We compare Guala’s unified theory of institutions with that of Searle and Greif. We show that unification can be many things and it may be associated with diverse explanatory goals. We also highlight some of the important shortcomings of Guala’s account: it does not capture all social institutions, its ability to bridge social ontology and game theory is based on a problematic interpretation of the type-token distinction, and its ability to make social ontology useful for social (...) sciences is hindered by Guala’s interpretation of social institution types as social kinds akin to natural kinds. (shrink)

How do social institutions exist? How do they direct our conduct? The Opposite Mirrors defends the thesis that the existence of institutions is a conventional matter. Ultimately they exist because we believe in their existence, and because they play a role in our practical reasoning. Human action necessarily has an unpredictable aspect; human institutions perform an important task by reducing uncertainty in our interactions. The author applies this thesis to the most important institutions: the law and (...) the monetary system. In his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. He discusses the nature of rules, authority, and power and analyzes the Hobbesian presuppositions which have been dominant in legal theory and in the economic analyses of the state. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists. (shrink)

Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle’s account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume (...) a form of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality. (shrink)

In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore 's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore 's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend (...) Binmore 's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism and what Binmore calls ‘whiggery’ as normative political programs. Key Words: theory of justice • bargaining theory • evolutionary game theory • human evolution • Ken Binmore • Herbert Gintis • Kim Sterelny. (shrink)

Institutional differentiation has been one of the central concerns of sociology since the days of Auguste Comte. However, the overarching tendency among institutionalists such as Durkheim or Spencer has been to treat the process of differentiation from a macro, "outside in" perspective. Missing from this analysis is how institutional differentiation occurs from the "inside out, "or through the efforts and struggles of individual and corporate actors. Despite the recent efforts of the "new institutionalism" to fill in this gap, a closer (...) look at the literature will uncover the fact that (1) it has tended to conflate macro-level institutions and meso-level organizations and (2) this has led to a taken for granted approach to institutional dynamics. This article seeks to develop a general theory of institutional autonomy; autonomy is a function of the degree to which specialized corporate units are structurally and symbolically independent of other corporate units. It is argued herein that the process by which these "institutional entrepreneurs" become independent can explain how institutions become differentiated from the "inside out." Moreover, this article offers five dimensions that can be operationalized, measuring the degree to which institutions are autonomous. (shrink)

Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit”, synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special theory of relativity—irrespective of whether the (...) account is interpreted as involving causal generation or non-causal grounding of worldly institutional facts—and should be replaced by a more modest theory which interprets the results of Status Function Declarations in terms of mere Cambridge change and institutional truth. I end the paper by indicating the import of this more modest theory for theorizing about the causal potency of institutional phenomena generated by declarations. (shrink)

The article reconstructs main assumptions and the theoretical context of Arnold Gehlen’s conception of institution. I argue that this conception is mainly a theory of action. At its centre Gehlen sets not so much specific institutions but rather specific forms of human activity that bring to life the over-individual normative structures. He describes them by means of a series of categories which, in his opinion, have a universal character. We do not find any genealogical analyzes here, but only (...) a constellation of concepts deduced a priori, referring to empirical facts. (shrink)

I address the objection that the concept of racism has become overly inflated. Critics of the conceptual inflation of “racism” argue that theories of institutional racism engage in untoward conceptual inflation insofar as they undermine our moral understanding of racial phenomena, hinder our ability to explain the causes of racial inequality, and even undercut struggles for racial justice. I develop an original account of institutional racism and show that it is immune to all three versions of the conceptual inflation challenge.

This book makes two important contributions toward a general and systematic theory of rights-a powerful philosophical analysis of the language of rights and an explanation of the nature of rights. In working out these ideas, Wellman has provided a new and cohesive way of thinking and talking about rights of every sort. Wellman succeeds in bringing all kinds of rights-moral, legal, institutional, etc.-under one unified theory in a way that illuminates their similarities and differences. This enables him to (...) deal in a consistent way with a very broad range of philosophical questions, questions that are too often dealt with in isolation from each other. (shrink)

Once affirmed that a formal and finalistic theory of action is one of the four pillars of neo‐institutionalism, the author introduces the concept of Freedom of action, which is based on two points: the empirical existence of a scope for action and an information process which determine the choice between alternative actions. He then analyzes different versions of determinism and the distinction between descriptive and practical sentences, and concludes that a theory of action based on the information process (...) has to deal with the structures of teleological thought. In this sense he stresses the practical relevance of the plurality of ends, often conflicting with each other. Finally, he explains how formal teleology is used in his theory of action and how this theory provides methodological achievements for jurisprudence.*. (shrink)

