The sciences of kalam and fiqh, which have a special importance in the history of Islamic thought and science, became prominent with their interactions with other sciences in their formation processes and their contributions to the evolution of religious thought. In the literature, the field representing the linguistic, religious, mental and practical aspects of fiqh has become widespread with the concepts of usūl-i fiqh and fürū-i fiqh, and the part about creed as usūlü'd-dīn or fiqhu'l-akbar. It has drawn our attention (...) that Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Shāfiʿī's ijtihads, fatwas and thoughts have remained up to date in every century without exception in the vortex of overdoing and understatement in these two disciplines. However, there are some narrations stating that although these imams were interested in kalam, they kept a distance from it. Their, famous students also indicated that they gave them advice in this sense. Therefore, this study has been prepared in order to examine the background of the aforementioned issues. For this purpose, the reasons why two imams preferred the science of fiqh in the main axis of the subject were subjected to a general criticism. Consequently, it has been seen that both imams had similar concerns and their ideas have been overlapping in the face of the creed developments of the period. (shrink)

On Islamic ethics and way of life, based on the Koran and Hadith.

Qualities of an ideal human character, according to Islam.

Al-Shāfi’ī has been unreservedly credited as one of the designers, if not the “master architect,” of uṣūl al-fiqh. His most important scholarly work, Al-Risālah, clearly demonstrates his cognitive creativity in this field. One of the methodologies for the decision of cases under Islamic law that Al-Shāfi’ī championed is qiyās, which he equated with ijtihād. His balanced approach invites further enquiry into the extensive use of qiyās in general and in criminal law in particular. The extent to which qiyās can be (...) applied to Islamic criminal law depends upon the degree or typology of qiyās being used, taking into account the Islamic theory of criminology. This article will analyse the position of al-Shāfi’ī in this regard. It will critically examine al-Shāfi’ī’s complex views on the use of qiyās as a method for establishing culpability under Islamic criminal law. It will then explore how his position corresponds to the human rights paradigm in the contemporary age. This article concludes that, while the use of qiyās in criminal law, especially in law of retaliation and predetermined punishments in accordance with al-Shāfi’ī’s approach is tantamount to incriminating a person based on less than certainty, it also represents the most promising way of protecting the right of victim. (shrink)

Islamic Law in Circulation: Shāfiʿī Texts across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean By KooriaMahmood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization), xvi + 450 pp. Price HB £105.00. EAN 978–1009098038.

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation (...) for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations). (shrink)

As a multi-layered theory of the foundations of “‘mathematicizing’ logic”, Husserlian pure logic is stratified on three levels (sub-theoretical, theoretical, meta-theoretical), which are then themselves transversally split in two sides (apophantic and ontological). This paper investigates how symbolic knowledge works in this framework—viz. in terms of ‘How can the subjective operating with symbols be justified in the process of obtaining objective contents of knowledge?’ To do so, it innovates in showing how Husserl’s theory of semiotic intentionality provides the epistemological-transcendental foundation (...) for the syntactic-semantic correspondence of the meaning relationship that is operative at the kernel of pure logic—i.e. on the theoretical level, between systems of axioms and formal manifolds. And thereby, it bridges the gap between the two volumes of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (namely, the Prolegomena and the six Investigations). (shrink)

Al-Shafi'i (d. 820) is clearly one of the most important figures in the early history of Islamic jurisprudence. His Risala or "Treatise" on the "principles of jurisprudence" (usul al-fiqh) is also of interest as an example of an approach to ethics that focuses on divine commands. Following a brief introduction, I offer the reader a few comments about al-Shafi'i's context. I summarize the content of the Risala and then analyze it as an example of divine command reasoning in ethics. Finally, (...) I present some observations on the place of al-Shafi'i's theory in the history of Islamic ethics, particularly with respect to his comments on ikhtilaf, "disagreement.". (shrink)

Ikhtisâr refers to the process of compilation a work by summarizing short and concise information or a large volume of work through abbreviation. It is intended to facilitate reading, learning and memorization, or to eliminate difficult parts in a book written in the form of Ikhtisâr. The compilation of concise works that fulfilled their purpose has become widespread over time and transformed into a tradition and also concise works have been compiled in fiqh as in other disciplines of sciences. In (...) particular, the work entitled Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr by Abu Shudjâ al-Isfahânî (d. after 500/1107), which is one of the concise works written in the Shafi'î madhhab, constitutes an important part of this tradition. In this study, primarily, the concise works written in the field of usûl/ancestor and furû/descendant in the Shafi’î madhhab were identified and given in chronological order, right after that, Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr and Ahmad bin Omar al-Shatirî’s (d. 1360/1941) work entitled Al-Yaqut al-Nafis were examined in terms of the ikhtisâr method. The comparative method was employed in order to determine the common and different aspects of these two works, which are among the basic sources of the Shafi'î madhhab, in terms of content and method. In this context, primarily, basic information regarding Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr and Al-Yaqut al-Nafis was presented, and right after that the classificcations and information in both works were compared and evaluated in terms of style. In this respect, it was determined that some of the topics in one of the aforementioned works are not included in the other work, and that there are certain differences between them in terms of the arrangement of the topics and the way they are explained. Based on this, in Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr the topics are dealt with in a brief manner and jurisprudential rulings are presented without giving much space to their evidences. In Al-Yaqut al-Nafis, on the other hand, each topic is dealt with in a detailed manner, and the elements, conditions and provisions related to the topics are mentioned as sub-headings. In particular, issues related to fiqh other than worship are explained with examples. Nevertheless, as in Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr the evidences of fiqh provisions are not included much. The topics in both works are arranged according to the Shafi'î fiqh methodology. (shrink)

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the most (...) comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

In the Muslim conception of religion, hadiths are considered as the se-cond source after the Ḳurʾān. In the minds of those who believe in the Ḳurʾān, there is no hesitation about the authenticity of this divine book since it has come to us through tawātur. As for the hadiths, since their relation to the Prophet is determined by the method of isnād, criticisms are mostly concentrated at this point. Muslim scholars resorted to the science of al-Djarḥ wa’l-taʿdīl to solve the (...) problem of the attribution of hadiths to Prophet Muhammad. There are criticisms directed towards hadiths and scholars who played significant roles in the formation of the Islamic schools of thought by non-Muslim schloars living in Islamic regions as well. George Tarabishi, a Syrian writer and translator, is a scholar who has written numerous works on Islam and the Arab civilization shaped by Islam. This study focuses on his criticisms of al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of hadith in his work, From the Islam of the Qur’an to the Islam of Hadith. Tarabishi’s criticisms against al-Shāfiʿī in his work were identified through document analysis technique and examined through the descriptive method. (shrink)

Al-Shāfiʿī’s works contain reports of numerous debates on the epistemological value of hadith reports, but unfortunately rarely name specific opponents or interlocutors or the groups to which they belong. In Jimāʿ al-ʿilm al-Shāfiʿī summarizes the views of scholars whom he considered opponents of hadith under two broad rubrics: those who reject hadith categorically and those who reject only part of the hadith. There have been speculations regarding their identity but only in 2013 was a concrete advance made, when Ahmed El (...) Shamsy identified one of al-Shāfiʿī’s opponents in debate as Ibn ʿUlayya. This study attempts to identify a group of al-Shāfiʿī’s opponents in Jimāʿ al-ʿilm, drawing on Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī’s Kitāb al-Maqālāt and other classical works of Islamic theology. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Yūsuf al-Ardabīlī is one of the Shāfiʿī jurists who lived in Azerbaijan in the 8th century of Hijri. This scholar, whose birth date we couldn’t find any information about, even though it has been searched in both local and foreign literature, died in Ardabīl in the year 799/1397 as bibliographical scholars agreed on. Ardabīlī is a person known by his work al-Anwār li-aʿmāl al-abrār, which he dedicated to Shāfiʿī jurisprudence, and someone with jurisprudential knowledge whom Shāfiʿī jurists benefit from. In (...) his work on jurisprudence (furūʿ al-fiqh), al-Anwār, he discussed the issues without delving deeply into evidences and partially mentioned uṣūl al-fiqh. Yūsuf al-Ardabīlī addressed the topics in his work by classifying them as acts of worship (ʿibādāt), transactions (muʿāmalāt), inheritance (farāʾiḍ), marriage and divorce (munākaḥāt-mufāraqāt), punishments (ʿuqūbāt), the conduct of judges (adab al-qāḍī), and freeing slaves (ʿitq). Moreover, in his work, he provides explanations that shed light on recent studies by addressing the subject of fatwā in detail. By addressing the fatwā institutions, Ardabīlī includes information on topics like the etiquette of istiftāʾ, fatwā with sharīʿah tricks (ḥiyal sharʿiyyah), and exceptions in divorce (ṭalāq). Because no academic studies have been done on his explanations in this field, the subject requires further attention. Additionally, presenting his explanations on the fatwā institution to the scholarly community is greatly important for shedding light on future studies. Islamic jurists recognize fatwā activities as a duty that requires responsibility in terms of religion and worldly life. Therefore, they do not favor the participation of those who lack knowledge and the capability of deducing religious rulings from sharīʿah evidences in fatwā activities.This study aims to contribute to the Islamic jurisprudence literature by addressing the principles of fatwā procedure through Ardabīlī’s perspective in his work, al-Anwār. (shrink)

