In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A CONTRADICTION IN SAINT THOMAS'S TEACHING ON CREATION THEODORE J. KONDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania 0 THOSE FAMILIAR with Saint Thomas's writings is generally known that the Angelic Doctor changed his position on a number of philosophical issues during the course of his relatively short professional career. For instance, there is his opinion concerning the instrumental role of higher creatures in the creation of the universe-something he allowed as (...) possible in his Commentary on the Sentences but later rejected in his Disputed Question On the Power of God and in the Summa Theologiae. Another example is Thomas's view on the possibility of an actual infinite multitude, an opinion he accepted in the early Disputed Question On Truth but argued against in the Summa Theologiae.1 However, to change one's mind on a particular issue is not to contradict oneself, since to do that is to say or hold, in the same time frame, pwhile also saying or holding not p. However, in his Treatise on Creation in the Summa Theologiae, Saint Thomas does, at least once, contradict himself in what he has to say on the question of the demonstrability of the world's temporal beginning, a contradiction which, to my knowledge, has never previous1 On the question whether higher creatures can be instrumental causes in the creation of lower creatures see In Sent. IV, d. 5, q. 5, a. 3; De potentia Dei, q. 3, a. le and Summa Theologiae, I, q, 45, a. Sc. On the issue of an actual infinite multitude see D. Q. De veritate, q. 2, a. 9 and Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 7, a. 5. However, in the De aeternitate mundi-a work possibly written after Saint Thomas completed the first part of his Summa-Aquinas asserts, towards the end of this work, that no demonstration has as yet been forthcoming that God cannot produce a multitude that is actually infinite. 51 52 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON ly been noted. In what follows I intend to expose this contradiction and to see whether there is any possible way for him to escape it. I In article 1 of Question 46 of the Prima pars, Aquinas argues that it cannot be demonstrated that the world of creatures always existed, given that the actual existence of creatures depends upon the causal will of God and the only thing which God wills necessarily is Himself.2 Consequently, whether or not the world exists, or is created eternally or with a temporal beginning, are matters entirely up to God's free will.3 In the following article he argues that neither can the world's temporal beginning be demonstrated but that this is something known only by faith.4 It cannot be demonstrated from the world itself since demonstration proceeds by way of knowledge of the universal essences of things and universals abstract from the hie et nunc, or from the question of temporal origin.5 Nor can it be proved from the world's efficient cause-the divine will-seeing that God's will cannot be investigated by reason except as regards those things which God wills necessarily (and what He wills about creatures is not among 2 " Dicendum nihil praeter Deum ab aeterno fuisse. Et hoc ponere non est impossibile. Ostensum est enim supra quad voluntas Dei est causa rerum. Sic ergo necesse est esse sicut necesse est Deum velle ilia, cum necessitatis effectus ex necessitate causae dependeat, ut dicitur in Meta. Ostensum est autem supra quod, absolute loquendo, non est necesse Deum velle aliquid nisi seipsum." ST I, q. 46, a. le. Latin quotations from Saint Thomas appearing in the footnotes are from the Leonine edition. 3 " Non est ergo necessarium Deum velle quod mundus fuerit semper. Sed eatenus mundus est quatenus Deus vult illum esse, cum esse mundi ex voluntate dependeat, sicut ex sua causa. Non est igitur necessarium mundum semper esse: Unde nee demonstrative probari potest." Ibid. 4 " Dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse sola fidei tenetur, et demonsrtative probari non potest; sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est." Ibid., a. 2c. 5 "Et hujus ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS: A REPLY THEODORE J. KoNDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania I N A RECENT article in The Thomist William Lane Craig has discussed certain aspects of Saint Thomas's teaching on God's knowledge of creatures. While for Craig Saint Thomas's concept of God's knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) is not fatalistic, his concept of God's knowledge of approbation (i.e., God's causal knowledge) is.1 Craig believes (...) that this latter type of divine knowledge implies fatalism since, on his reading, its causality determines everything that takes place in this universe. In developing his argument Craig makes a number of statements (and arguments) which are not only at variance with Saint Thomas's expressed thought but which, I believe, are also clearly mistaken. Some of his errors are of a trivial sort and may in part be due to the fact that he occasionally misspeaks himself. One can single out in this regard his statement, on page 78, that "God's knowledge does not necessitate an effect because an effect may be impeded by its secondary cause," and also his observation, on page 79, that "God's knowledge is the cause of everything God knows." 2 However, there are a number of more 1 See William Lane Craig, "Aquinas on God's Knowledge of Future Contingents," The Thomist, 54 (January 1990): 33-79. For his discussion of Thomas's teaching on God's knowledge of vision see particularly pp. 32-67; on Aquinas's teaching on God's causal knowledge, pp. 68-79. 