Much recent work in the philosophy of language has been concerned with the project of constructing a theory of reference and truth for natural languages. I shall discuss certain assumptions which have been tacitly in the background of most of this work; what I hope my rather sceptical discussion will show is that the project of giving a theory of reference and truth is much more problematic - and more closely tied to questions of general philosophical (...) interest - than is usually suspected. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive content in fixing reference plays a vital role. It also points out that Kripke is not a pure causal theorist. By introducing Thomas Kuhn and his theory on vulnerability of the rigid designation, I have shown that there is a danger for causal theory of reference. However Kuhn’s argument fails to have an impact if a Knowledge aspect is augmented (...) to Kripkean theory of reference. This new causal theory of reference preserves the truth of the referential term in spite of the vulnerability of the rigid designation and problem of reference change. It can also adequately answer the question of theoretical terms reference failure. (shrink)

In his development of an ontology for mathematics in line with Fregean abstractionism, Øystein Linnebo proposes criteria of identity as a mechanism for reference. This proposed mechanism appears to conflict with Saul Kripke's historical theory of names. However, Linnebo, distinguishing between semantic and metasemantic domains, asserts that no real conflict exists; while Kripke's theory is semantic, his is metasemantic. This paper posits a counter-argument, contending that Linnebo's account, contrary to his claim, indeed conflicts with Kripke's historical (...) class='Hi'>theory of names. The paper underscores that, in Kripke's framework, the reference relation transcends the individual, inhabiting a social domain. (shrink)

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the (...) philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others. (shrink)

In this work we examine critically how two competing approaches to meaning account for disagreements. We will argue that Hart's conventionalist stance does not commit him to descriptivism. That non-descriptivist theories of reference, properly understood, can account for a vast array of cases of interpretive disagreement and that and that an account of different kinds of disagreement can be provided from a conventionalist perspective within the framework of non-descriptivist theories of reference.

Both descriptivism and the causal theory of reference fail to account for the meaning of theoretical terms in a way consistent with scientific realism. Faced with this problem, hybrid theories of reference have been developed. They combine features of both descriptivism and the causal theory and seek to capture the advantages of each. In this work, we critically analyze two strategies to articulate hybrid theories of reference in the face of the problem of the meaning (...) of theoretical terms. They are exemplified by the proposals of Psillos and Kitcher. We argue that neither of these strategies is successful in articulating the descriptive and causal elements in a genuine hybrid theory of reference that satisfies the standards of scientific realism. (shrink)

In recent years, experimental philosophers have questioned the reliance of philosophical arguments on intuitions elicited by thought experiments. These challenges seek to undermine the use of this methodology for a particular domain of theorizing, and in some cases to raise doubts about the viability of philosophical work in the domain in question. The topic of semantic reference has been an important area for discussion of these issues, one in which critics of the reliance on intuitions have made particularly strong (...) claims about the prospects for philosophical theories of reference and arguments based on claims about reference. In this article, I review the main lines of argument in this area of experimental philosophy, with particular emphasis on the relevance of empirical data about intuitions to philosophical views. I argue that although traditional philosophical theorizing about reference faces little threat from experimental data about intuitions, there is nevertheless much to be gained from collecting and analyzing such data, which holds the promise of greatly enriching our conception of the mechanisms governing judgments about semantic reference in ways that are highly relevant to philosophers. (shrink)

The entry provides an overview of current (2021) theories of reference as well as bibliographical information about the key books and/or articles that discuss each theory.

In this paper I suggest that Searle’s theory of reference is immune to the specific criticisms that have been levelled against it. I first present an overview of Searle’s “cluster” theory, followed by an overview of the Kripkean critique. I then examine in detail Kripke’s objections and suggest that they are not sufficient for a rejection of Searle’s theory. Finally, I consider several general objections to the cluster theory and argue that they, too, do not (...) suffice to reject it. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Original and Derived Meaning The Causal‐Historical Theory The Crude Causal Theory The Asymmetric Dependency Theory Teleosemantics Informational semantics.

Kripke, Putnam and others have proposed what is often called The New Theory of Reference. Professor Matthen thinks that this theory needs to be modified in various ways: so as to avert misunderstandings about the New Theory's commitment to essentialism; so as to clarify the semantic function of what he calls “nonconnoting terms”; so as to answer Quinean doubts about the determinacy of ostension; so as to correct Putnam's “simplistic” account of ostension; so as to solve (...) Kripke's puzzle about the seemingly inconsistent beliefs of the bilingual Pierre; and so as to show how many ordinary names, contra Kripke and Putnam, can be treated as “equivalent” to definite descriptions. No doubt many of the other things he says in his paper are clever, and perhaps even true. But as to the six modifications I have listed, I have run into difficulties. To the extent that I am able to understand them, I have been forced to conclude that they are neither needed nor helpful. (shrink)

Efforts to bare the psychonomic nature of the semantic reference (representation) relation have been remarkably scanty; in fact, the only contemporary account developed with any care is the one proposed by Osgood. However, not even Osgood has looked deeply at the difficulties that beset any attempt to analyze reference in terms of common effects appropriately shared by a symbol and its significate.

