We introduce a new metric for interdisciplinarity, based on co-author publication history. A published article that has co-authors with quite different publication histories can be deemed relatively “interdisciplinary,” in that the article reflects a convergence of previous research in distinct sets of publication outlets. In recent work, we have shown that this interdisciplinarity metric can predict citations. Here, we show that the journal Cognitive Science tends to contain collaborations that are relatively high on this interdisciplinarity metric, at about the 80th (...) percentile of all journals across both social and natural sciences. Following on Goldstone and Leydesdorff, we describe how scientometric tools provide a valuable means of assessing the role of cognitive science in broader scientific work, and also as a tool to investigate teamwork and distributed cognition. We describe how data-driven metrics of this kind may facilitate this exploration without relying upon rapidly changing discipline and topic keywords associated with publications. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to demoting (...) one’s disputant, and the kinds of epistemic assessment involved in demoting a disputant. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section argues that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor and it explains how this demotion can occur in a sensible and appropriate way. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist, despite the defenses offered on behalf of theism against such doubts. It concludes that these persistent doubts could in some cases result in defeaters for theistic belief, even if the doubts are irrational, but that the gift of faith can compensate for this. (shrink)

Professor Merrie Bergmann presents an accessible introduction to the subject of many-valued and fuzzy logic designed for use on undergraduate and graduate courses in non-classical logic. Bergmann discusses the philosophical issues that give rise to fuzzy logic - problems arising from vague language - and returns to those issues as logical systems are presented. For historical and pedagogical reasons, three-valued logical systems are presented as useful intermediate systems for studying the principles and theory behind fuzzy logic. The major (...) fuzzy logical systems - Lukasiewicz, Gödel, and product logics - are then presented as generalisations of three-valued systems that successfully address the problems of vagueness. A clear presentation of technical concepts, this book includes exercises throughout the text that pose straightforward problems, that ask students to continue proofs begun in the text, and that engage students in the comparison of logical systems. (shrink)

Comprehensive coverage of the special theory (frames of reference, Lorentz transformation, relativistic mechanics of mass points, more), the general theory ...

Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...) one or both of those belief sources? Should evolutionary accounts of the origins of our moral beliefs and our religious beliefs undermine our confidence in their veracity? This volume places challenges to moral belief side-by-side with challenges to religious belief, sets evolution-based challenges alongside disagreement-based challenges, and includes philosophical perspectives together with theological and social science perspectives, with the aim of cultivating insights and lines of inquiry that are easily missed within a single discipline or when these topics are treated in isolation. The result is a collection of essays--representing both skeptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion--that move these discussions forward in new and illuminating directions. -/- Contributors: Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame; Michael Bergmann, Purdue University; Sarah Brosnan, Georgia State University; William FitzPatrick, University of Rochester; John Hare, Yale University; Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University; Patrick Kain, Purdue University; Jordan Kiper, University of Connecticut; Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College; Charles Mathewes, University of Virginia; Mark C. Murphy, Georgetown University; John Pittard, Yale Divinity School; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University; Richard Sosis, University of Connecticut; Sharon Street, New York University; Joshua Thurow, University of Texas at San Antonio; Ralph Wedgwood, University of Southern California. (shrink)

We study logic translations from an abstract perspective, without any commitment to the structure of sentences and the nature of logical entailment, which also means that we cover both proof- theoretic and model-theoretic entailment. We show how logic translations induce notions of logical expressiveness, consistency strength and sublogic, leading to an explanation of paradoxes that have been described in the literature. Connectives and quantifiers, although not present in the definition of logic and logic translation, can be recovered by their abstract (...) properties and are preserved and reflected by translations under suitable conditions. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with two questions: What is sexist humor? and what is wrong with it? To answer the first question, I briefly develop a theory of humor and then characterize sexist humor as humor in which sexist beliefs are presupposed and are necessary to the fun. Concerning the second question, I criticize a common sort of argument that is supposed to explain why sexist humor is offensive: although the argument explains why sexist humor feels offensive, it (...) does not place responsibility for the offense in the humorist or audience that enjoys sexist humor. I develop an alternate account of the offense in sexist humor that places responsibility for offense in precisely those quarters. (shrink)

