In this paper I argue against the holistic claim that the description and explanation of human behaviour is irreducibly social in nature. I focus on the more specific thesis that human behaviour is rule-guided and that 'rule' is an irreducibly social notion. Against this claim I defend a teleofunctional and reductionist view. Following Millikan (1990), who argues that 'rule' can be explicated in functional terms, I extend her argument to cover social rules as well, and argue that (...) rules are laws. I conclude that human rule-guided behaviour can be described and explained in functional, and in the end causal, i.e. causal-historical, terms. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a 'useable criterion of successful performance' (Pears) or 'operational standard of correctness' (Glock) for (...) its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails. (shrink)

What are values? -- What are rules? -- Why are rules useful? -- Breaking the rules -- What is a law? -- Why are laws helpful? -- Committing a crime -- Respecting rules at school -- Respecting rules at home -- Making a difference -- Glossary and index.

A recent study contends that for Plato, the state, including the ideal state of the Republic, is better governed by unfettered personal authority than by law. The present study maintains that even in the Republic and the Statesman, as well as in the Laws, it is law, not unfettered personal rule that underlies the state. Justification for such authoritarian rule, especially in the ideal state of the Republic, lies in the supposed inability of the ordinary individual to acquire (...) moral autonomy or Platonic justice owing to a lack of the necessary knowledge. But it is shown in this study that the ordinary individual of the ideal state can acquire an educated right opinion sufficient for gaining moral autonomy or Platonic justice. (shrink)

Socrates ́ thought of justice and obedience to laws is moti- vated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criti- cisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as (...) often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict. (shrink)

Who needs rules? -- Communities and rules -- Rules and responsibility -- Natural and positive laws -- History of law -- Systems of law -- Federal and state laws -- Criminal law -- Civil law -- Courts, lawyers, and judges -- Do laws change? -- Living with laws.

Human genomics is a translational field spanning research, clinical care, public health, and direct-to-consumer testing. However, law differs across these domains on issues including liability, consent, promoting quality of analysis and interpretation, and safeguarding privacy. Genomic activities crossing domains can thus encounter confusion and conflicts among these approaches. This paper suggests how to resolve these conflicts while protecting the rights and interests of individuals sequenced. Translational genomics requires this more translational approach to law.

This paper examines recent attempts to defend Rule-Consequentialism against a traditional objection. That objection takes the form of a dilemma, that either Rule-Consequentialism collapses into Act-Consequentialism or it is incoherent. Attempts to avoid this dilemma based on the idea that using RC has better results than using AC are rejected on the grounds that they conflate the ideas of a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure. Other strategies, Brad Hooker's prominent amongst them, involving the thought that RC (...) need contain no overarching concern to maximize the good are acknowledged to avoid the original dilemma, but lead to further problems of motivating and justifying RC in the absence of such a concern. The paper argues that Hooker's attempt to deal with these problems by using a 'Reflective Equilibrium plus method is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Cette bande dessine prsente par le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme (HCDH) le Programme commun des Nations Unies sur le VIH/SIDA (ONUSIDA) et l'Organisation mondiale de la Sant (OMS) a t conue pour donner aux jeunes les moyens de dfendre les droits de l'homme en relation avec le VIH/SIDA pour sensibiliser aux liens cruciaux existant entre le VIH/SIDA et les droits de l'homme pour faire mieux connatre la maladie et pour lutter contre les ides fausses et (...) les tabous qui s'y associent. (shrink)

What are rules? -- Why are rules important? -- Rules for the classroom -- Rules at school -- Rules in the community -- Follow the law! -- Rules and laws must be fair -- All together now -- It's good to have rules.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here l explain some of the techniques commonly used by ‘gurus’ to dupe people into thinking they have something profound to say.