to various, and often informal, strategies of policy co-ordination so long as there are no reasons to fear that the elementary civil rights might be severely interfered with. It represents constitutional authority for an administered world. (shrink)

RESUME L'œuvre de Michel Foucault est caractérisée par un déplacement continu, particulièrement entre les deux axes qui constituent d'un côté le pouvoir-savoir, et de l'autre la subjectivation. Foucault introduit une nouvelle pensée dans sa philosophie, selon laquelle le sujet même joue un rôle actif dans sa propre constitution en tant que tel. Le concept de transgression, qui provient de Georges Bataille, constitue une clé de compréhension de ce troisième Foucault et permet de saisir et de donner forme à ce (...) qu'on appelle, suivant Emmanuel Kant, une attitude moderne. ABSTRACT Michel Foucault's work is marked by a continual displacement. In particular between two axes: power-knowledge on one side, subjectivation on the other. Foucault introduces a new line of thought in his philosophy, in which the subject takes up an active role in his own constitution as such. The concept of transgression, taken from Georges Bataille, is key to understanding this third Foucault and allows for a better understanding and shaping of what may be called, following Immanuel Kant, a modern attitude. (shrink)

In this article the author analyzes the first written constitutions adopted at the end of the eighteenth century (the Constitution of the United States of 1787, the Constitution of Polish – Lithuanian State and the Constitution of France of 1791). These constitutional acts mark the beginning of the era of constitutionalism. These are the constitutions of the first phase (‘wave’) of constitutional development, which laid the foundations for the further establishment of constitutionalism in the world. The history (...) of the first modern constitutions confirms that the nations adopt constitutions in order to protect individuals from possible abuses of state power. The essence of constitutional regulation is the restriction of this power. The three countries differ in many ways, but all had certain tradition of the restriction of powers. The first modern constitutions established the separation of powers and protected classical individual rights. They have become an example for the authors of later constitutions. These constitutions propose legal standards for constitutional development. Each of these constitutions is an original system of principles and norms. (shrink)

The history of the modern study of myth can be divided into two main categories: that which sees myth as the primitive counterpart to natural science, itself considered overwhelmingly modern, and that which sees myth as almost anything but the primitive counterpart to natural science. The first category constitutes the nineteenth-century approach to myth. The second category constitutes the twentieth-century approach. Tylor and Frazer epitomize the nineteenth-century view. Malinowski, Eliade, Bultmann, Jonas, Camus, Freud, and Jung epitomize the twentieth-century (...) approach. The question for the twenty-first century is whether myth can be brought back to the physical world, but in a way compatible with science. The case of the myth of Gaia will be considered as a possible way of doing so. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate offers an overview of Platonic-Aristotelian thought on man with a view to considering what its alternative conceptual framework may contribute to the modern debate which is dominated by the scepticism confronting modern reductionism. -/- The mind-body problem is central to the modern philosophical and cultural debate because we cannot understand what man is until we understand what consciousness is and how it interacts with the body. Although many suggestions (...) have been offered, no convincing account has as yet appeared. Perhaps it was all mistaken ideology from the start? A crucial (and fatal?) distinction was made by modern natural science in the 17th century between the subjective/qualitative and the objective/quantitative. -/- The ancient Greeks, notably Plato and Aristotle, focused not on consciousness and experience, but on goal-directed reason/form, and the contrast was not mechanical matter, but the particular. The latter owed its intelligibility and being to reason and form and did not, therefore, constitute a realm of its own. Hence the ancient picture of man did not fall apart either: the soul is conceived of as a dynamic-telic aspect of the human organism. -/- Considering the problems and consequent scepticism that confronts modern reductionism and the recent appearance of holistic ideology in many areas it is suggested that we take a fresh look at the alternative conceptual framework of our ancient Greek ancestors. (shrink)