In the previous issue of Analyse & Kritik (2020, vol. 42, issue 1) Alexander Vostroknutov (3-39) aims at a ‘synthesis’ of economics with ‘psychology, sociology, and evolutionary human biology.’ This paper argues that his approach needs to be complemented at least by work from sociologists and social psychologists. Starting with problems of defining and measuring norms it is then claimed that a theory of norms should address the origin, change and effects of norms and model micromacro processes. This should (...) also be the goal of a theory of institutions (which are defined here as sets of norms-norms in the sense of accepting oughtness statements). We show how the social psychological value expectancy theory can be applied to model the variety of incentives that could play a role in explaining the effects of norms. Regarding the origin Coleman’s theory of norms is applied to show how Vostroknutov’s dissatisfaction-norms hypothesis can be improved. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the conception of “institutional moral theory” that Allen Buchanan lays out in his work. I argue that it moves within a trilemma of grounding. The trilemma arises because the three routes to grounding we find in Buchanan’s works – the anthropological route appealing to human nature, the liberal route appealing to liberal values and the institutionalist route appealing to practice-immanent values – are mutually exclusive. But more than that, each horn of the trilemma encounters (...) counterarguments from within Buchanan’s own thought, not only from the perspective of the other horns. Finally, I suggest a fourth alternative that refers to a notion of “justificatory responsibility” that Buchanan also suggests. (shrink)

As debate continues around the nature and values of education, it is important to ask the question of what factors motivate a student to engage with the ends of an educational institution. In this paper, a broad, holistic view of learner motivation, derived from Aristotelian ethics, is used to provide a model to drive institutional change. Focussing on the approach of one Higher Education institution to the particular accommodations required for students with disabilities, the paper identifies three factors which motivate (...) students, a failure to engage with the aims and ends of the educational project, a failure to see that a particular learning aim is worth attaining, and a simple lack of will‐power to attain it. To each of these failures a social cause is identified, and a change in both the institutional culture and the individual learner's approach to their education is suggested. (shrink)

In order to account for the mode of existence of social rules and norms, the author develops a theory of the emergence of institutional facts. Just as other kinds of institutional fact, rules and norms are meanings. Therefore, insight into the emergence of social rules and norms can be achieved by studying the recognition and the communication of meanings. Following accounts of meaning and factuality, institutional facts are characterized as unquestionable shared typifications. It is argued that, in becoming an (...) institutional fact, a typification goes through two phases. First, it becomes a social habit. Second, this habit turns into an obligation by being objectified. (shrink)

This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded as regularities in the behaviour of social agents, which the (...) agents themselves tacitly create to solve a wide variety of recurrent problems. The repetitive nature of the problems permits them to be described as a recurrent game or 'supergame.' The agents use these regularities as informational devices to supplement the information contained in competitive prices. The final chapter explores the applicability of this theory, first by relating it to previous work on the theory of teams, hierarchies, and non-maximizing decision theory, and then by using it to provide a new approach to a variety of questions both within and outside economics. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of recent doctrines of legal interpretation that can be subsumed under the common name “institutional turn” in theories of legal interpretation. Among the reviewed theoretical positions are the ones from Jeremy Wаldron, Victoria Nourse, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Scott Shapiro. It is concluded that the institutional turn in legal interpretation offers some significant insights into legal interpretation and interesting perspectives on the appropriate interpretative methodologies. The turn, however, does this by eschewing parts of traditional accounts (...) of legal interpretation that are arguably worth preserving in any theory of legal interpretation. (shrink)

The topic of the article is George Dickie’s institutional theory of art as one of contemporary art theories which purport to answer the “what is art?” question by defining the concept of art in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions. Introductory part of the article brings a brief review of so-called functionalist theories, as well as of their shortcomings when compared to theories to which institutional theory belongs. Also included is a short survey of theories and arguments (...) that significantly influenced institutional theory, e.g. Danto’s “theory of meaning”. Next are presented the basics of the institutional theory. It is shown that advantages of this theory over other functionalist theories became especially visible after the appearance of art practices of the 20th century which rendered the difference between artistic and non-artistic objects extremely complex. (shrink)

he first institutional theory of art is outlined in a 1964 essay by Arthur Danto, “The Artworld,” which ruminates on the paradox that Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes is art though any of its perceptually indistinguishable twins—any stack of Brillo boxes in a grocery store—is not. Danto’s offers this solution to the paradox: “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.” Ultimately, though, it (...) is “art theory” that makes Warhol’s stack of silk screened plywood boxes into art. (shrink)

