During the last fifteen years some theologians during have supported their understanding of how unbelievers might be saved by appealing to Thomas Aquinas and the development of his thought in by sixteenth-century Dominicans at Salamanca. These Salamancan Dominicans applied Thomas’ thought in the context of the New World’s discovery. These recent theologians attribute two claims to this tradition: first, that not every unbeliever is guilty of unbelief, and second, that unbelievers can perform good acts which in some strong manner (...) enable them to receive grace. I shall argue that although the first claim about the culpability of unbelief is held by the Thomist tradition, it has no historical or logical connection to the salvation of unbelievers. I shall argue that the second claim was not held by the tradition and that the contemporary misinterpretation results from a confusion over the relationship between moral goodness and merit. Whereas the first claim is historically accurate but irrelevant to the contemporary views for which it is invoked, the second claim is historically false if attributed to Thomas Aquinas or the Dominican tradition at Salamanca. (shrink)

‘No-fault unbelief’ can be named the view that there are those who do not believe in God through no moral or intellectual fault of their own. This view opposes a more traditional one, which can be named ‘flawed unbelief’ view, according to which religious unbelief signals a cognitive or moral flaw in the non-believer. Since this charge of mental or moral flaw causes a certain uneasiness, I oppose the former view, i.e. ‘no-fault unbelief’, with a strategy (...) that has nothing to do with the latter. I assume that ‘no-fault unbelief’ is correct and show what consequences follow for both unbelievers and believers. I conclude that the assumption in question is superficially beneficial but deeply detrimental to unbelievers, and by contrast, it is superficially detrimental and deeply beneficial to believers. (shrink)

The man who is isolated over against God is as such rejected by God. But to be this man can only be the choice of the Godless man himself. The witness of the Community of God to every individual man points in this direction: that this choice of the Godless is null and void, that he belongs to Jesus Christ from eternity and thus is not rejected, but rather chosen by God in Jesus Christ, that the reprobation which he deserves (...) on the basis of his wrong choice is borne and removed by Jesus Christ; that on the basis of the true, the Divine choice he is chosen for eternal life with God. The promise of his election will determine him as a member of the Church to become himself a carrier of its witness to the whole world. And the revelation of his rejection can determine him only to believe in Jesus Christ as Him by whom it is borne and removed. (Fourth of Karl Barth's "main theses" on God's Election of Grace in his Dogmatic II/2). (shrink)

In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection (...) of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false. (shrink)

"Belief and Unbelief? I had to read it in college. Good book." Over the years, at receptions and chance encounters and by letter, many strangers have ...

This volume delves into the question of how, in an Iberian world apparently far removed from the battlegrounds of modernity and secularisation, doubt and unbelief found fertile soil, stimulated by social and religious developments. Adopting a multidisciplinary perspective, the contributors show how the crisis of identity produced by forced mass conversion touched off inner crises about the nature of Truth. By tracing the path from medieval Spain to the Spanish Inquisition, and from the great literary and artistic works of (...) the Spanish Baroque to Sephardic Marranism, this volume fills a historiographical gap in European social and intellectual history, demonstrating the importance of the Iberian world in the evolution of European scepticism. Mercedes García-Arenal is Research Professor at CSIC, Madrid, and Stefania Pastore is Associate Professor at the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. They work on tolerance and dissent in Early Modern Iberia: on forced conversion, on the violent world of the Inquisition and the debates and protests that it sparked, and on the complex interplay of minorities. They have recently collaborated on After Conversion. Iberia and the Emergence of Modernity (Brill, 2016) and, as editors, Visiones imperiales y profecía. Roma, España, Nuevo Mundo (Abada, 2018). (shrink)

Religion has been intensely studied in the last years inside an evolutionary frame, trying to discern to what extent it contributes to fitness or becomes an adaptive entity in its own. A similar heuristic can be tried regarding the opposite tendency: unbelief and atheism, since these cultural phenomena could help to better adapt to some social settings or become an adaptive socio-cultural niche on its own. The present paper examines some scenarios in which that question makes sense: the tradition (...) of sociology of religion, with its different strands, including recent studies on ‘non-religious’; the cognitive; and the philosophical-theological reflection. The proposed venues show to what extent the evolutionary model might reveal neglected aspects in the study of unbelief, and at the same time its limits or the open questions that such application raise. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga’s recent contention, developed in Warranted Christian Belief (forthcoming), that if theism is true, then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person’s noetic establishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse consequences for (...) Plantinga’s epistemology of religious belief. Plantinga’s proper basicality thesis together with his view of rationality defeaters suggests that there are circumstances in which theistic belief would not be proper function rational even if theism is true. (shrink)

The Symposium on the Culture of Unbelief was held as part of the First International Symposium on Belief.