Theories of sexuality, culture and modern personhood rarely take account of differences in the construction of sexuality between advanced industrial nations. This article reveals different conceptions and management of adolescent sexuality among white, middle-class American and Dutch parents of teenagers. The American parents describe adolescent sexuality as a biologically driven, individually based activity which causes disruption to the teenager as well as to the family. The Dutch parents, by contrast, emphasize the love relationships and social responsibility of teenagers which (...) make their sexuality a `normal' phenomenon. The American parents exclude the sexuality of teenagers from conversation and the family while the Dutch parents accommodate culturally prescribed forms of teenage sexuality within the home. The article demonstrates how the two constructions of adolescent sexuality, and the conceptions of personhood and social life that engender them, constitute fundamentally different cultural logics. Without denying variations within the two countries, or overlaps between them, it suggests that different dominant understandings of sexuality and the individual have prevailed in the USA and the Netherlands. (shrink)

This article explores forms of haptic sociality in interspecies interaction. Data examined are taken from a corpus of equine assisted therapy sessions, in Finland and France. During these sessions, therapists invite clients to pay close attention to the horse’s behavioral displays of comfort or discomfort and to react accordingly. In this way, the horse is regarded as a living, sentient creature, whose body has haptic and kinesthetic properties, resulting in socialization practices that cultivate forms of care. The study discusses Merleau-Ponty’s (...) concept of “esthesiologic body”, in light of analytical instances, draws on contemporary re-examinations of phenomenological notions (such as intersubjectivity and intercorporeality) by ethnomethodologists and analysts of social interaction, and proposes to respecify them in the particular context of human–animal interactions. The argument is inspired by a conversation analytic approach, sensitive to the orderly character of social actions. Two formats, displaying diverse ways in which participants interact with the horse as an _esthesiologic_ body, are examined in detail. The analysis shows the fundamental role played by touch and haptic practices in the practical accomplishment of intercorporeality. (shrink)

The recognition of capitalism as a core component of modernity has often led to conflation of the two categories; this happens to critics as well as defenders of capitalism, and it reflects their shared but only partly acknowledged premises. A tendency to interpret capitalism as a self-contained system has strongly affected the debate on its historical significance; this reductionistic approach could be adapted to different ideological stances as well as to changing views of capitalism's long-term trajectory. The notion of a (...) `spirit of capitalism', in the sense of cultural sources essential to the constitution of the capitalist order, has been one of the most important correctives to economic determinism and reductionism, but it has proved difficult to link this dimension to other aspects of the problematic. The article surveys the contributions of Weber, Sombart, Castoriadis and - most recently - Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello to this debate. The last section then discusses the work of Fernand Braudel and suggests that it could serve to reformulate the problematic of capitalism in more multidimensional terms. (shrink)

The concept of religion as an anthropological category and the idea of race as an organizing principle of human identification and social organization played a major role in the formation of modern/colonial systems of symbolic representation that acquired global significance with the expansion of Western modernity. The modern concepts of religion and race were mutually constituted and together became two of the most central categories in drawing maps of subjectivity, alterity, and sub-alterity in the modern world. This (...) makes the critical theory of religion highly relevant for the theory of race, and both of them crucial for ethics. It follows from this, not only that religion and race have been profoundly intertwined in modernity, but also that any ethics that seeks to take seriously the challenges created by modernity/coloniality has to be, at least to some extent, decolonial. (shrink)

In his major work, An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence, Bruno Latour sets out to establish an anthropology of the Moderns based on the plurality of the modes of existence that make up their world. What about the beings of science, politics, art, religion, economics and so on? How do these beings relate to one another, and how do they constitute the specific forms of thought of the Moderns? Taking as its starting point one of the central notions of (...) modern thought, namely the notion of matter, this article seeks to identify the way in which Latour shows its importance in the constitution of modern thought. It examines its topicality through the double prism of an ecological and decolonial approach that animates Latour’s work, and which this article proposes to revisit. (shrink)