This paper argues that several important tenets of the so-called "new theory of reference"--also known as the "historical-explanation theory" and as the "causal theory" of reference--were developed by william james as early as 1885 and that by 1895 they were elaborated by him in no less detail than contemporary theorists have so far done. these tenets include the central doctrine that reference is dependent on a causal or historical-explanatory chain connecting the act of referring (...) with the entity referred to. james' theory of reference is argued to be an aspect of his theory of truth. reference in james is argued to be an aspect of his pragmatic conception of the "workings" of true ideas. (shrink)

Few philosophers today doubt the importance of some notion of rigid designation, as suggested by Kripke and Putnam for names and natural kind terms. At the very least, most of us want our theories to be compatible with the most plausible elements of that account. Anaphoric theories of reference have gained some attention lately, but little attention has been given to how they square with rigid designation. Although the differences between anaphoric theories and many interpretations of the New (...) class='Hi'>Theory of reference are substantial, I argue that rigid designation and anaphoric theories can be reconciled with one another and in fact complement one another in important ways. (shrink)

Causal theories of reference for natural kind terms are widely agreed to play a central role in arguments for the claim that theoretical identity statements such as “Water is H2O” are necessary, if true. However, there is also fairly wide-spread agreement, due to the arguments of Nathan Salmon, that causal theories of reference do not alone establish such essentialism about natural kinds: an independent, non-trivial essentialist premise is also needed. In this paper I will question this latter agreement. (...) I will argue that there is an independently attractive explanation of why such identity statements are metaphysically necessary, if true: an explanation which relies on assumptions about the semantics of natural kind terms, general philosophical assumptions about reference, and straightforward empirical assumptions, but presupposes no non-trivial essentialist premises. (shrink)

In 'Notes on the Theory of Reference' Quine offers a brief argument, based on Tarski's Convention T and semantic definition of truth, that the theory of meaning is 'in a worse state' than is the theory of reference and that the concepts of the theory of meaning are inherently more 'foggy and mysterious' than those of thetheory of reference. A careful reconstruction of Quine's argument, however, is sufficient to show both that he covertly (...) imposes a double standard of clarity on the two theories in question and that in so far as Tarski's contributions clarify or explicate the notion of truth they do likewise for the notion of analyticity. Consequently, the appeal which Quine makes to Tarski's definition of truth cannot be used in the manner he wishes, to draw a clear boundary between the theories of meaning and reference. (shrink)

It has sometimes been suggested that the so-called new theory of reference (NTR) would provide an alternative picture of meaning and reference which avoids the unwelcome consequences of the meaning-variance thesis and incommesurability. However, numerous philosophers of science have been quite critical towards the idea and NTR in general. It is argued that many of them have an over-simplified and, in part, mistaken understanding of what NTR amounts to. It is submitted that NTR, when correctly understood, can (...) be an important ingredient in the realist toolkit for defending the rationality of science. (shrink)

Roger Vergauwen seeks to provide an answer to the question, "How does language connect to the world?" He begins with the recent developments in formal semantics and from them constructs his own 'theory of reference' with which he considers the nature of the correspondence of the world. The author locates his metalogics between the philosophy of language and epistemology while he covers a range of models from Plato to Wittgenstein. Vergauwen assumes no previous technical or logical study. Contents: (...) Introduction: The Temperature of a Hot Topic; The Tarski Program: Hijacking the Truth about Reference; Reference and Theory of Reference; Inside Out: Reference and Metalogic; Outline of a Logic with Non-Standard Meanings. (shrink)

The New Theory of Reference (NTR) of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others is a theory in the philosophy of language and there has been much debate about whether it entails the metaphysical theory of essentialism. But there has been no discussion about whether the NTR entails another metaphysical theory, the absolutist theory of time and space. It is argued in this paper that the NTR carries this entailment; the theory of time is (...) the main focus of the paper and it is argued that the NTR entails the absolutist theory that times are event-independent moments. (shrink)

This paper is an extended response to Machery, Olivola and De Blanc (2009). I argue that the concerns I raised about Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) in Marti (2009) still stand.

I will contend that Quine's optimism about the theory of reference is incompatible with his pessimism about the theory of meaning. For, on Quine's own account, the problems that discourage him about the theory of meaning beset the theory of reference as well. And of the three arguments Quine advances to show the theory of reference better off than the theory of meaning, two are unsound and the third is in conflict (...) with his further views on reference. (shrink)

I propose to support these replies with actual episodes in late nineteenth and twentieth century physics. The historical record reveals that meaning does change but not in the Kuhnian manner which is tied to descriptive theories of meaning. A necessary part of this discussion is commentary on realist versus antirealist conceptions of science.

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that —according to them— reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that —as far as I know— have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to (...) the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)

This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?

I explain why the New Theory of Reference of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others does not entail absolute time and space, contrary to what Quentin Smith has recently claimed.