Māturīdism is an Ottoman identity and this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire. It maintained its formal existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly (...) in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. The new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. However, even in this period, Māturīdism was remarkably reflected in the muqaddimāt-i arba‘a literature which was directly sponsored by Meḥmed II. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. Shiism and its all other variants were bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. Unfortunately such a refutational approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in the refutation texts against Ṣafawids. This brought to the fore at first the Ḥanafite and then the Māturīdite identity. This paper attempts to analyze this changing emphasis on Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the political and intellectual factors that supported and nourished it. -/- SUMMARY It can be argued that the debates around Ash‘arism and Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the resulting meant more than attempts of the members of the two sides to understand each other and that Māturīdism, particularly from the 16th century onwards, was gradually brought fore as the identity of Ottomans. In fact, this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire; it maintained, in form, its existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. In this period, Ottoman scholars still embraced the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī line in their theological views. Ḫiḍir Beg’s al-Qaṣīda al-Nūniyya, and al-Khayālī’s commentary upon it, and the commentary written by Aḥmad b. Oġuz Dānishmand al-Aḳshahrī on al-I‘timād of Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were the most noticeable Māturīdite texts from that time. Besides, al-Khayālī’s supercommentary (ḥāshiya) upon the commentary of al-Taftāzānī written on al-‘Aqā’id of Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī was also of central importance. However, the new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. But, this should not be taken to mean that Māturīdism lost its ground of existence. That the Ash‘arite works produced in this new paradigm were transferred to and fully integrated in the madrasa curriculum was not because they were Ash‘arite texts but because they were the most original and highest achievements of the philosophical theology. These texts that aimed at combining all fields of knowledge on a single platform, despite the Ash‘arism they included, constituted the peak of the Islamic thought of the time. In the preference of these texts, the fact that the Māturīdī tradition generally stood, in course of time, distant to the philosophy and chose to continue the kalām in the classical line also played a role. Māturīdī theologians Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, partly, but Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Maḥbūbī, to a greater extent, were notable exceptions to this general Māturīdī tendency. These figures were theologically Māturīdite, but their framework of producing discourse was the combination of philosophy and kalām as with their Ash‘arī counterparts. Therefore, Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and through him, of against the Ash‘arism in the context of muqaddimāt arba‘a was wholeheartedly supported by the Ottoman ulama. Even it was Meḥmed II who sponsored the debates regarding muqaddimāt arba‘a. The works written by such scholars as Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Kastallī, al-Ṣamṣūnī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-‘Arabī, Mollā ‘Arab al-Anṭākī, Khaṭībzāde, Sa‘dī Chalabī during his and his son Bāyazid II’s reigns were the supercommentaries written upon the related chapter of al-Talwīḥ, al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s al-Tawḍīḥ where the former responded to the criticism of the latter from an Ash‘arī point of view. The Ottoman ulama, in their workswere forced to choose between the two scholars and they mostly supported Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a and Māturīdism. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. The reflex of of identifying oneself through ‘the other’ made, to a certain extent, the theological and philosophical debates regarding faith meaningless, and gradually gave the Ottoman Sunnism a doctrinal and political tone. In such a context, the Ottomans’ paradigm of producing thought in line with the philosophical kalām began to lose its function, and, the focus of scholarhsip shifted; Shiism with its all variants were began to be bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. When the refutation texts composed from the reign of Bāyazid II onward to criticize the Ṣafawids are chronologically analyzed, it is seen that the contents of the texts evolved from criticism of Rāfiḍa to criticism of Sūfism. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in these refutations. So the fatwās issued against Rāfiḍa and Ṣūfīs in malāmatī line in earlier centuries in different contexts for different reasons were employed to criticize the new opponents. This caused two important results: First, such an approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḫalwatīs, Bayrāmīs, Gulshanīs, Baktāshīs and Mawlawīs were the sufi groups influenced by this situation in varying degrees. Second, Sunnism was exposed to the narrowization and centered around the fiqh, particularly Ḥanafī fiqh, in the context of Ḳāḍīzādelīs who were the main adversaries of above mentioned groups. The culture of catechism (‘ilm-i ḥāl) that came to the fore through the efforts of Ḳāḍīzādelīs was a crystallization and was mainly fuelled from this tension. Such a crystallization led the Ṣūfīs, the opponents of Ḳāḍīzādelīs, to a higher level of discourse deemphasizing the Ḥanafī aspect: They underscored the discourse of Ahl al-Sunna and four madhhabs, and mostly turned towards the Shāfiʿī and Ash‘arī traditions to look for support fortheir views. This process during which the emphasis of sharī‘a and tradition began to come to the fore once again paved the way for the zuhd and fiqh-centered religious thought that was maintained from the time of the Seljukids in Anatolia and was influential until Meḥmed II’ reign. Therefore in the Ottomans, particularly starting with the reign of Suleymān I, an intensive emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa was witnessed. Abū Ḥanīfa was at the very center of the debates revolving around zuhd and fiqh which came about in the same period and in which the sharī‘a sensitivity was a determining factor. Al-Māturīdī, whose name was overshadowed for a long time by the name of Abū Ḥanīfa, but who became prominent in the tradition with Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, had to transfer his gains for a period of time to Abū Ḥanīfa. Emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa looks like a rope that when pulled, all the tradition comes with it. When the topics began to be discussed in a manner that would also include the theological context, the contribution of the works ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa, namely al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Waṣiyya and al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta‘allim to the discussions would be limited. For this reason, the need to refer to al-Māturīdī or to the theological formation bearing his name was inevitable. So, the literature on the points of disagreements between the Ash‘arism and the Māturīdism developed both vertically and horizontally in the 18th century and, corollary to that, the debates of free will as a corolloary to that, once again brought Māturīdism to the fore. (shrink)

This article places the textual production of classical Islamic law in its proper historical context. It does so by examining a transcript of an eleventh-century oral debate, or disputation, between the Shafiʿi and Hanafi jurists Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ṭāliqānī on the subject of the pre-emptive expiation for broken oaths. The comparison between the disputation transcript and al-Ṭabarī’s lengthy legal manual al-Taʿlīqa al-kubrā reveals that the complexity and argumentative detail of disputations far exceeded jurists’ writings. Even the lengthiest (...) legal manuals of the time are shown to be highly summarized accounts of juristic thought. The article explains how these summaries were essential to the proper training of jurists in the age of ijtihād: jurists were expected to learn these summaries before exploring the law in greater depth through disputations. These disputations were rarely recorded in writing, and few survive. The disparity between the oral and written legal discourse of jurists leads to a disquieting conclusion: much of the thought that produced classical legal opinions is lost to us today. We are therefore left with access to an attenuated version of classical law. (shrink)

Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī is one of the important representatives of Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School. Al-Ta‘līḳa is his famous work, which is one of the first commentaries of al-Muzanī’s Mukḫtaṣar. One of the important features of this work is the introduction to some of the subjects of ijtihād (process of juristic legal reasoning), taqlīd (acting upon the word of another without asking for specific proof), ijmā‘ (consensus of jurists) and view’s of the companions of the Prophet. The first systematic, complete and detailed (...) works of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory) that belonged to the Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School have reached to the present day belong to the second half of the V./XI. century. Making research on the studies which were done about uṣūl al-fiqh and formed the basis of this period is essential to follow the development of uṣūl al-fiqh of the Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School. Transfer of the uṣūl al-fiqh in al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī’s al-Ta‘līḳa make it possible to determine the literatüre, which was formed in Khurāsān region in the period from the death of Shāfi‘ī to the first half of the V./XI. century until the first half of the Khurāsān region, which allows the determination of the uṣūl al-fiqh. In this study, on the basis of ijmā‘, al-Qāḍî Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī’s method in al-Ta‘līḳa will be examined.Summary: Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī is considered to be one of the most important representatives of the Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School. In addition to receiving fiqh education from al-Qaffāl al-Marwazī, who is accepted as the founder of the Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School in Shāfiʿī fiqh circles. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn, one of the most distinguished students of al-Qaffāl al-Marwazī, has become one of the important bearers of the fiqh heritage of Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School. The fact that the epithet “el-kāḍî” is used in the works of Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School to absolutely refer to al-Qāḍî Ḥusayn, is another issue that shows his being authority on fiqh. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn al-Marwarrūdhī has accomplished many works in the field of fiqh. The most famous and most important work of al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn is the al-Ta‘lîḳa, written according to the Mukḫtaṣar arrangement style of al-Muzanī. He is often cited as the author of the well-known work al-Ta‘lîḳa in the sect. Al-Ta‘lîḳa, commonly cited in fiqh studies to refer to the views of al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn, is one of the first commentary on Mukḫtaṣar by Muzanī. With these characteristics, al-Ta‘lîḳa is one of the outstanding manuscripts for exploring the fiqh legacy of the Khurāsān Shāfi‘ī School. Another important feature of this text is that uṣūl al-fiqh issues such as ijtihād, taqlīd, ijmā‘ and view’s of the companions of the Prophet (qawl al-ṣaḥābah) have been covered in the introduction of the work. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn discusses the issues of evidentiality and types of ijmā‘ and ijmā‘ of ṣaḥābah in the chapter on ijmā‘ in al-Ta‘lîḳa. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn also handles the debates on view’s of the companions of the Prophet in the section on ijmā‘ of ṣaḥābah. It is also seen that the proofs proposed for evidentiality of ijmā since Shāfiʿī’s period became more versatile and differed. The fact that the arguments al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn cites in the chapter of the evidences of ijmā‘ were also mentioned by his contemporary, al-Māwardī, an Iraqi Shāfiʿī jurist, points out the accumulation of knowledge in terms of proofs of ijmā. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn makes two related distinctions that are fundamentally related to the types of ijmā. The first is the division between ijmā supporters, those who argue for knowability of ijmā, and their opponents. According to this, ijmā is divided into two parts as ‘āmm (general public) ijmā‘ and khāṣṣ (scholars) ijmā‘. Opposition to ‘āmm ijmā‘, such as fardhs (obligations) in prayer, rawātib sunnah (the practice that the Prophet regularly performed) and feast prayer requires kufr (blasphemy). Al-Qāḍî Ḥusayn, who considers issues such as ‘awl (a sharing method in Islamic inheritance law), mut‘a marriage (a type of temporary marriage) and riba’l-faḍl (interest in exchange or sale transactions) which are seen as controversial ijmā‘ issues in literature, as khāṣṣ ijmā‘ and evaluates opposition to this type of ijmā‘ as fisq (impiety). The second division al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn makes is between ijmā‘ based on the text and apparent comparison, and the ijmā‘ based on hidden comparison. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn thinks that the opposition to ijmā‘ that is based on ijtihād or the text in terms of sanad (chain of narrators), requires blasphemy. In a sense, this is to accept ijmā‘ as a provision on an equal basis and to reduce the distinctions of ijmā‘ to literary level. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn also discusses evidentiality of qawl al-ṣaḥābah in connection with the issues of ijmā‘. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn opposes the thesis that ijmā‘ is only limited to companions’ era and argues that it can be realized in any century after the Prophet. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn, who discusses ṣaḥābah’s ijmā‘ under two categories: the views of ṣaḥābah that have gained prevalence among other ṣaḥābahs and those that have not gained prevalence among other companions, argues for evidentiality of qawl al-ṣaḥābah, which have gained prevalence and known not to be opposed. He provides significant information on ijmā‘ discussion in Shāfi‘ī fiqh methods with regard to the evidentiality of this type of qawl al-ṣaḥābah, which is referred ijmā‘ al-suqūtī (consensus based on lack of opposition-silence). The knowledge al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn cites with regard to the evidentiality of qawl al-ṣaḥābah which have not gained prevalence among other ṣaḥābahs differs from Māwardī, one of his contemporary, and his predecessors. The fact that he cites Shāfi‘ī’s previous and latest views with regard to the state of such qawl al-ṣaḥābah in the face of qiyās (legal analogy) enables him to make comparison using uṣūl material available in his era. Al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn, who mentions debatable issues among ṣaḥābah, makes controversial narrations. While al-Qāḍī Ḥusayn reports that there is not any conflict on the argument that it is legitimate to express a third view with regard to issues on which ṣaḥābah is divided in two groups and fall into conflict, his contemporary al-Māwardī and other Shāfi‘ī jurists report that it is not legitimate to propose a third view on such an issue as there is ijmā‘ on these issues. (shrink)