This paper examines the case of Lawrence v. Texas to bring out the philosophical commitments of Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia. It is proposed that Justices Kennedy and Scalia, while both Catholics, represent fundamentally different visions of the “ends and reasons” of democratic law. A close reading of the Justices’ opinions in Lawrence indicates that Justice Scalia belongs to the tradition of the “ancients” and Justice Kennedy to the tradition of the “moderns.” The paper focuses in particular on the (...) Justices’ interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is claimed that the interpretation of this clause turns on a philosophical commitment regarding the ends and reasons that the Constitution should be understood to serve, and thus that justices cannot help acting as “philosopher kings” here. Which of the two Justices is more consistent with the Catholic tradition is proposed as a question for another day. (shrink)

In this article I consider how our experiences of bodily privacy are changing in the contemporary surveillance society. I use biometric technologies as a lens for tracking the changing relationships between the body and privacy. Adopting a broader genealogical perspective, I retrace the role of the body in the constitution of the modern liberal political subject. I consider two different understandings of the subject, the Foucauldian political subject, and the Lacanian psychoanalytic subject. The psychoanalytic perspective serves to appraise (...) the importance of hiding for the subject effects of excessive exposure to the Other’s gaze. I conclude to the importance of the subject’s being able to hide, even when it has nothing to hide. By considering these two facets of subjectivity, political and psychic, I hope to make sense of our enduring and deeply political passionate attachment to privacy. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta a Weber y Habermas como los umbrales o polos de una modernidad que tiene al progreso como horizonte teórico-práctico. El diagnóstico weberiano sobre la modernidad y su proceso de desencantamiento del mundo y la injustificada reducción de la actividad racional a una actividad utilitario-estratégica desprovista de su carácter veritativo y de su orientación valórica, Habermas la utiliza para justificar su propuesta teórico-crítica respecto a la modernidad y la "paradoja de la racionalización", distinguiendo "sistema" y "mundo vital". Aquí (...) "desencantamiento del mundo" y "consenso del proyecto de lamodernidad", se encuentranThis article presents Weber and Habermas like the thresholds or poles of a modernity that has to the progress as theoretical- practical horizon. The diagnosis weberiano on the modernity and his process of disenchantment of the world and the unjustified reduction of the rational activity to a utilitarian-strategic activity devoid of his character of truth, Habermas uses to justify his theoretical-critical offerwith regard to themodernity and the "paradox of the rationalization", distinguishing "system" and "vital world". Here "disenchantment of the world" and "consensus of the project of the modernity", they are. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

The use of specific language in the democratic Polish Constitution enacted on 2 April 1997 has created the essential differences in the status of religions and Churches in Poland to this in some other countries. It accepts the modern principles and values (tolerance, freedom, mutual independence of state and churches) but precludes the atheistic, hostile or indifferent to religions interpretations and implementations of these values and principles.

In this article I show how the concept of intertextuality as developed by Mikhail Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida can be applied to the political theory of constitutionalism. Such an approach carries with it the valuable democratic idea that all texts in society, including the political constitution, are in a dynamic relationship and reflect social pluralism. By analyzing and comparing intertextual theories, I develop the idea of the constitution as an open and emancipatory interpretative and textual category. (...) I show how intertextual theorizing contributes significantly to the democratization of a modern liberal constitutional order, offering distinct strategies for progressive political and social transformation. (shrink)

This article provides a substantive discussion of the relevance of the history of archeology to the history of science. At the same time, the article introduces the papers contained in this special issue as exemplars of this relevance. To make its case, the article moves through various themes in the history of archeology that overlap with key issues in the history of science. The article discusses the role and tension of regimes of science in antiquarian and archeological practices, and also (...) considers issues of scale and place, particularly in relation to the field. Additionally, the piece attends to issues of professionalization and the constitution of an archeological public, at the same time as discussing issues of empire, colonialism, and the circulation of knowledge. Meanwhile, enriching discussions within and beyond the history of science, the article discusses the history of archeology and its relationship with museums, collecting, and material culture and materiality. Finally, the piece discusses the relationship of the history of archeology with wider discussions about scientific ethics. In conclusion, the article questions whether we should speak of ‘the history of archeology’ at all. (shrink)