It is a common socio-moral practice to appeal to reasons as a guiding force for one’s actions. However, it is an intriguing possibility that this practice is based on fiction: reasons cannot or do not motivate the majority of actions—especially moral ones. Rather, pre-reflective evaluative processes are likely responsible for moral actions. Such a view faces two major challenges: i.) pre-reflective judgements are commonly thought of as inflexible in nature, and thus they cannot be the cause of the varied judgements (...) people rely on in everyday life, and ii.) if reflective reason-based judgements do not play a strong causative role in judgement, why do people rely on the articulation of reasons in their moral practices? We argue that the pre-reflective judgements motivating moral actions are embodied in nature. The experience of the rightness of an action that drives a person to act depends on the sensorimotor interactions that have cultivated an agent’s perspective on the world. These interactions are embedded in relational contexts, relative to which judgements are individuated. Because of this relational embeddedness they are more flexible than they are commonly thought to be, enabling us to explain the variety of human behavior by appealing to them. The Anglo-European practice of appealing to reason as if they were propositional belief-statements motivating actions can be accounted for as nothing more than an idiosyncratic way of constructing narratives to clarify and express the relational context of intentional actions. (shrink)

Of the measures for resolving work—family conflict proposed by Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers, government programs that provide or pay for nonparental child care would advance gender equality. However, paid parental leaves of six months for both parents, and the encouragement of part-time work, would retard it, and possibly reverse some of the advances toward gender equality that have been made in the home and the workplace. Female jobholders would increase their time at home to a much greater extent than (...) would male jobholders, increasing the share women do of child care, cleaning, cooking, and laundry. In the workplace, employers would become more reluctant to place women in nonroutine jobs, where substitution of one worker for another is difficult. Finally, recent studies of the effect on young children of nonparental care are reviewed. They can be interpreted in more than one way, and the lessons drawn from them depend crucially on the opinions of those doing the analysis. (shrink)

State provision of “merit goods” and of narrowly targeted cash payments has higher priority than large universal cash grants. Analysis of the Swedish budget shows that advanced countries do not have the taxing capacity to do both at once. Other problems with cash payments schemes include the disincentive to work for pay, reducing taxpaying capacity, and retrograde effects on gender equality. After the achievement of a welfare state, rises over time in productivity may gradually open up room in the national (...) budget for universal cash payments. (shrink)

Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...) that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the sceptical theist response to such arguments fails because it commits those who endorse it to a sort of scepticism that undermines ordinary moral practice. In this paper, we defend Bergmann's sceptical theist response against this charge. (shrink)

Die erweiterte und komplett überarbeitete 2. Auflage ist ein modernes Lehrbuch für Astrophysik-Vorlesungen. Der Bergmann-Schaefer-Reihe angemessen, stehen experimentelle Methoden und Messungen im Vordergrund; doch die Einbettung der Messergebnisse in die Theorie wird ebenfalls ausführlich dargestellt. Neu hinzugefügt wurden die Kapitel 1 Grundlagen der Astronomie und Kapitel 2 Terrestrische Observatorien. In Kapitel 3 (Extraterrestrische Observatorien) fanden die europäischen Beiträge eine stärkere erücksichtigung. Kapitel 6 Kosmologie wurde völlig neu verfasst. Mit den vielen praktischen Hinweisen zur Nutzung des Internets ist das Buch (...) auch nützlich für Amateur-Astronomen. Leser, die sich allgemeinbildend für die Astrophysik interessieren, finden hier Informationen über alle neuen Entwicklungen. Mit dem ausführlichen Register ist das Buch auch zum Nachschlagen geeignet. Weitere Informationen zum Bergmann/Schaefer finden Sie hier. (shrink)

The article Do translocal networks matter for agricultural innovation? A case study on advice sharing in small scale farming communities in Northeast Thailand, written by Till Rockenbauch, Patrick Sakdapolrak and Harald Sterly, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 10 April 2019 without open access.

The philosophy of Malebranche is a speculative system of great intellectual interest. A comprehensive examination of it, however concise, is therefore a major undertaking. In this paper I shall limit myself to three points. I shall examine, partly from within and partly from without, Malebranche's account of perception as it relates to the realism-nominalism problem; I shall inquire what, if anything, he has to say about the related problem of individuation; and I shall analyze some aspects of the vision in (...) God. These three topics will be taken up, in this order, in Sections Three, Four, and Five. The first two sections provide background. Section One deals, most concisely yet in an analytical fashion, with the realism issue. Section Two digests, in the same manner, what I shall need of Malebranche's system. Section Six contains some concluding remarks. (shrink)

This book gives a convincing philosophical explanation for the strong persistence of our diverse folk psychological intuitions about the self. For this purpose it introduces, on the one hand, the distinction between subject and self model as proposed by Metzinger, on the other hand, the distinction between a social/normative and a cognitive/organic perspective on the self. The book argues that one needs to take into account both distinctions, if one wants to answer notoriously difficult questions like the one that gives (...) the book its title: Is the self real? (shrink)

Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish (...) philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking up four main tasks. First, it identifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features: it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality, and it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way. (shrink)