The younger brother of the famous Ashʿarī theologician and Shāfiʿī jurist Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Aḥmad al-Ghazālī was a Ṣūfī shaykh who lived and preached in the Saljuq state and, in some cases, possibly influenced its fortunes. Owing to his best known and probably most important work, the Sawāniḥ, he is treated in the Persian Ṣūfī tradition as one of the principal representatives of the so-called "School of Love". However, he remained virtually unknown in the West, outside the narrow circle of (...) experts on Persian Ṣūfism, until the publication of Nasrollah Pourjavady's English translation of the Sawāniḥ in 1986. The aforementioned translation, which... (shrink)

Ḥanafī jurist Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī is one of the most prominent names in the history of the ʿilm al-naẓar’ (Islamic Disputation Theory) particularly due to his seminal work entitled al-Fuṣūl. We have located a manuscript which we will call an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl written by a Shāfiʿī scholar. This manuscript is titled al-Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar and it highlights the importance of al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl. The scribe of the manuscript attributes this Opponent-al-Fuṣūl to the famous logician Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī. Although no mention (...) of such a book belonging to al-Kātibī has been discovered thus far, in this article we will try to demonstrate that the book does indeed belong to him. In addition, we will undertake a comparison of both works, al-Fuṣūl and the Opponent-al-Fuṣūl, with a particular focus on the concepts of talāzum (implication), tanāfī (incompatibility) and dawarān (concomitance). A critical edition of the Opponent-al-Fuṣūl is appended to the article. (shrink)

Abrogation (naskh) is one of the controversial themes of Islamic studies, especially in later period that of principle of exegesis (uṣūl al-tafsīr). However, the recent studies on abrogation (naskh) do not offer a comprehensive analysis on the concept. In fact, the problem of naskh (abrogation) is in need of a systematic and holistic approach, which would only be possible with a detailed study on how the concept of abrogation (naskh) is understood in Islamic interpretive tradition (tafsīr). With this purpose in (...) mind, this article intends to examine two points regarding the term abrogation: first, the article will offer a analytical reflection on the diverse views of naskh, and then it will highlight how Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) understood and applied this term to his hermeneutical framework. By doing so, the present study aims to show Ibn Kathīr’s position in Islamic interpretive tradition on the matter of naskh. The key conclusion of this study is that although Ibn Kathīr is one of the representatives of the traditional riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) exegesis, he advances his interpretive hermeneutics with multiple aspects that also involves dirayah (personal opinion) exegesis (tafsīr). SUMMARY The problem of naskh (abrogation) is one of the most important and controversial themes of science and principle of exegesis (ʿilm wan a-l uṣūl al-tafsīr) in Islamic tradition. In order to understand naskh, which is claimed to be occurred in the Qur’ānic text, it is necessary to involve the time of the revelation of the Qur’ān. An analysis of this period reveals that first Muslims regard the naskh as a natural process of the revelation and do not dispute over this matter. In other words, the controversial theme naskh is perceived by first addresses of the Qur’ān as a hermeneutical characteristic of the Qur’ānic revelation. Therefore, naskh was not considered as a controversial concept and debated its origins based on the question whether it organically belonged to the revelation. It will be clear that the different views on naskh (abrogation), particularly after the time of the Companions is not a conceptual problem; rather Muslim scholars differed in their methodological approaches to naksh. Naskh has not been questioned as a concept in early Islamic tradition. Rather it has gradually developed over the centuries. Naskh has been elaborated with the terms of uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Law), such as takhṣīṣ (specification) and taqyīd (restriction) and its conceptual meaning has been extended after, particularly Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad b. Idris b. ʿAbbas al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820). To sum up, naskh is regarded with a methodological perspective. However, in the field of Turkish Islamic studies, especially after the Cumhuriyet, the term naskh is not regarded as a natural consequence of the process of tanzīl (revelation of the Qur’ān) neglecting the gradual aspect of revelation and the disputes over the term has been concluded either rejecting or simply accepting this concept without providing a satisfactory result on the matter. This article examines one of the most prominent Muslim exegete Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 1373) approach to the problem of naskh in the context of previous modern scholarship on naskh (abrogation). However, the analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh does not claim to be exhaustive on the matter. This requires a more comprehensive study on the concept of naskh, which is clearly beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, the present study intends to specifically focus on general aspect of Ibn Kathīr’s understanding of naskh and how his perception is presented in modern studies. When Ibn Kathīr’s commentary is analysed, it becomes clear that his understanding of naskh is significant and not necessarily in line with his riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) tafsīr (exegesis). For example, he notes the dates between abrogating and abrogated Qur’ānic verses and claims that it is necessary to find certain proofs to validate the claim of abrogation (naskh) for particular legal judgments and verses, which clearly shows that Ibn Kathīr approaches to the problem of naskh with a methodological perspective. Ibn Kathīr’s interpretation of the well known Qur’ānic verse Q 2.106 in a different sense and most importantly his consideration of the matter only in the Qur’ānic context are clear examples of his methodological approach. His interpretation of Q 2.106 simply shows that he meticulously distinguish between the acceptance of naskh as a concept and as an interpretive method. The modern studies on naskh, on the contrary, consider the matter only on the base of a conceptual analysis. Ibn Kathīr prefers to transmit the traditional opinions based on personal interpretation and interprets some Qur’ānic verses. This is clearly his method of re-interpretation based on rational thinking (taʾwīl). His way of rational reasoning leads Ibn Kathīr to the rejection of naskh (abrogation) and the restriction of Qur’ānic verses that are related to the theory of abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh-mansūkh). This clearly proves that Ibn Kathīr does not merely adopts and employs the method of riwayah, which is contrary to the supposition that he is the exegete of a commentary that heavily draws on hadith reports and transmitted traditional reports. In fact, this most importantly shows that Ibn Kathīr’s Qur’ān commentary can also be regarded as a dirayah (personal opinion) tafsīr (exegesis) and that there are enough material in traditional Muslim Qur’ānic exegesis to re-analyse the problem of naskh (abrogation). Relying on this last point, this article argues that a comprehensive analysis of naskh requires a research on the traditional interpretive sources. Therefore, it might be helpful to reconsider the matter of naskh with its conceptual background in the works of traditional Muslim exegetes rather than focusing only on whether the concept naskh exits or not in the origins of the Qur’ānic revelation. At this point, an analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh and his rational reasoning that is employed in his commentary will contribute to the understanding of the theory of naskh (abrogation) in the tradition of Qur’ānic exegesis. (shrink)

It is well-known that Ibn al-Salāh al-Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245) has an important place in the field of hadith methodology. In this context, it is possible to see Ibn-al Salah’s influence in a large proportion of the hadith terminology. The fact that the term ḥasan was not substantially included in the hadith method studies before Ibn-al Salah and that this concept became widely known in the field after him led to study the contributions of al Salah on the subject of ḥasan (...) hadith and in this regard, his effect on the term ḥasan. As result it was found that authorities such as Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848-49), Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855) used the concept of ḥasan in various meanings before al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) who, according to general acceptance, made the term ḥasan famous for its terminological use. However, it is possible to say that ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī was the first to use the terminological meaning of the concept ḥasan. Actually, the fact that Shafii’ used the term ḥasan isnād for an authentic hadith that al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim b. Ḥajjāj (d. 261/875) would later unanimously narrate, and Ahmad b. Hanbal used ḥasan as gharib, is evidence for the unsystematic use of the term in the early periods. Even though, thanks to al-Tirmidhī, an important place was opened for the concept in riwāya literature, there was no serious mention of the term in later hadith methodology. Therefore, it has been seen that hadith scholars considered the term ḥasan within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ or ḍaʻīf hadith, since they accepted the term as an intermediate concept, and for this reason they did not include the term ḥasan among the subjects of hadith methodology until Ibn al-Salāh. An examination of the argument, that one can act upon a ḍaʻīf hadith, would show that ḥasan hadith might have been interpreted within the scope of ḍaʻīf hadith. On the other hand, the fact that some scholars such as Mughulṭāy b. Qilīj (d. 762/1361) state that a hadith would be called ṣaḥīḥ if it is maqbūl with any presumption, and that there is no point in calling such a hadith ḥasan shows that the ḥasan hadith is considered within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ hadith. The fact that hadith methodology scholars did not mention ḥasan hadith before Ibn al-Salāh stems from the ambiguity of the subject. Contrary to his predecessors, Ibn al-Salāh tried to save the term ḥasan from its ambiguity by combining the different specifications put forward by al-Tirmidhī, al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998), and Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201). The specifications and interpretations of the term presented by Ibn al-Salāh via his meticulous efforts, have also been adopted by his successors. The term ḥasan hadith has gained an important place in the literature of hadith methodology thanks to the views and definitions built on the descriptions and interpretations of Ibn al-Salāh. In this context, while there are those who agree with Ibn al-Salāh’s descriptions and evaluations of the term, there are also those who criticize his remarks on the subject. However, it has been seen that those who criticize Ibn al-Salāh, along with those who follow him, criticized him by following the path drawn by Ibn al-Salāh. Based on this and similar situations, it was concluded that not only the descriptions and comments that Ibn al-Salāh made, but also his style and methods of handling the subject gave direction to the studies on hadith methodology. In addition, it has been observed that the most compact description of the term ḥasan is put forward by Ibn Hajar and today’s studies are predicated on his description. Within this framework, after emphasizing that there are four degrees of maqbūl hadiths, Ibn Hajar defined the two fields, which were covered by two different descriptions of Ibn al-Salāh, as ḥasan li-zatih and lighairih by Ibn al-Ḥajar. (d. 852/1449) By doing so Ibn al-Ḥajar gave the final shape to the ḥasan hadith terms. He also captured the fundamental point where ḥasan hadith differs from the ṣaḥīḥ hadith because the basic point in question, which was not directly stated before, is a slight flaw in the narrator’s grip. At the end of the study, it was concluded that -as al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) also stated- it does not seem possible to determine a comprehensive rule that gathers ḥasan hadiths under a single description. Considering the historical context of the term ḥasan, it has been observed that the most effective description of the ḥasan hadith are the terms ḥasan li-zatih and ḥasan lighairih, which were put forward by Ibn Hajar by transforming the dual division mentioned by Ibn al-Salāh into a more understandable form. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has emphasized the contributions of the great Maliki jurist Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī to Islamic legal thought. However, al-Qarāfī’s compilation of legal maxims and distinctions, al-Furūq, has not yet been studied, nor has the collection of his teacher, the prominent Shafiʿi jurist Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, known as al-Qawāʿid al-kubrā. Furthermore, the original thought of Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām and his formative influence on al-Qarāfī have been understated. This article compares their two works to demonstrate that al-Qarāfī based his collection in (...) large part on Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s al-Qawāʿid and it examines the techniques that al-Qarāfī used, which included reordering, refining, and supplementing borrowed maxims, and anonymizing references to his teacher. Most salient, however, is al-Qarāfī’s “Malikization” of maxims, which entailed replacing Shafiʿi doctrines and authorities with their Maliki counterparts and deploying maxims to defend Maliki doctrines. The article concludes by explaining al-Qarāfī’s authorial choices in light of his Maliki affiliation and the politics between the legal schools in Mamluk Cairo. (shrink)