The general claim advanced in this article is that Foucault’s genealogy of the modern state traces two ideal-typically different power arrangements at the origin of the modern state, roughly referred to as ‘sovereign power’ and ‘governmentality’. They are ideal-typically different in that they operate according to a different logic, including different ends, means and modi operandi. The more specific claim, then, is that due to this different logic, their ever changing interpenetration on the level of the state is (...) imbalanced. In order for ‘governmentality’ to operate according to the law, it must be backed by the juridical frameworks provided by sovereign power, but then again these juridical frameworks prove inadequate and insufficient to curb ‘governmentality’s’ operational procedures as well as the modalities and intensities of its implementation. In other words, in his genealogy of the modern state, Foucault tracks down ‘governmentality’ as a distinctive form of power which, although intertwined with the state, cannot juridically be contained by the state. It cannot be appropriately restrained by its legal regulations and, as such, constitutes an excess vis-à-vis those regulations. (shrink)

Contemporary political discourse is marked with the language of democracy, and Western countries in particular seek to promote democracy at home and abroad. However, there is a sublimated conflict in general political discourse between a desire to rely on alleged political experts and a desire to assert the supposed common sense of all men. Can the struggle between the democratic and aristocratic values embodied in this conflict be reconciled? The question is perennial, and raises issues that are central to constitutional (...) design. Aristotle, developing in significant ways insights made by his teacher Plato, grapples with it in his Politics. Aristotle's views on these matters are relevant—by way of the American Founders'—to contemporary American politics and modern democracies generally. During the eighteenth century, the Founders, some of whom explicitly reached back to Aristotle's work, also struggled—especially in The Federalist Papers—with these thorny issues of constitutional design. They created the U.S. Constitution in part to address these very same problems and issues. We are living in some ways, then, in the shadow of Aristotle's political theorizing, albeit as transposed by the American Founders. Both Aristotle and some of the American Founders theoretically favor aristocracy over democracy, but concede that in practice a blend of the two has to be integrated into the fundamental structure of political society. We need to reconnect with these important political discussions in order to come to terms with aristocratic and democratic values in our current circumstances. Footnotesa I am grateful to Fred Miller and David Keyt for many helpful suggestions and thoughtful questions throughout the editing process. I would also like to thank Irfan Khawaja for valuable feedback on an earlier version of this essay. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Montaigne Among the Moderns: Receptions of the “Essais”Patrick HenryMontaigne Among the Moderns: Receptions of the “Essais,” by Dudley M. Marchi; xiii & 334 pp. Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1994, $49.95.This ambitious project is not a study of the Essais per se, but rather an analysis of their receptions from the seventeenth century to the present. Written by a comparativist with access to German, French, and English literature (...) and philosophy, it deals with authors from diverse backgrounds and time periods and pays careful attention throughout both to intertextuality and to the particular “horizons-of-experience” in which the Essais were received. “Reception” here does not mean some un-Mont aigne-like passive acceptance, but rather the assimilation and reactivation of the essayist’s concept of literature, writerly project, and theories of reading and writing in the works of later writers, mainly “premodernists” (Emerson and Nietzsche), “high modernists” (Pater and Woolf), and “postmodernists” (Butor, Chaillou, Sollers). In the most general sense, what Montaigne shares with all these authors is the need to make central in the form and substance of his work the paradox of a rupture with the pa st and its simultaneous continuation. Here modernism is less a period concept than a recurring literary phenomenon whereby the essayist not only influences the moderns and the postmoderns but is one of them. This enables us, finally, to perceive in the Essais a dialogical process that resists closure and reenacts the literary and philosophical debates of our own historical situation.Chapter One schematizes the history of the receptions of the Essais in France from 1580 to 1950 focusing mainly on the stylistic and religious readings of major figures in French literature. While much of this has already been done, Marchi syn thesizes well, makes his own original points, and offers us exceedingly interesting pages on the essayist’s covenant daughter and most active literary executrix, Marie le Jars de Gournay. Throughout he depicts how the shifting nature of the Essais’ textuality (their “hermeneutic undecidability” [p. 74]) allows them to assume various identities in the minds of different interpreters through the ages, thus problematizing the very act of reception and granting the reader a role in the production of me aning.The next chapters constitute the most original parts of the study and analyze the reception of the Essais in the works of Emerson, Nietzsche, Pater, Woolf, Butor, Chaillou, and Sollers. In Emerson and Nietzsche, we find reactivated the Montaig nean dialogue between the unique self and cultural tradition. Emerson read the Essais in the Cotton translation and wrote about Montaigne in Representative Men but only relied on the essayist to help him reach his own intellectual independen ce, finally moving from a more ego-centered position to the security of past models and rejecting skepticism in favor of dialectical resolution. Nietzsche read Montaigne in the original and knew him through Emerson. Marchi finds “an active inter textual Montaignean dimension” (p. 124) [End Page 140] in Nietzsche’s work and underscores their mutual preoccupation with radical skepticism, self-cultivation, self-portraiture, mutability, the instability of language, and the crisis of representa tion. He discovers two sides to Nietzsche’s reception of the Essais: the Apollonian “Socrantic optimism” and the Dionysian “libertine transgression” (p. 165) and indicates how the essayist’s concreteness and acceptance of human limitations tempered respectively Nietzsche’s propensity toward abstract metaphysics and Schopenhaurean pessimism.The third chapter unveils the aesthetic and thematic elements of the Essais in the critical and creative works of Pater and Woolf who went beyond the philosophical essaying of Emerson and Nietzsche, were the first to extend aspects of the E ssais in narrative works since Marie de Gournay, and created Montaigne the modernist “by insisting on the qualities of his textuality most akin to their own” (p. 186). The most interesting pages here delineate, on the one hand, Pater’s failed attempt to reconcile the religion of Pascal and the aesthetics of Montaigne and the essayist’s presence in Pater’s Gaston de Latour and, on the other, Woolf’s Montaigne-like essayistic techniques of weighing probabilities, suspending dogmatic judgment, and breaking of narrative sequentiality and her concomitant assimilation... (shrink)