2 Contrary to Craig's way of stating this, Aquinas never speaks about an effect being impeded by its secondary cause. Rather, a contingent cause may be impeded from producing its effect by the intervention of another secondary cause. Examples would be frost preventing the production or development of the fruit of certain plants, or a drug preventing the development of a normal embryo. For Aquinas's discussion of a contingent cause see De veritate, q. 2, a. 12, c. and also Summa contra Gentiles, Book I, chap. 67. Concerning 117 118 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON serious errors to be found in his discussion of God's knowledge of creatures, and it is to these that I would like to address this reply. I. In discussing the topic of God's knowledge of future contingent singulars, Craig considers Saint Thomas's explanation as to how it is possible for God to know what is future and contingent (i.e., something which, from the standpoint of its proximate cause, can either come to be or not come to be). As generally known, his explanation points out that while what is future and contingent with respect to its proximate cause(s)-and thus also from our vantage point-is something indeterminate in being and therefore in truth and knowability, as falling within the scope of God's eternal knowledge it is something already present (and thus determined to one of two opposites) and, consequently, can be known with certitude.3 In this Thomistic view, then, there is no past or future in God's knowledge of created things; everything is known at once and as present. At this point in his discussion, when he has yet to consider Saint Thomas's position that God's knowledge of things is also a causal knowledge (i.e., a knowledge which involves God's will as First Cause of His creatures and their actions), Craig claims that Saint Thomas employs the Boethian notion of God's eternity, and thus of His timeless knowledge, in order to " defuse the threat of fatalism." ' He holds this view because, he argues, otherwise, i.e., if God's knowledge were something past with respect to a future contingent singular (so that God could be said to " foreknow " it), that future would be something which would necessarily come to be-either that or else God could be mistaken-and therefore not truly Craig's second observation, it is not true to say, even of God's causal knowledge, that God's knowledge is the cause of everything God knows since God knows many things He will never cause... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE START OF METAPHYSICS* THEODORE J. KoNDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania I N HIS RECENTLY published book, John F. X. Knasas seeks to answer this twofold inter-related question: What, according to Saint Thomas's expressed teaching, is the subject of metaphysics and how does the human mind proceed to attain it for the purpose of study? While he acknowledges a debt to Joseph Owens for certain of his basic positions, (...) Knasas will claim that the book's argument is original in the way in which it opposes what he takes as realistically the subject of metaphysics at its initial stage (or with the only understanding of beingens -metaphysics requires to begin) to what will become this science 's subject at its later, more mature stage. Moreover, although he may contradict himself on this point, he will reject, as Saint Thomas's view, the position that a physical demonstration can establish the existence of immaterial being, be it God or angels. He will also argue at some length what he evidently considers a crucial epistemic procedure for the start of metaphysics, viz., that a series of judgments relating individuals back to their acts of existence (from whence they were originally abstracted) is required for the "judgmentally constituted multitude" from which the mind attains common being. Finally, since he will insist that abstraction must be controlled by the data, he will allow no room in Thomistic metaphysics for a beginning metaphysical intuition in which being is seen as not necessarily linked to matter and motion, nor for an a priori approach to its subject which would start *John F. X. Knasas, The Preface to Metaphysics: A Contribution to the N eo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics. New York: Peter Lang, 1990. Pp. 193. 121 122 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON from the nature of the knowing subject, viz., the human intellect, as open to and directed toward infinite being and intelligibility. In what follows I will discuss (and critically assess) each of these features of this book as well as address myself briefly to certain things the author has to say about the Thomistic " five ways." In the first three chapters Knasas is primarily concerned with showing that metaphysics cannot begin with a notion of being understood in the sense of ens commune. This sense of the notion traditionally includes both material and immaterial being. However, he argues, since (according to his reading of Aquinas) only metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of immaterial being, its subject cannot, at least at its outset, encompass such being, not even as something conceivable. He therefore opposes the view of Neo-Thomists who, basing themselve? on the now famous and frequently cited text from Saint Thomas's Expositio on Boethius's De Trinitate (Question 5, article 3), insist that metaphysics begins with the recognition that being is something separate from matter and motion (and not merely so in the mind's consideration by abstraction). This separation is understood in the so-called negative judgment of separation: " it is not of the nature of being to be in matter and motion (even though it is sometimes found therein)." On this point Knasas finds fault with " Natural Philosophy" Thomists, among whom he includes the Dominicans L.-B. Geiger (although this writer is barely mentioned and only in a footnote discussion) and James Weisheipl, both of whom have argued that the subject of metaphysics presupposes a demonstration from natural philosophy that immaterial, unchanging being exists (otherwise, they maintain, the separation of which Saint Thomas speaks in the De Trinitate Commentary would have no fundamentum in re). Again, his main argument with these Thomists is that no textual justification can be found for their view-indeed there is counter-textual evidence against it-that physical philosophy proves the existence of immaterial being and that, in the eyes of Aquinas, metaphysics awaits such a demonstration in order to begin. He equally rejects the position, one which he at- THE START OF METAPHYSICS 123 tributes above all to Maritain, that, prior to any argument that would establish the actual existence of God, being can be understood -and this thanks to an existential judgment in which existence is restored to the essence... (shrink)