According to the Christian faith, the reason why certain people do not believe in God is willful unbelief, i.e., spiritual blindness. Christians hold that God is ultimate reality and that God makes covenants with human beings. People become convinced of God’s presence through the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit, although natural theology can show that religious belief is warranted. Belief in God, even if it is based on private evidence, can be rational.

Through autobiography, I explain why I cannot accept conventional Christianity or any other form of religious belief. I sketch how, through modern evolutionary theory, I try to find an alternative world‐picture, one which is, however, essentially agnostic about ultimate meanings. I characterize my position as being that of “David Hume brought up‐to‐date by Charles Darwin.” I express sad skepticism about ever realizing the hopes on which Zygon was founded.

The head of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship at Harvard, MIT, and Tufts, Curtis Chang turns to the seminal works of Augustine and Thomas as a way of engaging the challenges of postmodernity. He accordingly argues that Aquinas’s De Civitate Dei and Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles were composed precisely to challenge a world growing suspicious, if not negligent, of the Christian story. The rhetorical strategy Chang cleverly uncovers in both DCD and SCG is threefold: both Augustine and Thomas enter their opponents’ unique (...) stories and worldviews, both retell that story by reinterpreting that story on their opponents’ own terms, and finally, each capture that retold tale and tell the eternal story of Christianity in a way that is now intelligible and attractive to their interlocutors. (shrink)

The scientific study of atheism and unbelief is at a pivotal turning point: past research is being evaluated, and new directions for research are being paved. Organizations are being formed with an exclusive focus on unbelief research, and large grants are funding the topic in ways that historically have never happened before. This article serves as an introduction to the state of the literature and study of evolutionary perspectives towards unbelief, which incorporates cognitive, adaptive, and biological contributors. (...) This article serves to contextualize the subsequent articles, which all have distinct perspectives on the evolutionary factors that contribute towards unbelief. (shrink)

David Friedrich Strauss is a central figure in 19th century intellectual history. The first major source for the loss of faith in Christianity in Germany, his work Das Leben Jesu was the most scandalous publication in Germany during his time. His book was a critique of the claims to historical truth of the New Testament, which had been the mainstay of Protestantism since the Reformation. As the father of unbelief, his critique of Christianity preceded that of Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, (...) and Schopenhauer. His views imposed a harsh fate upon him - he was persecuted for his beliefs by religious and political authorities and was denied employment in the university and government, forcing him to live as a free-lance writer. He led a wandering and isolated life as an outcast. Here, Frederick C. Beiser studies the intellectual development of Strauss and recounts his fate, which began in faith as a young man but finally ended in unbelief. (shrink)

Atheism was the most fundamental challenge to early-modern French certainties. Leading educators, theologians and philosophers labelled such atheism as manifestly absurd, confident that neither the fact nor behaviour of nature was explicable without reference to God. The alternative was a categorical naturalism. This book demonstrates that the Christian learned world had always contained the naturalistic 'atheist' as an interlocutor and a polemical foil, and its early-modern engagement and use of the hypothetical atheist were major parts of its intellectual life. In (...) the considerations and polemics of an increasingly fractious orthodox culture, the early-modern French learned world gave real voice and eventually life to that atheistic presence. Without understanding the actual context and convergence of the inheritance, scholarship, fierce disputes, and polemical modes of orthodox culture, the early-modern generation and dissemination of absolute naturalism are inexplicable. This book brings to life that Christian learned culture, its dilemmas, and its unintended consequences. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 4 Seiten: 483-500.