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of (...) the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La época moderna como es sabido modificó el sentido de la autoridad, porque venía a impugnar la auctoritas y la potestas de la todopoderosa Iglesia de Roma y, con ello, se quería sustituir la autoridad del papa por la de la conciencia de cada uno, es decir, la razón individual o subjetiva se constituye en la nueva autoridad. Fue Hegel quien, en su filosofía política, da un lugar central a la noción de Estado, constituyendo la culminación del pensamiento moderno (...) y fuente de gran parte de la crítica de la modernidad y del pensamiento contemporáneo en general, en sus vertientes ideológicas de izquierda, centro y derecha.ABSTRACT: The modern epoch since it is known it modified the sense of the authority, because it was coming to contest it auctoritas and potestas of the all-powerful Church of Rome and, with it, the authority of the dad wanted to be replaced with that of the conscience of each one, that is to say, the individual or subjective reason is constituted in the new authority. It was Hegel, who in his political philosophy, gives a central place to the notion of State, constituting the culmination of the modern thought and source of great part of the critique of the Modernity and of the contemporary thought in general, in his ideological slopes of left side, center and right.PALABRAS CLAVE: época moderna, estado hegeliano, auctoritas y potestasKEYWORDS: modern epoch, hegelian state, auctoritas and potestas. (shrink)

This work exposes the development of Hegel’s political theory from its origins in Hegel’s reading of Sir James Stewart and the composition of the early theological writings, through the Philosophy of Right. Its principle value lies in showing how careful use may be made of Hegel’s earlier writings in interpreting his mature political philosophy. Avineri describes Hegel’s early dissatisfaction with the understanding of the state as an instrument for the protection of private property, and his attempts to develop a concept (...) of ethical community. Developments of the latter notion are seen in the anti-nationalism of The German Constitution, as well as in the theories of property, class, and representation contained therein. Avineri shows the inappropriateness of ascribing to Hegel a political romanticism, regarding either Prussia or Classical Greece. And in his comments on the System der Sittlicheit [[sic]] and the Realphilosophie, he offers detailed and valuable commentary on Hegel’s early concept of labor. He demonstrates here Hegel’s sensitivity to the complex economic reality of modern society, and shows the early Hegel’s ability to describe labor, class divisions, commodity production, money, and alienation in ways remarkably akin to Marx. Here too Hegel’s notion of the state as that which overcomes the private character of production in civil society and constitutes society as an ethical community is seen. (shrink)