I defend impact-based accounts of institutional racism against the criticism that they are over-inclusive. If having a negative impact on non-whites suffices to make an institution racist, too many institutions (including institutions whose affirmative action policies inadvertently harm its intended beneficiaries) would count as racist. To address this challenge, I consider a further necessary condition for these institutions to count as racist—they must stand in a particular relation to racist ideology. I argue that, on the impact-based model, (...) institutions are racist if they have a negative racial impact AND this impact is legitimized by racist ideology. Racist ideologies limit social criticism of and collective action against institutions that have a negative racial impact, and in so doing, lend stability to systems of racial domination. (shrink)

Nowadays, neo-institutionalistic approaches are prominent in economics, political science, the science of public administration and sociology. There is a general complaint about the vagueness of the concept of institutions and the apparent disparity of phenomena falling under it. This article shows how institutional legal theory provides a typology of institutions as sets of rules and corresponding patterns of regulated behaviour that can help to avert much confusion. The typologys usefulness is tested by applying it to an array (...) of private governance structures distinguished by transaction cost economics. (shrink)

"Question: What do all works of art have in common? Answer: They are all products of a major cultural institution called "The Artworld." Question: Is this what makes them art? Answer: Yes. The New Institutional Theory of Art is a different kind of theory about art. The theory is capable of explaining how it is that a urinal offered up by Marcel Duchamp, and a statue of Moses offered up by Michelangelo, are both works of art, and (...) under precisely the same terms. Together with this, the theory can also explain why it is that Michelangelo's work is magnificent, whereas Duchamp's is "interesting," at best. By focusing not on the works of art themselves, but rather upon the complex social-cultural context of their creation and presentation, the New Institutional Theory provides fresh, clear and powerful explanations of the very inner workings of Art, writ large. The artists, the public, the issues, the techniques, the bothers and the worries are all illuminated for the reader to gain true insight into the actual logic of Art. This book is intended for all readers, professionals and non-professionals alike.". (shrink)

A collection of specially commissioned papers which apply new analytical methods to the dtudy of the institutions, their origin, maintenance, and adaptation, which play such an important role in agrarian relations and rural development.

Der Begriff des »Zombie Formalismus« beschreibt eine Form der Kunst, welche die Intention verfolgt, die Bedürfnisse des Marktes zu erfüllen. Gegenwärtige Entwicklungen des Kunstmarkts fordern die institutionelle Theorie von Kunst heraus, da es zunehmend fraglich erscheint, dass ›die Kunstwelt‹ – das Kernstück der institutionellen Theorie – noch von einem tiefgehenden Kunstverständnis anstatt von ökonomischen Interessen geleitet wird. Da die institutionelle Theorie ›die Kunstwelt‹ an sich sehr vage definiert, könnte diese auch wirtschaftlich orientierte Sammlerinnen und Galeristen einschließen. Wenn der monetäre Wert (...) von Kunst aber die treibende Kraft für die Erschaffung von Kunst ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie dies die Kunstwelt als Institution, die darüber entscheidet, ob etwas als Kunst gelten kann, beeinflusst. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich mich mit neuesten Entwicklungen der zeitgenössischen Kunstwelt auseinandersetzen, da diese es erfordern, die institutionelle Theorie so zu modifizieren, dass sie auf gegenwärtige Phänomene anwendbar ist. Als Ausblick werde ich vorschlagen, dass David Humes allgemeiner Maßstab für das Geschmacksurteil zur Entwicklung eines Maßstabs für das kuratorische Urteil beitragen könnte. Möglicherweise könnte dieser kuratorische Maßstab dazu dienen, dass Kuratorinnen als unabhängige Gatekeeper fungieren. (shrink)