Ḥanafī jurist Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī is one of the most prominent names in the history of the ʿilm al-naẓar’ particularly due to his seminal work entitled al-Fuṣūl. We have located a manuscript which we will call an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl written by a Shāfiʿī scholar. This manuscript is titled al-Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar and it highlights the importance of al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl. The scribe of the manuscript attributes this Opponent-al-Fuṣūl to the famous logician Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī. Although no mention of such a (...) book belonging to al-Kātibī has been discovered thus far, in this article we will try to demonstrate that the book does indeed belong to him. In addition, we will undertake a comparison of both works, al-Fuṣūl and the Opponent-al-Fuṣūl, with a particular focus on the concepts of talāzum, tanāfī and dawarān. A critical edition of the Opponent-al-Fuṣūl is appended to the article. (shrink)

Nawawî, who is a competent scholar achieving many successes in a short life span of forty-five years, has made a name for himself not only in the field of Islamic law (fiqh), but also in the area of other Islamic sciences. His works, investigations and opinions have been fiducially accepted by later scholars. Nawawî, who is his views are appreciated in the Islamic world, wrote nearly fifty works on hadith, fiqh, methodology (usûl), language, biography (tabaqât), and other fields. Nawawî, who (...) is one of the important representatives of the Shafi'i sect, has gained an important position in Islamic law with his works, although he was particularly interested in this sect. The work called “al-Usûl wa ad-Dawâbit”, which we have translated and evaluated, is about usûl and qawâid, as you can understand from it’s name. In this work, Nawawî mentioned nine issues related to fiqh rules, method and point, which are important for the student of science, and explained the rules of fiqh based on these problems. The purpose of Nawawî's writing this work is not to compose a work on fiqh’s rules, all science students will need. In this study, Nawawî's aforementioned article has been translated, the concepts in the text have been introduced, and the sealed and incomprehensible issues have been clarified. In addition, a scientific evaluation has been done on the subjects it contains. (shrink)

There are two widely accepted definitions of ilm al-tafsīr in the hāshiyahs on Anwār al-Tanzīl. The most accepted ones are as follows: Tafsīr is the science that investigates the states of the word of Allah in terms of signifying the will of Allah. This definition mainly belongs to al-Taftāzānī in his hāshiyah on al-Kashshāf. Despite the objections directed to it, the definition was accepted in the later phases and there were not any detailed discussions on it. From this point of (...) view, it can be concluded that there is a common tafsīr definition in Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs due to the fact that the majority concurred with this definition. The prevalence of this definition is also out of the question for al-Kashshāf hāshiyahs. Its prevalence in the following literature may be attributed to its implementation in accordance with the definition requirements. Because in the definitions made based on the subject, the subject is regarded as genus, and how this subject is addressed is also considered as a difference (fasl). Accordingly, in the above definition, the subject of the tafsīr is explained as the states of Kalam, and the direction in which it is addressed is expressed in terms of the will of Allah. Thus, the subject of tafsīr and its research direction were explained and its difference from other sciences researching the Qur’ān was also stated. According to the second most widespread definition in the hāshiyahs, tafsīr is a science in which the meanings of the Kalam of Allah are known in terms of human capacity/capability. This definition is more or less a description (rasm) compared to the previous one. Hence, it is a looser definition. For this reason, the definition does not allow tafsīr to be separated from other sciences. Because, the meanings of words in the Qur’ān, language sciences and religious sciences are also explored. However, in the other definition, the difference of tafsīr was taken into consideration by including the directional record and the will/intent expression more quickly. On the other hand, the second definition has a limitation of being based on human capacity/capability that reveals some features of the tafsīr more clearly. This limitation expresses that the research in tafsīr is based on suppositional data in one way and continuity in another. Both definitions in the hāshiyahs show that there are clear and common definitions of ilm al-tafsīr between the hijri 9th and 12th centuries. It is stated that with a few exceptions, in almost all of the hāshiyahs, the ilm al-tafsīr is divided into two parts as tafsīr and ta’wīl. The tafsīr here is based on narrative, and ta’wīl is based on reason. Explanation of both of them in this way can be seen in al-Kashshāf. Accordingly, it is understood that both concepts become evident in al-Kashshāf and Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs. However, when we look at some tafsīr introductions, and literature of ulūm al-Qur’ān, it is observed that vastly different explanations have been made about them. This gives the impression that there is no clear and widespread acceptance of them. However, by explaining as mentioned, their meaning becomes clear in the next literature. Because this explanation about them is essentially a statement that al-Māturīdī conveyed from his predecessors. Accordingly, an explanation about both concepts that was conveyed from the early period has gained acceptance and became widespread especially in the sharhs-hāshiyahs for the following process. Since al-Baydāwī associates both concepts with muhkam and mutashābih, the commentators also explained this relationship. They contain the definitions of the muhkam and mutashābih, which al-Baydāwī made in accordance with Shāfi‘ī method. Accordingly, muhkam are the ones that is clear in terms of what is meant, and do not need further explanation. Examples of muhkam are verses about shari‘a 'orders, inheritance distribution, transactions, and marriage issues. The provisions on these issues should be based on narrative, not reason. Thus, the explanation of muhkam becomes tafsīr. The mutashābih is interpreted since the meaning is not clear. In this case, their interpretation is also ta’wīl. The religious sciences that tafsīr benefits from are explained as being hadith, fiqh, theology, mysticism, and usūl al-fiqh, and this case expresses a general opinion. Literary sciences required for tafsīr are also described as glossary, derivation, morphology, grammar, bayān, ma‘ānī, and badī‘. However, there are two opinions about the knowledge of disciplines such as prosody, rhyme, qard al-shi‘r, khat, and inshā. According to one opinion, since these sciences are not related to the Qur’ān, it is not necessary to know them in order to interpret them. According to the other one, for a competent interpretation activity, these sciences must be known, and their data are thought to contribute to tafsīr. (shrink)

Islamic family law plays a significant role in minimizing the unpleasant effects of the family break up faced by the divorced women and their children by protecting their rights to financial support after divorce. This study undertakes to discuss the historical development of the financial rights after divorce applicable among the Muslims in the pre and post colonial periods, particularly with reference to the iddah maintenance, mut’ah, arrears of maintenance, and child maintenance. The study indicates that despite the provisions were (...) inconformity with the Islamic principles, the applications were restricted and influenced by the Shafi’i madhhab. However, the amount of iddah maintenance and mut’ah were substantial taking into account the standard of living of the Malay society in the 15th and 16th century. This means that the welfare of the divorced women was taken care of since the codification of the Islamic law and its implementation in the Malay society. (shrink)

Logic was revered in the thirteenth century, perhaps more highly than it has been revered before or since. In the Muslim East, logic was an integral part of the syllabus of schools and found to be especially helpful for legal studies. It was at this time that The Canons of Logic was composed by Najm al-Din al-Katibi, a scholar of the Shafi'i school of law. The Rules of Logic is the most widely read introduction to logic in the Arabic-speaking world. (...) It has probably enjoyed a longer shelf-life than any other logic textbook ever written, having been in use by madrasa students from the early fourteenth century up until the present day. Building on the theories of Avicenna, al-Razi, and other pioneers of logic, al-Katibi discusses the many pitfalls of building arguments and setting out unambiguous claims in natural language. The enduring nature of the text is a testament to al-Katibi and his impact on concepts of formal discourse and argument. This new translation of The Canons of Logic provides new life to an influential text that has shaped the work of scholars of logic for centuries. (shrink)