On the historic Cross, it is God Himself Who has actually met the last dark limits of our life, and has brought Himself face to face with that inescapable something (or Someone) which seems to keep us forever strangers (physically, morally, logically and in every other way) to the Absolute and Eternal. And because it is God Himself Who has thus in life and in death personally encountered sin, death, time and corruption, He has overthrown them and raised and transformed (...) the existence that is subject to them, our existence, into the glorious Being of His Everlasting Godhead. He has robbed death of its sting and the grave of its victory, and delivered us from Satan's ancient power. A.N. Prior: Athanasius Contra Mundum. Prior (1934). (shrink)

A leading psychologist at the Menninger Foundation analyzes the current cultural situation where deep unbelief alienates itself from classical belief. He recognizes that unbelief is not just a simple negation of belief but is itself pluralistic, and the varieties of unbelief have now become the attitudes of masses of modern men. The author makes extensive use of recent philosophical reflection. He is also well aware of how social policy may tend to replace what had once been religious (...) goals and institutions, and how secular institutions may become the vehicle of sacred values. Both belief and unbelief are understood as aspects of man’s pursuit of happiness, although the classical philosophical considerations of this happiness principle are never debated. The psychological foundations of the book lie in psychoanalytic object relations theory suggesting an isomorphism between personal relations and the relations between the self and reality. Overbeliefs, [[sic]] whether secular or religious, are analyzed as a function of such object relations. With this in mind the author treats, for both believers and unbelievers, problems of dependency and autonomy, mystery, options, Providence, and fantasy and reality. The analysis and suggestions will be helpful to the lay audience but will not seem especially new to trained philosophers. Strangely enough, the author himself seems to remain in the position between belief and unbelief. He understands each side sufficiently well so as not to reveal decision for either but offers instead a strong philosophically supported plea for tolerance. It is even stranger, in a book concentrating upon the alienation from belief, that so much analysis is given to the nature, content, and psychology of belief. Unfortunately, what one misses the most is what is most needed and desired in a more secular culture; a profound and penetrating analysis of the psychology or psychologies of the unbeliever. Just how the sincere secular man’s psychological character operates to affirm unbelief, involving the psychological analysis of his character so that we may understand his attitude toward anxiety, despair, suicide, hope, self-respect, concern and care, the psychology of tolerance, mortality and death, meaning and meaninglessness surely deserve the same depth and care of analysis that hundreds of years in the psychology of belief has offered, but this, one does not find. One can only hope that out of his extensive clinical experience the author will further reveal the deep ambiguities and psychological character of the sincere unbeliever and his internal struggle with the good, the true, and the beautiful. In such an analysis the profound struggle of unbelief with any classical theories of man’s natural inclination towards belief, clarifying precisely what is being denied, and how one negates it and lives with this negation psychologically, would form a fascinating adventure into the psychological processes of contemporary secular man.—H.A.D. (shrink)

Michael Ruse's rejection of religious belief is questioned at two levels. First, on the metaethical level of analysis, evolutionary ethics cannot account for moral behavior that is based on a “strong version” of the Love Command. Second, agnosticism is discussed as a form of belief. Insights from religious forms of life that are inclusive, pluralistic, and expansive are contrasted with exclusivistic, closed, and fundamentalist forms of religion in order to develop criteria for “genuine religion.” Theistic agnosticism is presented as a (...) prolegomena to belief. (shrink)

Best known for having declared the death of God, Nietzsche was a thinker thoroughly absorbed in the Christian tradition in which he was born and raised. Yet while the atheist Nietzsche is well known, the pious Nietzsche is seldom recognised and rarely understood. Redeeming Nietzsche examines the residual theologian in the most vociferous of atheists. Fraser demonstrates that although Nietzsche rejected God, he remained obsessed with the question of human salvation. Examining his accounts of art, truth, morality and eternity, Nietzsche's (...) thought is revealed to be a series of experiments in redemption. (shrink)

At a moment when the requirements of belief and unbelief were being negotiated in unexpected ways, transcendentalism allowed for a more creative approach to spiritual questions. Interrogating the movement's alleged atheistic underpinnings, David Faflik contends that transcendentalism reconstituted the religious sensibilities of 1830s and 1840s New England, producing a dynamic and complex array of beliefs and behaviors that cannot be categorized as either religious or nonreligious. Rather than "the latest form of infidelity," as one contemporary described it, adherents viewed (...) their unconventional and distinct spiritual practices as a modern religion. Transcendental Heresies draws on an expansive antebellum archive of period commentary and writings by transcendentalism's practitioners, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Theodore Parker, Margaret Fuller, and the women of transcendentalism's second and third waves. From Boston to Concord to the heady environs of Harvard, the species of unbelief they practiced multiplied the religious possibilities of the era, expressing misgivings about traditional notions of divinity, flouting religion's customary forms, and ultimately encouraging spiritual questioning. (shrink)