One cannot ignore the institutions that surround art if one wants to deliver a theory of art acknowledging that art lives through a community of social relationships and assumes meaning as such. I make the claim that the evolution of sports from mere play, survival, and diversion toward the global phenomenon of modern sports can likewise be understood as a function of social connectivity. In this article, I first outline the theory of art, then link that to (...) sport as an institution to then develop the thesis that art and sport institutionalize the body in a particular way and deduce that this creates culture. I conclude that both art and sport, a notion somewhat derived from Wittgenstein, are kinds of... (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that categories play significant roles in the appreciation of artworks. This paper argues that the correct categories of artworks are institutionally established through social processes. Section 1 examines the candidates for determining correct categories and proposes that this question should shift the focus from category membership to appreciative behaviour associated with categories. Section 2 draws on Francesco Guala’s theory of institutions to show that categories of artworks are established as rules-in-equilibrium. Section 3 reviews the (...) explanatory benefits of this institutional theory of the correct category. [Winner of the 2022 Debates in Aesthetics Essay Prize]. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a comparative analysis and reconstruction of the approach to social, moral, and institutional change in the theories of Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. In their theories moral philosophy is inextricably linked with social thought. I also discuss the role of education and institutions in such a process. I argue that Smith's and de Grouchy's understanding of the roles of sympathy and institutions are strictly connected to the way they perceive (...) the process of social change. Both philosophers considered people as equals and equally capable of sympathizing with others. For both of them, sympathy is a key element in reconstructing how societies change. In my opinion, both these philosophers believe that such a change can be induced: in the case of de Grouchy, this would be done primarily by legislators. In the case of Smith, respected people are capable of initiating change and are subsequently followed by others. (shrink)

I summarize seven general trends in the institutional analysis of organizations which I view as constructive and provide evidence of progress in the development of this perspective. I emphasize corrections in early theoretical limitations as well as improvements in the use of empirical indicators and an expansion of the types of organizations included and issues addressed by institutional theorists.

In Habermas’s discourse theory of law, the guarantee of citizens’ private and public autonomy is a prerequisite of legitimate law. This includes social entitlements. They provide the living conditions necessary for equal opportunities in the use of private and public freedoms. A proceduralist paradigm of the welfare state ensures private and public autonomy in shaping social rights. This makes welfare state regulations a legitimizing institution. This legal theoretical approach is outlined and defended against objections. The focus falls on examining (...) the critique of the justification and quality of social entitlements. Also considered are possible measures to strengthen the basis of legitimation in shaping social rights. (shrink)

Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.

Hybrid organizations that pursue both financial and social goals have gained significant attention within the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, an ongoing concern within hybrid organization research centers on the tensions between multiple goals. We establish a behavioral theory of hybrid organizations based on both the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) and imprinting theory to interpret the patterns of simultaneous or sequential pursuit of conflicting goals. Drawing evidence from China's mixed-ownership enterprises (MOEs), we examine (...) the impact of institutional imprinting on managerial attention priority. Our findings show that originally state-owned MOEs simultaneously pursue financial and social goals, while originally privately-owned MOEs sequentially pursue dual goals. Moreover, the persistence and decay of this institutional imprint are affected by internal and external sources of coalition power. By examining how financial performance feedback impacts tensions of dual goals, we contribute to the literature dialogue between hybrid organizations and BTOF. (shrink)

The author presents a theory of institutional inequality in which, in analysing taxation she shows that tax incidence depends upon the causes of inequality.

The aim of the article is to examine the legacy of Menger’s theory of social institutions. We argue that Menger’s insights about the origin of social structures inspired later contributions in three main areas: theory of spontaneous order, theory of money, and theory of law.

While political economic perspectives of urban globalization tend to generalize the economic pressures upon socio-political transformations of cities, recent European research has stressed the institutional context of urban collective action. However, the structural bias of the European city model merely complements the criticized economization by a culturalist essentialization of urbanity, and thus fails to conceptualize political agency. In order to elaborate the theoretical foundations of a political counterhypothesis to urban globalization, this article clarifies the different historical and normative conceptions of (...) institutional structure and agency in the urban context. Most research of cities implies — more or less implicitly — a common urban ideal which associates centrality with a local integration potential of plural societies. However, distinguishing between a historically embedded empirical category, a normative model of public space, and an analytical ideal-type of political agency helps to overcome the static structural conception of an essentially European urban culture and problematizes the role of knowledge models in reflectively constructing urban realities. Therefore, a dynamic and contextual relation between political economic functions, historic heritage, and normative frames might contribute to an open-ended comparative framework of urban collective action that can be applied to any ordinary city across and beyond Europe. (shrink)