Once upon a time, a scholar, ascetic and relig-ious man named Abu Hamid Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Shafi'i al-Ghazali (AI-Ghazali, 1058-11 II) wrote a worl, called The Incoherence qf the Philosophers, 1\ clever philosopher, Abu AI-\Valid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Hushd (Averroes, 112li-1 ID8), responded to this by writing The IlIcolurence (!l the Inroherence. In IVhat is Art;;, Tolstoy refers to the importance of art in order to ridicule itl He notes the attention paid to art, music, theatre, filrn, (...) and books in the press. IIe notes the in\'(~stment of gm'ernments in the support of museums, theatres and the like. He notes the time spent by artists and perlilrmers in learning- their craft. He presents the most sardonic description of an opera rehearsal you will ever read. He describes the eHilrt and money poured into art as "stupefying", "repulsive", "a gigantic absurdity", and "utterly incomprehensible".~ I-Imv can art be so important that a peasant should have to sell his only cow to pay the taxes that maintain the artist-producer in grand luxury~. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) was one of the prominent figures of Khorasan Shafiʻīsm and a jurist among the Aṣḥāb al-Wujūh. He received education in Irāq from important scholars in the fields of theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and hadīth. After returning to Nishabur, he taught at a madrasa built in his name. He trained students such as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38), Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (d. 450/1058), Abu al-Qāsim al-Isqāf al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 452/1060), Abu al-Rabīʿ Ilākī (...) (d. 465/1073), and Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), who later influenced the course of Shāfiʿīsm. He authored works as an important hadith scholar and Ashʿarī theologian. Although most of these works have not survived to the present day, we learn about his views through excerpts from them. He held views, reflected in the prin-ciples of jurisprudence, that led to criticism for being influenced by the Muʿtazila. Despite being a theologian, his adoption of the jurists' method in jurisprudence further emphasizes the importance of his views. The aim of this study is to reveal Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī's thoughts on the principles of jurisprudence, specifically in the areas of hadīth, consensus (ijmā), indepen-dent reasoning (ijtihād), and imitation (taqlīd), and to identify their reflecti-ons on the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence. Since there is no specific study on Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s thoughts on jurisprudence in our country, we beli-eve that this research will contribute to future studies on his legal scholarship. (shrink)

The absence of one single religious authority for the whole Muslim community in Britain results in the emergence of various religious authorities due to ethnic and sectarian differences. Muslim communities in Britain have generally been ghettoized around ethnic and sectarian identities, and thus establishing mosque and religious authority accordingly. This paper investigates what the sources of religious authority for British born young Sunnī Muslims are. The data was gathered via an ethnographic research made in Leeds, one of the most cosmopolitan (...) cities of Britain, interviewing young Sunnī British Muslims who are between 18 and 30 years old. The main aim of this study is to reflect on how and where these young Muslims get religious advice for their daily religious lives. This paper presents the preferences of the informants in seeking religious authority in the context of Britain. It is particularly significant to discover the orientation of British born Muslims from that aspect. Based on the preferences of young Sunnī Muslims in searching religious authority in Leeds, this paper initially introduces four mosque imāms, who lie at the centre of religious authority for ordinary Muslims. By dealing with them, I expose the role of mosque imāms in the life of Sunnī Muslims in Britain. The types of the questions raised by the mosque attendees and their methods in approaching the imāms are reported while each imām’s profile is examined. Then, I focus on two famous figures who issue religious rulings and have a special importance in the religious lives of Muslims in Leeds. Finally, the Internet is examined as a virtual platform in seeking religious authority for ordinary Muslims living in Britain. Thus, this study offers two main results: From different sectarian orientations, such as Deobandī, Barēlwī and Jamāʿat-i Islāmī, they generally admit that following a school of law (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī) in current is essential for a lay person. Therefore, the tendency among them in seeking religious guidance initially starts from local mosque imāms, and then widened with more expert ʿulamāʾ repudiated across their ethnic and sectarian oriented communities. (shrink)

General utterances are described as words that express more than one singular at the same time in terms of the meaning they contain. Schools have adopted different approaches about the value of showing these singulars that general utterances contain. Accordingly, while Hanafi scholars accepted that the indication of general utterances was certain, the majority of scholars claimed that the indication of these general utterances implied suspicion. This difference of opinion about the indicator of general utterances was not limited to the (...) theoretical field and became a source for the provisions in different fields. While Shafi'i scholars argue that the indication of general utterances is not certain, they have argued that the general addresses are addressed to the addressees in the period of revelation, and that these addresses do not cover all the people who will come until the Day of Judgment. Today, some academics who defend historicity get involved in the discussion at this point and present these arguments as reference sources of historicity. In the same way, they argue that scholars who claim that the indication of the general utterances is not certain have put forward some views that lead to historicity. In this study, this claim is discussed, and the historical reference value of the arguments put forward at the point of the indicator of general utterances is examined. (shrink)

I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories "Islam, Iman," and "Ihsan" are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that "shari'a" refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding of "shari'a" as simply Islamic "law," and an alternative understanding of "usul al-fiqh" as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of (...) reason in Islamic moral epistemology via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī. (shrink)

The ijtihâd issues are among important problems of uṣûl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). Given al-beyân el-ijtihâd in the meaning of interpreting naṣṣ (text) and al-qiyâs el-jtihâd in the meaning of reaching a verdict of a new issue which is not determined by naṣṣ, it is possible to say that mujtahid (a jurist) is actively in the ijtihâd activity. Thus, the ijtihâd issues has been discussed in uṣûl al-fiqh since early period. The fact that Shâfi‘î refers to ijtihâd issues in his (...) works which have arrived the present day shows that there is a rich accumulation of knowledge about ijtihâd discussions in early period. After Shâfi‘î, the issues were discussed by scholars of Islamic legal theory. Among the Shâfi‘î (uṣûl al-fiqh) works which have arrived the present day, the first work that deals with ijtihâd issues in an ordered, systematic and detailed way is the work of al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr. In this study, al-Mâwerdî discusses many issues in uṣûl al-fiqh, especially the definition of ijtihâd, its types, the relation between ijtihad and qıyâs, the qualities of mujtahid, iṣâbet (right) and ḫaṭâ’ (fault) in ijtihâd and the provision of ijtihâd. The debates on the ijtihâd issues in Shâfi‘î uṣûl al-fiqh before al-Mâverdî are important our subject. al-Mâwerdî’s view of uṣûl has a close relationship with the accumulation of uṣûl developed prior to him. al-Mâwerdî mentions the views of many scholars who have contributed the accumulation of the sect in the ijtihad issues, especially Shâfi‘î. He refers to the views of scholars from sects other than Shâfi‘î in the issues he discussed. From this point of view, it is certain that to determine the ijtihâd issues in al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr will also help us to determine the framework and course of debates on ijtihâd in the classical period. (shrink)

Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jāʿiz) for the origins (aṣl) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalties). Shāfiʿī jurists, Imam al-Shāfiʿī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. Nevertheless, (...) Shāfiʿī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (istiḥsān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ʿilla (taʿlil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of taʿlil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiyās’ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ḥadd consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiyās. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas.Summary: As a general principle, devoting (taʿabbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and reasoning (taʿaqqul/taʿlīl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma’dul bih ‘anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is taʿaqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfiʿī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiyās. Al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describe that Hanafī jurists’ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: istiḥsān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd. However, Hanafī jurists defend that they are not in a contradiction, and indeed they do not apply qiyās in kaffarah and ḥadd and derive their illations mostly from textual implications (dalālah) that are mostly out of qiyās format such as tanqīh al-maʿnā (isolating ʿilla), istidlāl, and dalālah al-naṣṣ (inferred meaning). As understood from the relevant arguments, applying qiyās in these areas is directly associated with the issue of potentiality for “the analogy in reason.” The type of qiyās that Hanafī jurists consider illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd is the analogical actions made for the reasons. One of the most rationalist representatives of Shāfiʿī uṣūl, al-Juwaynī pronounces that the method to determine ʿilla (cause) is fundamentally the suitability (munāsaba) that can be defined as “rational compatibility.” In his opinion, the ratiocination (taʿlīl) is based on this suitability. According to him, the indications of qiyās will be clear or it becomes practicable even in the presence of low-level, implicit suitability. Al-Juwaynī considers that it is licit to apply the analogy for the kaffarah and ḥadd as well as the non-qiyās foundations, including ruhsat and muqaddarāt or taqdīrat, whether direct or explicit (i.e. the meaning of analogy: qiyās al-maʿnā) or indirect or implicit (i.e. the commonality of analogy: qiyās al-shabah). In this context, one of Juwayni’s concern is “the matter of inherence in textual sources such as naṣṣ or the Qur’ān and the Sunna),” corresponding to the area where the judgment is based on a specific reason by naṣṣ. For him, a number of reasonable meanings can be inferred in these areas when it is critiqued independent of the uttered words. But the inherence mentioned in the texts of naṣṣ, indicates to avoid the use of analogy for making a judgment. Al-Juwaynī asserts that some fractional elaborate or detailed meanings cannot be obtained for physical prayers and only a set of universal meanings can be imagined. He defines that it is permissible to compare the reasons of physical worshipping with each other when any suitable meaning is present. He considers that for the permissibility of qiyās in ruhsat, it is adequate to find a meaning suitable for the judgment, and besides, the commonality of analogy (qiyās al-shabah) is applicable in the area of muqaddarāt or taqdīrat. Nevertheless, a patient’s condition is similar to that of a traveller in terms of ruhsat for not fasting (ṣavm). In al-Juwaynī’s way of thinking, patients should act like travellers for ruhsat to shorten (qaṣr) the prayers (ṣalāh) due to “requiring” as a proper meaning. However, as mentioned by al-Juwaynī, there is a consensus (ʿijmā or ittifāq) on the fact that a patient cannot shorten his or her prayers. Due to this impediment, it is understood that the rule of shortening their prayers (ṣalāh) is permissible for travellers but not for patients (manʿ al-ʿijmā’).In criminal cases, the right of oath before the court is belonging to the defendant, whereas to the claimant in kasāme, an oath method in unidentified murders. Taking an oath from the claimant is merely inherent to the kasāme application. Al-Juwaynī states that this inherence is known by the principle of being inherent to each circumstance (iḥtisās bi-l hāl), and with this aspect, kasāme is a closed area for qiyās. According to al-Juwaynī, contracts are suitable for qiyās because they have conditions such as offers and agreements explicitly stating the quality and quantity, and mutual assent. He describes that these are the reasons unavailable for qiyās with respect to their characteristics. With this, the contracts are among the reasonable sources in one respect and the unreasonable in another respect. Consequently, al-Juwaynī suggests that the analogy loses its functionality or validity in a limited number of the closed areas for qiyās, which are the static devotional judgments (taʿabbud) having no proper meaning, direct or indirect, or explicit or implicit; the areas where the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the naṣṣ (ihtisās bi-l-nass) (as in the example that sacrificing a female goat at the age of less than one year is a specific judgment for Burde b. Niyār). The point leads to the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the principle of ihtisās bi-hāl; and banned ʿijmā issues (as in the example of ʿijmā that it is agreed on the fact that patients cannot shorten (qaṣr) their prayers (ṣalāh), unlike travellers. Al-Juwaynī sees the application of qiyās as licit based on the availability of suitable meaning in all areas except for the above-mentioned issues. That he minimizes the closed areas for qiyās and widely expands the functionality of analogy is the reflections of the value that he gives to qiyās. (shrink)