This chapter contains sections titled: How Eliminativism Became Embroiled in the Theory of Reference Stich on the Meta‐theory of Reference, and Eliminativism Stich's Way Out The Easy Way Out The Theory of Reference and How Sentences Code for Content Coda Notes and References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Where we will make our start The supervenience of reference on nature The availability issue What is required of a user of a name? The issue about personal level knowledge The demand for precise and explicit specifications What is a theory of reference a theory of? In the mouths of the very young The description theory and interchangeability What is to come and a final objection noted.

Combining new insights from cognitive science and speech act theory, Unnsteinsson develops a compelling theory of singular reference which avoids well-known puzzles. The theory, Edenic intentionalism, is grounded in a mechanistic perspective on explanation in cognitive science and a new Gricean account of speaker meaning and speaker reference.

In this paper, I argue that the causal and description theories of natural kind term reference involve certain psychological elements. My main goal is to refine these theories with the help of empirical psychology of concepts, and to argue that the refinement process ultimately leads to the dissolution of boundaries between the two kinds of theories. However, neither the refined theories nor any other existing theories provide an adequate answer to the question of what makes natural kind terms rigid. (...) To provide an answer to this question I conclude my paper by introducing a framework of a unified theory of natural kind term reference that is built on the empirical psychology of concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I present a way of formally representing proper names in accordance with a description theory of reference–fixing and show that such arepresentation makes it possible to retain the claim about the rigidity of proper names and is not vulnerable to Kripke’s modal objection.

We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social de- velopment ðe.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagionÞ can serve as refer- ence fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer (...) to those states. This allows intentional concepts to be anchored to their referents, even if folk psy- chological descriptions turn out to be false. (shrink)

“La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister”J. M. CharcotRoughly speaking, references relate what is said to just those things about which it is said. A theory of reference is commonly taken to be a statement or characterization of that relation which references effect — that relation, that is, which holds between something that is said and some object just in case in that which is said reference is made to that object. Such a theory (...) is often further conceived as answering one or both of the questions: For any given object X, what is it for a reference to be made to X, and For any given reference, R, what is it for an object X to be the referent of R. Let us call a theory which correctly answers at least some of these questions a classical theory of reference. (shrink)

Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.

I argue for a theory of the optimal function of the speech act of referring, called the edenic theory. First, the act of singular reference is defined directly in terms of Gricean communicative intentions. Second, I propose a doxastic constraint on the optimal performance of such acts, stating, roughly, that the speaker must not have any relevant false beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the intended object. In uttering a singular term on an occasion, on this (...) theory, one represents oneself as not having any confused beliefs about the object to which one intends to refer. This paves the way for an intentionalist theory of reference that circumvents well-known problems, which have not been adequately addressed before in the literature. (shrink)

This 1979 doctoral dissertation was the basis for the author’s 1981 book, /Reference and Essence/ (Princeton University Press and Basil Blackwell). The dissertation was published by University Microfilms International (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1980).

It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole.

This paper is a reply to some of Scott Soames ' comments on my colloquium paper Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference. Except for the indicated parts added in May, 1995, this paper was written on December 16th–25th, 1994 as my reply to Soames for the APA colloquium in Boston, December 28, 1994. In this paper, I argue that Soames ' contention that Marcus is not one of the primary founders of contemporary nondescriptivist (...) theories of reference is false. Soames presents numerous arguments for his thesis that Marcus did not originate ideas later elaborated upon by Kripke, but his arguments are unsound; they are based in part on a misunderstanding of Marcus' theory and in part on an inadequate grasp of some of the key notions of the New Theory of Reference, such as the notion of a posteriori necessities and the notion of reference-fixing descriptions. (shrink)

The paper engages in two metaphilosophical disputes. The first concerns the importance of studying original texts to establish the methods used by philosophers. The second addresses the role of intuitions in philosophical arguments. In this paper, I argue that a close reading of original texts is crucial for the methodological dispute on the role of intuitions in philosophy. I refer to the critique of this stance proposed by Landes, discuss it, and justify my claim by presenting the results and benefits (...) of a corpus study concerning the practice known as “intuition-talk” in the theory of reference. The study consists of an in-depth qualitative analysis of this practice with respect to four parameters: indicators of intuition-talk, the subject of that talk, the mode of that talk (whether intuition-talk is used by formulating a judgment on a particular case or ascribing a general property to a given phenomenon), and the issue of whether intuitive claims are supported by arguments. I discuss the results, their consequences, and outline some challenges that need to be addressed in future studies conducted within the proposed approach and thereby demonstrate why such a study, focused on the content of original texts, should be seen as metaphilosophically valuable. (shrink)

In 'Notes on the Theory of Reference' Quine offers a brief argument, based on Tarski's Convention T and semantic definition of truth, that the theory of meaning is 'in a worse state' than is the theory of reference and that the concepts of the theory of meaning are inherently more 'foggy and mysterious' than those of thetheory of reference. A careful reconstruction of Quine's argument, however, is sufficient to show both that he covertly (...) imposes a double standard of clarity on the two theories in question and that in so far as Tarski's contributions clarify or explicate the notion of truth they do likewise for the notion of analyticity. Consequently, the appeal which Quine makes to Tarski's definition of truth cannot be used in the manner he wishes, to draw a clear boundary between the theories of meaning and reference. (shrink)