SCHVARZER: “To visualize the near future in Argentina, it is necessary to consider some structural changes that have taken place during the last decade. First, important changes have taken place in the pampas' agricultural production in the last decade. After thirty years of stagnation, production took a formidable leap in excess of 24 to 40 million tons. This almost doubled Argentina's real export capacity. This leap might be seen as the result of the pampa-landowners managerial skills, but in reality is (...) the consequence of a series of public policies and the effect of technological change which not only triggered this increase but showed, moreover, that agricultural production can grow even more: the production of cereals can be increased 50%, and this implies an almost 75% increase in Argentina's exports. (shrink)

The target article raises the question of whether transcription-based evidence is sufficient to support assumptions relating to patterns of mandibular activity in young children. Studies on the perception of both adult and infant speech indicate that the argument needs to be reexamined on the basis of acoustic and articulatory data.

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” that (...) stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

We prove some results about the limitations of the expressive power of quantifiers on finite structures. We define the concept of a bounded quantifier and prove that every relativizing quantifier which is bounded is already first-order definable (Theorem 3.8). We weaken the concept of congruence closed (see [6]) to weakly congruence closed by restricting to congruence relations where all classes have the same size. Adapting the concept of a thin quantifier (Caicedo [1]) to the framework of finite structures, we define (...) the concept of a meager quantifier. We show that no proper extension of first-order logic by means of meager quantifiers is weakly congruence closed (Theorem 4.9). We prove the failure of the full congruence closure property for logics which extend first-order logic by means of meager quantifiers, arbitrary monadic quantifiers, and the Härtig quantifier (Theorem 6.1). (shrink)

This paper analyzes responsible human–machine interaction concerning artificial neural networks (ANNs) and large language models (LLMs) by considering the extension of human agency and autonomy by means of artificial intelligence (AI). Thereby, the paper draws on the sociological concept of “interobjectivity,” first introduced by Bruno Latour, and applies it to technologically situated and interconnected agency. Drawing on Don Ihde’s phenomenology of human-technology relations, this interobjective account of AI allows to understand human–machine interaction as embedded in the social lifeworld. Finally, the (...) paper develops a connectionist account of responsible AI, thereby focusing on patterns such as social goals and actions. (shrink)

In the wake of massive structural changes within the world trade the WTO faces important challenges. Like an invisible world govemment the WTO uses its agreement as a sort of basic law. This basic law demands equal chances for every human being in the world. Therefore it is important to strengthen the WTO in order to pave the way for fair conditions within the world trade. This essay asks which circumstances are necessary to achieve this goal.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s and Friedrich Schiller’s conception of drive can be interpreted as a systematic response to an ambivalence in Kant’s conception of drive and driving force, which he associates with heteronomy and autonomy. Reinhold distinguishes between a selfish and an unselfish drive. In doing so, he revaluates the drive as something that is compatible with our freedom of the will. Both drives are the vital basis of our free decision and therefore united. Schiller distinguishes between three kinds of drive. (...) The object of the form-drive is the Gestalt of the world, its intelligible structure and necessity, whereas the object of the material drive is the human life and its sensual reality. In opposition to Reinhold, Schiller introduces a third drive that he calls the “play drive”. However, it is not an instance additional to the material and form-drive, but rather designates the harmony of both drives. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich aus genuin philosophischer Perspektive dem Phänomen der Digitalität. Er analysiert dessen ontologische, epistemologische und moralphilosophische Dimensionen. Als Schlüsselbegriff erweist sich dabei der Begriff der Virtualität, der jedoch notorisch unklar ist und von verwandten Phänomenen wie Simulationen und Fiktionen unterschieden werden muss. Abschließend werden einige pädagogische Perspektiven aufgezeigt, welche sich aus der Digitalität ergeben.

Ultimately this book provides a theory of intergenerational justice that is both intellectually robust and practical with wide applicability to law and policy.

Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...) properties, whereas medialpallio-thalamo-tectal circuitry makes the system sensitive to changes in internal state and to prior history of exposure to stimuli. RMs encode the diverse stimulus conditions referring to the same prey object through different combinations of “specialized” tectal neurons, involving cells selectively tuned to prey features. The prey-selective neurons express the outcome of information processing in functional units consisting of interconnected cells. Excitatory and inhibitory interactions among feature-sensitive tectal and pretectal neurons specify the perceptual operations involved in distinguishing the prey from its background, selecting its features, and discriminating it from predators. Other connections indicate stimulus location. The results of these analyses are transmitted by specialized neurons projecting from the tectum to bulbar/spinal motor systems, providing a sensorimotor interface. Specific combinations of such projective neurons – mediating feature- and space-related messages – form “command releasing systems” that activate corresponding motor pattern generators for appropriate prey-catching action patterns. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the ‘original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.

Questions Cavell's thesis that scepticism is a "natural" condition for mankind, by exploring certain historical developments (such as the scientific revolution) which does give scepticism a "natural" place in modern thinking. Emphasis is laid upon the question how scepticism can be an overwhelming ordinary experience, which is traced back to the establishment of devices such as the microscope.