Aḥmad al-Chārpardī (d. 746/1346), Shāfi‘ī jurist, was one of the scholars of the period of mutakkhkhirīn. He dedicated his life to teaching students and composing works, settling in Tabriz where he remained for the rest of his life. Recognised as one of the most distinguished students of al-Qāḍī Batḍāwī (d. 685/1286), al-Chārpardī wrote a commentary on al-Bayḍāwī’s concise work on uṣūl al-fiqh entitled Minhāj al-wuṣūl, which he called al-Sirāj al-wahhāj. One of the fundamental characteristics of uṣūl al-fiqh of the mutaakhkhrīn (...) period is the structuring of issues and evidence using the terminology of theology, logic, dialectics and disputation. Based on the systematic approach of al-Bayḍāwī’s work and the understanding of uṣūl al-fiqh of his time, al-Chārpardī discusses the issues and evidence that al-Bayḍawī succinctly addressed. The aim of the study is to determine Chārpardī’s methodology in jurisprudential thought, the scholars who influenced him, and the method he employed in jurisprudential debates by focusing on the evidence that falls outside the unanimously agreed upon evidence, which includes the Qur’ān, Sunna, ijmā‘, qiyās and is subject to debate as to its validity. The limited number of studies on al-Chārpardī in Türkiye, such as those found in the TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi and the İslam Düşünce Atlası, this study is seen as contributing to an increase in research focusing on Chārpardī’s jurisprudential thought. (shrink)

Hadiths that have been discussed in this paper consist of narrations regarding divine attributes and having some problematic meanings between supporters of Bişr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī. These narrations were mostly accepted denounced (munkar) by Bişr al-Marīsī and his sopporters due to having an anthropormophist and corporealist content about God. They rejected divine attributes according to their understanding of God based on incomparability (tanzīh) which provided by Mutazilite approach towards divine attributes even though they conveyed some features of Ahl al-Ra’y. (...) They found contradicted of attributing human features to God based on their tanzīh understanding, therefore, they interpreted such this kind of narra-tions in terms of their approach or rejected at all. At the other hand, a hard Hadith scholar Uth-man al-Darimi believed that one should accept divine attributes as they are in the Qur’an and Sunna. According to his belief, he considered the explicit meanings of the narrations without interpretation of divine attributes, and based on his perpective he denied Bişr al-Marīsī and his supporters’ interpretations claiming they would cause divesting God of all attributes (ta‘tīl). He argues that these narrations should be taken into considerations based on their explicit mea-nings. The discussions on these hadiths are important due to showing different approaches of scholars from the schools of Ahl al-Ra’y and the ones from Ahl al-Hadith towards the hadith du-ring the period when the main Hadith works were collected. Discussions on the narrations stu-died in this paper reveal two schools’ understandings of divine issues, their approaches to divi-ne attributes, as well inform us their perspectives of hadith in general.Summary: The present paper examines the debates between ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894) and the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) on the divine attributes mentioned in some hadiths in the period when the main hadith books were composed (i.e., III/IXth century). These debates that took place between the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra’y concern the un-derstanding and interpretation of the hadiths in a certain way.It could be stated that the debates focus on how the hadiths should be understood, or whether it is the explicit meaning of the words or the possible methaphorical meanings beyond them that should be considered.It is worth briefly introducing the parties who discussed the hadiths studied here. The aforementioned discussions about some hadith narrations are between the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, one of the important figures of the Ahl al-Hadith who wrote a separate work on these hadiths. This work was written as a rejection of the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and his two students on the attributes of God and some issues regarding hadith.Bishr al-Marīsī was regarded as an important scholar of Kalam who received fiqh education from Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798). He is a scholar of Ahl al-Ra’y who made scientific dis-cussions with many scholars including Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 204/820). He was on the council of the Caliph Al-Mamūn (d. 218/833) and had a significant role in the adoption of the idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān (khalq al-Qurʾān).Uthmān al-Dārimī,on the other hand, was a scholar of Ahl al-Hadith who learned ha-dith from the authorities of his era such as Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 237/851), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Having visited all the important cities for the training of hadith, he learned the hadiths and conveyed them.With the understanding of proving the divine attributes and the opposition of the misin-terpretation of the narratives related to them, the groups advocating the appropriation of these lines in accordance with the understanding of incomparability (tanzīh) have complied the works since the first period. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the rejection of the divine attributes by Mu'tazila was influential in the emergence of the criticism literature of the Ahl al-Hadith and many authors wrote works in this direction.Regarding a narration by Abū Hurayra, an opponent reports that this narration gives the impression that God has the eyes and ears as we know. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī reports that this hadith proves sight and hearing not the eyes and ear organs. He indicates that God has no like by no means. Therefore, it is slanderous to refer the claim that Allah is made of organs to the Ahl al-Hadith. Abū Dāwūd states that with this hadith the attributes of sight and hearing for God are proved and Jahmiyya’s denial of the divine attributes are rejected.The opponent also considered Abū Hurayra's narration referring to the Prophet: "Faith is from Yemen, wisdom is from Yemen! I feel the breath of your Lord from Yemen!" as denounced (munkar). Because, according to Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions, breath can only come from those with an abdominal cavity, and Allah is free from it. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the opponent misunderstood. What is meant here is the wind that blows from Yemen and comforts people. In the context of this narration, we see that supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī evaluate the narrative literally, while ʿUthmān al-Dārimī interpret the narrative.Regarding the narration, "You can not approach Allah with something more virtuous than what comes out of it (the Qur'ān)" Ibn al-Saljī reports that Mushabbiha understands this as one with an abdominal cavity and from whom speech comes out. This understanding is in-valid since God is "samad" in the sense that He has no void. With this hadith, it is meant that the Qur'ān comes out of Allah’s presence rather than Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the real aim of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny God's attribute of speech. There is no doubt that the Qur'ān comes from Him, and those who do not accept it merely deny His attribute of speech.Attributed to Ibn Abbas; The meaning of "yamīn Allah" (the right hand of Allah) in narration "Black Stone (al-ḥajar al-aswad) is the right hand of Allah on earth, handshakes with the people" is not the right hand that we know according to Ibn al-Saljī, it is blessing and grace of Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who acknowledges that Black Stone is not meant to be a hand, the purpose of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny the two hands mentioned in the verses and ha-diths about Allah with invalid interpretations.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who criticized that Ibn al-Saljī quoted from another narration which Ibn Abbās heard from the Prophet, says that such poor narrations should not be spread. In addition, he points out that Ibn al-Saljī's interpretation is ugly and he criticizes it. Because Allah who is mentioned in the narrative is depicted as a young man with curly hair in a green suit. Such a narration is also an untrustworthy narration as it contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who made this assessment of the narration, rejects the com-ments that the opponent made about the narration. According to the opponent, the phrase "I have come to Allah" means "to come into the presence of Allah in the Garden of Eden." Accor-ding to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī’s understanding, such complicated hadiths should not be only narra-ted.About the narration that are based on the Prophet and he does not know the answer to what he has come to know of himself, then he feels the coolness of his fingers as he puts his hand on his back and learns everything, the opponent evaluates the following: He was not Allah who came to the Prophet, but a well-behaved angel who was being directed by Allah and he was the angel who put his hand. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī rejects this interpretation of that oppo-nent. This comment is also contrary to other authentic hadiths. After he refused to the com-ment of the opponent about relevant narration, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī stated that he could not trust this comment on the basis of the authentic narrations he mentioned.Salaf scholars have preferred to be silent in this regard, as it is seen among the most difficult subjects to talk about divine attributes. However, subsequent generations have held dif-ferent paths in this regard. The basic approaches to understanding the divine attributes can be summarized in three main titles: tafwīd, tashbīh, and ta’wīl. Tafwīd is the path adopted by the early salaf scholars and means to leaving the knowledge about Allah’s entity and attributes to His knowledge. Tashbīh means to compare Allah to the created or the created to Allah. Ta'wīl is to interpret the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths that give the impression that Allah is like the crea-tures with semantics and rational deduction. The ones who deny the adjectives are called as Muʿattila and those who prove their attributes are called as Sifatiyya. According to Ahl al-Ra’y, it is necessary to appropriately make interpretation (ta'wīl) of the attributes giving the impression of anthropomorphism in terms of the dictionary. In the divine attributes, Muʿtazila advoca-ted the incomparability (tanzīh), whereas Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya adopted interpretation in accordance with incomparability. Mushabbiha and the Wahhābī-Salafī understanding has also taken the expressions regarding divine attributes with their explicit meanings.The debate between the scholars who lived in the ages II/VIII and III/IX, when the most important works are composed in the science of hadith, is important in that it is the first turn. In addition to this, the debate also contains important information on the approach to the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths, in that it shows two basic approaches, one of which represents the school of Ahl al-Ra’y, and the other represents the school of Ahl al-Hadith.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī generally advocates adhering to the explicit meaning of the narra-tion, while Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions criticize the narration labeling it as denied (mun-kar) or making an interpretation. On rare occasions, the places where ʿUthmān al-Dārimī re-jects the narration and makes interpretation, or where Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions de-fend the narrative can be seen.Interpretations made by Bishr al-Marīsī on the problematic narratives have influenced on the next scholars. Alongside Muʿtazilite scholars such as al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), his interpretations have been quoted by Sunni scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).The fact that the truth can be put forward in the science of hadith, which is based on the narration, does not favor one of the "narration" and "ra’y", it should be kept in mind that both of these depend on the proper and balanced use of both. To reveal the truth, the narration is in need of the opinion and the opinion (ra’y) is in need of the narration. Narration and opinion sho-uld be seen as complementary elements, not each other's opponents. (shrink)