Summary Since its definition at the council of Nicea the date of Easter had been calculated on a cyclical basis. The Easter formula publicized by C. F. Gauss in 1800 has neither achieved recognition with the chronologists nor with the officials of the papal curia, responsible for the fixing of Easter. In the paper being presented here the elements of medieval computus are transformed on an arithmetical basis and from this a formula for the fixing of Easter is developed. With (...) the help of these two components it is possible to calculate the Julian as well as the Gregorian dates of Easter and, in addition the calendar of any given year. The formula for the date of Easter being submitted here can be traced back exclusively to the elements of the medieval computus and can be ratified by the chronologists. Thus it renders possible the fixing of every Easter date with the help of a pocket calculator or the use of two small tables. This demonstrates that the history of methodology contains tools in order to develop a ‘new’ solution of a systematical problem. (shrink)

Der Kinder- und Jugendgesundheitssurvey soll repräsentative, gültige Daten und Erkenntnisse zur gesundheitlichen Situation von Kindern und Jugendlichen in Deutschland als entscheidende Voraussetzung für die Bewertung und die Verbesserung von deren gesundheitlicher Lage schaffen. Forschung und insbesondere Blutentnahmen an nichteinwilligungsfähigen Personen erfordern eine profunde ethische und rechtliche Überprüfung. Der Beitrag befasst sich damit, welche medizinethischen Empfehlungen und welche rechtlichen Grundsätze in Deutschland für die Bewertung relevant sind. Nach geltendem deutschen Recht können Eltern zu Blutentnahmen bei ihren Kindern nur zustimmen, wenn diese (...) in deren individuellem gesundheitlichen Interesse liegen. Ein „gruppenspezifischer Nutzen“, wie er von Medizinethikern national und international als Voraussetzung für ethische Akzeptabilität (bei minimalem Risiko der Untersuchungen) ebenfalls für sinnvoll und wichtig angesehen wird, und der in dem geplanten Survey in jedem Falle gegeben wäre, genügt deutschen Rechtsansprüchen nicht. Im Pretest hat sich der potenzielle individuelle Nutzen der Blutentnahmen bestätigt: Viele Kinder hatten biochemisch nachweisbare Gesundheitsrisiken (z. B. verborgener Nährstoffmangel, allergische Sensibilisierung, Hinweise auf Impflücken oder langfristige Gesundheitsrisiken), die ohne Blutuntersuchung nicht feststellbar gewesen wären. Bei über 90% der Kinder waren nach schriftlicher Einwilligung der Eltern und Jugendlichen sowie informeller Zustimmung der Kinder, die in jedem einzelnen Falle berücksichtigt wurde, Blutentnahmen möglich. Nach der Befragung einer Unterstichprobe ist die Akzeptanz insgesamt gut. (shrink)

The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...) mind, the answer to The Question is ‘yes’ (though that positive answer is less wholehearted in the case of external rationality). Then, in section 2, I briefly make some more general remarks about when discovering a disagreement provides a defeater and when it doesn't. In the final section, I consider an important objection to the answer given in section 1 to The Question. (shrink)

The book then discusses another group of issues ("whether it is, what it is, how and why it is"), which determined the argumentation, the axiomatic ordering of the sciences, and concludes with a demonstration on the basis of concrete ...

The Making of the Economy uses Husserl's critique of formalism in natural science in The Crisis of the European Sciences work as the template for an analogous critique of formalism in economic science. The historical narrative focuses on the emergence of formal economic analysis out of a series of successive life-worlds, or concrete historical situations. This generates new substantive understanding of both the historical material and the current discourse of crisis surrounding economics. It will appeal to historians and philosophers of (...) economics, as well as scholars of history, philosophy, and sociology. (shrink)

This posthumous work by Gustav Bergmann was essentially complete before his death in 1987.

Religious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to (...) such potential defeaters, emphasizing the way epistemic intuitions are involved in both the skeptical arguments and my recommended response. In section 2, I discuss the way in which peer disagreement—on any topic—is a potential defeater for our beliefs, highlighting the conditions under which recognized disagreement is a successful defeater and those under which it isn't. In the third section, I consider how to use a section-1 type of response to deal with a section-2 type of defeater for religious belief. (shrink)

It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...) a crucial role—perhaps the only crucial role—in the justification of our noninferential beliefs. But Phenomenal Conservatism seems to conflict, in a number of ways, with externalist accounts of justification. As a result, the attractiveness of the intuitions appealed to in support of views like Phenomenal Conservatism present something of a challenge to externalism. The purpose of this paper is to deal with that challenge by developing and defending an externalist-friendly account of the role of seemings in the formation and justification of our noninferential beliefs—an account that incorporates what is attractive in views like Phenomenal Conservatism. Because this externalist-friendly account is compatible with both externalist accounts of justification and the plausible elements of views like Phenomenal Conservatism, the challenge to externalism inspired by such views is thereby undermined. (shrink)