How the insane asylum became a laboratory of democracy is revealed in this provocative look at the treatment of the mentally ill in nineteenth-century France. Political thinkers reasoned that if government was to rest in the hands of individuals, then measures should be taken to understand the deepest reaches of the self, including the state of madness. Marcel Gauchet and Gladys Swain maintain that the asylum originally embodied the revolutionary hope of curing all the insane by saving the glimmer of (...) sanity left in them. Their analysis of why this utopian vision failed ultimately constitutes both a powerful argument for liberalism and a direct challenge to Michel Foucault's indictment of liberal institutions. The creation of an artificial environment was meant to encourage the mentally ill to live as social beings, in conditions that resembled as much as possible those prevailing in real life. The asylum was therefore the first instance of a modern utopian community in which a scientifically designed environment was supposed to achieve complete control over the minds of a whole category of human beings. Gauchet and Swain argue that the social domination of the inner self, far from being the hidden truth of emancipation, represented the failure of its overly optimistic beginnings. Madness and Democracy combines rich details of nineteenth-century asylum life with reflections on the crucial role of subjectivity and difference within modernism. Its final achievement is to show that the lessons learned from the failure of the asylum led to the rise of psychoanalysis, an endeavor focused on individual care and on the cooperation between psychiatrist and patient. By linking the rise of liberalism to a chapter in the history of psychiatry, Gauchet and Swain offer a fascinating reassessment of political modernity. (shrink)