Ibn al-Qāṣṣ (d. 335/946), one of the representatives of the Shāfiʿī school of law in the 4th/10th century, compiled a short treatise of extraordinary nature: Fawāʾid Ḥadīth Abī ʿUmeyr. In this work, he deduces sixty different wajhs (verdicts, comments) from a ḥadīth reporting the Prophet’s interest and affection to a child known as Abū ʿUmayr and his family during a visit he paid after Abū ʿUmayr’s birdie died by jokingly telling him in rhyme, “yā Abā ʿUmayr, mā faʿala al-nughayr” (O (...) Abū ʿUmayr, what happened to the nughayr?) This study deals with the primary goal of the composition of the Fawāʾid, its content, and structural qualities as well as the author’s approach in deducing verdicts. As one of the aṣḥāb al-wujūh, the author’s legal/madhhab notion and the literalist and external perspective he developed regarding the interpretation of texts, seems to have directly affected his deductive reasoning and determined his approach. This concise work not only sheds light over certain aspects of the relationship between ḥadīth and fiqh at the time of Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, but also exemplifies to what extent methodological tendencies and personal factors might affect the process of deriving verdicts from ḥadīth and could push the limits in that regard. Summary: Ibn al-Qāṣṣ (d. 335/946), one of the representatives of the Shāfiʿī school of law in the 4th/10th century, compiled a short treatise of extraordinary nature: Fawāʾid Ḥadīth Abī ʿUmeyr. In this work, he deduces sixty different wajhs (verdicts, comments) from a ḥadīth reporting the Prophet’s interest and affection to a child known as Abū ʿUmayr and his family during a visit he paid after Abū ʿUmayr’s birdie died by jokingly telling him in rhyme, “yā Abā ʿUmayr, mā faʿala al-nughayr” (O Abū ʿUmayr, what happened to the nughayr?) The report of Abū ʿUmayr, which is in the focus of the work, is, in essence, reflects a singular and special aspect of the close relationship between the Prophet and Anas b. Malik’s family. Nevertheless, it is surprising that many ḥadīth scholars from the early times, not only Ibn al-Qāṣṣ, have chosen this ḥadīth as an example in which they can demonstrate their skill in the field of fiqh al- ḥadīth. Fawāʾid seems to be a work in which the juridical point of view centered and resembles the classical fiqh commentaries in a sense. In the work, different variants of the Abū ʿUmayr report were brought together and evaluated within the framework of the text and textual possibilities as possible. The author also analyzed some words in the narrative text for being a base for a verdict, referred to Qurʾānic verses, prophetic ḥadīths, reports, and legal opinions, tried to solve the disputes and the conflicts among legal evidences in various ways, and stated occasionally his personal opinions. Fawāʾid reflects the author’s rich accumulation of legal knowledge, while at the same time gives an idea about his knowledge of ḥadīth and his approach to the ḥadīth. Considering what the author did and wanted to do, it is understood that he deals with ḥadīth as well as fiqh, and he has a certain level of relationship not only with fuqahāʾ (muslim jurisprudents), but also with ḥadīth scholars. Ibn al-Qāṣṣ’s interest in fiqh and ḥadīth must have lead him to take initiative to eliminate the tension between the ahl al-ḥadīth of Shāfiʿī school of law who focused on transmitting ḥadīths and the fuqahāʾ of Shāfiʿī school of law who care about the fiqh perspective, in that period of time. It can also be said that he tried to establish a reconciliation between the ahl al-ḥadīth (the traditionists) and the ahl al-raʾy (the rationalists) and bring the parties together in the middle way. The work seems to have been written as a result of such considerations. As Ibn al-Qāṣṣ was considered as one of the aṣḥāb al-wujūh, that is, as a jurist who was bound of a madhhab Imām for legal reasoning, he seems to have followed the methodology of Shāfiʿī school of law for deriving legal solutions from the sources. Legal notion of the author and his literalist and textualist perspective with regards to the interpretation of texts, seems to have directly affected his way of reasoning from the ḥadīth and determined his approach. This approach, as mentioned in many contemporary studies, is not sufficient and appropriate for the evaluation of ḥadīth texts, which were transmitted by meaning, not word-by-word, and shaped by the transmitter’s dispositions. It is also difficult to say that Ibn al-Qāṣṣ sufficiently considered the physical, historical, social, and cultural context surrounding the text as well as other extra-textual elements, which complete the meaning. This situation implies that some of the wajhs recorded in the work are the author’s attempt to find a base and evidence for his ideas, which he already had, rather than deductions drawn from the ḥadīth. It makes the scientific quality and accuracy of his efforts controversial. The verdicts presented in the work, as wajh and fāʾida are predominantly jurisprudential and compatible with the opinions of the Shāfiʿī School of law, however, there are also controversial ones, and the author pointed to them without revealing his own tendency. It does not seem that these wajhs in the work are systematically ranked. In this vein, similar wajhs are sometimes in succession, sometimes scattered, and some wajhs are repetitive. The degree of accuracy, clarity and quality of some wajhs also seem arguable. Zayn al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī (d. 806/1404), who made a general evaluation of these wajhs, said that: “Some of the (meanings of the) wajhs in the work are apparent, some of them are hidden and some are strained.” The work’s editor drew attention in the footnotes to the wajhs, which might be subject to objection. The early ḥadīth scholars, who reported this ḥadīth in their compilations, deduced six or seven judgments from the ḥadīth under the headings (bāb) specified for this ḥadīth. This appears quite modest in comparison to the treatise of Ibn al-Qāṣṣ. The given ḥadīth has also taken its place in the fiqh literature, and it has been questioned in the context of the issue of Madīna’s being of ḥarām region (holy land) and hunting ban in this region. In conclusion, Ibn al-Qāṣṣ’s treatise of Fawāʾid Ḥadīth Abī ʿUmayr, is a short but worthy example of the ḥadīth literature in terms of its purpose and interesting content. This work can be considered as a study that exemplifies how the purpose of writing can be determinative on the structure of a work, and in particular to what extent methodological tendencies and personal factors might affect the process of deriving verdicts from ḥadīth and could push the limits in that regard. The author’s universe of meaning, which focused on the apparent meaning and to draw as many judgments as possible from the text, should be related to his personal intention and purpose as well as to the fiqh perspective of his time. Due to the textual approach and the method for drawing inferences, which are observed in the work, the tool-purpose relationship between the text and the judgment sometimes remains obscure and sometimes becomes unimportant. In some respects, this work is a striking example of the consequences of ignoring the context and historical reality surrounding texts for specific purposes. (shrink)

This article aims at examining the limits of change in the field of worship through a study on the origins of the ḥukm[religious ruling] of Shawwāl fasting that is widely practiced in the different parts of Muslim world. The study, firstly, deals with the evolution of the ḥukm of Shawwāl fasting chronologically among four sunnī schools of law, then analyzes the solitary reports on the topic. It concludes that in Mālikīand Ḥanefīschools, the ḥukm of this specific worship changed within the (...) limits of karāha [reprehensibility], ibāha [permissibility], and nadb [recommendation]. This ḥukm was constructed based on solitary reports which later became a paradigmatic source of religious legitimacy in the Ḥanbalīschool beginning with the eponymous Imām and in the Shāfiʿīlong after the founding authorities. It also claims that it is strongly probable that the solitary reports on the topic go back to a deduced opinion in the age of companions, but then reached to a form of prophetic solitary report in the corpus of hadīth reports. Ultimately, this specific worship that has restricted number of fasting was established with the paradigmatic effect of the approach to solitary reports as the only authentic way of transmitting the sunna, even though it is at odds with the fact that this worship had not been implemented in the first two centuries after hijra, i.e. contrary to the established practice [ʿamal]. Summary: The issue of change of rulings in Islamic law comes up frequently on various occasions, and an increasing number of academic studies are trying to determine the characteristics and limits of this change in numerous books, articles and papers. These studies mostly seem to focus on bringing together the arguments that can be compiled under the title of ‘the flexibility of Islamic law in response to the challenges of modernity’. Although the change of rulings in Islamic law is an undeniable fact, reading it only from the lens of the change in Islamic law depending on the requirements of time is an inadequate reading. The change of rulings in Islamic law has different motives; and the change of time, more precisely the change of custom, is only one of them.On the other hand, another issue that comes up in relation to the change of rulings is the claim that this change can only take place in terms of the rulings regulating the interpersonal relations, i.e. muʿāmalāt. In fact, this claim relies on the abovementioned approach that limits the change in Islamic law with the change of custom. Hence, because other two main areas of Islamic law, worships (ʿibādāt) and punishments (ʿuqūbāt) are not open to change through custom, their rulings will not change at all. This article will try to reveal that the change in rulings might reside in a sort of another change emerged in relation to the sources of these rulings, which is a neglected point. Thus, by exposing that the field of worships which is mostly considered as a closed area for change in rulings is actually open to it, this article will examine the limits of this change.For this analysis, the article deals with the fasting of six days in the month of Shawwāl as an example, which is widely practiced in various parts of the Islamic world. The main evidence on which this fasting is based on is a report transmitted in the considerably authentic hadith sources of Ahl al-Sunnah, which reads as follows “Whoever fasts the Ramaḍān and adds six days from Shawwāl, will get reward of the entire year”. This fasting, which is the subject of a great agreement on its ruling as recommended (mustaḥāb) practice today, was actually regarded as reprehensible (makrūh) by the two great eponymous jurists of the first two schools of law in the second Hijrī century, namely Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa. In his al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,Mālik clearly expresses that he did not recognize any scholar who keeps this fast, and that no [authentic] report has reached him on this. The fact that both Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa declared an opinion on the subject shows that this practice started to appear in the first half of the second ḥijrī century as a practice or as a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid). However, both imāms have stated that such a specific worship would be makrūh. In spite of these very sharp expressions, the schools of law, which were founded by the followers of these two eponymous scholars, abandoned their views and widely accepted Shawwāl fasting as mustaḥāb. This article examines why this sharp change occurred in a worship in the schools of law and in which way it took place.Accordingly, the fundamental motive in this change is a paradigmatic transformation in understanding and identifying the sunna as a source of normativity. Although an agreement was formed on the validity of solitary reports as a source of knowledge in the second ḥijrī century, it was not yet accepted that these narrations are identical to sunna as a source of normativity. For that reason, both Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik did not hesitate to reject any solitary report that contradicted a stronger evidence. However, as a result of the extraordinary efforts of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the epistemic value of solitary reports has reached to an authority equating them to the sunna with a very rapid acceleration as of the end of the second century and throughout the third century. This situation led later scholars of schools to abandon the views of the eponymous scholars of these schools on certain topics in favor of certain solitary reports. This was also the process for the change in Shawwāl fasting.This thesis will be put under two headings, a section that tries to determine the periods and processes for the Sunnī schools of law in considering this fasting as mustaḥāb; and another section that provides an evaluation of transmitted reports in relation to the Shawwāl fasting. Accordingly, in the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, due to the effect of the reports, the ruling of Shawwāl fasting has been transformed from makrūh into the mustaḥāb as a result of the interpretational activities that started in the fourth ḥijrī century. Shawwāl fasting was accepted as mustaḥāb in the Shāfiʿī school, although there was no transmitted opinion on the subject from the founding imāms, in the fifth ḥijrī century; and in the Ḥanbalī school directly by the founding imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, whose main aim was to follow a concept of religion that puts the transmitted reports at the center. When the reports on the subject are examined, it demonstrates that the mustaḥāb ruling is mainly rooted in a report by Saʿd b. Saʿīd transmitted in the famous hadīth compilations including Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ.Yet, this report was criticized in its both chain and text. Combining the facts that the same report with the same chain was also transmitted as the words of the companion in some sources and the verse that declares good deed will be rewarded ten times higher than what it deserves will make the following explanation a valid one: As Mālik put it such a fasting practice was commonly unknown to the Muslim society in the first two centuries after the ḥijra. Sometime after the death of the Prophet, an inference was made probably by a companion(s) as that it would be a good deed if someone who fasted an entire month already and got used to the fasting to fast six more days in order to get a reward of fasting for the entire year according to the verse that rewards good deeds with ten times higher. Since it is a recommended practice in essence, i.e. fasting for the sake of Allah, this inference transformed into a report and easily passed through the filters of hadīth scholars who are linked to a sort of piety promoting worships among people. After the solitary reports gained an authority to the extent that they can rarely be challenged, the followers of later schools of law preferred to get in a process of re-interpreting the opinions of their imāms in order either to reconcile them with the content of report, or at least to show why these imāms actually spoke against this fasting. Eventually, the later scholars of madhhab decided for the standard opinion of the madhhab depending on the reports in favor of the Shawwāl fasting rather than following their eponymous imāms. (shrink)