Epistemology, as generally understood by philosophers of science, is rather remote from the history of science and from historical concerns in general. Rheinberger shows that, from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth century, a parallel, alternative discourse sought to come to terms with the rather fundamental experience of the thoroughgoing scientific changes brought on by the revolution in physics. Philosophers of science and historians of science alike contributed their share to what this essay describes as an ongoing quest to (...) historicize epistemology. Historical epistemology, in this sense, is not so concerned with the knowing subject and its mental capacities. Rather, it envisages science as an ongoing cultural endeavor and tries to assess the conditions under which the sciences in all their diversity take shape and change over time. (shrink)

We show that, consistently, there can be maximal subtrees of \\) and \ / {\mathrm {fin}}\) of arbitrary regular uncountable size below the size of the continuum \. We also show that there are no maximal subtrees of \ / {\mathrm {fin}}\) with countable levels. Our results answer several questions of Campero-Arena et al..

The Savage and the Anscombe–Aumann frameworks are the two most popular approaches used when modeling ambiguity. The former is more flexible, but the latter is often preferred for its simplicity. We conduct an experiment where subjects place bets on the joint outcome of an ambiguous urn and a fair coin. We document that more than a third of our subjects make choices that are incompatible with Anscombe–Aumann for any preferences, while the Savage framework is flexible enough to account for subjects’ (...) behaviors. (shrink)

Ohne Unmittelbarkeit verliert sich das Selbst in Vermittlungen. Daher die Versuchung, auf Differenzen zu verzichten, zur Selbstaufgabe ins Unum. Wie aber, wenn wir Grenzen als als Trefflinien oder Flächen denken sollten? Das wird hier mit Fichte am Bild erwogen: Bild als Dienst im Erscheinungsgeschehen. Darin zeigt das Eins sich als Mit-Eins. Das bedrohliche Zwischen wird zum Ort wechselseitigen Daheim-seins.Without immediateness the self will be lost in mediations. Is it therefore forced to self-delivery into Unum? This paper suggests, to take borders (...) for meeting-lines or -faces. In this way - according to Fichte - pictures are serving within a process of appearance . So Unum could become togetherness, the threatening »between«: »circuminsessio«, mutually being at home. (shrink)

We investigate some aspects of bounding, splitting, and almost disjointness. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the bounding number, the closed almost disjointness number, the splitting number, and the existence of certain kinds of splitting families.

In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and (...) affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles. (shrink)

Identity and Individuality are key subjects of modernity. They are categorically unfolded by Schleiermacher's conception, that individual identity is constituted by an ethic process and is closely linked to its complementary, the universal of sociality. In the first instance this essay explicates this conception in the poeticised romantic early work ‘Monologen’ and thereupon it connects with his mellower dogmatic-theological main work ‘Glaubenslehre’. In the ‘Monologen’ individuality is constituted by imagining a human transcendental ‘realm of spirits’ as the background for looking (...) at the individuals in the ‘world’. On the other hand the ‘Glaubenslehre’ interlaces ethic-religious processes of the constitution of identity with institutionalised communication between empirically different individuals in the context of ecclesiology. Associated with a coupling of ‘spirit’ and ‘world’ this makes a structural openness possible for the real plurality right up to divergence and difference. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to understand what Socrates says about expertise and virtue in Plato’s dialogue Laches in the light of Socrates’ idea of “human wisdom” in the Apology of Socrates. Conducting a good life requires both “knowledge about good and bad things”, that is, knowledge about human well-being, and “human wisdom”. Socrates aspires to epistemic autonomy: Trust in your own reason, and don’t let any expert tell you anything about your own happiness.

Murray N. Rothbard presents Richard Cantillon as the true founding father of modern economic science. This note provides some criticism of Rothbard’s thesis, but also further evidence in support of it. We show that Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature du commerce en général pioneers the economic analysis of property relations, stressing that the demand of property owners determines the whole structure of production. Moreover, Cantillon anticipated the modern functional distinction of capitalists, workers, entrepreneurs, and governments according to their types of (...) income. He also analysed to what extent the state profits from a high quantity of money; and he demonstrated that all results of government intervention are ephemeral and reversed by law of nature.Murray N. Rothbard présente Richard Cantillon comme le véritable père fondateur de la science économique moderne. La thèse de Rothbard est sujette à des critiques, mais à encore plus de soutien. L’article vise à démontrer que l’“Essai sur la nature du commerce en général” de Cantillon annonce l’analyse économique de la propriété; il insiste sur le fait que la demande des propriétaires détermine l’ensemble de la structure de production. De plus, Cantillon aurait, selon l’auteur, anticipé la distinction fonctionnelle moderne entre capitalistes, travailleurs, entrepreneurs et gouvernants selon leurs formes de revenus. Il avait aussi analysé dans quelle mesure l’Etat tire profit d’une offre élevée de monnaie et avait démontré que tous les résultats de l’intervention étatique sont éphémères et amenés à être contredits par la loi naturelle. (shrink)

The article presents Dewey’s own understanding of rationality by reconstructing his criticism of idealism. For Dewey, idealism is an important and valuable expression of the modern idea that both knowledge and values are historical products of human self-determination. Thus, it rightly defends the power of thought against the uncritical claims of mere religious and social authority. Yet idealism, Dewey claims, still misconceives that human power by ultimately treating it as a merely intellectual power, thus following the philosophical tradition. For Dewey, (...) however, human thought and reasoning have to be understood in a much broader way. Dewey decenters thought by arguing that it is a natural, dependent and essentially temporal process, in which the intellectual elements only play a subordinate role. Thought, he claims, does not only have a history; furthermore, thinking only matters to human beings precisely because it is open to reflective change. Dewey’s position, thus, can be seen as an attempt to preserve the existential importance of philosophical self-reflection by binding thought to history and change in a radical way. (shrink)