The main argument of the article regards Aristotle’s anti-realistic account, which presents a different viewpoint from that which simply fulfils or negates the truth-values of our statements on Mixed Constitutions. In modern times, the idea of a Constitution of many minds or of many individuals is proposed by Sunstein and by Hart, who maintain that neither intentions in juridical procedure nor Constitutional provisions can produce an ideal Constitution. Thus any interpretative procedure assigning to legal reality any definite, (...) once-and-for-all meaning is precarious, according to Aristotle who asks whether we can gain epistemic access to the real essences of Constitutions and their structure. These ideas respond to a challenge in the Works of Contiades, who will help us to turn the ideal Constitution into a realisable model in the situation in which we live nowadays. This is the main challenge to be met by the institutions of Europe in order to safeguard the nature of historical and intellectual values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 425-446 [Access article in PDF] Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina Vicki Hsueh Indians. Of Edisto Ashapo and Combohe to the South our friends. Of Wando Ituan Sewee and Sehey to the north came to our assistance and were zealous and resolute in it 1000 bowmen In our want supplied us. Q. Spaniards. What we shall (...) doe to the Spaniards if we invade them we brake the peace, if we sit still we loose our reputation with the Indians our friends. Westoes. Inland man eaters. Country. To the northward more sickly, about Ashley River fertile and of a wonderful growth. Tatchequea. A very fruitfull Country 8. days jorney by the North west the Emperor our friend and enemy to the Westoes and to hard for them. Q. Settlem't. 500 people will secure the settlement 1000 perfect it. desires supplys of necessarys till that time Excerpt from Carolina Memoranda in the handwriting of John Locke, Esq., 15 September 1670 Within the last decade, scholars such as James Tully, Barbara Arneil, and Bhikhu Parekh have performed a crucial intervention on modern constitu-tionalism's behalf. 1 Not only has constitutionalism in the modern age been [End Page 425] plagued by assumptions of cultural uniformity and an on-going inability to adjudicate between competing cultural claims, but it has been unable effectively to diagnose those limitations and dilemmas. The root of the problem, James Tully suggests, is ultimately a matter of historical perspective. "[T]he tendency," he writes, "is not to notice the philosophical and ideological debates over the last three hundred years... only the result of these debates is seen—the victorious modern language of constitutional uniformity—and claims for recognition are viewed through its framework as if it were impartial and universal." 2 In response Tully and others have sought to tackle this predicament at its historical root. Identifying modern constitutionalism's colonial origins as a significant part of the problem, their studies address the development of constitutionalism and colonialism as an entwined phenomenon in the early modern period, focusing particularly on the British-American context. In this sense, Locke's Two Treatises of Government stands as an exemplary illustration of the period's entangled colonial and constitutional temperaments. Well-known for its influential articulation of compact and resistance, the Two Treatises, Barbara Arneil argues "were written as a defence of England's colonial policy in the new world against the sceptics in England and the counter-claims of both the aboriginal nations and other European powers in America." 3 Accordingly, present-day constitutionalism continues to bear the weighty legacy of those colonial rationales. "[T]he language of modern constitutionalism," Tully further explains, "which has come to be authoritative was designed to exclude or assimilate cultural diversity and justify uniformity. The design is difficult to see because this 'modern' language has become the customary way of thinking about, reflecting on and envisioning a just constitutional order." Ultimately, Tully submits, citing Wittgenstein, "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." 4This much-needed thickening of constitutionalism's historical context has enriched our awareness of constitutionalism's vexed origins, as it has proffered potent tools for interrogating current cultural adjudication. Yet, a troubling predicament persists. As if caught within the tenacious grip of the language of modern constitutionalism, Tully, Arneil, and Parekh insistently portray seventeenth-century British-American colonialism solely as a straightforward process of appropriation and assimilation without addressing or incorporating the [End Page 426] complex and contingent elements of that history in its emergence. Lacking the various negotiations and accommodations between settler and indigene in ambition and actualization, their portrayals crucially underplay the dynamic relationship between theories of constitutionalism and practices of colonialism—an approach that ultimately serves to reinscribe the narrative of triumphalist progress within their critiques. 5This problematic is the context for my reading of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,1669... (shrink)

New Edition In the ten years since the initial publication of _Insurgencies_, Antonio Negri's reputation as one of the world's foremost political philosophers has grown dramatically. An invigorating appraisal of revolutionary thought, Insurgencies is both the precursor to and the historical basis for Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's masterwork, Empire. At the center of this book is the conflict between "constituent power," the democratic force of revolutionary innovation, and "constituted power," the fixed power of formal constitutions and central authority. This (...) conflict, Negri argues, defines the drama of modern rebellions. Now with a foreword by Michael Hardt, _Insurgencies_ leads to a new notion of how power and action must be understood if we are to achieve a democratic future. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone argumentar que el proyecto sociopolítico enunciado por Alberdi en Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina contribuyó a imposibilitar la constitución del moderno estado nacional cuya existencia buscó promover. El logro de dicho objetivo sólo resultará posible a partir de explicitar los supuestos alrededor de los que se estructura el razonamiento que permite alcanzar dicha conclusión; hacerlo implicará, en primer lugar, señalar las reflexiones de Aníbal Quijano en torno a (...) la constitución de los modernos estados nacionales y al eurocentrismo, en segundo lugar, establecer el carácter eurocéntrico de Las Bases y, por último, reconstruir el razonamiento que sustenta la idea directriz que atraviesa al trabajo. This paper intends to argue that the sociopolitical project enunciated by Alberdi on Bases and starting points for the political organization of Argentina contributed to preclude the constitution of the modern national state of which existence it sought to promote. Achieving this goal will only be possible by making explicit the assumptions from which the reasoning that allows to reach such conclusion are structured; it will involve, first, to point out Quijano's reflections about the constitution of modern national states and the eurocentrism, secondly, to establish The Bases's eurocentric nature and, finally, to rebuild the reasoning behind the leading idea running through the work. (shrink)