This article deals with the elevation of the administrative status of Jerusalem from vilāya to niyāba and the impact of this transformation on the judicial organization and the appointments in the city. During the early Mamluk period, Jerusalem remained as wilāya, a less significant administrative unit, subordinate to the nā’ib of Damascus. However, in the later eighth/fourteenth century, the city was turned into a separate niyāba, an administrative unit governed by the viceroy (nā’ib al-saltana) of the sultan, and attached directly (...) to Cairo, the political centre of the Mamluks. While the existing scholarship tends to see this change as a manoeuvre against the Crusader threat, this article argues that the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem was associated with the bureaucratic centralisation of the Mamluk Sultanate and the religious importance of the city. Unlike the Ayyubid politics of fragmented sovereignty between the dynasty members, the Mamluks appointed viceroys on behalf of the sultan to the significant cities of Syria. Therefore, the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem can be seen as a continuation of this attempt toward the centralisation of the Syro-Egyptian lands. On the other hand, with this change, the Mamluk sultan had the opportunity to express his patronage over Jerusalem in a more powerful way and to control the administrative, judicial, and scholarly realms in the city directly. What is more important in terms of the judicial practices is that Jerusalem was introduced to four chief judgeships (Shāfi‘ī, Hanafī, Mālikī, and Hanbalī) within the thirty-year period after the founda-tion of niyāba. All these changes meant that the city became bureaucratically more integrated with Cairo so that the Cairene elite were increasingly in-volved in local appointments of scholars. Moreover, it became increasingly crucial for Jerusalemite scholars to have connections with Cairene bureaucrats in order to secure scholarly positions in Jerusalem. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

: While Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī is known to posterity primarily as a historian and commentator on the Qurʾan, his most creative work may have been in the law, and Ibn al-Nadim places his main entry on al-Ṭabarī in Book VI of the Fihrist, on law. Unfortunately, most of his legal works have been lost. Building on and revising George Makdisi’s analysis of the relationship between the ṭabaqāt genre and the theoretical justification of the legal madhhabs, this study (...) argues that one of these lost books, Marātib al-ʿulamāʾ “Degrees of the Scholars,” was devoted to the generations of jurists and intended to provide a theoretical basis for the authority of the Jarīrī madhhab, one among a number of pieces of evidence that suggest al-Ṭabarī was consciously designing and creating his own legal madhhab, in contrast to earlier jurists, such as Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī, whose legal madhhabs were created by subsequent generations of students. (shrink)

Ancient Arabic literature dealt with linguistic sciences such as sarf, nahiw, belagha and Islamic sciences such as fıqh, hadith and tafsîr. This is known to the elite and the common people. But what is hidden and forgotten is that Arabic literature also includes the foundations and rules of modern sciences such as sociology and economics. Among the ancient Arabic literature is the writing of Maqamat, which holds an important position among the masterpieces of Arabic literature. For this reason, it is (...) important to study the writing of Maqamat from the perspective of the various disciplines of Islamic sciences and modern sciences. This study deals with fıqh and economic issues within the framework of Al-Hariri’s famous book, Maqamat. The aim of the study is to reveal the fıqh and economic aspects of Makamat writing through Hariri's Makamat as an exemplary study. The approach followed by the study is to select three maqama from Al-Hariri’s book, which contained fifty complete maqama, and to search for what is in them of fıqh and economics. Accordingly, the study includes three main headings, and in these three headings, fıqh, farâid (inheritance law) and economic issues are discussed, respectively. Although the science of farâid (inheritance law) is a branch of fıqh, it is singled out for mention independently because it has its own rulings. The study examined the jurisprudential aspect of the Maqamat in the thirty-second maqama called “the Tayyibi Maqamat,” the aspect related to the science of farâid in the fifteenth maqama called “the Faradiya Maqamat,” and the economic aspect in the forty-ninth maqama called “the Sassanid Maqamat.” The method followed by Hariri in her book is to present the issues in the form of stories through two fictional characters, Haris bin Hammam and Abu Zayd, whom she chose as mirrors reflecting the two opposing identities of the society. Abu Zaid appears in different forms and in various clothes. He sometimes appears as a beggar who deceives and a thief who betrays, and at other times as a preacher who advises and a scholar who guides. Rather, he is an imaginary character that Hariri put in place. Wherever he went, he met Al-Harith bin Hammam and the strange and adventurous incident begins, or he appears as a person from whom Al-Harith narrated the incident and the story. Harith is the person who always warns his against bad things, orders his to do good, and sometimes condemns his if he does evil. The results obtained in the study are, first of all, the determination that the Makâmât writing deals with the subjects of the science of fiqh as in the thirty-second makama and the subjects of the science of farâid (inheritance law) as in the fifteenth makama and the subjects of economics as in the forty-ninth makama. It is seen that some of the principles put forward by Adam Smith years later were also present in the Maqamat literature centuries ago. The fact that fiqh views are according to the Shafi'i sect shows that the Shafi'i sect was widespread in the region at that time. Additionally, as can be understood from the forty-ninth makama, there is also a profession of begging in the society where Hariri lives. The study also reveals the society's interest in, submission to, and acceptance of moral principles at that time, and shows that the Arabic language reached its peak during this period. (shrink)

Prophethood (nubuwwah) is a divine institution that teaches the healthy progression of relations between Allah and humans, as well as between humans and the universe. However, from another perspective, it is also considered a human institution. Some opponents of religion, lacking strong evidence to challenge the existence of Allah, direct their objections towards prophethood, which is seen as a manifestation of Allah’s attribute of speech (kalām). To counter the rejection of prophethood, scholars of theology (kalām), hadith, and Prophetic biography (sīrah) (...) have compiled a body of literature known as Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah (Proofs of Prophethood). Their aim has been to collect proofs supporting prophethood as a response to these refutations and to dispel doubts regarding it. All extraordinary events occurring from before the birth until the death of Prophet Muhammad are considered evidence.During the fifth century, a notable figure in this tradition was the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Māwardī, who defended prophethood in his book Aʿlām al-nubuwwah (The Signs of Prophethood). Aʿlām al-nubuwwah has inspired subsequent works in this field due to its clarity and robust proofs. It became known by both names, Aʿlām al-nubuwwah and Dalāʾil al-nubuwwah, as it encompassed methods of narration and debate. Within his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barāhimah, Dahriyyah, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. According to him, Barāhimah, of Indian origin is a sect that denies prophethood despite accepting the unity of Allah. Dahriyyah is a denialist sect attributing eternity to the universe and creativity to nature. Al-Māwardī considers these philosophers as infidels due to their comments on prophethood rather than outright denial. The basis of these movements' idea of denying prophethood lies in their efforts to portray reason (ʿaql) as an alternative to revelation (waḥy). Jews and Christians, on the other hand, are portrayed as groups that accept the concept of prophethood, however they reject Muḥammad’s. prophecy. Their objection stems from the fear of their religions being superseded. Al-Māwardī counters those rejecting prophethood by addressing the public interest (maṣlaḥah) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He illustrates that prophet charged with the duty of prophethood proves it through spectacular events orchestrated by Allah but carried out through his own hand. The prophet serves the public interest by conveying matters beyond human intellect and presenting them in a comprehensible manner, thereby ensuring the worldly and eternal felicity of humanity. Furthermore, he provides evidence for the Prophet Muḥammad’s prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. The biography of Prophet Muhammad’s begins before his birth, and the method of proof is used to demonstrate his prophethood. In essence, al-Māwardī’s method of proving prophethood in Aʿlām al-nubuwwah can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology and hadith. One prominent figure in this tradition during the fifth century was the Shafi'i scholar al-Māwardī who defended prophethood through his book " ʿA'lām al-Nubuwwa" (The Signs of Prophethood). In his work, al-Māwardī mentions figures like Barahima, Dahriyya, and certain philosophers as representatives of the idea rejecting prophethood. While the Jews and Christians accept the concept of prophethood, they reject the prophecy of Muhammad (P.B.U.H). These groups attempt to present logic as an alternative to divine revelation (Wahy), as their objection stems from their concern that their religions may be abrogated. Al-Māwardī responds to those who reject the institution of prophethood by addressing the public interest (maslaha) of humans, the necessity of prophets, and the role of miracles. He also provides evidence for Muhammad's (P.B.U.H) prophethood through his moral character, prophetic biography, and accounts of miracles. In short, al-Māwardī's method of proving prophethood in "A'lām al-Nubuwwa " can be seen as a synthesis of the approaches used by scholars of theology (Kalam) and hadith. (shrink)